We had a great discussion about his personal experience shepherding Zhang Youxia around the US many years ago, his work on US-China military-to-military relations, and the disappearance in 2023 of South China Morning Post reporter Minnie Chan.
Great interview. I had the opportunity to work on some of the mil-to-mil dialogues with Drew and I know that his insight is invaluable.
On my second listen, I gained even more from the conversation than I expected. I then went back to read the PLA Daily editorial and a thought popped into my mind after reading: "...巩固深化政治整训成果，推动人民军队换羽重生，为强军事业发展注入强大动力." (Consolidating and deepening the achievements of political rectification will drive the transformation and rejuvenation of the People's Liberation Army, injecting powerful momentum into the development of a strong military.)
Drew talked about Zhang being a stabilizing force to the PLA leadership and to Xi—the most senior uniformed advisor who understood the cost of combat. Zhang knew that winning and losing, living and dying in combat has nothing to do with political loyalty or political fervor. It has to do with training (combat competency), and sometimes dumb luck (though you could define luck as when preparation meets opportunity). The thing is, I don't think Xi can make that distinction. He seems to view political discipline as the foundation of combat power. Zhang knew it took more than just pretty-looking equipment, reading PLA Daily articles, and chanting slogans.
This is where that PLA Daily quote hits me: the message that "political rectification will drive the transformation and rejuvenation of the PLA" is being positioned as the foundation of combat power. But that's backwards. Good military training and military discipline is the foundation of combat power, period.
Here's my complete speculation—and I want to emphasize I have absolutely no evidence for this, it's just me thinking out loud based on almost 3 decades in the Army and about 2 decades of looking at the PLA: Zhang's competence may have threatened Xi because Zhang was exactly the type of general who could lead a coup. Not that he would—but he could. He had the respect, the combat experience, the intellect, and the capability to do so if he chose to. And for someone as paranoid as Xi has to be to survive in that position, that combination of traits in a subordinate—even a friend—is dangerous. Zhang could potentially tell Xi things Xi didn't want to hear about PLA capabilities and the costs of conflict. Competent generals with that kind of credibility are both the most valuable and the most threatening.
Again, pure speculation on my part. But watching Xi push for both more realistic training (which actually builds combat effectiveness) while simultaneously doubling down on political solidarity and control... there's a fundamental tension there that feels unresolvable.
Thanks Bill and Drew for the podcast. Brilliant. It made my morning walk here in the Adelaide Hills among the vineyards and horse and cattle studs more informative and enjoyable. What struck me was how much Drew knew what he was talking about, without coming over as ideological about China. His pragmatism about how these relations work, and often don't, was matched by many personal insights into and almost affection for the value of the relationships he established and maintained.
I agree with his insights into Xi's thinking and the risk of advisors telling him 'what he wants to hear', much like the White House, though with Xi the danger is it is more what his advisors 'think he wants to hear.' In the White House there are genuinely dangerous and obnoxious ideologues advising the President, though I am reluctant to draw any comparison between Wang Huning and Stephen Miller.
I also agree with Drew on Taiwan, though I would add that Xi is unlikely ever to invade because the one thing above everything else he abhors is luan, and domestic and international chaos is most certainly what will ensure. I have no idea whether that is what Zhang Youxia was advising.
Great interview. I had the opportunity to work on some of the mil-to-mil dialogues with Drew and I know that his insight is invaluable.
On my second listen, I gained even more from the conversation than I expected. I then went back to read the PLA Daily editorial and a thought popped into my mind after reading: "...巩固深化政治整训成果，推动人民军队换羽重生，为强军事业发展注入强大动力." (Consolidating and deepening the achievements of political rectification will drive the transformation and rejuvenation of the People's Liberation Army, injecting powerful momentum into the development of a strong military.)
Drew talked about Zhang being a stabilizing force to the PLA leadership and to Xi—the most senior uniformed advisor who understood the cost of combat. Zhang knew that winning and losing, living and dying in combat has nothing to do with political loyalty or political fervor. It has to do with training (combat competency), and sometimes dumb luck (though you could define luck as when preparation meets opportunity). The thing is, I don't think Xi can make that distinction. He seems to view political discipline as the foundation of combat power. Zhang knew it took more than just pretty-looking equipment, reading PLA Daily articles, and chanting slogans.
This is where that PLA Daily quote hits me: the message that "political rectification will drive the transformation and rejuvenation of the PLA" is being positioned as the foundation of combat power. But that's backwards. Good military training and military discipline is the foundation of combat power, period.
Here's my complete speculation—and I want to emphasize I have absolutely no evidence for this, it's just me thinking out loud based on almost 3 decades in the Army and about 2 decades of looking at the PLA: Zhang's competence may have threatened Xi because Zhang was exactly the type of general who could lead a coup. Not that he would—but he could. He had the respect, the combat experience, the intellect, and the capability to do so if he chose to. And for someone as paranoid as Xi has to be to survive in that position, that combination of traits in a subordinate—even a friend—is dangerous. Zhang could potentially tell Xi things Xi didn't want to hear about PLA capabilities and the costs of conflict. Competent generals with that kind of credibility are both the most valuable and the most threatening.
Again, pure speculation on my part. But watching Xi push for both more realistic training (which actually builds combat effectiveness) while simultaneously doubling down on political solidarity and control... there's a fundamental tension there that feels unresolvable.
Thanks Bill and Drew for the podcast. Brilliant. It made my morning walk here in the Adelaide Hills among the vineyards and horse and cattle studs more informative and enjoyable. What struck me was how much Drew knew what he was talking about, without coming over as ideological about China. His pragmatism about how these relations work, and often don't, was matched by many personal insights into and almost affection for the value of the relationships he established and maintained.
I agree with his insights into Xi's thinking and the risk of advisors telling him 'what he wants to hear', much like the White House, though with Xi the danger is it is more what his advisors 'think he wants to hear.' In the White House there are genuinely dangerous and obnoxious ideologues advising the President, though I am reluctant to draw any comparison between Wang Huning and Stephen Miller.
I also agree with Drew on Taiwan, though I would add that Xi is unlikely ever to invade because the one thing above everything else he abhors is luan, and domestic and international chaos is most certainly what will ensure. I have no idea whether that is what Zhang Youxia was advising.