China’s Political Discourse September 2022: We are all on that bus
By China Media Project
In the month ahead of the 20th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which closed last week in Beijing, Xi Jinping made his first overseas trip in three years since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic. His destinations were Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. A missive published in the CCP’s official People’s Daily newspaper said that Central Asia was a strategic choice for China as the “friend circle” (朋友圈) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was intended to break through the “encircling ring” (包围圈) the United States has directed against China in recent years. For a more detailed discussion, please refer to the “Foreign Leaders” section for a more detailed discussion.
But one of the most impactful and symbolic stories in September 2022 was the deadly overturning of a transport bus in Guizhou province carrying positive Covid cases to quarantine facilities outside the capital city in the dead of night. The crash, which killed 27 people, was understood by many Chinese commenting online as one of the bloodiest and most tragic outcomes of the “at all costs” (不惜一切代价) approach to be resolutely followed nationwide under the leadership’s zero Covid policy.
As the nation chattered across social media about the specific policies and measures implemented in Guizhou that had contributed to the fatal crash, the overturning of the transport bus became a symbol of tragedies that now seem unavoidable to many in the face of uncompromising politics. The Guizhou bus crash, a fitting prelude to the institutional risks on display at the recent 20th Congress, provides the focus of this month’s discourse summary.
Focus Topic
A patient transfer leads to tragedy
In September, the city of Guiyang, the capital of Guizhou province, experienced an outbreak of new Covid cases. Beginning on September 16, the Gui’an New Area (贵安新区), an urban area that lies between Anyang proper and the neighboring metro area of Anshun, instituted a policy of three consecutive days of mandatory PCR testing for residents. Close contacts of positive cases were subjected to collectively forced quarantine under the zero Covid policy.
On September 17, the Covid response authorities in Gui’an issued a news release reporting that 7,396 cases had already been transferred to quarantine facilities outside the city area. According to statistics released by the Guiyang Health Bureau, a total of 230 positive and symptomatic Covid cases had been identified in the city in the first 29 full days of September, in addition to 1,543 asymptomatic cases. At that time, 81 symptomatic cases had already been released from hospital care, while 880 asymptomatic cases had been released from medical observation. At the time of the city’s release, the bureau reported 149 symptomatic cases and 663 asymptomatic cases.
Judging from this official release, it could be estimated that the 230 positive and symptomatic cases reported were the sum of the 81 cases already released from the hospital and the 149 symptomatic cases at the time of the release. But there had been no deaths reported at all in Guiyang for September. The numbers suggest that had positive Covid cases not been transferred to quarantine facilities outside the city under hazardous conditions in the dead of night, the numbers on Guiyang’s Covid prevention report card would have looked clean by month’s end.
But tragedy struck in the immediate wake of the September 17 release by authorities in Gui’an. According to a government press conference, a transport bus with 47 people, 45 of whom were positive Covid cases for transfer to a Covid quarantine facility in Libo County, overturned on the expressway in the early morning hours of September 18. The accident occurred at around 2:40 AM, the bus careening into a deep ditch along the side of the expressway, killing 27 and injuring 20.
The late-night operation of passenger transport buses does not comply with Chinese regulations. Article 38 of the Code of Safety Management for Road Passenger Transport Enterprises, which was revised in 2018, stipulates that long-distance passenger vehicles should cease operations or apply shuttle transportation (接驳运输) between the hours of 2 AM and 5 AM. “Shuttle transportation” means they must ensure drivers on late shifts are relieved by well-rested reserve drivers riding along for the journey. But clearly, these regulations, created expressly for the safety of passengers, had been violated in the name of Covid prevention. (See CMP’s “When Laws Fail for Policies”).
After the accident, official state media reporting focused mainly on press conferences and official statements, such as the announcement that Guizhou province was organizing a fact-finding mission into the responsibility of “cadres involved” (涉事干部). But there was no public reporting of the names of the victims.
In a period during which in-depth and investigative reporting has withered on the vine in China, this has been the usual practice in the disclosure of information on accidents. One exception in this case was Caixin Media (财新传媒), which still sought to do professional reporting. Contacting friends of accident victims, a reporter from Caixin learned that the passengers on the bus were mostly residents of an area called Xiangyang Compound (向阳大院) in Guiyang’s Yunyan District. Before being subjected to collective quarantine, they had been told by prevention personnel that infections were detected in the area.
Among the small number of publications in China that offered meaningful coverage or commentary on the Guiyang accident was the Shanghai Law Journal (上海法治报), published under the umbrella of the state-owned Shanghai United Media Group. In an article on October 4 called, “Can a Steep Price Prompt Change to the Legal System in Dealing with Emergencies?” The article observed: "In this case, the bus was on the highway in the middle of the night, but with just one driver who, moreover, wore protective clothing throughout [the journey], which might easily create the risk of fatigue while driving."
The article posed the critical question: “Is it of most urgent importance that transfer targets be reached and the numbers look good? Or is it most important to carefully and seriously ensure the life and safety of residents facing the epidemic?”
But in the days and weeks that followed the tragedy, the vast majority of coverage focused on the unwavering necessity of robust and uncompromising measures to contain and eradicate Covid. On September 19, the day after the deadly accident, and even as the names of the victims remained unknown, the front page of Guizhou Daily, published by the province’s propaganda department, ran a commentary that doubled down on the policy. It spoke of using the “strongest fighting force” (最强战斗力) to “extinguish” the epidemic.
The official silence on the tragedy contrasted sharply with voices on social media, which emphasized the sense of a deep and far-reaching social and political crisis caused by Covid policies. The Guizhou bus crash became for many a metaphor for leadership failures and their crushing consequences: “We are all on that bus,” many users on social media wrote.
In a post to a WeChat group translated by CMP, Gao Yu (高昱), deputy executive editor at Caixin, wrote: ““We must wake up! We must return to normalcy!”
August Surprises
Not even for a minute
In an article published in the fifth 2022 edition of the journal China Cyberspace (中国网信), Xinhua News Agency chief Fu Hua (傅华) said: “As a strategic position in the Party’s news and public opinion work, Xinhua News Agency must speak politics with a clear banner, persistently strengthening online propaganda for Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era, taking [the concept] as the logical starting point of news reporting.”
The CCP’s official news agency, he said, must continue to be “a strong voice of the era for the ‘Two Upholds,’” referring to the protection of Xi Jinping’s “core” status and the protection of the leadership of the Central Committee. Finally, he said that the agency must “achieve not even for a minute outside the camp of the Party, not even one minute deviating from the guiding direction of General Secretary Xi Jinping, and not even one minute straying from the perspective of General Secretary Xi Jinping and the Party’s Central Committee.”
Fu’s “three minutes” statement was discussed on social media and online, where one commenter remarked that one minute was far too long — and that one second would be more suited to the times. They suggested, tongue in cheek, that the Cultural Revolution and the battle against the capitalists and bitter criticism of the “revisionists” might be a decent reference case — in which “in the flash of bitter struggling against the ‘private,’ a revolution could be made in the depths of the soul.”
The Tropical Rainforest Shopping Festival
Beginning on August 25, the city of Chengdu in Sichuan province experienced an outbreak of Covid-19. On August 29, an internet user with the alias “Tropical Rainforest” (热带雨林) wrote that leaders in Chengdu had met to discuss shutting the city down, and this prompted many city residents to rush to supermarkets to stock up on food and supplies.
Online posts showed stores full of bare shelves, and one comment remarked that “Tropical Rainforest” had with one simple post achieved the annual sales targets of all supermarkets in the city. This several-day period during the first week of September was nicknamed the “Tropical Rainforest Shopping Festival” (热带雨林购物节).
On August 30, police in Chengdu announced that they had arrested a certain “She ____” (佘某某), the individual behind the “Tropical Rainforest” account, on charges of picking quarrels and provoking trouble (寻衅滋事), a broad category of offenses deemed by the authorities to have been harmful to social order. The suspect was detained for 15 days and issued a fine of 1,000 yuan.
Beginning at 6 PM on September 1, Chengdu instituted city-wide home isolation management measures for residents and organized several rounds of compulsory PCR testing. The rumors spread by "Tropical Rainforest" were then deemed by internet users to have been prophecies.
All beings suffer, but Paris pastries are sweet
At the start of September, a punishment issued by the Shanghai Municipal Market Supervision Administration against Paris Baguette, a bakery brand, created a social uproar. The issue went back to the Shanghai lockdown in April this year when the brand closed its Shanghai factory and arranged for employees who were unable to return to their homes due to lockdown measures to remain at a company training center, where they learned to use company equipment and supplies and made bread for their own use.
As the lockdown situation intensified, the employees decided to sell the bread they made in group purchases. In all, they made 400 group packages of pastry and bread products worth an estimated 58,500 yuan, selling these to customers under lockdown. In response to the case, arguing that the training center had not obtained a food production and operation license, the Shanghai Municipal Market Supervision Administration confiscated the full amount of the operating proceeds and additionally imposed a fine on the company equivalent to 10 times the value of the goods sold.
Many internet users felt that the fine against Paris Baguette for operating during the lockdown was a great injustice, and many flocked to the bread shop to purchase goods as an act of solidarity. During the Shanghai lockdown, many said, food supplies had been seriously short, and the ability to buy pastries had been precious. A slogan emerged online, even shared as traditional calligraphy: “All beings suffer, but Paris pastries are sweet.”
The Hot and the Cold
About the Scale:
According to the discourse scale developed by CMP in 2016, based on a historical analysis of keywords appearing in the China Communist Party’s flagship People’s Daily newspaper, we define a six-tier system of discourse intensity based on the total number of appearances of a given discourse term on a per article basis for the full year in the paper. The scale is as follows:
In 2021, CMP adjusted its classification method for CCP discourse, determining the intensity (热度) of Party terminologies according to the absolute number of articles including those terms in the People's Daily newspaper. Previously, CMP used a proportional method, which looked at the number of articles including a particular catchphrase (提法) as a ratio of total articles in the newspaper over a given period. Our monthly classification standard, based on the six-level scale created in 2016, is as follows:
In September, the top of the CMP scale included the terms “Belt and Road” (一带一路) and “Covid-19” (新冠肺炎) on top of phrases already in Tier 1 in August, including “since the 18th National Congress” (十八大以来) and “with Comrade Xi Jinping as the core” (以习近平同志为核心).
The phrase “Belt and Road” rose to its highest point in 2022 in September owing to the 22nd Council of Heads of State Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Eurasian security and economic organization that includes China, Russia, and Central Asia countries.
The term “the 20th CCP National Congress” also reached a high in September as the important quinquennial meeting approached. While the term remained in Tier 2, where it has held steady all year, it recorded a total of 154 articles, closing in on the 167-article threshold for Tier 1.
The set of terminologies signaling the power and position of General Secretary Xi Jinping held steady in Tier 2 for September. These included Xi’s so-called “banner term,” or qizhiyu (旗帜语), “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想), as well as the “Two Establishes” (两个确立), the “Four Confidences” (四个自信), the “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识) and the “Two Upholds” (两个维护), which can also be called the “Two Safeguards.”
During the second half of August, the “Two Establishes,” which has been a term of significance since the Sixth Plenum in November 2021, pointing to the need to affirm Xi as the “core” and his ideas as the source of Party guidance, seemed to lose its steam within the official CCP discourse. But by the first week of September, as the 20th National Congress drew closer, the phrase was clearly back on track.
The five most important permutations of Xi’s banner phrase for various policy areas made no significant moves in September. “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization” (习近平生态文明思想), the phrase pointing to Xi’s policies on environmental protection and sustainability, led the group, rising one level to Tier 3, where it joined the generally strong “Xi Jinping Thought on Rule of Law” (习近平法治思想). “Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military” (习近平强军思想) remained in Tier 4. “Xi Jinping Thought on the Economy” dropped one level to Tier 5, where it joined the general laggard of the group, “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” (习近平外交思想).
It is worth noting that the phrase "public opinion channeling" (舆论引导) —closely related to the press control phrase "public opinion guidance" (舆论导向) — appeared in the People's Daily on September 5, included in a report about the issuance by the General Office of the CCP Central Committee and the General Office of the State Council of the document Opinions on the Further Strengthening the Popularization of Science and Technology in a New Era (关于新时代进一步加强科学技术普及工作的意见). In fact, a number of points in this document, ostensibly about the need to enhance general education about science in Chinese society, are weighed down by political demands, a point worth bearing in mind as the CCP leadership has lately placed a strong emphasis on science and innovation as the path forward for development. Xi Jinping’s political report to the 20th National Congress of the CCP on October 16 emphasized self-reliance in science, and made a point of noting: “We accelerated the self-reliance and self-improvement in science and technology, and the expenditure on R&D of the whole society increased from one trillion yuan to two trillion and eight hundred billion yuan [over the past 10 years], ranking second in the world, and our total number of R&D personnel ranked first in the world.”
But real results in science and technology could be hampered if China rewards political obedience and relevance over substantive education, career professionalism, and real innovation.
The September opinion on science popularization emphasized that “the political nature of science popularization work be emphasized.” Article 25, meanwhile, demanded that “public opinion channeling in the science popularization sector [must be] strengthened.” It reads: "[We must] adhere to the correct political stance, strengthening the construction and supervision of public opinion positions in science popularization."
This clearly establishes CCP-led political correctness as a precondition in the popularization of science concepts and education in a way that has not been seen so overtly in the reform era. The CCP seems to be consolidating what it sees as its prerogative in offering explanations in the arena of science and technology.
Considering ongoing controversies over Covid-19 pandemic prevention policies, such a political emphasis within the science field would mean that even if scientific studies were available to confirm that a strain had mutated, the sharing of such information with the public would have to take into account the correct political stance and the prerogatives of national security, broadly defined.
The following table shows the key terms we reviewed for the month of September 2022 and how they rated on our scale:
Monthly Hot Words
The “Two Establishes”
In September 2022 there were a total of 1,566 articles in provincial-level official CCP newspapers that mentioned the “Two Establishes” phrase, one of the most important buzzwords signaling the power of Xi Jinping. The numbers in September actually represented a drop of 12.2 percent from July levels and a drop of 12.8 percent from August levels, bringing the intensity of coverage closer to the level seen back in May and June.
The “Two Establishes” has been an important phrase to watch through 2022, as it is meant to signal the legitimacy of Xi Jinping’s rule, and pose a challenge to any who might resist his leadership. The top provinces using the phrase in September were Guangxi, which had 94 articles and made the top three for the second time this year; Shaanxi, also with 94 articles, making the top three for the first time; and Xinjiang, which had 86 articles, making the top three for the first time. In April and June 2022, Xinjiang was in the bottom three in terms of total mentions of the “Two Establishes.”
The bottom three municipalities and provinces in September were Shanghai, which recorded just 22 articles, putting it in the bottom three for the fifth time this year; Ningxia, which also had 22 articles, putting it in the bottom three for the first time; and Liaoning, which had 26 articles, putting it in the bottom three for the fourth time.
Eight provinces in September published far fewer articles including the “Two Establishes” than in previous months. These were: Shanxi, Sichuan, Tianjin, Guizhou, Henan, Liaoning, Guangdong, and Tibet. This is likely explained by the different strategies employed by various provincial-level leadership groups as the 20th National Congress of the CCP drew near. While a general sense of uncertainty likely prompted some to hedge by toning down over pro-Xi signaling, others chose the opposite approach.
Now that the 20th National Congress has closed, and Xi Jinping’s dominance of the Party has been consolidated and reinvigorated, it will be important to continue monitoring the progress of the “Two Establishes” phrase into 2023 to see how it develops, and how it is accompanied by other signaling phrases.
The Centrality Index
From September 14 to 16, Xi Jinping took part in the 22nd Council of Heads of State Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Samarqand, the capital of Uzbekistan. His trip included formal state visits to both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The trip was Xi’s first outside the country since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020.
Looking closely at the People’s Daily newspaper from September 17 to 26, there were no reports whatsoever during this period of Xi Jinping taking part in official events. The only reports were of letters and messages from the general secretary that did not require his physical presence. This was likely due to the fact that Xi underwent a 10-day quarantine upon his return to China from the SCO meeting.
For the full month of September, Xi Jinping appeared in 689 articles in the People’s Daily, far outstripping all other members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC). The second-place finisher on the PSC was Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥), who logged just 32 articles in the newspaper — a staggering 657 less than Xi. In third position was Yang Jiechi (杨洁篪) with 28 articles, followed by Premier Li Keqiang (李克强), in fourth place, with just 26 articles. Li Zhanshu (栗战书) brought up the rear with 21 articles for the month.
Ding and Yang moved slightly in September as both accompanied Xi Jinping to the SCO meeting in Samarqand. Wang Yang was also present, but received slightly less attention. Premier Li moved up one level in coverage, from Tier 4 to Tier 3. Despite his last-place finish, Li Zhanshu actually jumped two levels in September, from Tier 5 to Tier 3, as a result of visits to Mongolia, Nepal, South Korea and Russia, where he took part in the 7th Eastern Economic Forum, held in Vladivostok.
On Sunday, October 23, a new crop of Standing Committee members marched out before the media at the Great Hall of the People. In a further mark of consolidation of power at the top of the CCP, all six of the Standing Committee members lined up with Xi were known to be staunch loyalists, unlikely to voice even the slightest opposition to his policies and approaches. The same is true more broadly of the Party’s Central Committee, comprising 205 members known to be loyal to the general secretary. One expert rightly called the CCP's new politburo "an emphatic statement of Xi's dominance over the party."
CMP’s November and December reports should offer an interesting glimpse in the People’s Daily of the gap in official press coverage between Xi Jinping and the remaining six. Questions that have lingered through 2022 over the relative visibility of Xi versus his number two, Premier Li Keqiang, and possible gaps in messaging — noted in our May report — could fade into the past, as uniformity of message creates relative uniformity in press coverage across the board.
Foreign Leaders
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Samarqand in September brought a rally in People’s Daily coverage for Russian President Vladimir Putin, who has alternatively run cold and warm through 2022. Putin appeared in a total of 14 articles for September, taking him all the up from Tier 6 at the bottom of the CMP scale, to the upper end of Tier 4. One more article would have tipped the Russian leader into Tier 3.
But the real beneficiary of the SCO meeting in terms of official People’s Daily press coverage (a paltry prize to be sure) was the president of the host country Uzbekistan, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who appeared in a total of 26 articles in September. Naturally, this had far more to do with Xi Jinping than with Mirziyoyev. For Xi's visit, Uzbekistan specially created a prize it boasted as its highest foreign honor, the so-called "Supreme Friendship" medal. Xi Jinping was given the first such medal during his visit, his medal numbered “001.” This was of course the perfect opportunity for CCP media, including the People’s Daily, to emphasize both the degree of respect Xi receives from Central Asian leaders and the deep friendship between China and other member states — the subtext being the “friend circle” (朋友圈) of the SCO that is meant to break the “encircling ring” (包围圈) of US containment of China.
Similarly, joining Mirziyoyev in the relatively hot Tier 3 was the President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who awarded Xi Jinping with the “Order of the Golden Eagle,” or “Altyn Qyran,” during Xi’s visit to the Ak Orda Presidential Palace in Kazakhstan’s capital of Astana.
In Tier 4, one level below Mirziyoyev and Tokayev, was Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. Narendra Modi, the prime minister of India, appeared in four articles in September, rising from Tier 6 to Tier 5. There he was joined by the President of Kyrgyzstan, Sadyr Japarov, and the president of Tajikistan, Emomali Rahmon.
Despite his country’s status as an SCO dialogue partner, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan remained in cold Tier 6 territory in September. US President Joe Biden — the leader in China’s estimation of the “encircling ring” — was only slightly warmer. Biden appeared in four articles in the People’s Daily in September, barely making the cutoff for Tier 5. Two of these articles appeared on September 24, both dealing with Wang Yi’s visit with Henry Kissinger, during which he urged the United States, according to official media reports, to “properly handle the Taiwan question.”
Among the national leaders not appearing at all in the People’s Daily in September were German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, Chilean President Sebastian Pinera — and of course Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who has disappeared from the CCP’s flagship newspaper since January, before Russia’s invasion of his country.
US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, the top-performing foreign politician in the People’s Daily in August owing to the lingering impact of her visit to Taiwan, the focus of last month’s CMP report, returned to Tier 6, at the bottom of the CMP scale. Pelosi appeared in just one article for all of September, a marked slide from her staggering 71 articles in August. This article was a report on the official visit to Russia of Li Zhanshu, the now former third-ranking member of the PSC and chairman of the standing committee of the National People’s Congress. During Li’s visit to Moscow, Chinese state media emphasized remarks from Russian counterparts criticizing Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.
Offering a sneak peek into October, which the 20th National Congress has made a busy month for discourse watchers, we can note that Pelosi also appears just once, but in one of the most consequential documents of the year — the CCP’s official chronicle of “major events” since the 19th Congress in 2017. In the massive document, a retelling of CCP history to favor Xi Jinping and the past 10 years, the first entry for August 2022 deals with Pelosi’s Taiwan visit. The entry noted that the consensus in China’s leadership was that “China will take all necessary measures to resolutely defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and all consequences arising therefrom must be the responsibility of the US side and the secessionist forces of 'Taiwan independence.'"