1. The disaster in Nepal and Tibet

2. Xi at the SCO

3. State Council Executive meeting

4. Measures to expand and upgrade consumer goods consumption

5. Revised National Defense Mobilization Law

6. Signals for PRC-US AI dialogue

7. Cracking down excessive competition in the domestic auto market

8. New era for real estate

Read more

This month’s digest pulls in different directions—insofar as we can follow a single thread, it is that of traditional systems being swept away and of “changes unseen in a century” coming to pass: in discussions of nuclear proliferation, the Cold War nuclear order has “irreversibly come to an end”; in the Middle East, the US security architecture is crumbling; in the maritime domain, volatility threatens sea lanes; and overseas, Chinese firms’ modus operandi is shifting.

While most scholars identify the increasing security risks attendant on such changes, what comes next and what China should do about it are open questions. More hawkish scholars advocate stronger unilateral action in the international system, while others caution against such measures.

Addressing maritime chokepoints, Di Dongsheng argues that China must embark on a 30-year effort to secure control of the seas, whereas Zhao Long makes the opposite case, arguing that the solution lies in the international community’s joint efforts to maintain “open, stable, and predictable operating rules”. Hu Bo comes down on Zhao Long’s side, arguing that military power cannot provide absolute security, while also claiming that maritime chokepoints remain secure despite volatility and that Hormuz is an exceptional case.

On Taiwan, two analysts reflect positively on the US’ new posture following the May summit. Zhou Zhihuai argues that the “Taiwan issue has begun to become an option for cooperation” between the US and China, while Wang Weixing claims that Taiwan’s path of “resisting reunification by force” has been “completely closed off” after the US revealed its bottom line.

However, on the broader US–China relationship, Wang Fan counsels caution, writing that while US strategic contraction is an inevitable trajectory, China should maintain strategic composure and not act too hastily.

In the Middle East section, Zhou Li, a former vice-minister, looks favourably on the “Mecca Agreement” signed on 7 August. Not only does it have points of convergence with China’s Global Security Initiative, but it is “an inevitable product of deepening global multipolarity” that exposes the “inherent fragility and hypocrisy of the US-led unipolar security architecture”.

Sun Degang reads weakening US security commitments as forcing the Gulf States to pursue policies that reflect a newfound pragmatism and emphasis on diversification. Meanwhile, Niu Xinchun explores the downward trajectory of US–Israel relations and Guo Xiaobing explains how the Iran war has fundamentally changed the underlying logic of aerial warfare.

While next month’s commentary on Europe is likely to heat up ahead of ministerial talks in October, August’s coverage was sparse but contained a couple of highlights: Duan Demin and Wang Hongyi provide a fascinating, business-focused map of Europe’s shifting geoeconomic landscape, while Wang Yuyan and Wang Shuo pin Europe’s “economic protectionism” on France.

Elsewhere, Zheng Jiyong provides an unusually frank account of Beijing’s shifting priorities vis-à-vis North Korea, admitting China’s discomfort with growing Russia–DPRK ties and writing that short-term denuclearisation is no longer a realistic goal. On Russia itself, Zhou Li offers a rare account of the country’s economic woes, though he is quick to highlight Putin’s responsiveness to criticism.

This month’s “Going Out” section focuses on the Global South—Qin Hui claims that China’s “low human-rights advantage” is being eroded and that rather than dispatching Chinese labour for overseas infrastructure, Chinese firms are now hiring local labour. Ju Yue and Chen Qi then explore how another established economic model—in which resource-producing countries supply minerals and China processes them—is shifting due to localisation and “resource nationalism”.

On AI, commentators focus on wider AI ecosystems: Huang Yutao looks at China’s “token exports” model; Hou Hong examines the trade-offs of continuing the open-source strategy for development; and Liu Shaoshan makes the case that as agentic AI develops, a cheap supply of energy will become a major source of China’s comparative advantage.

Finally, the award of Fields Medals—mathematics’ highest honour—to Chinese nationals in July continues to prompt reflection. Ding Xueliang uses the occasion to question China’s focus on applied disciplines over theoretical research, while Li Houchen examines the debate over whether the winning mathematician, Wang Hong, should return to China.

Zhu Rongji’s death also generated a number of pieces, the most interesting of which (besides the Zhao Jian piece we translated in full) was Yang Zaiping’s article, which warns that China’s development is fettered by “ultra-leftist” ideological currents that threaten to derail continued market reform.

More than usual, August’s commentary is a mixed bag of themes, without a dominant mood or prescription—the constant is change, coupled with a strong sense that geopolitical turbulence is an operating condition rather than a problem that can be solved.

— Jacob Mardell

1. US–China & Global Order:

   1. Jin Canrong on China needing to expand its nuclear arsenal to strengthen deterrence.

   2. Jiang Tianjiao on the Cold War nuclear order having “irreversibly come to an end”, bringing new risks.

   3. Wang Fan on US strategic contraction being inevitable, but China needing to resist advancing rashly.

2. Taiwan:

   1. Zhou Zhihuai on “jointly managing ‘Taiwan independence’” becoming an area of US–China cooperation.

   2. Wang Weixing on historic restructuring in the Taiwan Strait and “resisting reunification by force” being completely closed off.

3. Maritime Security:

   1. Di Dongsheng on China needing a 30-year effort to “regain” control of the oceans.

   2. Zhao Long on growing threats to maritime chokepoints requiring international cooperation.

   3. Hu Bo on broad maritime security, Hormuz being an exceptional case and military power being unable to provide absolute security.

4. Middle East:

   1. Zhou Li on the “Mecca Agreement” aligning with the Global Security Initiative and reflecting deepening multipolarity.

   2. Sun Degang on weakening US security commitments pushing Gulf states towards different forms of diversification.

   3. Niu Xinchun on US–Israel relations entering long-term structural decline as both ideological affinity and strategic alignment erode.

   4. Guo Xiaobing on Iranian asymmetric operations fundamentally disrupting the logic of aerial warfare.

5. Europe:

   1. Duan Demin & Wang Hongyi on Europe’s geoeconomic map being redrawn, with Southern Europe shifting from periphery to destination.

   2. Wang Yuyan & Wang Shuo on France as the “standard-bearer” of European economic protectionism.

6. Russia & North Korea:

   1. Zheng Jiyong on short-term North Korean denuclearisation no longer being realistic and the risks of deeper Russia–DPRK ties.

   2. Zhou Li on Russia’s resilience under sanctions masking long-term erosion of economic competitiveness.

7. Economy:

   1. Dong Yu on the Chinese government’s plan for the economy.

   2. Yao Yang on a naïve belief that high tech can replace the property sector.

   3. Sun Liping on the difficult challenge of establishing a social security system for the growing ranks of flexible workers.

8. Going out:

   1. Qin Hui on rising wages and local resentment eroding China’s “low human-rights advantage” and the growing use of local labour in overseas infrastructure.

   2. Ju Yue & Chen Qi on resource nationalism shifting critical-mineral value chains towards local processing.

9. AI & Tech:

   1. Huang Yutao on China competing with the US through “token exports”, with overseas compute and data trust remaining constraints.

   2. Hou Hong on growing US support for open-source AI competition.

   3. Liu Shaoshan on cheap energy becoming a major Chinese comparative advantage as agentic AI develops.

10. Society:

    1. Ding Xueliang on institutional conditions constraining breakthroughs in mathematics and basic science.

    2. Li Houchen on the Wang Hong debate revealing an assumption that individual career choices are subject to collective judgement.

    3. Yu Huiwen on Hohhot using continuous performance evaluation to enable cadre demotion.

    4. Yang Zaiping on “ultra-leftist” thinking as the principal fetter on economic development, threatening continued market reform.

    5. Liu Dong & Zhang Jun’an on young people’s “debt spiral” reflecting structural risks, requiring stronger welfare provision and tighter credit controls.

1. US-China & Global Order

Jin Canrong (金灿荣): China should rapidly expand its nuclear arsenal, developing tactical nuclear weapons and increasing its reserves as much as possible in order to strengthen deterrence. Recent NBC reporting that the US Department of Defense is studying a new policy of using tactical nuclear weapons in the case of a direct conflict with China or Russia is plausible and warrants China moving beyond its previous thinking of “as long as we have enough, that will do” regarding its nuclear arsenal. — Director, Center for China’s Foreign Strategy, Renmin University of China (金金乐道编辑部, 14 August).

Jiang Tianjiao (江天骄): The Cold War-era nuclear order has irreversibly come to an end, but a new order has not yet coalesced. Doubts about extended nuclear deterrence have led Japan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia to debate acquiring nuclear weapons, while some Global South states may pursue proliferation to enhance security and international standing. Russia and the US are developing new nuclear weapons and doctrines for their “limited use” in conventional conflicts. China fears its smaller arsenal could be vulnerable to a pre-emptive US strike, while Washington has refused to assure Beijing that it would not target China’s retaliatory capabilities. — Associate Professor, Development Institute of Fudan University. (复旦发展研究院, 9 August).

Wang Fan (王帆): US strategic contraction did not begin with Trump and is not determined by the wishes of a particular president—when the cost of maintaining hegemony exceeds the benefits, contraction becomes inevitable. However, China should exercise restraint, rather than seizing the opportunity to “advance rashly”. As major-power competition shifts towards artificial intelligence, the world may leave the area of nuclear deterrent-based stalemate and wars may once again produce clear winners, increasing systemic risk in the world order. As these changes progress, a world dominated and controlled by the West will fade out of existence—and in its place will be a more reasonable situation of multipolar joint governance. — Former President and Professor, China Foreign Affairs University (Guancha.cn, 7 August).

2. Taiwan

Zhou Zhihuai (周志懷): Following the China–US leaders’ meeting in May 2026, the Taiwan issue has begun to become an option for cooperation between the two sides, but cooperation should involve “jointly managing ‘Taiwan independence’”, rather than “jointly managing the Taiwan Strait”. The two sides have not yet formed an institutional consensus embodied in a joint statement or joint communiqué, and the US should reduce uncertainty by moving from personal statements by the president towards formal official statements. Overall, the essence of China–US relations remains competition, and the relationship is still at the stage of strategic stalemate rather than strategic counter-offensive. — Research Fellow and former Director, Institute of Taiwan Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CRNTT, 12 August).

Wang Weixing (王卫星): The security configuration in the Taiwan Strait has undergone a historic restructuring and the path of “resisting reunification by force” has been completely closed off. The overall chessboard of China–US competition has undergone a systemic reset, while Trump has clearly revealed America’s “strategic bottom line” of being unwilling to become involved in a conflict in the Taiwan Strait and unwilling to pay the price for “Taiwan independence”. The balance of power across the Taiwan Strait has undergone a fundamental reversal, with mainland China’s ability to strike at “Taiwan independence” separatism and resist external interference continuously strengthened. — Vice-President, National Society of Taiwan Studies; former Deputy Political Commissar, PLA Academy of Military Science (京彩台湾, 12 August).

3. Maritime Security

Di Dongsheng (翟东升): The US has not fully accepted the “relationship of constructive strategic stability” and may be preparing leverage against China’s weak points, the major one being its maritime routes. Geopolitical changes around the Panama Canal, Greenland and Iran are warning signals that the openness of the oceans is moving towards an end. Counting the US alliance network and overseas bases, China remains far from surpassing US maritime power and may need a 30-year effort to secure control of the seas. Besides channelling funds into the navy, China must foster a new national consensus: only by “regaining” control of the oceans can the Chinese nation have a future. — Associate Dean, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (翟东升的全球政治经济研究, 25 August).

Zhao Long (赵隆): Under the dual impact of the Ukraine crisis and the Middle East crisis, the vulnerability of critical maritime routes has become even more pronounced. The rapid proliferation of long-range precision-strike weapons and low-cost unmanned platforms has increased asymmetric combat capabilities, while critical routes are increasingly becoming an important lever through which certain countries seek strategic competitive advantages and dominance over industrial and supply chains. The international community should uphold freedom of navigation, common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, and improve the provision of public goods for critical maritime routes. — Director and Research Fellow, Institute for International Strategy and Security, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (环球时报, 24 August).

Hu Bo (胡波): Developments in the Strait of Hormuz have caused enormous volatility, but global maritime chokepoints remain stable and secure overall. The Strait of Hormuz is exceptional—other routes have alternatives and other countries would find it difficult to imitate Iran’s approach of blockading the strait. Military strength has its limits—safeguarding the security of maritime passages must still rely primarily on diplomatic, economic, financial and legal means. As the world’s largest goods-trading nation, China cannot pursue absolute security in the way the United States does. China should maintain strategic composure and not become excessively anxious merely because certain countries occasionally “talk tough”. — Director, South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (溟坤数科, 9 August).

4. Middle East

Zhou Li (周力): The principles embodied in the “Mecca Agreement”—“collective self-strengthening, openness and inclusiveness, and defensive self-protection”—have points of convergence with the core spirit of China’s Global Security Initiative. The agreement’s political significance exceeds its military significance, communicating to the outside world a strategic posture of “collective self-strengthening and not relying solely on the United States”. It is an inevitable product of deepening global multipolarity, catalysed by the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, which has further exposed the inherent fragility and hypocrisy of the US-led unipolar security architecture. — Former Vice-Minister, International Department of the CPC Central Committee (爱思想, 19 August).

Sun Degang (孙德刚): The Gulf Arab states’ philosophy of “security depends on the United States, development depends on Asia” is coming under strain as conflict in the Middle East intensifies, forcing them to pursue divergent policies that nonetheless reflect diversification amid declining US hegemony and weakening security commitments. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are pursuing strategic autonomy by expanding cooperation with additional partners. Oman and Qatar are pursuing strategic balancing, maintaining close relations with the US while engaging Iran. The UAE and Bahrain, meanwhile, remain dependent on US support. — Director, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Fudan University (光明日报, 2 August).

Niu Xinchun (牛新春): The structural trajectory of US–Israel relations is one of gradual long-term weakening due to the erosion of two traditional pillars: ideological affinity and strategic alignment. Ideologically, Americans, particularly Democrats, increasingly see Israel’s “democratic” character as fading and moving away from American values, while polling shows growing public hostility towards Israel. Strategically, US and Israeli interests are increasingly misaligned: Washington is pursuing strategic retrenchment in the Middle East, while Israel seeks to reshape the regional balance of power through military force against its regional adversaries. — Executive Dean, China–Arab States Research Institute, Ningxia University (环球时报, 11 August).

Guo Xiaobing (郭晓兵): Iran’s asymmetric operations have broken through the US–Israeli air and missile defence system, disrupting the underlying logic of aerial warfare. Faced with the impact of Iran’s swarm tactics, the West is accelerating adjustments to air and missile defence systems. Emphasis will be placed on developing short-range laser interception capabilities, with reliance on high-end missiles abandoned in favour of a graduated, layered defence system. Artificial intelligence will likely be used to remedy weaknesses in low-altitude detection, attack and defence will be integrated in order to strike threats at their source, and manufacturing capacity across the entire industrial chain will be strengthened. — Director, Arms Control Research Centre, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (中国网, 11 August).

5. Europe

Duan Demin (段德敏) & Wang Hongyi (王弘毅): Europe’s geoeconomic map is being redrawn and Southern Europe is shifting from the market periphery towards becoming a destination for investment into electrification-related industries. Following the EU’s imposition of anti-subsidy duties on Chinese EVs, Chinese firms must resolve industrial frictions by implementing a localisation model of “manufactured in Europe, designed for Europe, maintained by European workers”. Political change in Central and Eastern Europe provides an opportunity to abandon the rigid model of tying relations to “top-leader projects”. In security-conscious Northern Europe, Chinese firms should use minority equity stakes, joint R&D, replaceable supply-chain models and avoid controlling acquisitions. — Director of Centre for European Studies, Peking University; Associate Professor, Centre for Central and Eastern European Studies, Beijing Foreign Studies University (北京对话, 9 August).

Wang Yuyan (王语嫣) & Wang Shuo (王朔): France has become the “standard-bearer” of European economic protectionism, turning French concerns into common European anxieties and French initiatives into EU operating rules. Europe is facing competition from Chinese manufacturing to the East and US subsidy policies to the West. Whereas the “China shock” of the late twentieth century was concentrated in labour intensive industries, the new shock has penetrated into traditional areas of European strength. France has shaped a roadmap for the EU’s direction of travel, “herding” member states towards trade defence, industrial support and greater “economic sovereignty”. — Research Assistant and Professor, School of International Relations, Beijing Foreign Studies University (世界知识, 25 August).

6. Russia & East Asia

Zheng Jiyong (郑继永): Beijing is adjusting its policy priorities towards North Korea—it recognises that immediate denuclearisation of the peninsula is not realistic, while deepening Moscow–Pyongyang relations give North Korea greater strategic autonomy and make its behaviour more difficult to predict. The greatest risk from deepening Russia–North Korea cooperation is that it provides the US, Japan and South Korea with a powerful pretext for strengthening security cooperation. China needs an institution-driven policy towards North Korea, emphasising formal cooperation mechanisms and institutionalised communication channels. Beijing also hopes to involve North Korea in more multilateral cooperation platforms. — Professor and Dean, Institute of Country and Area Studies, Tianjin Foreign Studies University (Foreign Affairs, 10 August).

Zhou Li (周力): Russia has demonstrated surprising resilience under Western sanctions, but this has been more a matter of passive adaptation than active breakthrough—the Russian economy faces erosion of its long-term competitiveness as military mobilisation, capital outflows and tight monetary policy squeeze civilian investment. External pressure is “resonating” dangerously with internal structural weaknesses. Former VEB chief economist Andrei Klepach argues that Russia finances the world while the world finances Ukraine, and warns that a social crisis is “almost certain”. Klepach is a genuine patriot, while Putin’s response is evidence that he is listening to expert opinion. — Former Vice-Minister, International Department of the CPC Central Committee (爱思想, 24 August).

7. Economy

Dong Yu (董煜)：Four “Zhong Caiwen” articles published in quick succession this August address misunderstandings regarding the leadership’s responses to China’s economic challenges. The government is working both to “accelerate the transition between old and new growth drivers”, but this does not involve the abandonment of traditional industries, whose upgrading remains an important part of economic planning. Meanwhile, the absence of large increases in stimulus is due to planners aiming for targeted structural measures to avoid creating economic dependence on policy support. The economic priorities are to continue focus on the provision of high-quality services, leverage private investment by providing private companies with a list of “national projects” eligible for support, and aim to “create a fair and orderly environment for market competition”, curbing local protectionism and duplicated construction. — Executive vice-president, China Institute for Development Planning Tsinghua University; Former deputy director, Second Economic Bureau of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission (三里河，25 August)

Yao Yang (姚洋)：The prevailing explanation that China is passing through a “gear shift” period while transitioning from property to an economy driven by technology obscures the pressing need to focus on boosting weak demand. Property and construction are huge industries, and there is space for it to expand as rural populations continue to move to cities, or migrate from third- and fourth- tier cities to first- and second- tier cities. Furthermore, while a strong property sector does not suppress the development of high tech, excessive investment in high tech sectors can crowd out consumption as it reduces local governments’ ability to subsidise household consumption. The idea that local governments may eventually be able to replace income previously generated by property through returns on equity investments in technology sectors is “extremely naïve”. — Dean and Professor, Dishui Lake Advanced Finance Institute, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (姚洋说, 21 August)

Sun Liping (孙立平)：The controversy surrounding recent statements by a Peking University professor on social security for gig workers draws attention to a salient fact: China’s flexibly employed population is growing rapidly, and the traditional “five social insurances and one housing fund”, financed jointly by employers and employees, is not adapted to this kind of work. The professor suggested that gig workers with irregular schedules enjoy a greater degree of “freedom” and that it therefore does not make sense to include them in the same social-security system as those in formal employment—a claim that is difficult to accept. However, her core proposal of introducing an “unbundled” and flexible system of social-security protection for mobile workers would function well as a transitional arrangement towards fuller protection in the future. — Retired Professor of Sociology, Tsinghua University (老孙荐读, 26 August)

8. Going Out

Qin Hui (秦晖): The traditional Chinese overseas infrastructure model is precisely the opposite of the colonial model—rather than using local workers for hard labour, Chinese firms dispatched their own migrant labour abroad. However, this is now changing as rising wages and local resentment push Chinese firms towards local hiring. The Tindouf–Béchar railway illustrates this “integration with international standards”, with skilled workers and managers coming from China and locals performing the heavy labour. As such, China’s “low human-rights advantage” is being eroded, though the old model has not disappeared, as demonstrated by the BYD “slave labour” case in Brazil. — Professor Emeritus of History, Tsinghua University (失語者, 7 August).

Ju Yue (琚悦) & Chen Qi (陈琪): Global critical-mineral value chains are shifting from a model in which “resource-producing countries supply minerals and China processes them” towards one in which “resource-producing countries retain the value chain”, diminishing China’s control over processing capacity. Across resource-rich African countries, export controls, industrial-chain localisation and changes to ownership and operating rights are turning temporary interventions into structural norms. China must move beyond the role of “resource acquirer” towards “two-way empowerment”, using joint ventures, technology sharing and local processing to align investment with African development goals. — Lecturer and Researcher, respectively, Baize Institute for Strategic Studies, Southwest University of Political Science and Law (白昃研究, 23 August).

9. AI & Tech

Huang Yutao (黄宇韬): The key arena of competition between Chinese and US AI is shifting to one of ecosystems, rather than purely the performance of the models. The Trump administration has rescinded many of the Biden restrictions on global exports, emphasising export of the “full stack”. As China cannot replicate this model, it is focusing on “token exports”, a non-monopolistic business model that is attractive to price-sensitive users. However, Chinese token exports generally run on overseas data centres—a far cry from the ideal of using local electricity and national compute. The main challenges for this model are balancing overseas and domestic demands for inference and establishing trust in Chinese companies’ handling of overseas data. — Assistant Research Fellow, Global Governance Division, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (FT Chinese, 24 August).

Hou Hong (侯宏): The emergence of strong voices in the US tech industry in support of competing on the open-source front signifies a growing US industrial consensus on the importance of ecosystem diffusion to national AI competitiveness. However, while Chinese companies’ open-source approach may serve the national interest, the reality is that the difficulty of earning profits on open-source technology means that the industry’s future business model is uncertain. The open-source model may yet find a way to “save itself”: Kimi recently modified its K3 open-source terms to require overseas cloud platforms deploying its model to sign a separate agreement, departing from the classic definition of open-source and offering a potential profit-making path forward. — Assistant Professor of Management, National School of Development, Peking University (侯宏文存, 16 August).

Liu Shaoshan (刘少山): Energy is not currently the main price constraint of artificial intelligence model-inference costs, but as agentic AI develops, a cheap supply of energy will become a major source of China’s comparative advantage in AI. At present, cheap electricity can partially relieve the pressure that poor chip efficiency might place on operating costs. However, it is not enough to simply continue providing data centres with cheap electricity. To avoid idle capacity, policy needs to focus more on improving actual utilisation rates through better coordination between computing and grid supply, as well as developing the capacity to provide compute services to overseas customers, at lower costs than the US. — Director, Embodied Intelligence Centre, Shenzhen Institute of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics for Society (环球时报，26 August).

10. State & Society

Ding Xueliang (丁学良): This year’s Fields Medals have prompted reflection among mainland scholars: whereas the winners had access to five-to-ten-year research funding, Chinese mathematics and basic-science researchers complain that annual reporting requirements push them towards projects seeking “quick success and immediate benefit”. Government funding should not favour applied disciplines while cutting support for abstract theoretical research. Some discussion encouraging students to study abroad has already been abridged, yet the winners’ decision to pursue postgraduate study in the West was crucial. Internationalised teams are also less prone to rigid hierarchy, arbitrary administrative interference and senior researchers abusing their positions. — Professor Emeritus, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (學人, 2 August).

Li Houchen (李厚辰): The debate over whether Fields Medallist Wang Hong should return to China reveals a deeper consensus that an individual’s career is a national question open to collective judgement. Even official commentary’s “tolerance” over Wang Hong staying away implies that her choice requires permission. This system of absorption is not accomplished through propaganda alone, but is a Chinese-style logic in which investment amounts to a claim over someone’s person. The real question is whether those ordinary researchers who have no Fields Medal also have the right to choose where they live, whom they work with and whom they thank. — Independent scholar and columnist (看理想, 10 August).

Yu Huiwen (于会文): To promote a system in which cadres can “go up and down”, cadres must genuinely be able to “go down”, with the “soft ailments” of mediocrity and laziness treated as grounds for demotion alongside the “hard injuries” of disciplinary or legal violations. Hohhot is responding by turning cadre evaluation from “judging horses” to “racing horses”, using monthly tracking and differentiated performance indicators to identify officials for removal. Since the reshuffling of Hohhot’s Party and government leadership teams in 2021, 11 cadres have been removed from leadership teams for shortcomings including weak public-engagement skills and an inability to handle difficult and complex situations. — Member, Standing Committee of the CPC Inner Mongolia Autonomous Regional Committee; Party Secretary of Hohhot (求是, 1 August).

Yang Zaiping (杨再平): The principal fetter on China’s economy is now the resurgence of “ultra-leftist” ideological currents, which have caused a lack of confidence among private businesses, foreign investors and the market. The old planned-economy system has largely been reformed, but the process is not complete. The basic spirit of reform and opening since Zhu Rongji’s period can be summarised in three words: marketisation, rule of law and internationalisation. This was true then and will remain true for a long time to come—successful reforms must retain continuity rather than constantly “flipping the pancake”. — Founding Secretary-General, Asian Financial Cooperation Association (IMI财经观察, 16 August).

Liu Dong (刘东) & Zhang Jun’an (张君安): The “debt spiral” among young people is a defensive strategy for survival in an uncertain environment and a consequence of structural risks being transferred downwards onto vulnerable groups. Online-lending platforms and illegal credit providers target young people who urgently need funds or lack self-control. The government should increase subsidised rental housing, improve subsidies for training and education, as well as strengthen the social-security system’s buffering role. Regulators should also impose strict combined credit ceilings on young people who don’t have stable repayment capacity and prevent borrowing from multiple lenders. — Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Social Work and Lecturer in Social Work, Shanghai Business School (文化纵横, 26 August).

Why China’s Football Problem Is an Economic Problem | Li Xunlei| (28 August)

Li Xunlei, chief economist at the securities firm Zhongtai International, is among the most engaging proponents of economic rebalancing in China. In the this article, he cites China’s World Cup qualification woes as among the consequences of a growth model that prioritises fixed-asset investment. With returns on investment falling and growth in local government debt outpacing GDP growth, Li presses the case for an urgent shift towards growth anchored in household consumption. He argues that failure to carry out such a shift represents an obvious, but neglected, risk factor in China’s economy—what one might also call a “grey rhino”. Read here

Xu Jilin on the Politics of Resentment among China’s Youth (26 August)

In this piece, introduced by Timothy Cheek, Xu Jilin dissects the phenomena of “lying flat”, “involution”, and the troubling attitudes of China’s youthful “post-90s” generation. That attitude, expressed in the low motivation of lying flat and distrust of the meritocracy described as involution—in which more work does not result in advancement—is described by Xu as yuanhen, “resentment” in simple terms. Xu’s essay is both a recognition of the social experience of this generation (and a useful introduction to readers of Sinification) and also a warning to those with the power to give this youth some hope and opportunity. As he concludes, “These are grave questions that China must now confront in earnest.” Read here

Sun Liping and Li Daokui Debate China’s Disconnected Growth (20 August)

Whether expressed as “strong supply, weak demand”, overcapacity or some form of a “K-shape”, a consensus has emerged that insufficient demand is the central weakness of the Chinese economy. The persistent debate centres on how best to fill that demand gap. Here, Li Daokui argues that while new industries have failed to expand sufficiently to replace the old ones, the deflationary “black hole” of local government finances has exerted a cooling effect on the entire economy. In the same edition, Sun Liping provides a riposte to Li Daokui’s diagnosis. Read here

Understanding Europe’s “China Shock” Anxiety | Huang Yiping (19 August)

The full-scale trade war that Huang Yiping warns of here has not yet come to pass, but the reprieve may be temporary. Huang is very much an establishment voice and he doesn’t stray far from the mainstream framing, but he takes European anxiety far more seriously than most and makes an important concession along the way. This should offer some encouragement to EU policymakers, who for years have felt that their concerns have fallen on deaf ears. However, those same policymakers may be less heartened by Huang’s reading of European fragmentation and his later recommendation that China “bypass highly politicised EU-wide negotiating frameworks”. Read here

Strong Supply, Weak Demand, Little Urgency? | Economic Digest: July 2026 (14 August)

“K shaped” is July’s defining buzzword, with a flurry of articles exploring China’s simultaneous boom and bust in different parts of the economy through this alphabetic metaphor. Taken together, this edition contains a remarkable range of competing prescriptions, but many do converge around a sense that insufficient demand and economic imbalance require a more urgent policy response. It is ironic then, that the most recent piece in the collection—Zhang Jiqiang’s reading of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee meeting held on 30 July—concludes that, in Zhang’s opinion, “the urgency of stepping up policy support is not high.” Read here

Dreaming of Zhu Rongji’s China | Zhao Jian (14 August)

The death of Zhu Rongji, the former premier of China who spearheaded market-oriented economic reforms during the 1990s, was announced on Wednesday. This obituary is by the economist Zhao Jian, an advocate of renewed marketisation and an admirer of Zhu’s forceful approach to driving through a series of state enterprise restructurings and market-oriented reforms. Judging by the article’s removal from WeChat a day after publication, it may have touched a nerve. Nominally written as an obituary for Zhu, the piece is really his lament for a bygone era when Chinese society felt confident and people said what they really thought. Read here

Advantage Does Not Equal Victory | Digest: July 2026 (4 August)

The celebratory mood that followed the Trump–Xi summit in May seems to have run its course. The prevailing assessment of US–China “strategic stability” remains broadly optimistic, but July’s commentary offers a more sober assessment of China’s strategic environment. July’s strongest writing qualifies confidence in China’s rise—American retrenchment is adaptive rather than terminal, the trade war is survivable but unavoidable and China’s growing power is running ahead of the institutional, diplomatic and intellectual capacities needed to translate it into durable gain. Read here

N.B. Sinification features a broad spectrum of voices, ranging from conservative hawks and state propagandists to more moderate and liberal thinkers. Readers are encouraged to bear this diversity in mind when engaging with the content.

On today's show Andrew and Bill begin with a series of questions on the US and China, including a look at the likely toothless threats implied by Trump's "Economic D-Day" agenda, China's role or lack thereof in a breakdown between the US and Canada, questions about the next four weeks and four months of the relationship, and, unrelated to the US, what to watch for as Xi heads to the SCO Summit where he could potentially meet Vladimir Putin. From there: A cabbage scandal in Hebei province and a longstanding concern among both PRC citizens and the party. At the end: How and why the central government is using tax crackdowns to cover local government shortfalls, four People's Daily articles on the economy, a surprise plenary session of the CCDI, the founder of Evergrande is sentenced to life in prison, and thoughts on what the Party wants from the stock market as Unitree stock loses nearly half its value after an initial IPO pop.

Read more

We did record this week’s episode of Sharp China earlier today, so look for that in your inboxes on Thursday.

In this issue:

1. Disaster at Tibet-Nepal border

2. Xi to attend SCO Summit and visit Egypt

3. PRC-India

4. Li Qiang inspects Heilongjiang and Jilin

5. New PRC AI model

The Feed: Business, Economy and Trade - Politics and Law - Foreign and Defense Affairs - Taiwan - Tech and Media - Society, Arts, Sports, Culture and History - Energy, Environment, Science and Health

Today’s top items:

1. Disaster at Tibet-Nepal border - A massive mudslide swept down the river on t…

Read more

1. PRC response to “Economic D-Day”

2. The Zhong Caiwen articles

3. Cadre accountability for environmental damage

4. Formaldehyde Kimchi?

5. Corruption investigators still looking at PLA Rocket Force

The Feed: Business, Economy and Trade - Politics and Law - Foreign and Defense Affairs - Hong Kong - Tech and Media - Society, Arts, Sports, Culture and History - Energy, Environment, Science and Health

Today’s top items:

1. PRC response to “Economic D-Day” - The Foreign Ministry spokesperson said Tuesday:

China’s cooperation with Iran has always been conducted within the framework of international law and should not be interfered with or undermined. China is closely following relevant developments and will take all necessary measures to resolutely safeguard its rights and interests.

The US government may have set another trap for itself around the Iran quagmire. If they only sanction mostly meaningless PRC entities like they did Monday, Trump and team look like paper tigers, but if they move aga…

Read more

1. Xi meets Jordan’s king

2. Sixth Plenum of the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection

3. “Zhong Caiwen 钟才文” on the economy

4. Fiscal revenue grew in July

5. Formaldehyde-dipped cabbage

6. US-China

The Feed: Business, Economy and Trade - Politics and Law - Foreign and Defense Affairs - Hong Kong - Taiwan - Tech and Media - Society, Arts, Sports, Culture and History - Energy, Environment, Science and Health - Rural and Agricultural Issues

Today’s top items:

1. Xi meets Jordan’s king - Xi Jinping met Monday with King Abdullah II of Jordan. According to the readout, translated here:

The two heads of state exchanged views on the situation in the Middle East. Xi Jinping emphasized that China has consistently advocated a comprehensive ceasefire and an end to hostilities, the resolution of disputes through political and diplomatic means, and respect for the sovereignty and security of regional countries, including Jordan. The Palestinian question is at the core of the Middle East issue, and efforts to resolve it should adhere to four principles. First, a political settlement must be upheld. The correct direction of the two-state solution should be firmly maintained, Israeli–Palestinian peace talks should be restarted, and an independent Palestinian state should be established at an early date. Second, the principle of “Palestinians governing Palestine” must be upheld. Palestine is the homeland of all Palestinians, and governance of the West Bank and the postwar reconstruction of Gaza should proceed in accordance with this principle. Third, humanitarianism must be upheld. The international community, particularly the United Nations Security Council, should earnestly shoulder its responsibilities, protect civilian safety, ensure humanitarian assistance, and halt the humanitarian catastrophe. Fourth, fairness and justice must be upheld. Efforts should take the international rule of law as their foundation, address both symptoms and root causes as their goal, and use practical action as their path, so as to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting settlement of the Palestinian question at an early date.

两国元首就中东地区局势交换了意见。习近平强调，中方一贯主张全面停火止战，通过政治外交途径化解争端，认为包括约旦在内地区国家的主权和安全应当得到尊重。巴勒斯坦问题是中东问题的核心，推动解决这一问题应坚持4点原则：一是必须坚持政治解决，锚定“两国方案”这一正确方向，推动巴以重启和谈，实现巴勒斯坦早日独立建国；二是必须坚持“巴人治巴”，巴勒斯坦是所有巴勒斯坦人的家园，应秉持“巴人治巴”原则推进约旦河西岸治理和加沙战后重建；三是必须坚持人道主义，国际社会特别是联合国安理会应该切实负起责任，保护平民安全，确保人道主义援助，制止人道主义灾难；四是必须坚持公平正义，以国际法治为基础，以标本兼治为目标，以务实行动为路径，推动巴勒斯坦问题早日实现全面、公正、持久解决。

The joint statement, translated here, had this to say about the Iran war:

11. The two sides emphasized the need to maintain the ceasefire between the United States and Iran and, through dialogue and negotiation, reach a comprehensive solution capable of eliminating the root causes of tensions while ensuring respect for the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of regional countries. The Strait of Hormuz is an important corridor for international trade in goods and energy, and normal passage through the strait should be restored.

十一、双方强调，应该维持美国与伊朗之间的停火，通过对话谈判达成能够消弭局势紧张根源的全面解决方案，确保尊重地区国家主权、安全和领土完整。霍尔木兹海峡是国际货物和能源贸易重要通道，应该恢复海峡正常通行。

2. Sixth Plenum of the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection - CCDI Plenums usually convene in January, so the Sixth Plenum on Saturday was a rare out-of-cycle meeting. The communique announced two new deputy secretaries - Zhao Shiyong and Zhang Zhong. Zhang is also now a member of the CCDI Standing Committee. They replace two of Wang Qishan’s close associates - Xiao Pei and Fu Kui.

We do not know why this Plenum convened now, but my operating assumption is that it involves preparation work for something that will come out of the upcoming Fifth Plenum, perhaps related to closing out the cases of fallen senior officials, and maybe even something more on Xi Jinping Thought on Party Building. From the communique, translated here:

The plenary session thoroughly studied and implemented Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, particularly Xi Jinping Thought on Party Building. The meeting pointed out that Xi Jinping Thought on Party Building is the Party-building component of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. It is a systematic summary and theoretical elevation of the practical experience of exercising full and rigorous Party self-governance in the new era, and is broad and profound, rich in content, deep in thought, and rigorous in its system. It has led the entire Party to open up a new realm of self-reform for a century-old major party and provides the fundamental guidance and action guidelines for governing and managing the Party and for invigorating and strengthening it. Discipline inspection and supervision organs are an important force for advancing full and rigorous Party self-governance. They must deeply understand the decisive significance of the “Two Establishes,” resolutely achieve the “Two Upholds,” remain unwavering firm believers in and faithful practitioners of Xi Jinping Thought on Party Building, steadfastly follow the anti-corruption path with Chinese characteristics, and advance the high-quality development of discipline inspection and supervision work on the new journey of the new era with higher standards and more concrete measures.

全会深入学习贯彻习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想特别是习近平党建思想。会议指出，习近平党建思想是习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想的党建篇，是新时代全面从严治党实践经验的系统总结和理论升华，博大精深、内涵丰富、思想深邃、体系严密，引领全党开辟了百年大党自我革命新境界，为管党治党、兴党强党提供了根本遵循和行动指南。纪检监察机关是推进全面从严治党的重要力量，必须深刻领悟“两个确立”的决定性意义、坚决做到“两个维护”，矢志不渝做习近平党建思想的坚定信仰者、忠实实践者，坚定走好中国特色反腐败之路，以更高标准、更实举措推进新时代新征程纪检监察工作高质量发展。

3. “Zhong Caiwen 钟才文” on the economy - People’s Daily has run four consecutive articles on page two by “Zhong Caiwen 钟才文”, assumed to be the pen name for an article written by the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission. The last time we saw a run of consecutive 钟才文 pieces in People’s Daily was September 30-October 7, 2025, just ahead of the Fourth Plenum, with eight articles under the theme “习近平经济思想指引下的中国经济专论 Special Commentaries on the Chinese Economy Under the Guidance of Xi Jinping Economic Thought.” People’s Daily said afterwards the series was about how to understand the economy and how to do economic work, to stabilize expectations, strengthen confidence and promote development.

The articles so far do not seem to be signaling any upcoming shifts in policy, but rather a continuation of the “steady as she goes, we are confident and can handle the pressures as we transition the economy”, with maybe some incremental tweaks along the way as well as faster implementation of existing policies.

From the Monday installment - What Does 4.7% Economic Growth in the First Half Tell Us? 上半年经济增长4.7%说明了什么？:

Compared with some economies that rely on high debt and large deficits to stimulate growth, China has not followed a path of excessive reliance on strong policy stimulus. Aggregate policies have remained proactive and effective, while structural policies have targeted key pressure points, avoiding the creation of a “policy dependency.” Overall, the supporting conditions and basic trend for the long-term improvement of China’s economy have not changed. The macro-policy toolbox is ample, there remains substantial room for countercyclical adjustment, China has the conditions to introduce practical and effective incremental policies as circumstances change, and it has the capacity to accomplish the full-year economic and social development targets and tasks.

相比于部分经济体依靠高债务、高赤字刺激经济，我国没有走过度依赖政策强刺激的路子，总量政策保持积极有为，结构政策“点穴”发力，避免形成政策“依赖症”。总的看，我国经济长期向好的支撑条件和基本趋势没有改变，宏观政策工具箱充足，逆周期调节空间依然较大，有条件根据形势变化出台务实管用的增量政策，有能力实现全年经济社会发展目标任务。

The Fifth Plenum is not until October, so the timing may be more related to the upcoming August Politburo meeting sometime in the next six days, but that is just a guess.

Here are translations of the articles so far:

The Resilience and Vitality of the Chinese Economy 中国经济的韧性与活力

China Is an Active Contributor to World Economic Growth and a Powerful Anchor of Stability 中国是世界经济增长的积极贡献者和强大稳定锚

What Does 4.7% Economic Growth in the First Half Tell Us? 上半年经济增长4.7%说明了什么？

Promote the Steady and Sustained Advance of High-Quality Development 推动高质量发展行稳致远

4. Fiscal revenue grew in July - Fiscal revenue grew 11.7% in July over the same period in 2025. From Caixin:

China’s fiscal revenue jumped 11.7% year-on-year in July, marking the fastest monthly growth since late 2024, though government spending remained sluggish.

General public budget (GPB) revenue was boosted by a 13.9% jump in tax receipts, Ministry of Finance data showed. The GPB is the largest of the four budgets in China’s fiscal system.

A bustling stock market fueled a 108.6% surge in stamp duty revenue from securities trading, while corporate and individual income taxes soared 20.8% and 25.9%, respectively.

The robust revenue collection contrasts sharply with weak state expenditure. GPB spending ticked up just 0.5% in July.

5. Formaldehyde-dipped cabbage - A citizen blogger filmed farmers in Hebei dipping recently harvested cabbage in formaldehyde before loading them onto open, unrefrigerated cargo trucks for delivery to markets in other regions. The videos have caused outrage, and the Food Safety Office of the State Council, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, and the State Administration for Market Regulation issued a statement, translated here, in which they “immediately directed local authorities to investigate and verify the facts, handle the matter strictly and swiftly in accordance with the law, trace the flow of the cabbages involved, and work rigorously to prevent problem products from entering the market.”

This is not a new issue, as Yicai notes in “At Least 2–4 Layers of Wholesalers From Field to Table: Questions About Circulation and Supervision”:

Formaldehyde cabbage is not entering public view for the first time. A similar incident was exposed in Qingzhou, Shandong, in 2012; media reports at the time said a large jug of about 2.5 liters of formaldehyde solution cost only 7 yuan, and half a jug was enough for a 10-ton truckload of cabbage.

甲醛白菜并非首次进入公众视野。2012年山东青州就曾曝出类似事件，彼时媒体报道称，一大壶约2.5升的甲醛溶液仅需7元钱，一车10吨白菜用半壶就够了。

More than a decade on, the same violation is still happening. But formaldehyde cabbage is only the tip of the iceberg of vegetable quality and safety problems.

十几年过去，同样的违规操作依然在发生。但甲醛白菜只是蔬菜质量安全问题的冰山一角。

Sampling data from national authorities at all levels repeatedly expose problems such as excessive pesticide residues; beyond pesticide residues, these also include the irregular use of preservatives.

在国家各级抽检数据中，屡屡曝出农残超标等问题，除了农药残留，还包括保鲜剂违规使用。

Videos of the dipping:

6. US-China - Bloomberg reported today that the US will add another 7.5% tariff on PRC goods “over allegations of excess manufacturing capacity”, but that was to be expected and should not draw a substantive reaction from the PRC side.

PRC officials are likely correct in believing that the Trump Administration’s announcement of an “Economic D-Day” against Iran will not include sanctions against any major PRC financial institutions or central SOEs, as Trump wants the Xi visit in September and the PRC still has too much leverage over rare-earths. From what I am hearing so far, this may be more like “Economic T-Day”, T as in Taco, when it comes to actions against China over Iran.

Read more

1. US may impose more sanctions on China over Iran?

2. Wang Yi in South Korea

3. Life for Evergrande founder

4. People’s Daily on AI governance

5. Supply chain weaponization against Taiwan

6. CASS attacks “pseudo-history”

The Feed: Business, Economy and Trade - Politics and Law - Foreign and Defense Affairs - Hong Kong - Taiwan - Tech and Media - Society, Arts, Sports, Culture and History - Energy, Environment, Science and Health

Today’s top items:

1. US may impose more sanctions on China over Iran? - On Wednesday evening, President Trump announced on Truth Social an “Economic D-Day” against Iran:

Today, I am also announcing that ANY country that allows its financial institutions, businesses, airports, or government entities to provide any type of lifeline to Iran will itself face TREMENDOUS Economic Consequences. Oil smuggling, swap lines, cash transfers, exchange houses, ship registries, front companies — It all needs to stop NOW. You know who you are.

Given the PRC’s economic relations with Iran…

Read more

Show Notes:

On today's show Andrew and Bill with Wang Yi's visit to South Korea this week, including the fortunate timing for the PRC in the wake of President Trump's decision to scale back joint US-ROK exercises, PRC concerns around North Korea, and dynamics on the peninsula that are shifting in ways that aren't entirely clear. Then: Zhu Rongji's legacy, a week of nostalgia for the Zhu/Jiang era, and the uncertain future of the Linden Centre after a poignant Financial Times piece two weeks ago. At the end: Catching up on US-China news from the break, including thoughts and questions ahead of Xi's visit to D.C., a draft plan to make American AI partners choose between the US and China, China's continued reliance on Nvidia hardware, the White House highlights transshipment concerns, the DOW asks higher education for more info on foreign research, and an emailer who asks about the New York Times' reporting on PRC programs to surveil foreigners.

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1. Wang Yi in South Korea

2. Unitree IPO

3. Ministry of Justice tells EU to pound sand in JD.com case

4. Youth unemployment rate hits 17.9% in July

5. Beijing finally approves purchases of Nvidia H200 chips

6. ”Once Upon a Time in the Middle East” as soft power

The Feed: Business, Economy and Trade - Politics and Law - Foreign and Defense Affairs - Hong Kong - Taiwan - Tech and Media - Society, Arts, Sports, Culture and History - Energy, Environment, Science and Health

Today’s top items:

1. Wang Yi in South Korea - Wang Yi met Wednesday with his counterpart in Seoul, days ahead of the 34th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. From the readout:

Wang Yi said that China and the ROK face each other across the sea and ought to interact frequently, enhance mutual trust, and deepen cooperation. Since late last year, President Xi Jinping and President Lee Jae-myung have successfully exchanged visits and reached important common understandings on the future development of China-ROK rel…

Read more

1. Funeral for Zhu Rongji

2. Xi meets Ecuadorian President Noboa

3. More on Jiang Zemin

4. Wang Yi to visit South Korea

5. Unitree IPO

6. Housing provident fund regulations amended

7. Increasing consumption and lower-tier markets

8. What does China want?

The Feed: Business, Economy and Trade - Politics and Law - Foreign and Defense Affairs - Hong Kong - Taiwan - Tech and Media - Society, Arts, Sports, Culture and History - Energy, Environment, Science and Health

Today’s top items:

1. Funeral for Zhu Rongji - Top leaders paid their final respects to Zhu Rongji on Tuesday. CCTV showed the Standing Committee members plus Han Zheng at Babaoshan, and reported that “Hu Jintao sent a wreath to express condolences.” His death is an obvious manifestation of the end of an era, but in reality that era ended many years ago. And for all the nostalgia about what once was by some, the Party’s playbook for managing the passing of senior leaders works well.

2. Xi meets Ecuadorian President Noboa - The Ecuador president is on an eight day state visit to China. On Tuesday he met with Xi and then attended a welcome banquet. According to the Xinhua readout, Xi said:

The series of new advances in China-Ecuador relations reflects both the dividends released by the two countries' free trade agreement and the potential of China's super-large market. The two sides should strengthen the alignment of development strategies, implement the cooperation plan for jointly building the "Belt and Road," carry out cooperation projects in energy, mining, infrastructure construction and finance, actively explore cooperation in the digital economy, green development, new energy and artificial intelligence, and continue to tap the potential of the free trade agreement so that its dividends benefit more enterprises and consumers.

They also “exchanged views on the situation in Latin America and the Caribbean”:

Xi Jinping stressed that China has consistently maintained that the status of Latin America and the Caribbean as a zone of peace should not be shaken, that the path of development and revitalization of Latin American and Caribbean countries should not be interrupted, and that the right of Latin American and Caribbean countries to independently choose their cooperation partners should not be interfered with. China supports Latin American countries in upholding independence and autonomy, conducting external cooperation proceeding from their own interests, and safeguarding regional peace and stability. Noboa said Ecuador attaches great importance to China’s position and role, and is willing always to be China’s good friend on the other side of the Pacific.

两国元首就拉美和加勒比地区形势交换了意见。习近平强调，中方始终主张拉美和加勒比和平区地位不应被动摇，拉美和加勒比国家发展振兴的道路不应被打断，拉美和加勒比国家自主选择合作伙伴的权利不应被干涉。中方支持拉美国家坚持独立自主，从本国利益出发开展对外合作，维护地区和平稳定。诺沃亚表示，厄方高度重视中方立场和作用，愿始终做中国在太平洋另一端的好朋友。

Those comments are clearly referring to US activities in the region.

Xi will meet with Jordan’s king later this week, and the expected comments about the situation in the Middle East should be interesting.

You can read a full translation of the readout here.

3. More on Jiang Zemin - Cai Qi gave a speech at the “Symposium on the Life and Thought of Jiang Zemin”, which I have translated here. Cai uses the speech “to share some reflections on deepening research into the important thought of the ‘Three Represents’ and exchange views with all of you”. His reflections are a selective appropriation of the concept that he uses to reinforce the 15th Five-Year Plan and Xi’s ideological program. He does not really discuss the market economy, ownership pluralism, private entrepreneurs, and external integration, the components that formed the most economically consequential parts of Jiang’s legacy.

Page 6 of the August 18 People’s Daily is devoted to commentaries on Jiang:

• Inherit and Develop Jiang Zemin’s Thought on National Defense and Military Building — Zhang Shengmin (张升民), CMC Vice Chairman — Translation

• Learning from Comrade Jiang Zemin’s Innovative Spirit of Keeping Pace with the Times — Qu Qingshan (曲青山), Institute of Party History and Literature — Translation

• Advance the New Great Project of Party Building Consistently — Shi Taifeng (石泰峰), Politburo/Organization Department — Translation

• Appreciate the Brilliant Thought, Gather the Strength to Struggle — Liu Guozhong (刘国中), Politburo/Vice Premier — Translation

• Build Comrade Jiang Zemin’s Hometown into an Even Finer Place — Xin Changxing (信长星), Jiangsu Party Secretary — Translation

I am not sure why so many foreign media reports made a big deal out of Xi’s comments about 1989 in his speech at the commemoration for Jiang.

In his speech at the December 2022 memorial service for Jiang Zemin, Xi Jinping had this to say about the 1989 protests and crackdown:

In the spring and summer of 1989, a serious political disturbance occurred in our country. Comrade Jiang Zemin resolutely upheld and implemented the Party Central Committee’s correct decision to take a clear-cut stand against the turmoil, defend the socialist state power, and safeguard the fundamental interests of the people; relying closely on the broad ranks of Party members, cadres and the masses, he effectively maintained stability in Shanghai.

1989年春夏之交我国发生严重政治风波，江泽民同志坚决拥护和执行党中央关于旗帜鲜明反对动乱、捍卫社会主义国家政权、维护人民根本利益的正确决策，紧紧依靠广大党员、干部、群众，有力维护上海稳定。

In his speech at the Monday 100th commemoration, Xi had a slightly different formulation:

In the spring and summer in 1989, a serious political disturbance occurred in our country; Comrade Jiang Zemin resolutely upheld and carried out the correct decisions of the Party Central Committee, forcefully safeguarding stability in Shanghai.

1989年春夏之交我国发生严重政治风波，江泽民同志坚决拥护和执行党中央正确决策，有力维护了上海稳定。

To me, there is not much to see here, just Xi repeating a variation of what he has said in the past.

4. Wang Yi to visit South Korea - Wang Yi will visit South Korea for two days starting Wednesday. According to the Korea Herald:

A Seoul Foreign Ministry official, requesting anonymity, said Tuesday that Lee’s broader vision for peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula is expected to feature naturally in Wang’s meetings in Seoul.

Lee’s latest proposal is part of his administration’s efforts to improve strained inter-Korean relations and support the resumption of dialogue between North Korea and the United States, with Seoul casting itself as a “pacemaker” for diplomacy.

It is not clear when the Wang trip was arranged, but even if scheduled weeks ago, the timing, just after Trump’s post about his instructions to the US Secretary of War to “substantially reduce the Joint Military Exercises!”, is certainly interesting. Is it just a coincidence?

And will this post from Trump come up? I would love to hear what Xi thinks of it:

5. Unitree IPO - Unitree Technology—宇树科技, 688836.SH—will begin trading Wednesday on Shanghai’s STAR Market after selling 40.45 million new shares at RMB150.80, valuing the company at RMB60.99 billion, or about US$9.05 billion, at the offer price. The first day pop should rival CXMT’s from a few weeks ago.

6. Housing provident fund regulation amended - The State Council published the “Decision on Amending the Regulations on the Management of the Housing Provident Fund 关于修改《住房公积金管理条例》的决定”, translated here. Article 1 has added the phrase “better meet diversified housing consumption demand 更好满足多样化住房消费需求” next to the existing language about protecting the rights of fund owners. Article 18 mandates employee and employer contributions each of no less than 5% of the employee’s average monthly wage for the previous year, with ceiling set nationally, and the specific rate determined at the provincial level.

The fund was set up to help contributors purchase a home. “Diversified housing consumption demand” is a wider category than just buying a home, and this expanded definition is useful for unlocking some of these funds even as the real estate market remains weak.

The amendments permit withdrawals for rent without the previous income-ratio condition, as well as for home renovation/decoration and property fees. It enables nationwide recognition of contribution records and cross-regional lending and extends voluntary coverage to gig workers, individual businesses and other flexible workers. It also allows the funds to buy policy-bank bonds, more of which will be on offer soon, and channels investment earnings toward public rental housing and building-safety spending.

7. Increasing consumption and lower-tier markets - Nine departments including the Ministry of Commerce, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security recently jointly issued an opinion on “Further Stimulating the Vitality of Lower-Tier Markets and Enlivening County-Level Consumption 关于进一步激发下沉市场活力 活跃县域消费的意见”, translated here. It includes 18 measures but no mention of any additional funding. Employment is one of the concerns:

(13) Promote stable employment and expand channels for income growth. Support enterprise headquarters or platform enterprises in siting business outlets and operating units in counties where conditions permit, so as to expand employment capacity. Step up implementation of work-relief programs. Coordinate services and safeguards for migrant workers going out to work and support for employment and entrepreneurship by those returning home. Encourage the integration of public employment recruitment with special county-level consumption events, and add employment services at county-level consumption venues and convenience service outlets where conditions permit. Encourage localities to include service-sector occupations in county-level catalogues of urgently needed and scarce talent in light of actual conditions.

（十三）推动稳岗就业拓展增收途径。支持企业总部或平台企业在具备条件的县域布局经营网点和业务单元，拓展就业容量。加力实施以工代赈。统筹做好农民工外出务工服务保障和返乡就业创业扶持。鼓励公共就业招聘和县域消费专场活动融合，在有条件的县域消费场所、便民服务网点等加载就业服务。鼓励各地结合实际将服务业相关职业列入县域急需紧缺人才需求目录。

8. What does China want? - The Summer 2026 issue of the journal “International Security” has published multiple responses to David C. Kang, Jackie S. H. Wong and Zenobia T. Chan’s Summer 2025 article “What Does China Want?”. I thought it was a very problematic article, but it was amplified and praised by the propaganda system and others, and now only a year later has the journal published rebuttals from Rush Doshi, Andrea Ghiselli, Todd H. Hall, Jamie Gruffydd-Jones and Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou. You can read them here. I find them convincing.

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1. More weak July economic data

2. Premier Li chairs State Council Plenary session

3. Jiang Zemin Commemoration

4. Xi’s September visit

5. AI tokens and the intelligent economy

6. “Once Upon a Time in the Middle East”

The Feed: Business, Economy and Trade - Politics and Law - Foreign and Defense Affairs - Hong Kong - Taiwan - Tech and Media - Society, Arts, Sports, Culture and History - Energy, Environment, Science and Health - Education

Today’s top items:

1. More weak July economic data - The National Bureau of Statistics on Monday released more data that show the domestic-demand slowdown broadening.

There were some positive areas. Service retail sales rose 5.0% Jan-July, outpacing goods retail by 3.9 points, and online retail rose 4.8%. High-tech investment areas grew fast, as electronic-circuit manufacturing investment rose 57.7% and integrated-circuit manufacturing 11.5%. New growth drivers in high-tech and digital manufacturing contributed roughly half of industrial value-added growth Jan-Ju…

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The “Beidaihe Break” is over and I wanted to send out a shorter note before the daily grind returns Monday.

The top leadership will all make an appearance Monday morning at the commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the birth of the late General Secretary Jiang Zemin. This is a heavily scripted protocol ritual that should not yield any surprises beyond the inevitable speculation if any Jiang family members or retired senior leaders do not appear at the event, though no one should expect Hu Jintao to attend given his health issues.

The 16th issue of 2026 of Qiushi, published today, and which I have summarized and in part translated here, includes an article from the Institute of Party History and Literature of the CPC Central Committee on Jiang Zemin titled “在中国特色社会主义道路上不断创造无愧于时代和人民的新业绩 Continuously Creating New Achievements Worthy of the Times and the People on the Road of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”. I have posted a translation of that article here.

It of course concludes by linking the achievements under Jiang to the current leadership:

At the turn of the century, Comrade Jiang Zemin thus looked back on the past and forward to the future: from the mid-20th century to the mid-21st century, all the struggle of the Chinese people is for the realization of the motherland’s prosperity and strength, the people’s affluence, and the great rejuvenation of the nation. “For this great historical cause, our Party has led the whole nation in struggle for 50 years and made tremendous progress; after another 50 years of struggle, it will surely be victoriously accomplished.” Now, there are less than 10 years until we basically realize socialist modernization, and only 20-some years until we realize the goal of building a great modern socialist country in all respects — time waits for no one, and we must seize the day. Let us unite even more closely around the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, comprehensively implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, deeply study and implement Xi Jinping Thought on Party Building, firm up confidence and carry on the struggle, and advance courageously toward the grand goal of building a great modern socialist country in all respects and realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation!

世纪之交，江泽民同志曾这样回顾过去、展望未来：从20世纪中叶到21世纪中叶，中国人民的一切奋斗是为了实现祖国的富强、人民的富裕和民族的伟大复兴。"这个历史伟业，我们党领导全国人民已经奋斗了五十年，取得了巨大进展，再经过五十年的奋斗，也必将胜利完成。"现在，距离基本实现社会主义现代化只有不到10年时间，距离实现全面建成社会主义现代化强国目标也只有20多年时间，时不我待、只争朝夕。让我们更加紧密地团结在以习近平同志为核心的党中央周围，全面贯彻习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想，深入学习贯彻习近平党建思想，坚定信心、接续奋斗，朝着全面建成社会主义现代化强国、实现中华民族伟大复兴的宏伟目标奋勇前进！

Ahead of the commemoration, the propaganda system released a twelve-part propaganda series on Jiang’s life that you can watch here on YouTube:

The series as expected aligns with the official biography of Jiang’s life and career. Perhaps the most surprising bit from the series was this screenshot:

Former Premier Zhu Rongji died on August 11 at the age of 98. His memorial service will be on August 18. Zhu has not been politically relevant for many years, and his death should not cause any issues for Xi and the leadership. There is a playbook for managing any outpouring of grief or reminiscences hinting at dissatisfaction with the current Era after the passing of a senior leader, and for the memorial service. The Party has recent practice in managing the deaths of retired Premiers, as Li Peng died at 90 in 2019 and Li Keqiang died at 68 in 2023. The People’s Daily treatment of the respective announcements is identical:

Zhu’s legacy is complicated, as he did much to push through economic reforms, and to join the WTO, but also pushed through policies that led to mass layoffs and did not improve the rural-urban divide. He definitely was not “China’s Gorbachev” as some of the more wishful foreigners once claimed. Here are some of the articles/posts on his passing that I found most interesting:

Yasheng Huang

Zhu Rongji, A Complex Leader with a Complex Legacy

Zhu Rongji, who has just passed away, is being remembered with a lot of nostalgia. I share that nostalgia. I greatly admire and miss his plain-talking, direct, no-nonsense style, a breath of fresh air in the often stultifying and vague rhetoric of the official speak. I am also nostalgic for an era when China sought to globalize its economy, had a workin…

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19 days ago · 56 likes · 9 comments · Yasheng Huang

Zhu Rongji: A Reformer Who Centralized More Power in the Chinese State - Victor Shih for The Wire China:

In banking policies and other areas, then, Zhu was no better or worse than other senior leaders in the Party. When it came time to choose between genuine reform and the pressing needs of the day, pressing needs almost always took priority.

However, many of us remember Zhu Rongji’s time as premier fondly not because he was a genuine reformer, but because he was eager to communicate with the outside world; and to the extent he could, shared with foreign leaders and thinkers his worries and hopes for China. Such candor made it possible for the world to imagine genuine partnership with China and even with its leaders.

邓聿文 / Yuwen Deng

Zhu Rongji’s death triggers China’s ‘superpolitics’

Zhu Rongji died on August 12. Five days later comes the 100th anniversary of Jiang Zemin’s birth. And less than two months after that, the Chinese Communist Party will convene the Fifth Plenum of its 20th Central Committee…

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18 days ago · 2 likes · 邓聿文 / Yuwen Deng

Wen Jiabao is the last surviving retired Premier, at the relatively young age of 83.

Xi Jinping’s visit to Washington DC to meet President Trump is less than six weeks away, and as usual we are starting to see stories saying the PRC side is worried about a lack of progress in preparations for the meeting. On Saturday the South China Morning Post published an “exclusive” titled “China rattled by Trump White House chaos weeks ahead of Xi visit. It has happened before”:

This time, according to the sources, the anxiety runs deeper as the summit will take place on foreign soil.

One person with knowledge of the preparations said that no US official or agency had thus far assumed responsibility for organising the visit, leaving officials on both sides largely engaged in routine preparations without clear leadership…

Two people familiar with the thinking on the Chinese side suggested the issues appeared operational, logistical and optics-related, as neither side had high expectations of achieving anything substantive from the September summit.

Having minimal expectations for his visit is the correct approach. There no signs that the visit will not happen, but the two sides continue their tit-for-tat chipping away at the “understanding” between Xi and Trump. Among the announcements since the start of the “Beidaihe Break”:

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Note: The summaries included in this digest were drafted with AI assistance according to detailed editorial instructions: we selected the central and subsidiary points to highlight, determined their structure and emphasis, and then revised and reviewed each summary before publication. AI was not used to select the material or to generate summaries independently of editorial direction.

The celebratory mood that followed the Trump–Xi summit in May seems to have run its course. The prevailing assessment of US–China “strategic stability” remains broadly optimistic, but July’s commentary offers a more sober assessment of China’s strategic environment.

Authors still assume that US primacy is weakening and China’s material power is growing, but they repeatedly ask whether those advantages can be converted into durable influence. As Zhou Li, a former vice-minister of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, writes in an otherwise confident survey, “having an advantage does not equate to a winning position”.

Zheng Yongnian and Da Wei complicate familiar narratives of American decline. Zheng describes a waning hegemon whose decline is relative, protracted and non-linear, warning, “China must not lull itself into a false sense of security”. Da distinguishes the end of Pax Americana from the unresolved trajectory of American national power, while Wu Xinbo provides the policy prescription: “constructive strategic stability” rests on credible Chinese counter-pressure.

Elsewhere, Wu says that Xi Jinping’s four global initiatives require real resources to implement. His tone is far from critical, but the observation that “global governance cannot rely solely on conceptual initiatives” is nonetheless striking. Jin Canrong similarly acknowledges that China’s historically East Asia-centred statecraft has left it short of experience in managing genuinely global affairs, while cultural insecurity means confidence lags behind material strength.

AI coverage in July included commentary on Xi Jinping’s announcement of the World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organisation (WAICO) and the unveiling of a new Chinese AI model that allegedly rivals US competitors, but much of this commentary was boilerplate. Instead we included two pieces that resist triumphalism about China’s recent advances. While Zhu Songchun identifies dependence on US-defined concepts and paradigms as China’s deeper weakness, Huang Ping distinguishes mass-market success from American frontier leadership.

Among the pieces focusing on Chinese society, Yao Yang uses Wang Hong’s Fields Medal to explore weak female representation in senior politics and a revival of patriarchal ideas. Zhou Lian and Xu Jilin, and separately Dong Yue, focus on young people’s retreat from public life. Zhou and Xu attribute this retreat to repeated experiences of powerlessness, while Dong identifies a sub-group of highly educated home-staying “squatting youth” [蹲族], produced by an expansion of educational opportunities, but a lack of good jobs.

June’s “Going Out” section largely made the case for a new wave of outward investment—July’s selection focuses on its conditions and risks. Li Wei warns that China’s commercial footprint could outstrip the state’s capacity to protect overseas assets, while Liang Dong, Wu Ting and Wu Huimin argue that outward investment serves “dual circulation” only when profits and productive capabilities return home.

On the home front, Liu Shijin treats China’s “strong supply, weak demand” as the result of a production-first growth model that has outlived the shortage economy for which it was built. A fuller account of China’s domestic economy will follow in our forthcoming Economy Digest.

On Europe and its relations with Beijing, the tone is pessimistic about the prospects for resolving structural conflict, but broadly confident about China’s relative position. The most arresting argument comes from former Chinese trade diplomat Zhou Xiaoming, who says China’s support for a “strong, united EU” no longer serves Beijing’s interests: Brussels was imagined as an autonomous pole in a multipolar order, but has instead become an institutional centre of confrontation with China.

Ding Chun and Wu Jiwei, and separately Qin Shuo, reach softer conclusions. Ding and Wu describe EU–China industrial relations as “competitive coexistence”. Qin, a prominent business-media commentator, writes that trade conflict is a normal consequence of China becoming the axis of global manufacturing. His conclusion—that China bears responsibility for steering the contest towards a more open and balanced order—is refreshing.

Coverage of Britain’s new prime minister was voluminous but held few surprises: Long Jing expects broad foreign-policy continuity, constrained by existing security alignments and Britain’s diminished room for manoeuvre.

On the Middle East, Liu Zhongmin and Tang Zhichao see the Iran war accelerating the transition towards a “post-American” regional order—both predict deeper fragmentation and disorder alongside greater regional agency.

July also saw many pieces marking the tenth anniversary of the 2016 South China Sea arbitration award. Most were boilerplate, but Wu Shicun’s interview with the South China Morning Post stands out for warning that fixed Chinese facilities on Scarborough Shoal remain an option if Philippine and foreign patrols intensify. Wu’s threat fits a longer pattern, but remains notable. Bao Yinan offers a less confrontational route, proposing consent-based mediation through the new Hong Kong-based International Organisation for Mediation.

Neighbourhood diplomacy is another major theme of the month. Both Zhou Fangyin and Zhao Long describe an increasingly securitised environment in which US alliance policy raises pressure to choose sides. On China’s regional engagement, Zhang Yun reads Japan–Philippines maritime talks as part of Tokyo’s attempt to become a second centre of regional leadership, Mao Keji and Mao Yaxin interpret India’s reopening to Chinese investment as industrial necessity rather than strategic trust and Wang Youming expects Latin America’s rightward turn to complicate China’s position without dislodging it.

July’s strongest writing qualifies confidence in China’s rise—American retrenchment is adaptive rather than terminal, the trade war is survivable but unavoidable and China’s growing power is running ahead of the institutional, diplomatic and intellectual capacities needed to translate it into durable gain.

— Jacob Mardell

1. US–China & Global Order:

   1. Zheng Yongnian on America as a “declining hegemon” whose relative decline coexists with renewed technological and coercive power.

   2. Da Wei on Pax Americana ending without settling whether American national power declines or revives.

   3. Wu Xinbo on:

      1. “constructive strategic stability” resting on credible Chinese counter-pressure.

      2. China’s four global initiatives requiring “real money”, institutions and trained personnel to become operational.

   4. Jin Canrong on China’s global experience and cultural confidence lagging behind its material strength.

   5. Zhou Li on accelerating US hegemonic decline and China’s systemic “ideas + strength + strategy” advantage.

2. Europe:

   1. Zhou Xiaoming on why China’s long-standing support for a “strong, united EU” may no longer serve its interests.

   2. Qin Shuo on trade war as a structural consequence of China becoming the axis of global manufacturing.

   3. Ding Chun & Wu Jiwei on China–EU industrial relations entering “competitive coexistence”, with selective cooperation surviving behind higher barriers.

   4. Sun Chenghao on NATO 3.0 becoming more militarily effective.

   5. Long Jing on Andy Burnham’s foreign policy being untested but constrained by circumstances.

3. Chinese Economy & Going Out:

   1. Liu Shijin on “strong supply, weak demand” as the result of China’s production-first growth model.

   2. Li Wei on China’s commercial expansion outrunning its capacity to protect overseas interests.

   3. Liang Dong, Wu Ting & Wu Huimin on outward investment serving “dual circulation” only when profits return home.

   4. Yang Ping on Chinese capital potentially undermining industrialisation in the Global South.

4. Middle East:

   1. Liu Zhongmin on the interruption, but not reversal, of the Middle East’s movement towards strategic autonomy, reconciliation and development.

   2. Tang Zhichao on the acceleration of a fragmented “post-American” order.

5. South China Sea:

   1. Wu Shicun on fixed facilities at Scarborough Shoal remaining an option.

   2. Bao Yinan on using consent-based mediation to manage practical disputes in the South China Sea.

6. Neighbourhood Diplomacy:

   1. Zhou Fangyin on “de-securitisation” and “de-geopoliticisation” as principles for keeping China’s neighbourhood from splitting into rival camps.

   2. Zhao Long on “doubt and fear of America” keeping states vacillating between strategic autonomy and tighter alliance dependence.

   3. Shi Yuanhua on a 64-state “greater periphery” including the United States and the case for China biding its time on Taiwan.

7. Regional Policy:

   1. Zhang Yun on Japan using the Philippines to become a second centre of power alongside Washington.

   2. Mao Keji & Mao Yaxin on India’s attempt to reduce reliance on China making it more dependent on Chinese goods.

   3. Wang Youming on Latin America’s rightward turn complicating, but not dislodging China’s position.

8. AI & Tech:

   1. Zhu Songchun on China remaining dependent on US concepts.

   2. Huang Ping on China’s “good enough and cheap” AI advantage facing a Huawei-style political blockade.

9. Society:

   1. Yao Yang on Wang Hong’s Fields Medal, patriarchal revival and Chinese women’ s shrinking horizons.

   2. Zhou Lian & Xu Jilin on young people’s retreat from public life and “dog-wisdom-ism” among knowledge elites.

   3. Dong Yue on graduate “squatting youth” [蹲族], produced by the mismatch between higher-education expansion and the lack of suitable employment.

1. US-China & Global Order

Zheng Yongnian (郑永年): The whole world may misunderstand the United States, but China cannot afford to do so. America’s decline is relative, not absolute and the decline of a major power is a long-term process. Multipolarisation is a long process and the US will remain the most important pole. Meanwhile, the nature of American hegemony is changing, from “constructive” to “destructive”. In important fields such as AI, American hegemony has not only failed to decline but is being strengthened and upgraded. The US practises protectionism in areas of goods trade where it lacks comparative advantage, but in fields where it possesses comparative advantage, it continues to advance globalisation, thus increasing the dependence of other countries. The American claim that “China is only a few days behind the United States”, satisfies the vanity of people in China while mobilising resources within the United States.— X.Q. Deng Presidential Chair Professor and Dean, School of Public Policy, CUHK-Shenzhen (大湾区评论, 4 July).

Da Wei (达巍): “Pax Americana” is coming to an end, but no conclusion can yet be reached about America’s rise or decline. America is actively dismantling the hegemonic system that it took the lead in constructing after the Second World War. MAGA is not a retreat from empire back to republic. It is a retreat from a liberal internationalist empire to the late-nineteenth-century imagination of a nationalist empire. America has not simply decided that it “does not want to be a hegemon” any longer. More accurately, America is unwilling to continue bearing the costs. Historically, leaps in American national power generally came from the opening of three kinds of frontier: geographical, institutional and technological frontiers—only this latter frontier remains available to the US. America’s national power may increase again, but “Pax Americana” is unlikely to return. — Director and Professor, Centre for International Security and Strategy (CISS), Tsinghua University (清华大学战略与安全研究中心, 1 July).

Wu Xinbo (吴心伯): Constructive strategic stability depends on credible Chinese counter-pressure, and every strike answered with equal or greater force. Repeated rounds of “fighting and talking” have changed expectations. Washington must now price in retaliation before acting. Planned trade and investment councils, fentanyl cooperation, maritime military consultations and the suspension of Taiwan arms sales indicate what stabilisation is able to deliver. However, Trump sees Taiwan as leverage for obtaining concessions from China, so Beijing should make sure to maintain pressure, repeatedly restate its red lines and respond forcefully to US provocation. Stability also remains exposed to US domestic politics—a Democratic House could use hearings, human rights, arms sales and investment restrictions to constrain Trump. Taiwan’s January 2028 leadership election and the November US presidential contest may bring significant changes. — Dean, Institute of International Studies, and Director, Centre for American Studies, Fudan University (思路打开, 6 July).

Wu Xinbo (吴心伯): America’s waning global leadership creates a historic opening for China, but Beijing’s four global initiatives still need to be translated into concrete outcomes. US leadership originally combined material power with progressive principles, but Cold War militarisation and intervention eroded its public character. Meanwhile, today’s reliance on sanctions signals declining diplomatic persuasion and credibility. Newer arrangements such as the Indo-Pacific strategy lack the appeal of post-war institution-building. Global governance cannot rely solely on conceptual initiatives, and if the UN headquarters one day moves from the Hudson to the Huangpu, China must prepare the necessary resources, physical space and professional talent in advance. — Dean, Institute of International Studies, and Director, Centre for American Studies, Fudan University (人大重阳, 3 July).

Jin Canrong (金灿荣): China may yet overturn Brzezinski’s prediction that America will be the last global superpower, but converting its underestimated strength into a genuinely global role requires experience and institutions that its historically East Asia-centred statecraft never developed. Unlike Western powers that were formed by centuries of colonial expansion, Chinese dynasties governed a vast, diverse society, but remained strategically defensive. China’s instinctive rejection of “G2” reflects resistance to being “praised to death”, but also a lack of preparation for global affairs. A separate legacy of Qing rule results in cultural self-denigration—China has grown to 1.95 metres but still thinks itself 1.2 metres tall. Development will reverse this insecurity, while US containment acts as a “good teacher”, training China for the world stage. China should ultimately practise an enduring “kingly way” [王道] of restraint, rather than the West’s “hegemonic way” [霸道]. — Wu Yuzhang Chair Professor, School of International Studies, and Director, Centre for China’s Foreign Strategy Studies, Renmin University of China (金金乐道编辑部, 9 July).

Zhou Li (周力): The American hegemonic system is accelerating its own decline and multipolarisation is deepening, while China possesses a systemic “ideas + strength + strategy” advantage in the emerging order. The US–Israel–Iran conflict demonstrated that military superiority, sanctions and unilateral pressure cannot secure political outcomes. Pakistan- and Qatar-led mediation and the reopening of Hormuz point towards greater regional agency and an American return to offshore balancing. Meanwhile, Western political dysfunction and central-bank gold repatriation signal declining trust in established institutions and the dollar-centred system, though this is “de-risking” rather than imminent de-dollarisation. China’s governance model offers an alternative to Western institutional crisis, but “having an advantage does not equate to a winning position”. European protectionism and a more extreme America remain major risks. Beijing must secure 15th Five-Year Plan technological breakthroughs, repair supply-chain weaknesses and maintain strategic composure. — Former Vice-Minister, International Department of the CPC Central Committee (习近平外交思想和新时代中国外交, 6 July).

2. Europe

Zhou Xiaoming (周小明): China should reconsider its long-standing support for a “strong, united EU”. European integration once suggested an autonomous pole capable of preventing a US–China bipolar order and a third world war, but Brussels has instead become an institutional vehicle for confrontation with China. Recent consultations pulled both sides back from the brink—China still values the European market and strategic autonomy and Brussels doubts it can withstand Chinese retaliation. However, the two sides cannot resolve the structural conflict rooted in Europe’s declining competitiveness and export controls on the advanced goods China actually wants to buy. The “systemic rival” label now overrides partnership, recasting interdependence as risk, keeping the investment agreement frozen and treating engagement with member states as “divide and rule”. Beijing should “discard illusions” [丢掉幻想], prepare for wider restrictions under the EU’s Industrial Accelerator Act and shift more effort to national and local governments, but retain cooperation with EU institutions where possible. — Senior Fellow, Centre for China and Globalisation (CCG); former Deputy Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva (观察者网, 8 July).

Qin Shuo (秦朔): Trade war is a normal condition of China becoming the central axis of the global manufacturing industrial chain—just as China is the anchor of world goods, America is the anchor of world currency. However, compared with when the United States led globalisation, China will have more opponents because China’s industries inevitably face many more competitors. China should not “protect commerce with swords”, or create a “Chinese circle”. Rather it has a responsibility to guide trade war towards a new order. Chinese companies can do more to accelerate localised production, establish more complete compliance systems, respond better to carbon and ESG challenges, and accelerate market and supply-chain diversification. China also has a major card to play, that is, making its own market bigger.— Co-Director, China Business Civilization Research Centre; former editor-in-chief, Nanfeng Chuang and China Business News (秦朔朋友圈, 12 July).

Ding Chun (丁纯) and Wu Jiwei (吴佶蔚): China–EU industrial relations have entered “competitive coexistence” [竞争性共存]. China’s rise from workshop to same-market rival has moved competition from products and prices into investment conditions, technology standards and rules. However, deep interdependence persists and the most likely trajectory is selective cooperation behind higher barriers. Europe still possesses strong basic research capabilities, but it suffers from structural weaknesses in translating scientific and technological achievements into commercial productivity and risks falling into the “medium-technology trap.” The Sino-European contest in emerging industries like artificial intelligence is essentially a clash between “governance-driven” and “application-driven” paths. This competition will not be limited to a single product or technology contest, but will extend to multiple dimensions, including breakthroughs in underlying technologies, supply chain support and the formulation of industry rules. — Ding: Director, Centre for European Studies, Fudan University; Wu: Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute of Belt and Road & Global Governance, Fudan University (欧洲问题研究, 5 July ).

Sun Chenghao (孙成昊): “NATO 3.0” may become more militarily effective without becoming more politically united. China should not expect transatlantic differences to lead to the disintegration of NATO—instead it should expect NATO’s military industrial expansion to lead to more securitised European scrutiny of Chinese technology and supply chains. NATO is shifting towards the delivery of industrial capacity and sustained combat power and Washington seeks to transfer responsibility transfer, without relinquishing US leadership. Trump wants Europe to gradually transform from a “security consumer” to a “security provider,” allowing the US to allocate more strategic resources to the Indo-Pacific. NATO is beset by three contradictions: between the pursuit for strategic autonomy and dependence on the US; between European priorities; and between NATO members who diverge on shared values. NATO will neither disintegrate rapidly nor revert to its past. — Associate Fellow, Centre for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University (中美聚焦, 17 July).

Long Jing (龙静): Britain’s seventh prime minister since the Brexit referendum was open to cooperation with China at the local level, but will face a more complicated position as prime minister. Burnham inherits economic decline, social division and international uncertainty, as well as the risks associated with chronic leadership churn. This means that his priority is likely to be domestic repair rather than diplomatic reinvention. Lacking foreign-policy experience, Burnham will likely preserve Starmer’s interest-driven policy, stabilising ties with Washington, sustaining support for Ukraine, rebuilding practical European ties and widening relations with middle powers. — Deputy Director, Centre for European Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) (中美聚焦, 24 July).

3. Chinese Economy & Going Out

Liu Shijin (刘世锦): Strong supply and weak demand are not the result of short-term fluctuations, but originate in an unbalanced pattern of growth supported by institutional and structural factors. At the beginning of reform and opening, China was a shortage economy and this growth model—characterised by high savings, high investment and high exports—was appropriate and possessed clear advantages. But when investment can no longer be expanded and begins to contract, as is the case in China, it becomes increasingly difficult to sustain. Excessive productive investment now suppresses returns, while strong exports are a reason for rather than a consequence of weak domestic consumption. Meanwhile, companies distribute too little income and household deposits are concentrated among the affluent. Only by reducing the savings rate and increasing terminal demand can capacity utilisation be raised. China should reduce its total savings rates, reform its tax system, encourage private enterprises to increase dividends, funnel RMB20 trillion of listed state capital into social-security funds, use 50 per cent of macroeconomic to address the problem, raise pensions to release consumption and use housing support to address the mismatch facing migrant workers. — Former Vice-Chair, Committee for Economic Affairs of the 13th CPPCC National Committee; former Vice-President, Development Research Centre of the State Council (中国宏观经济论坛, 7 July).

Li Wei (李巍): China risks falling into a seventeenth-century “Dutch trap” [荷兰陷阱] if its expanding commercial footprint outstrips its capacity to protect overseas assets, personnel and international routes. China should therefore focus on building a robust system to safeguard its overseas interests. Great-power competition is shifting from seizing wealth towards creating it through technology, commercial application and industrial ecosystems, putting “super-enterprises” on the front lines of geopolitical competition. Chinese companies need to achieve a genuine breakthrough in profitability, rather than simply in sales volume, to achieve sustainable progress. Although globalisation faces severe challenges, it is not coming to an end. Several questions remain: whether China can maintain its status as the “world’s factory” and further climb up the global value chain; whether the US can reindustrialise; and whether emerging manufacturing bases can replicate the industrialisation experience of the “Four Asian Tigers” — Wu Yuzhang Distinguished Professor and Deputy Dean, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (财经, 2 July).

Liang Dong (梁栋), Wu Ting (吴婷) and Wu Huimin (吴慧敏): “Going global” is not the end goal. Outward investment matters only insofar as it feeds profits and productive capabilities back into China’s domestic economy, advances “dual circulation” and avoids industrial hollowing-out. China has yet to convert its vast domestic industrial advantages into a commensurate capacity to own and earn income from overseas assets. Notably, it still runs an investment-income deficit. Japan offers lessons—including its retention of domestic “mother factories”—but it’s not a model China can simply reproduce. Geopolitical fragmentation, investment restrictions and localisation requirements are replacing the sequential “flying geese” model with a sovereign-bounded “hive model” [蜂巢模式] of multi-centred local production, firms and suppliers moving abroad together. Ultimately, repatriated profits, personnel circulation and overseas R&D should return technology, standards and management capabilities to China. — CICC analysts; Wu Huimin is Executive Dean, CICC Global Institute, and Executive Head, CICC Research Department (中金研究院, 9 July).

Yang Ping (杨平): China’s current phase of exporting capital and productive capacity may damage the Global South’s national industries, triggering protectionism and resource nationalism. If Chinese expansion destroys Southern countries’ own industrialisation, China’s Global South strategy will have “turned entirely into its opposite”, creating new dependency rather than enabling development. Beijing must not conflate its commercial and strategic relationships with the Global South, and should instead coordinate China’s industrial development with Southern countries’ autonomous industrialisation. The “community with a shared future for mankind” requires a political economy that goes beyond generic claims of “win-win” cooperation. — Founder, President and Editor-in-Chief, Beijing Cultural Review (文化纵横, 16 July).

4. Middle East

Liu Zhongmin (刘中民): Renewed war has divided the Middle East into three loose power formations, but has not reversed the deeper shift towards regional strategic autonomy, reconciliation and development. The US- and Israeli-led Abraham Accords grouping now coexists with a Saudi–Pakistan–Turkey–Egypt “Sunni Diamond”, as well as Iran’s weakened but resilient “resistance front”. The new Sunni grouping is not trying to choose a camp or overturn the existing order, but to “find direction” and avoid marginalisation, while Saudi Arabia continues to uphold the two-state solution. This fragmentation has severely impacted, but not yet reversed the previous trend of easing tensions and pursuit of common development and it is increasingly difficult to shake the growing sense of strategic autonomy within the region. While US allies have been unable to completely break free from their security dependence on the US in the short term, they have significantly accelerated their diversification in security and diplomacy. — Professor, Middle East Studies Institute, Shanghai International Studies University (环球时报, 13 July).

Tang Zhichao (唐志超): The US–Israel–Iran conflict has accelerated the Middle East’s transition towards a “post-American era”. This will likely lead towards a more fragmented and disorderly, but more autonomous regional order. Washington’s Gulf security architecture has become a liability that attracts Iranian retaliation, while US forces have failed to protect partners or control Hormuz, shattering the myth of the invincible US security shield. The strategic development trend in the Gulf region has also been reversed, with countries falling into a new development–security dilemma. Regional fronts such as the “Four-Nation Group” of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan and Egypt are coalescing and the fragmentation of the Middle East is further intensifying. The US strategy of using Iran as a breakthrough to contain China and Russia in the Middle East has been thwarted, with strategic cooperation between China and Middle Eastern countries deepening.— Professor and Deputy Director-General, Institute of West Asian and African Studies, CASS (当代世界, Issue 6, 2026).

5. South China Sea

Wu Shicun (吴士存): China will not proactively undertake further South China Sea reclamation, but fixed facilities on Scarborough Shoal remain an option. If Beijing builds, it will be because “external forces have left us with no choice”. Any Philippine vessel deliberately grounded at Sandy Cay will be towed away, although China itself does not intend to occupy the feature. Opening Taiwan-held Taiping Island to US or Japanese forces would cross a mainland red line if this developed into activity targeting the mainland or infringing Chinese sovereign rights. Beijing will likewise reject maritime delimitations reached without China that violate its sovereign rights. Practical cooperation should begin bilaterally with fish-stock surveys, catch quotas, coordinated licensing and pollution control. — Founding President and Chairman of the Academic Committee, National Institute for South China Sea Studies (South China Morning Post, 13 July).

Bao Yinan (包毅楠): The Hong Kong-based International Organisation for Mediation (IOMed) could provide China with a third-party mechanism for addressing selected South China Sea disputes without sacrificing the consent and procedural control that is lacking in compulsory arbitration. Proceedings at the IOMed require the agreement of all parties, allow any party to withdraw unilaterally and make only settlements that are formally concluded by the parties legally binding. China helped establish the organisation, was its first signatory, and five of eleven ASEAN countries have already joined. WTO disputes are excluded from its jurisdiction, but not sovereignty or maritime-delimitation disputes. UNCLOS allows parties to pursue consensual procedures before compulsory settlement, placing mediation within rather than outside the Convention. Scholars believe that a “salami-slicing” [切香肠] approach should be taken, prioritising “non-core disputes” [非核心争端] such as fisheries, marine environmental protection, submarine cables and pipelines and law-enforcement encounters. — Associate Research Fellow, Huayang Centre for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance (亚太安全与海洋研究, Issue 3, 2026).

6. Neighbourhood Diplomacy

Zhou Fangyin (周方银): China should keep great-power rivalry from hardening its neighbourhood into opposing camps and make “de-securitisation” [去安全化] and “de-geopoliticisation” [去地缘政治化] central to regional cooperation during the 15th Five-Year Plan. Strategic competition among major powers is leading to a deterioration of China’s surrounding environment, with the US promoting the “de-Sinicisation” [去中国化] of supply chains and pressuring countries to introduce discriminatory policies against China. The securitisation of economic issues and the weaponisation of interdependence have become increasingly common in China’s neighbourhood since 2018, hampering regional integration. China possesses a significant military advantage compared to most of its neighbours, deterring other countries from provoking armed conflict. This provides space for China to firmly state its position, demonstrate goodwill and strengthen consultation with relevant countries. China should also deepen non-traditional security cooperation with its neighbours. — Professor, School of International Relations, Sun Yat-sen University (国际展望, Issue 2, 2026; via 爱思想, 16 July).

Zhao Long (赵隆): China’s neighbourhood will grow more unstable during the 15th Five-Year Plan as the US turns “island chains” into an “alliance chain” [盟链] and regional states oscillate between reducing dependence on Washington and binding themselves more tightly to the US. By forward-deploying partners and outsourcing costs, Washington is able to lower the threshold for military intervention. Trump’s “extractive partnership” produces both “doubt and fear of America” [疑美恐美]—unreliable commitments encourage greater autonomy and diversified ties, but fear of abandonment also pushes US-dependent states towards early declarations of support, over-compliance and surrendering policy space. European NATO members may back Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy in order to keep US attention on Europe, even as Greenland threats and tariffs erode transatlantic trust. Beijing should build an Asian security model through shared security, respect for differences, dialogue, crisis management and low-sensitivity public goods, backed by BRI and RCEP cooperation, therefore strengthening neighbours’ resilience against external pressure. — Director, Institute for International Strategic and Security Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) (国际展望, Issue 2, 2026; via 爱思想, 16 July).

Shi Yuanhua (石源华): China’s neighbourhood should remain the primary focus of its diplomacy until at least 2035. This “greater periphery” extends beyond China’s immediate neighbours to 64 states across six subregions and even includes the United States. China and the US form the two poles, while all other states are “middle countries” [中间国家] whose positions vary according to their interests rather than fixed bloc loyalties. This includes Japan, which, although clearly an ally of the US, may take a middle course between China and the US on certain issues. During the transition from “standing up” through “becoming prosperous” to “becoming strong”, China has gradually developed its own Indo-Pacific, or “Two-Ocean”, strategy. China’s north and west are relatively stable, while tensions in the east and south are more acute. The most important thing for China is to continue to grow stronger—it should wait until the time is ripe on the Taiwan issue, which may resolve itself without the need for military action, either through internal unrest in Taiwan or the US descending into chaos. — Distinguished Professor, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University (观察者网, 22 July).

7. Regional Policy

Zhang Yun (张云): Japan and the Philippines’ maritime-delimitation talks are less about drawing a boundary than about Tokyo’s attempting to move from subordination in the US system towards becoming a second centre of regional leadership alongside Washington. Tokyo is building direct links among American allies and “like-minded” states and Manila is an obvious partner because it is both a US treaty ally and a longstanding Japanese economic partner. The 2024 trilateral summit, Japan–Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement and Japanese participation in Philippine exercises and live-fire anti-ship missile drills show that cooperation is moving from diplomacy towards operational military coordination. Japan’s rise to prominence can also reduce strategic costs for the US and under the Trump 2.0 framework, a new “US-Japan-Philippines-Australia” Quadrilateral Mechanism has promoted the deepening of strategic interaction between Japan and the Philippines. — Professor, Department of International Politics, School of International Relations, Nanjing University (中美聚焦, 6 July).

Mao Keji (毛克疾) and Mao Yaxin (毛雅欣): The Achille’s heel of India’s economic policy toward China is the paradox that it seeks to compete with China by utilising its capital, while simultaneously harbouring security concerns regarding Chinese investment. India has repeatedly oscillated between security anxieties, manufacturing ambitions and practical dependence, but guarding against Chinese investment has not yielded the expected results, with bilateral trade reaching new highs. This leaves India in the “double bind” of neither having reduced its dependence on China nor achieved its desired economic autonomy. Ultimately, India’s easing of approvals for Chinese investment in key industries does not mean it has abandoned its economic security logic. — Mao Keji, Associate Research Fellow, and Mao Yaxin, Research Assistant, International Cooperation Centre, National Development and Reform Commission (世界知识, Issue 13, 2026).

Wang Youming (王友明): Latin America’s rightward turn will complicate China’s position without dislodging it. Governments leaning towards Washington will still buy two “insurance policies”, of American political-security protection and Chinese economic support. The “Trump–Monroe doctrine” [唐罗主义] has become a coercive regional architecture, which combines military force and threats against Venezuela and Cuba with an “Americas Shield”—a critical-minerals alliance targeting the lithium triangle, a China-excluding “Silicon Peace Initiative” and open support for right-wing candidates. The consequences are already visible in Panama’s refusal to renew its Belt and Road memorandum, the revocation of a Chinese port concession and “cold politics, hot economics” under some right-wing governments. However, China remains difficult to replace as a commodity buyer, infrastructure provider and partner in the digitalisation and green development of mineral resources. — Senior Research Fellow, Department for World Peace and Security Studies, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) (中美聚焦, 8 July).

8. AI & Tech

Zhu Songchun (朱松纯): Through the grand narrative of an “AGI race” and a capital bubble, the United States has successfully siphoned global capital into its domestic AI industry—the bubble will eventually burst, but the infrastructure will remain in the United States. Meanwhile, China ranks among the world leaders in the number of papers published, but its ability to define problems and open up new paradigms remains far too weak—China must abandon the mentality of a “follower” and stop copying the United States’ narrative framework. The true height of technological competition is autonomy in thought and narrative—this is, in essence, a cultural competition, not merely a technological one. We must break our “faith in data” and understand clearly that intelligence is led by values, not driven by data. Here the thousand-year exploration and discussion of the “heart” in Chinese thought points towards an AGI technological path based on Eastern philosophy and wisdom. — Director, Beijing Institute for General Artificial Intelligence; Dean, School of Intelligence Science and Technology, Peking University (知识分子, 19 July).

Huang Ping (黄平): Chinese AI has won the battle of “good enough and cheap”, but not the battle of “the strongest”, and America’s current restraint is a matter of choice, not a matter of capacity. Chinese models meet functional requirements while offering extremely good value for money, but America dominates the high-end market. America’s political toolkit remains largely unopened—Domestically, American companies using Chinese AI could easily be incorporated into a stricter regulatory framework, while America’s influence over its global network of allies is far stronger than it has so far demonstrated. Faced with this largely foreseeable blockade, China must prepare in advance. The limits of China’s power mean the best path is an indirect response, accelerating the depth of the global integration of its open-source ecosystem, focusing on the Global South and promoting local development of its weights. It should resist restricting foreign access to its strongest models. — Associate Professor and Assistant Dean, School of Public Policy; Deputy Director, Institute for International Affairs, Qianhai, CUHK-Shenzhen (大湾区评论, 15 July).

9. Society

Yao Yang (姚洋): Wang Hong’s Fields Medal shows what Chinese women can achieve, but the status of women in China is shrinking. In recent years, the space available for women to develop and flourish in China has shown signs of contraction. The socialist revolution launched a powerful movement for women’s liberation, and the number of women entering the workforce continued to grow with the transition to a market economy. However, the path for women into politics and public society is much narrower and within the senior cadre ranks there are only two female governors and no female provincial Party secretaries. Traditional thinking is returning, while overseas conservative thinking has also entered China, creating a trend of rejecting work to advance women’s rights. — Dean and Professor, Dishui Lake Advanced Finance Institute, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics (姚洋说, 29 July).

Zhou Lian (周濂) and Xu Jilin (许纪霖): Young Chinese are withdrawing from public life because repeated experiences of powerlessness have taught them that participation changes little. From the 1980s until around 2010, intellectuals and young people generally cared about public issues, but ten years ago, Chinese society underwent a significant change involving a turn towards the self and personal growth. Under the conditions of precarious and scarce employment, it is entirely understandable that young people treat “preserving the self” and “securing the present” as their primary objectives. Since reform and opening, those who received the greatest dividends were indeed the generations born in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. Among elites of this generation, the pathology is “dog-wisdom-ism” [狗智主义], meaning a cynicism that sees through hypocrisy but engages with it anyway, venting through irony rather than resistance. Meanwhile, China’s education system sets rules for children too early, limiting their creativity. — Zhou: Professor, School of Philosophy, Renmin University of China; Xu: Zijiang Scholar and Professor, Department of History, East China Normal University (许纪霖文化说, 13 July).

Dong Yue (董越): The mismatch between educational opportunity and job scarcity has produced a distinct group of graduate “squatting youth” [蹲族]—middle-class alumni of leading universities who remain outside of regular work, refusing jobs they regard as beneath the value of their education. They are distinct from those “lying flat”—rather than rejecting intense competition, their “squatting” is more strategic: through non-participation in employment, they resist competition they regard as unfair and standards of success they regard as alienating. Responses must move beyond the short-term logic of “forcing employment”. Structural and cultural problems require systematic solutions. Higher education should move from expansion based on scale towards high-quality development better adapted to economic needs and the government should improve social-security systems for freelancers, digital nomads and micro-entrepreneurs, providing low-cost environments for business incubation. — Faculty Member, School of International Education, Guangdong University of Finance (当代青年研究, 12 July).

Zhou Juan on The Social Costs of China’s Education System | (29 July)

Zhou Juan’s striking claim is that Chinese children suffer not from an “excess of self”, but from selves that have never been fully formed. Academic competition divides pupils into over-disciplined “good kids” and withdrawn “bad kids”, but both are deprived of the free play, sustained relationships and unstructured time needed to develop judgement, empathy and emotional resilience. The result, Zhou argues, is a generation whose inner lives become narrow enough to be dominated by grades, adult approval, phones or games. Today’s silent, fragile and mutually alienated pupils will become tomorrow’s university students and will shape the country’s future class structure, Zhou concludes. Read here

Shi Zhan on RMB Appreciation and Building a “Shadow China” Abroad (22 July)

Shi Zhan goes beyond a call for companies to invest overseas, setting out a wider architecture for China’s next phase of globalisation. His argument—including his suggestion that renminbi appreciation could attract foreign buyers of Chinese government bonds, giving Beijing additional fiscal resources with which to cushion the resulting employment pressures—is striking. But what makes the piece especially relevant to European policymakers is the tension between the emerging “Made with China” narrative and Shi’s frank admission that only the “front end” of Chinese manufacturing will move abroad. Read here

Investing in People—or Just More Things? | Economic Digest: June 2026 (14 July)

Last month’s economics digest examines whether “investing in people” signals genuine rebalancing or simply repackages the country’s long-standing preference for investment. Chinese economists connect weak demand with strained local finances, increasing reliance on government and SOE borrowing, depressed household incomes and property-sector damage. They debate remedies ranging from rural pensions and social security to debt restructuring and institutional reform. Read here

Justin Yifu Lin on Pessimism about the Chinese Economy (9 July)

Justin Yifu Lin challenges three increasingly common diagnoses of China’s slowdown: state-sector overreach, demographic ageing and balance-sheet recession. He argues that weak growth stems primarily from the prolonged global slowdown since 2008, while state-backed infrastructure has supported private firms rather than displacing them. Education can keep “effective labour” rising despite ageing, and China’s vast household deposits suggest that weak consumption reflects confidence rather than insufficient resources. Notably, he treats pessimistic economic commentary itself as a cause of weak expectations. Read here

American Decline, Chinese Exposure | Digest: June 2026 (6 July)

June’s Chinese policy debate is confident about America’s relative decline, but less relaxed about the vulnerabilities accompanying China’s own rise. This digest tracks contrasting readings of Trump’s Taiwan policy, the US–Iran agreement, Europe’s growing resistance to Chinese exports and a new phase of firms “going out”. It also looks at North Korea’s nuclear status, Russia’s demographic contraction, weak domestic demand, AI-driven job disruption, social over-competition and dependence on overseas critical-mineral supplies. Read here

Zhang Jian on China, the EU and Russia “De-Risking” from the US (3 July)

Zhang Jian turns the language of “de-risking” back on Washington. China, Russia and Europe, Zhang argues, are simultaneously reducing their exposure to American finance, technology and security power, producing the effect of a collective response to US hegemony even without any formal coordination. Trump’s return has worsened Europe’s strategic position, improved Russia’s and expanded Beijing’s room for manoeuvre. Meanwhile, the digital euro, European defence autonomy and local-currency settlement all help weaken dollar dominance and bloc politics. Zhang likely overstates both Europe’s convergence with China and Russia and the deterioration of its transatlantic ties, but a CICIR vice-president treating Western fragmentation as an opening for China is a notable signal. Read here

N.B. Sinification features a broad spectrum of voices, ranging from conservative hawks and state propagandists to more moderate and liberal thinkers. Readers are encouraged to bear this diversity in mind when engaging with the content.

The Beidaihe Break has officially started, signaled by the CCTV report on Cai Qi visiting “experts vacationing in Beidaihe”:

From the report:

The invitation by the CPC Central Committee and the State Council for outstanding experts to vacation in Beidaihe is an important institutional arrangement in the Party and state’s talent work. The theme of this year’s vacation program is “Make Contributions in the New Era.” Participants include experts in high technology and philosophy and the social sciences, as well as young talent in basic research and other fields.

党中央、国务院邀请优秀专家代表到北戴河休假，是党和国家人才工作的一项重要制度性安排。今年休假活动的主题是“建功新时代”，参加休假活动的有高科技领域、哲学社会科学领域专家和基础研究领域青年人才等。

I have yet to see an unofficial list of all the invitees. If anyone has one, please share it.

In this issue:

1. State Council executive meeting

2. Politb…

Read more

• Fifth Plenum scheduled for October, agenda is “to study major issues concerning the unremitting advancement of full and rigorous Party self-governance”;

• Diagnosis of economic situation section includes “it is necessary to attach great importance to the difficulties and challenges in economic performance 要高度重视经济运行中的困难挑战”, which suggests increasing concern about the state of economy;

• Readout language signals at least some additional, marginal policy support, including “promptly plan and introduce practical and effective incremental policies 及时谋划出台务实管用的增量政策”

Before we get into the full readout and comparisons with recent Politburo meeting readouts on the economy, some housekeeping:

• I published this week’s episode of Sharp China earlier today. You can listen to “Memory-Maker Makes History; New Robot Rules; The Open Weights Debate Rages; End of July News and Notes” here;

• The newsletter will be taking its version of the “Beidaihe Break” after this issue, so there will be no regular issues until mid-August. I may send out some shorter issues if anything interesting is going on;

• I have used AI to assist with this post by having ChatGPT create two tables comparing relevant language in the April 2026 and July 2026 readouts and the July 2024, 2025 and 2026 readouts, and one examining policy changes after those meetings that may have been signaled by language in the readouts. Let me know if you think this use of AI is useful.

I have included a full translation of the readout below. From the opening paragraph:

The Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held a meeting on July 30 and decided that the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China would be held in Beijing this October. Its main agenda will be for the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee to report its work to the Central Committee and to study major issues concerning the unremitting advancement of full and rigorous Party self-governance. The meeting analyzed and studied the current economic situation and made arrangements for economic work in the second half of the year. Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, presided over the meeting.

新华社北京7月30日电　中共中央政治局7月30日召开会议，决定今年10月在北京召开中国共产党第二十届中央委员会第五次全体会议，主要议程是，中共中央政治局向中央委员会报告工作，研究持之以恒推进全面从严治党若干重大问题。会议分析研究当前经济形势，部署下半年经济工作。中共中央总书记习近平主持会议。

So just as the Politburo meeting last July announced the Fourth Plenum would meet in October, this one announced that the Fifth Plenum will also convene in October.

The readout is worth poring over for economic signals, but ahead of the discussion of the economy are the second and third paragraphs which go into more detail about the “unremitting advancement of full and rigorous Party self-governance”, the main agenda of the October Fifth Plenum. And since that section is about the politics, and politics is always in command, it is important, and especially since this should be the last Plenum before the 21st Party Congress next year [CORRECTION: This is sloppy, there may be a sixth plenum that matters. The one right before the party congress, usually the seventh, is usually not that meaningful. Thanks for the comments on this. Apologies]. Here is the second paragraph:

The meeting pointed out that since the 18th Party Congress, full and rigorous Party self-governance had achieved great accomplishments, opened a new frontier in the self-reform of a century-old Party, driven historic achievements and historic changes in the cause of the Party and the country, and enabled the Party and the people to gain the historical initiative in building a strong Party and a strong country. At the same time, as international, national, and Party conditions undergo profound changes, full and rigorous Party self-governance also faces many new circumstances and new problems. From the strategic height of consolidating the Party’s governing position and fulfilling its mission and tasks, the entire Party must deeply understand the great significance of unremittingly advancing full and rigorous Party self-governance; maintain firm confidence and strategic resolve; uphold and apply the valuable experience of full and rigorous Party self-governance in the new era with higher standards and more concrete measures; rectify and resolve the prominent problems confronting Party building; and consolidate and develop the favorable political environment created through managing and governing the Party.

会议指出，党的十八大以来，全面从严治党取得伟大成就，开辟了百年大党自我革命新境界，推动党和国家事业取得历史性成就、发生历史性变革，党和人民赢得强党强国的历史主动。同时，随着世情国情党情发生深刻变化，全面从严治党也面临许多新情况新问题。全党必须从巩固党的执政地位、实现党的使命任务的战略高度，深刻认识持之以恒推进全面从严治党的重大意义，坚定信心，保持定力，以更高标准、更实举措把新时代全面从严治党宝贵经验坚持好、运用好，把党的建设面临的突出问题整治好、解决好，把管党治党形成的良好政治局面巩固好、发展好。

The pressure on cadres will not lessen, and that political pressure, especially as we are well into the personnel jockeying ahead of the 2027 21st Party Congress, may spill over into policymaking and cadre behavior, in a constraining way.

In the fourth paragraph, the one that sums up economic performance so far this year, there is one interesting change in language:

The meeting held that since the beginning of this year, the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core had united and led the entire Party and the Chinese people of all ethnic groups in forging ahead and striving courageously, coordinating the domestic and international situations and development and security, and responding effectively to various external shocks and internal difficulties. China’s economy had displayed a development trend in which growth drivers were becoming newer and the structure was improving. At the same time, it is necessary to attach great importance to the difficulties and challenges in economic performance, remain confident, confront difficulties head-on, make good use of all opportunities and advantages, and ensure that high-quality development proceeds steadily and reaches far.

会议认为，今年以来，以习近平同志为核心的党中央团结带领全党全国各族人民锐意进取、奋勇拼搏，坚持统筹国内国际两个大局，统筹发展和安全，有效应对各种外部冲击和内部困难，我国经济呈现动能向新、结构向优的发展态势。同时，要高度重视经济运行中的困难挑战，坚定信心，迎难而上，用好各种机遇和优势，推动高质量发展行稳致远。

“At the same time, it was necessary to attach great importance to the difficulties and challenges in economic performance 同时，要高度重视经济运行中的困难挑战” would be seem to be an acknowledgement that the economy is not doing well.

The relevant April 2026 readout section said “China’s economy has gotten off to a strong start, with major indicators exceeding expectations and demonstrating strong resilience and vitality. At the same time, the economy also faces some difficulties and challenges, and the foundation for sustained economic recovery and improvement still needs to be further consolidated.”

This adjusted diagnosis could open the door to new, incremental policies, and in the next paragraph it says just that - “promptly plan and introduce practical and effective incremental policies 及时谋划出台务实管用的增量政策”:

The meeting emphasized that economic work in the second half of the year must be guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era; uphold the general principle of pursuing progress while ensuring stability; fully, accurately, and comprehensively apply the new development philosophy; accelerate the creation of a new development pattern; better coordinate the domestic and international situations and development and security; persist in deepening reform and opening; and accelerate the transition between old and new growth drivers. It must properly implement the more proactive fiscal policy and moderately loose monetary policy; give full play to the effectiveness of all existing policies; promptly plan and introduce practical and effective incremental policies; step up countercyclical adjustment; make greater efforts to expand domestic demand and optimize supply; earnestly safeguard and improve people’s wellbeing; strengthen the drivers of development and stimulate social vitality; promote the economy’s continued movement toward newer drivers, better structure, and stronger performance; and strive to secure a good start to the 15th Five-Year Plan.

会议强调，做好下半年经济工作，要坚持以习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想为指导，坚持稳中求进工作总基调，完整准确全面贯彻新发展理念，加快构建新发展格局，更好统筹国内国际两个大局，统筹发展和安全，坚持深化改革开放，加快推动新旧动能转换，实施好更加积极的财政政策和适度宽松的货币政策，充分发挥各项存量政策效能，及时谋划出台务实管用的增量政策，加大逆周期调节力度，加力扩大内需、优化供给，切实保障和改善民生，增强发展动力、激发社会活力，推动经济持续向新向优向好发展，努力实现“十五五”良好开局。

The readout includes language about balanced trade, so perhaps there is a recognition that the trade imbalances are becoming a real problem?

The meeting pointed out the need to expand the scope for mutually beneficial international economic and trade cooperation, vigorously develop trade in services, and promote balanced trade development. It called for improving the system for managing outward investment and the comprehensive overseas service system, and for actively attracting and utilizing foreign investment.

会议指出，要拓展国际经贸互利合作空间，大力发展服务贸易，促进贸易平衡发展。完善对外投资管理制度和海外综合服务体系，积极吸引和利用外资。

Real estate is mentioned in the risks section, as are capital markets:

The meeting emphasized the need to firmly strengthen the security barrier. It called for stabilizing the real-estate market; properly implementing the package of debt-resolution plans; making solid progress in reforming local small and medium-sized financial institutions to resolve risks, reduce their number, and improve their quality; deepening comprehensive reform of investment and financing in the capital market; and increasing the capital market’s resilience and confidence. It also called for thoroughly identifying and rectifying all types of risks and hidden dangers and resolutely preventing major and especially serious accidents. It demanded stronger investigation and remediation of hidden dangers involving unsafe reservoirs, river embankments, areas at risk of mountain torrents and geological disasters, and low-lying urban locations prone to waterlogging; solid work in flood control, emergency response, rescue, and disaster relief; and every effort to protect people’s lives and property.

会议强调，要切实筑牢安全屏障。稳定房地产市场，实施好一揽子化债方案，扎实推进地方中小金融机构改革化险、减量提质。深化资本市场投融资综合改革，提升资本市场韧性和信心。深入排查整治各类风险隐患，坚决遏制重特大事故发生。加强对病险水库、江河堤防、山洪和地质灾害危险区、城市低洼易涝点等隐患排查治理，扎实做好防汛应急抢险救灾各项工作，全力维护人民群众生命财产安全。

Ahead of the tables, here is the translation of the readout, with language I find interesting in bold.

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On today's show Andrew and Bill begin with reactions to CXMT's IPO success this week, including responses from legislators in Washington and the stakes of Apple's continued lobbying fight to relax restrictions on US companies working with PRC memory firms. Then: The FCC announces rules restricting the import of new, foreign-made robots and power inverters in a move to curb security risks and fuel onshoring. From there: Surveying the ongoing debate over the future of open weights models, including disadvantages facing US-led open source AI efforts, MOFCOM's statement on distillation and Silicon Valley's support for Chinese open weights AI, and the risks of building atop PRC AI infrastructure. At the end: Expectations for the July Politburo meeting, news out of Iran that may threaten constructive strategic stability in advance of Xi's visit to D.C., a bad few weeks for Mercedes, and more clashes between the PRC and the Philippines.

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In this issue:

1. RMB and global imbalances

2. PRC sending missiles to Iran?

3. National Plan for Addressing Climate Change During the ‘15th Five-Year Plan

4. China’s commercial space expansion

5. 6-year-old dies after Shanghai gene-editing treatment

The Feed: Business, Economy and Trade - Politics and Law - Foreign and Defense Affairs - Hong Kong - Taiwan - Tech and Media - Society, Arts, Sports, Culture and History - Energy, Environment, Science and Health -Education

Look for this week’s episode of Sharp China in your inboxes in about 11 hours. The title of this episode is “A Memory-Maker Makes History; New Robot Rules; The Open Weights Debate Rages; End of July News and Notes”.

Today’s top items:

1. RMB and global imbalances - Gita Gopinath, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas and Hélène Rey - two former IMF chief economists and the incoming chief economic advisor at the Bank for International Settlements, respectively - wrote “Don’t blame global imbalances on t…

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1. Xi meets Slovak President

2. “Excess capacity” or “Overcapacity”?

3. CXMT IPO the day after

4. Xinhua’s mid-year review of the Chinese economy

5. Li Qiang commemorates the 50th anniversary of the Tangshan earthquake

6. National Conference on Overseas Chinese Affairs Work

7. AI and chips

8. US to ban new PRC robots

The Feed: Business, Economy and Trade - Politics and Law - Foreign and Defense Affairs - Hong Kong - Taiwan - Tech and Media - Society, Arts, Sports, Culture and History - Energy, Environment, Science and Health

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And then on or around August 1 the top leaders will disappear from public for two weeks or so for the “Beidaihe Break”, even though we do not know if they all go to the seaside resort. Last year at this time there were lots of crazy rumors about Xi and possible coups; this year the rumor mill so far has been very quiet.

Today’s top items:

1. CXMT IPO - Hefei-based DRAM memory maker ChangXin Memory Technologies (CXMT) has the second largest IPO in PRC history Monday. Its shares rose 466% on their first trading day, valuing Hefei state-owned entities’ combined 36.79% stake at more than RMB 1.2 trillion after roughly RMB 30 billion in investment over a decade.

2. Taxing…

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1. CSRC Symposium on Party Building and Regulatory Work - According to a readout today, the China Securities Regulatory Commission “held a symposium on Party building and regulatory work to thoroughly study and implement Xi Jinping Thought on Party Building, conscientiously implement the decisions and arrangements of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, the Central Economic Work Conference and other important meetings, and, in accordance with the requirements of the meeting on Party building work in the financial system, review Party building and regulatory work across the system in the first half of the year, analyze the current situation, and push to complete the year's goals and tasks.” I have posted a translation here.

The meeting was not specifically about propping up the stock market, but the first of the seven tasks the readout listed

take comprehensive measures to fully safeguard stable market operations and enhance the resilience of the c…

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