Triangles and Chokepoints | Sinification: April 2026
Global Order | US-China | Europe | Russia | East Asia | Trade and Resource Security | Economics | Artificial Intelligence
This monthly report is prepared for Sinocism by the excellent Sinification, an invaluable resource for understanding how domestic and international affairs are debated within the Chinese establishment. — Bill
The concept of Sino-US-European “trilateral relations” featured prominently in April foreign-policy discourse, with the emphasis, predictably, placed on China’s strategic preference for a Europe more independent from US influence. The presentation of this varies, however. Among scholars at Tsinghua’s CISS, Da Wei writes in Foreign Affairs of the need for Europe to reject transatlantic right-wing nationalism and rediscover a liberal-minded “independent soul”, while Sun Chenghao proposes an engagement strategy for forestalling closer EU “embeddedness” in transatlantic tech networks.
By contrast, other scholars speculate about how a right-wing populist swing in Europe could paradoxically lead to greater self-reliance for the continent and thereby benefit Sino-European relations. Di Dongsheng, Dean of Area Studies at Renmin University, presents European right-wing populists as “pragmatic” forces pushing Europe to rethink liberal orthodoxies and therefore not necessarily as obstacles to improved China–Europe ties. Fudan University’s Yan Shaohua, continuing his previously explored theme of the potential benefits to China from the rise of the European far-right, notes that recent US pressure on Europe has forced certain far-right figures to distance themselves from Trump.
This more optimistic view of the far-right is likely shaped by the precedent of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary carrying out an “Eastern Opening” policy that courted Chinese investment. Fidesz’s defeat by Tisza in the general election this month is read by researchers Dai Yichen and Li Kai as pointing to closer alignment with Brussels and tighter regulatory scrutiny of Chinese investment, especially in sectors such as batteries, but not as a radical break given Hungary’s continuing economic dependence on China. Brussels, as usual, is cast throughout by analysts as China’s main frustration, from Taiwan to green energy policy.
Another, tacit, assumption may be that a softening on Russia, with which the European far-right is associated, could alleviate that well-known obstacle in the Sino-European relationship. At a Shanghai forum with the Moscow-based think tank Valdai Discussion Club, Cui Hongjian—former director of the Institute of European Studies at the China Institute of International Studies—expressed the hope that Russian elites could rebuild economic ties with Europe after the Ukraine War and establish a continent-spanning “New Eurasia” trade and security community linking Europe and China.
April also saw a share of “America-watching”, with the historian Niu Ke and the analyst Zhang Tengjun providing contrasting, though not necessarily contradictory, interpretations of the evolving intellectual currents in US foreign policy.
We shall separately cover two-month assessments of the Iran war and its impacts in the coming week, but its broad shadow is clearly visible in the economics section: from Guan Tao and Lian Ping on the nuanced effects of energy-price inflation and export pressure, to former People’s Bank of China Governor Zhou Xiaochuan and Sheng Songcheng, an adviser to the Shanghai municipal government, on the new openings for RMB internationalisation.
Against the backdrop of both risks to global supply chains and Beijing’s recent order that the Manus-Meta deal be cancelled, economic and resource security is also a clear theme. Hong Nong and Jin Canrong ponder the implications of the Hormuz crisis for other trade corridors, while Zheng Shanjie of the National Development and Reform Commission, Long , Long Guoqiang of the Development Research Centre of the State Council, and Zhao Minghao of Fudan University discuss the meaning—and limits—of “high-quality opening up”.
— James Farquharson
In Brief
Yang Jiemian & Zhang Chong on the “multipolar stalemate” that creates the conditions for trilateral China–Europe–US cooperation.
Chen Xi, Wang Dong, Xiao Geng & Zhu Xufeng on establishing a UN outpost in Shenzhen as a link between East Asia and the Global South.
Yang Guangbin & Wan Zeyu on China’s search for its own theory of “win-ology” to rival the West.
Liu Ye on why China doesn’t need to “win” in Africa.
Jia Qingguo on how risk narratives shape political authority.
Niu Ke on the growing appeal of “restraint” as a strategic concept in US foreign-policy thinking.
Zhang Tengjun on the generational influence of younger China hawks in Congress and their institutional constraints.
Gu Wenjun viewing the US MATCH Act as leverage prior to the Trump-Xi meeting rather than a stable sanctions regime.
Li Wei on why US-China economic conflict now has fewer stabilisers.
Da Wei on Beijing’s preferred conception of European strategic autonomy.
Sun Chenghao on the need to prevent a drift in Europe’s role from a US-China buffer to a conduit for US pressure.
Di Dongsheng on the conditions for a future improvement in Sino-European relations.
Yan Shaohua analysing the positioning of Europe’s New Right between Trumpism and national sovereignty.
Wang Wanying & Ma Xiaolin on China-EU relations shifting from values-based confrontation to rules-based rivalry.
Zhang Rui & Tong Tong on how clean energy infrastructure became a tool of geopolitical pressure for Brussels.
Dai Yichen on how a Tisza-led Hungary may narrow Orbán-era political space for China without ending pragmatic economic cooperation.
Li Kai on Chinese firms needing to prepare for stricter economic regulation in Hungary after the election.
Cui Hongjian on Europe as the missing link in a China-Russia “New Eurasia”.
Shang Yue on the contested nature of Russia’s post-2022 “turn to the East”.
Zhao Long calling for a recalibration of Sino–Russian energy and trade coordination after the Hormuz crisis.
Zheng Jian on establishing cross-Strait peace backed by mainland deterrence.
Qiu Changgen on dialogue as the Taiwan Strait’s pressure valve.
Ding Chun & Shang Lixue on the EU’s gradual hollowing-out of the “One China” policy.
Da Zhigang on NATO’s Asia-Pacific turn and the risk of Japanese remilitarisation.
Wu Shicun on China’s “protracted war” against the South China Sea Arbitration ruling.
Guan Tao on energy shocks and China’s fragile reflation.
Lian Ping on when high oil prices shift from useful inflationary pressure to macro risk.
Yu Yongding on why China should not give up on infrastructure stimulus.
Luo Zhiheng on the shift in fiscal policy emphasis following the 28 April Politburo meeting.
Sheng Songcheng on Chinese corporate globalisation creating real offshore yuan-asset demand.
Zhou Xiaochuan on why the RMB need not copy the dollar’s path of running a current account deficit.
Economic and Resource Security:
Hong Nong on why Hormuz turmoil raises the Arctic’s strategic value.
Jin Canrong on how the Hormuz crisis boosts China’s confidence in managing the Strait of Malacca.
Zheng Shanjie on securing China’s internal development and external investments against risk.
Long Guoqiang on firms needing to carry out disciplined expansion overseas without leaking China’s industrial and tech advantages.
Zhao Minghao on why Chinese AI firms now face economic-security scrutiny.
Cai Fang on AI displacement and the case for universal basic income.
Cao Heping on turning personal data into shareholding-based income for the era of AI job displacement.
I. Global Order
Yang Jiemian (杨洁勉) and Zhang Chong (张翀): The post-Cold War order has moved from US “single-superpower dominance” [单超独霸] to a “multipolar stalemate” [多极相持] defined by “one superpower defending supremacy, multiple strong powers seeking strength” [一超护超、多强求强] as the US role shifts from provider of global public goods to interest-first unilateralist. Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy is a useful but limited opening for China: it may weaken US hegemony and preserve space for China–Europe cooperation, yet internal division and continuing dependence on US security and technology keep the triangle closer to 1:2 than 1:1:1. Despite such obstacles to constructive three-way engagement, the shift to multipolarity creates a real need for trilateral public-goods provision in specific areas: China’s role in development finance makes old Paris Club debt governance insufficient, while AI development in the US and China also increases the importance of “risk-sharing”. — Chair, Academic Advisory Committee, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies; Doctoral Student, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Shanghai International Studies University (国际关系研究, 2026 Issue 2)
Yang Guangbin (杨光斌) and Wan Zeyu (万泽雨): While Western ideological power has long rested on a systematised “win-ology” [赢学] that presents the West’s rise as the “end of history”, China’s comparatively underdeveloped “win-ology” should be addressed, as any country without its own “win-ology” is “finished” [就会完蛋]. An example of modern Western “win-ology” is liberal democracy and market economics, which recast historically contingent Western dominance as universal knowledge: the Nobel Prize in Economics serves as the archetypal “Western win-ology prize”. This underlines the need to overcome Western-centred social science and clarify the value of China’s “new form of human civilisation” [人类文明新形态]. — Dean, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China; Doctoral Student, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (观察者网, 11 April)
Liu Ye (刘烨): African states are strategic actors using Chinese, Western and multilateral resources to expand development autonomy, with China historically willing to let its support become a “strategic card” [战略牌] in smaller states’ bargaining with the West. The Lobito Corridor [Zambia-DRC-Angola, running west to Angola’s Atlantic port of Lobito] shows why Chinese and Western interests are not wholly opposed: although promoted by the US and Europe partly to reduce reliance on China, it rests on Chinese-rebuilt railway and port infrastructure, and its launch accelerated TAZARA’s revival [Zambia–Tanzania railway, running east to Dar es Salaam on the Indian Ocean] by reminding China and African partners of the railway’s latent strategic value. Angola, Zambia and the DRC treat Lobito as another logistics and financing channel, not an anti-China project, while Chinese firms still retain deep interests across the corridor. — Postdoctoral Researcher, Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences, Tsinghua University (文化纵横, 2026 Issue 2)
Chen Xi (陈溪), Wang Dong (王栋), Xiao Geng (肖耿) and Zhu Xufeng (朱旭峰): Establishing a comprehensive UN hub in Shenzhen or Hangzhou would directly connect China’s innovation clusters with the Global South’s developmental requirements, particularly in frontier sectors such as AI and the low-altitude economy. This addresses a structural gap regarding the UN’s physical presence in East Asia, while alternative candidates such as Singapore or Tokyo are hindered by high operational costs and limited proximity to developing markets. Shenzhen, in particular, could leverage Hong Kong’s financial infrastructure and the “One Country, Two Systems” framework to facilitate global access and cross-border data flows, rendering the UN a more resilient, multi-centric network. — Chen Xi: Professor, Zhejiang International Studies University. Wang Dong: Professor, School of International Studies, Peking University. Xiao Geng: Associate Dean, School of Public Policy, CUHK-Shenzhen. Zhu Xufeng: Dean, School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University. (中美聚焦, 16 April)
Jia Qingguo (贾庆国): Prediction has always underpinned political authority because convincing narratives of risk identification reduce the world’s inherent uncertainty and guide the allocation of power, legitimacy and resources. From priests and shamans to strategists and scientists, risk recognition has become more empirical and data-driven, yet never purely objective: cognitive limits, partial elite knowledge, mass anxiety and political struggle all distort judgement, while simplified narratives such as the “Thucydides Trap” can harden into accepted “truths”. Effective risk governance therefore requires recognising uncertainty and the limits of knowledge, limiting bias and manipulation, and using history and data to identify risks before they become threats. — Professor, School of International Studies, Peking University (中华读书报, 1 April—introduction to “From Cold Politics to Hot Politics, Global Risk Politics in an Age of Anxiety and Anger” by Pang Xun (庞珣), Professor, School of International Studies, Peking University)
2. US-China
Niu Ke (牛可): A narrative shift towards “restraint” [节制] is emerging as a powerful, cross-partisan consensus within US foreign policy discourse, challenging the Washington establishment’s ideological reliance on global hegemony. Driving this shift are new organisations such as the Quincy Institute, which successfully spreads anti-interventionist ideology by leveraging new media to engage politically disaffected demographics and appeal to the isolationist streak in US society, notably grassroots MAGA voters. Despite current glaring contradictions between assertive overseas military operations and isolationist rhetoric, the fusing of systemic “retrenchment” with “America First” principles will likely define the future trajectory of US foreign policy. — Associate Professor, Department of History, Peking University (北京大学中外人文交流研究基地, 1 April)
Zhang Tengjun (张腾军): A predominantly Republican new generation of US legislators, possessing a security mindset shaped by the 9/11 and 2008 financial crises, has adopted a China stance deeply critical of the engagement policy adopted by the older generation. Viewing China as a “systemic rival” following perceived historical policy failures, the rise of this cohort has triggered a surge in China-related legislative proposals—from 14 in the 115th Congress to 169 in the 118th—usually resulting in increased legislative scrutiny, review and restrictions. However, these younger radicals remain constrained by executive authority and veteran legislators, whilst younger Democrat “hawks” take a softer line than their Republican counterparts, favouring a “constructive rebalancing” over a full bilateral rupture. — Deputy Director, Institute of American Studies, China Institute of International Studies (当代美国评论, 9 April)
Gu Wenjun (顾文军): The US MATCH Act marks another escalation in semiconductor containment, but its widening trajectory—from targeted strikes against Huawei and SMIC, to “small yard, high fence”, and now towards an attempted “large yard, high fence”—signals that Washington’s “moves are running out” [招数见底] and their marginal effect is declining, while the bill may function less as an executable sanctions regime than as bargaining leverage before Trump’s China visit. The April revision of the bill, which shifted some blanket bans into a licensing regime, exposes an unstable decoupling coalition: hawks and firms such as Micron seek to prevent China from dominating memory-chip manufacturing as it did solar, while firms like Nvidia and semiconductor-equipment suppliers fear lost market share, damaged earnings and share-price pressure. Strict enforcement would also excessively punish Dutch and Japanese suppliers deeply reliant on China, which accounted for 36.5% of global equipment sales in 2025, making delay, dilution and loopholes likely. — Chief Analyst, ICWise (芯谋研究, 26 April)
Li Wei (李巍): US and Chinese economic interests are now in direct opposition, as Washington prioritises manufacturing revival while Beijing seeks industrial upgrading, eroding the old complementarities of globalisation and making intensified struggle unavoidable. Trump’s new security doctrine is economic nationalism centred on reindustrialisation, supply-chain autonomy and technological supremacy, especially in AI. Yet neither side is likely to defeat the other decisively, making cyclical rivalry and selective cooperation the more probable outcome, as both continually test each other’s bottom lines [“战略底线”] and gradually forge a new balance of power and status. — Professor, Department of International Relations, Renmin University of China (观察者网, 16 April)
3. Europe
Da Wei (达巍): Beijing wants Europe to act as a genuine “independent pole” in the China–Europe–US triangle, but sees European “strategic autonomy” as largely rhetorical: Europe responds weakly to US pressure over Greenland and remains soft on Israel, while continuing to signal against China through naval deployments around Taiwan and the South China Sea. This frustration persists despite China and Europe sharing “more common ground” on global governance and issues like Iran than either does with the United States, even as China and the United States paradoxically converge in nationalist, economically interventionist and executive-centred governing instincts. To become a true geopolitical pole, Europe must rediscover its liberally inclined “independent soul” rather than succumb to trans-Atlantic nationalism, whose fragmenting logic would weaken European integration and reduce its global relevance. — Director, Centre for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University (Foreign Affairs, 17 April)
Sun Chenghao (孙成昊): Europe faces “dual embeddedness” [双重嵌入] in the asymmetric China–US–Europe triangle: dependence on the US in security, institutions and norms gives it influence but exposes it to American pressure, while deep economic and technological ties with China complicate simple bloc alignment with the US. The trilateral relationship’s trajectory hinges on whether European strategic autonomy can withstand US efforts to turn the transatlantic alliance into a “technology-security community” [科技安全共同体], binding Europe to American standards in technology, data, investment screening and export controls; if those efforts by the US succeed, Europe becomes less a buffer than an amplifier [放大器] for the global diffusion of US pressure. For China, stabilising China–US relations is therefore the “ballast stone” [压舱石] of the trilateral relationship as it eases Europe’s strategic anxiety and reduces pressure for bloc alignment, while deeper green, digital and industrial cooperation can help address European de-risking concerns. — Associate Research Fellow, Centre for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University (国际展望, 2026 Issue 2)
Di Dongsheng (翟东升): Europe, long seen as a stronghold of “white-left” [白左] progressivism, is being pushed by globalisation-induced “crowding and disorder” [拥挤混乱], migration tensions and weak economic performance into political self-examination, with “pragmatic” and “patriotic” right-populism—exemplified by Meloni—potentially better placed than exhausted progressive orthodoxies to revive growth. This shift need not obstruct better China–Europe relations: these forces are less anti-system extremists than conservative pragmatists, while Europe’s likely turn towards greater conservatism in trade, internet governance and social policy could coexist with a search for autonomy from the US. A real European “move towards China” would require relative defence autonomy from the US, an independent public-opinion and digital ecosystem, as well as Chinese steps to ease industrial-competition anxieties, including possible RMB appreciation or credit mechanisms supporting purchases of Chinese green-energy products. — Dean, School of Global and Area Studies, Renmin University of China (世界知识, 2026 Issue 7)
Yan Shaohua (严少华): Europe’s New Right is splitting into three camps as it struggles to reconcile earlier enthusiasm for Trump and links with the American right with the geopolitical and economic threat now posed to Europe by Trumpism. A “European sovereignty resistance camp”, represented by Jordan Bardella, condemns US pressure over Greenland as coercion; a “pragmatic compromise camp”, represented by Giorgia Meloni, tries to balance Washington and Brussels while facing tariffs and defence-spending demands; and an “extreme clientelist camp” around the AfD’s harder intellectual circles accepts subordination to US power if it helps expel immigrants and preserve racial “homogeneity”. The New Right now faces the choice between diluting its nationalist core and becoming Washington’s proxy, or upholding sovereignty-based nationalism that protects European civilisation and interests. — Deputy Director, Centre for China–Europe Relations, Fudan University (世界知识, 2026 Issue 8)
Wang Wanying (王婉赢) and Ma Xiaolin (马晓霖): The European Parliament IMCO delegation’s late-March to early-April China visit, the first after years of parliamentary estrangement following the 2021 Xinjiang sanctions dispute, signals renewed functional contact under low trust as China–EU interaction shifts from value-based confrontation to institutional competition over market rules and governance frameworks. Its agenda on digital trade, platform liability, customs logistics and consumer protection moves relations towards technical rule dialogue, especially as EU customs reforms raise obligations on Chinese platform firms and the electric-vehicle dispute is managed through minimum price undertakings. China should not passively absorb external rules, but use institutional opening, Chinese regulatory proposals and stronger domestic system-building to turn rule-making pressure into institutional competitiveness. — Assistant Researcher, China-CEEC Economic and Trade Cooperation Research Institute, Ningbo University; Director, Institute of Pan-Mediterranean Studies, Zhejiang International Studies University (财新, 7 April)
Zhang Rui (张锐) and Tong Tong (童桐): Based on an analysis of EU policy documents from 2020–2024, the EU’s “geopoliticisation” of clean energy intensified as its strategic narratives moved the energy transition from technical governance into international power competition, casting “systemic rivals” and “non-market actors” as competitors in critical raw materials and clean-energy supply chains. By legitimising industrial intervention, protectionist trade tools and exclusionary “raw-material clubs”, this shift could restrict Chinese firms’ market access, fragment global supply chains and raise transition costs; China should contest politicised clean-energy narratives, strengthen public-opinion rebuttals [舆论回击], and promote a cooperative world story [世界故事] to defend open markets and its new-energy industries. — Researcher, Global Energy Interconnection Economic and Technological Research Institute; Lecturer, State Key Laboratory of Media Convergence and Communication, Communication University of China (国际关系研究, 2026 Issue 2)
Dai Yichen (戴轶尘): The Tisza Party’s victory will recalibrate rather than reverse Hungary’s China policy: Budapest will shift towards EU-mainstream positions on investment screening and compliance, but pragmatic economic cooperation with Beijing will largely endure. Tisza lacks any geopolitical intent to wield an “Eastern Opening” [东向战略] strategy as leverage against Brussels, removing the logic that underpinned Orbán’s tilt. Yet with China supplying 57% of Hungarian FDI in 2025, and the Budapest–Belgrade Railway and Chinese battery plants now generating tangible returns, the new government must balance embedding bilateral ties into an “EU common policy framework” against safeguarding domestic economic interests. — Executive Deputy Director, Department of European Studies, Institute of International Relations, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (澎湃新闻, 14 April)
Li Kai (李恺): Chinese enterprises in Hungary must prepare for a Tisza government inclined to discipline foreign investment through EU rules rather than offer the policy dividends of Orbán’s “Eastern Opening” [向东开放]. This will require deeper feasibility studies of local and EU regulations, front-loaded compliance work in environmental protection, labour and auditing, and readiness to handle investigations under the EU’s Foreign Subsidies Regulation, alongside budgeting for materially higher operating costs. The shift presents both a challenge and an opportunity: navigating these constraints will sharpen Chinese firms’ ability to adapt and compete within the EU framework, laying foundations for broader European expansion. — Associate Researcher, Institute of World Development, Development Research Center of the State Council (国务院发展研究中心世发所, 25 April)
4. Russia
Cui Hongjian (崔洪建): China and Russia should stabilise a “New Eurasia” marked by “risks at both ends and stability in the middle” [两端有风险、中间基本稳定], extending their strategic partnership from bilateral trust into a wider regional framework. Europe is currently the crucial missing link in this vision: a development-centred order would connect European capital, technology and talent with Russian resources and energy, and Chinese market scale and technology, turning Eurasia into an open, autonomous and interconnected space. While some Russian scholars see post-Ukraine Russia–Europe relations through a pessimistic, cyclical view of history, the impossibility of restoring the old relationship need not preclude a more constructive one, especially as insecure maritime and land routes make Eurasian connectivity more strategically urgent. — Professor, Academy of Regional and Global Governance, Beijing Foreign Studies University (观察者网, 29 April; speech at the China–Russia Conference, Valdai Discussion Club, Shanghai, April 26-27)
Shang Yue (尚月): Russia’s effort to reshape its identity would require accepting that “Europe is no longer the sole reference point” and remoulding its “state–civilisation” [国家—文明] framework from the top down—entailing not only sustained investment and interest reorganisation, but a deeper spiritual transformation. Repeated Russian efforts to Westernise or integrate with the West since Peter I have largely failed, and some Russian elites now argue that the post-2022 “turn to the East” [向东看] cannot remain confined to trade and diplomacy: Moscow is pursuing four integrations across Siberia, the Far East and the Arctic, spanning regional development, mineral-processing chains, the “Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor” [跨北极运输走廊], and domestic-external logistics links. Yet this turn remains contested rather than settled: Russian advocates of Russia’s “Siberianisation” face counterarguments that the country’s most developed and populous regions remain in Europe and cannot be detached from European structures. — Deputy Director, Institute of Eurasian Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (世界知识, 2026 Issue 6)
Zhao Long (赵隆): Beyond the geo-economic shocks of the US–Israeli strikes on Iran, the narrative competition surrounding China and Russia has intensified, with some Western media stressing a “Russia wins, China loses” [俄赢中输] framing that is essentially divisive in orientation. Against this backdrop, Sino–Russian strategic coordination requires a targeted “recalibration” [再校准]: enhanced risk-hedging in energy and connectivity, optimised settlement mechanisms, and reduced dependence on high-risk maritime routes through accelerated overland projects, anchored by an SCO/BRICS-led “bottom-line consensus” [底线共识] on corridor and supply-chain security. — Director, Institute for International Strategic and Security Studies, Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (上海国际战略问题研究会, 26 March)
5. East Asia
Zheng Jian (郑剑): Peace has become an urgent task in cross-Strait relations, and the KMT and CCP bear an unavoidable responsibility to safeguard the course of peaceful development [和平发展] after Xi Jinping’s April meeting in Beijing with KMT leader Cheng Li-wen — at a time when Taiwan independence [台独] forces and external actors continue to damage its foundations. This peace must rest on the 1992 Consensus, renewed party-to-party exchanges, deeper integration and increased benefits for Taiwan compatriots. The mainland’s military capability and industrial depth are now sufficient to prevail in any scenario involving rapid escalation, prolonged resistance or foreign intervention. — Director, Centre for Strategy and Security Studies, Taiwan Research Institute, Xiamen University (CRNTT, 13 and 23 April)
Qiu Changgen (仇长根): Cross-Strait dialogue is an essential tool for managing Taiwan Strait risks, and the mainland’s renewed bridge-building gives Taiwan an opportunity to lower tensions in a way that benefits both sides and acts as a stabiliser for peace. Xi Jinping’s meeting with Cheng Li-wen strengthens KMT-CCP interaction, creates a new channel for communication and cooperation, helps restart exchanges across fields, reduces misunderstanding, and helps return relations to the track of peaceful development [和平发展]. Although the Taiwan Strait remains severe and complex, the situation is broadly controllable [总体可控]. — Director, Institute of Cross-Strait Exchanges and Regional Development, East China Normal University (CRNTT, 11 April)
Ding Chun (丁纯) and Shang Lixue (尚丽雪): EU–Taiwan relations have shifted since 2020 from limited economic and cultural contact into a broader economic, political and soft-security relationship, with the European Parliament as the most activist driver, and recorded interactions rising fivefold between 2019 and 2024. The foundation is economic: Taiwan’s chips, electronic components and key parts have recast it from a “fragile democracy” into a strategic supply-chain partner and Taiwan Strait maritime-security concern. The political consequence is the hollowing-out of the EU’s “One China policy”, through quasi-official contacts and de-emphasising “One China” language in communications about Taiwan. Europe also links Taiwan to Ukraine through the “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow” logic, binding US credibility in Asia to its security role in Europe and giving European actors greater reason to emphasise Taiwan. In response, China should maintain “strategic composure” [战略定力], defending red lines while managing disputes to preserve China–EU stability. — Professor, Institute of World Economy, School of Economics, Fudan University; Doctoral Student, “Global Europe” Programme, Shanghai Academy of Global Governance and Area Studies, Shanghai International Studies University. (台海研究, 2026 Issue 1)
Da Zhigang (笪志刚): NATO’s large-scale ambassadorial visit to Japan and South Korea in mid-April signals that its penetration of the Asia-Pacific is becoming increasingly substantive, forcibly transplanting bloc confrontation [阵营对抗] into an already complex region and risking weaker cooperation, lower mutual trust, arms racing and erosion of peaceful development across the Asia-Pacific. Japan and South Korea serve as military-industrial, technological, intelligence and strategic “springboards” [天然跳板] for NATO’s regional expansion, but the sharper danger lies in Japan: NATO cooperation gives external endorsement and strategic cover to Japanese remilitarisation [再军事化], reinforcing Tokyo’s offensive security shift and becoming a major variable destabilising Northeast Asia. — Researcher, Northeast Asia Research Institute, Heilongjiang Academy of Social Sciences (环球时报，17 April)
Wu Shicun (吴士存): China must continue repudiating the “toxic legacy” [遗毒] of the 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling, which sought to deny China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights, risks spilling into wider maritime disputes, and enables claimant states to conduct cognitive and public-opinion warfare [认知战、舆论战] against China by presenting the ruling as “international law”. Its deeper danger lies in giving legal cover to Philippine unilateralism, external intervention and challenges to China’s rights, while distorting UNCLOS beyond questions it can legitimately adjudicate. China should therefore “strike whenever it emerges” [冒头就打], wage a “protracted war” [持久战] through sustained legal and discursive rebuttal, and target the tribunal’s composition, jurisdiction, admissibility and interpretations to reshape international opinion. — Chairman, Huayang Center for Maritime Cooperation and Ocean Governance; Chairman, Academic Committee, National Institute for South China Sea Studies (环球时报, 28 April)
6. Chinese Economy
Guan Tao (管涛): Although China has shown resilience to the initial energy shock, if extreme volatility drags into the third quarter, the hit to Asian and European economies—which absorbed 71.3% of Chinese exports in 2025—would significantly weaken China’s external demand. Imported inflation from higher commodity prices may be partly welcome amid China’s fragile reflation [再通胀], but it remains uncertain whether producer-price inflation (PPI) can pass smoothly into consumer price inflation (CPI) and avoid squeezing downstream producers’ profit margins. If import costs rise while export prices decrease and domestic demand weakens, China’s trade conditions will deteriorate, overcapacity pressures will intensify, and external demand’s support for growth will be seriously weakened. — Global Chief Economist, BOC Securities (中国宏观经济论坛, 21 April)
Lian Ping (连平): A sustained oil shock from the Iran war would hit China mainly through cost pressure and demand compression: higher transport, logistics and energy costs would raise imported inflation, squeeze household discretionary consumption, and weaken investment as midstream and downstream firms face both rising input costs and soft final demand. The losses would be limited if the crisis is short, and some gains could emerge: higher oil prices may ease deflationary expectations, lift profits for upstream energy producers, improve the economics of renewables and electrification, and accelerate energy-security upgrades. But if the crisis lasts six months or more, with oil at USD 140–180 per barrel, the gains would be outweighed by broader inflation, export-competitiveness and balance-of-payments pressures, in which case China should therefore cap domestic fuel-price pass-through by releasing reserves. In the long-term, China should expand domestic oil and shale exploration, increase long-term contracts with non-Middle Eastern suppliers, deepen RMB settlement in energy trade, and gradually lift the non-fossil energy share from 21.7% towards 30%. — Lian Ping, Chief Economist, Guangkai Chief Industry Research Institute (大公報, 9 April)
Yu Yongding (余永定): Total factor productivity (TFP) and consumption growth should not be fetishised as independent variables for macroeconomic adjustment: much of China’s earlier TFP growth reflected one-off reform dividends, while consumption is the result of growth rather than its driver. The shift from “investment-driven” to “consumption-driven” growth is therefore a strategic trap, even though raising consumption remains necessary amid weak demand. Social security, tax reform and redistribution matter, but are too slow as short-term macroeconomic levers; sustained consumption depends on higher permanent incomes and improved expectations. The optimal response is renewed central government support for infrastructure investment, producing a crowding-in effect that drives private investment → growth → higher incomes → improved expectations → stronger consumption. Wasteful local-government infrastructure spending should be corrected, not used as a reason to abandon infrastructure altogether — or to “give up eating for fear of choking” [因噎废食]. — Academician and Research Fellow, Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (上海发展研究基金会, 2 April)
Luo Zhiheng (罗志恒): The 28 April Politburo meeting on current economic conditions and economic work sent a stabilisation signal focused on sustaining Q1 momentum and guarding against downside risks: real and nominal GDP growth reached 5.0% and 4.9%, yet strength partly reflected policy front-loading and concentrated project starts, leaving the key test whether consumption can shift from policy stimulus to income- and expectations-led demand. “Optimising the fiscal expenditure structure” [持续优化财政支出结构] signals a rebalancing from broad enterprise- and project-led fixed-asset stimulus towards consumption, households and “investment in people”. Meanwhile, fixed-asset investment is to be channelled into higher-quality infrastructure, with “six-network” [六网] construction—water, power, computing, communications, underground-pipeline and logistics networks—stimulating near-term demand while easing medium-term constraints on digital industry, advanced manufacturing, urban resilience and supply-chain circulation. — Chief Economist and President, Research Institute, Yuekai Securities (粤开志恒宏观, 28 April)
Sheng Songcheng (盛松成): China’s accelerating corporate “going global” wave [出海], with overseas operations contributing a rising share of listed firms’ revenue and profits, is generating organic demand for renminbi loans, bonds, safe assets, trade credit and treasury management tools, creating an opportunity for the RMB to deepen its role as an international financing currency rather than merely a settlement unit. Policy has also shifted from emphasising RMB recycling back into China to market-led discretion, allowing firms to retain earnings offshore or reinvest abroad and echoing aspects of a reserve-currency logic. While the US Federal Reserve is constrained between inflation and labour weakness, China retains comparative freedom of movement for lower interest rates and the RMB has the advantage of lower financing costs, exchange rate stability and access to the Chinese market. Priorities should include expanding offshore RMB safe assets, strengthening Shanghai–Hong Kong coordination, and preserving a market-based but stable exchange rate. — Adjunct Professor of Economics and Finance, China Europe International Business School; former Director-General of the Statistics Department, People’s Bank of China (财新, 21 April)
Zhou Xiaochuan (周小川): While no single currency will replace the dollar in the short term, the RMB can expand internationally through the capital and financial account, overseas lending, policy-bank credit, FDI, corporate financing and central-bank swap lines; it does not need to replicate the classic reserve currency model of supplying global liquidity through a current account deficit. The present moment is a “golden window” [黄金窗口期] for advancing RMB internationalisation, as US tariff activism, sanctions overreach and geopolitical disruption have weakened confidence in the dollar. Given global reserve demand is far smaller than the stock of US Treasuries, China need not replicate America’s debt-heavy system, but should deepen and liberalise RMB safe-asset markets [安全资产] through more liquid, accessible bond markets, pursue calibrated capital-account opening, stronger cross-border financial infrastructure and Shanghai-centred institutional reform. — Former Governor, People’s Bank of China (中国宏观经济论坛 CMF, 10 April)
7. Economic and Resource Security
Hong Nong (洪农): Middle Eastern disruption is underscoring the Arctic’s strategic significance as an alternative energy and shipping corridor, also raising the geopolitical value of Alaska LNG as Asian importers seek supplies that bypass Hormuz. The renewed importance of high-latitude routes and resources extends beyond hydrocarbons, benefiting Arctic and near-Arctic actors such as Norway, Greenland and Canada, while positioning the region as a potential global resource-security “buffer zone” [缓冲区]. Within this shift, Russia will remain especially important to energy-importing Asian economies, even as Europe continues to unwind its energy ties with Moscow. — Executive Director & Senior Research Fellow, Institute for China-America Studies (N.B., a PRC-funded think tank based in Washington DC) (环球时报, 1 April)
Jin Canrong (金灿荣): America’s difficulties in confronting Iran around the Strait of Hormuz make direct conflict with China less, not more, likely, since Washington should become more cautious after exposing the limits of its military power. The Malacca problem, or “Malacca predicament” [马六甲之困], is an old vulnerability for China, but one already addressed through strategic oil reserves, domestic production, overland pipelines and new-energy substitution, thereby reducing its dependence on vulnerable maritime chokepoints. Should the US ever block Chinese tankers in such distant waters, China could exploit its near-seas advantage by pressuring US allies such as Japan and South Korea, whose dependence on overseas supplies is greater, while also holding US bases and Indian Ocean deployments at risk. — Professor, School of International Studies, Renmin University of China (金金乐道, 27 April)
Zheng Shanjie (郑栅洁): China must develop a “new security architecture to safeguard the new development pattern” [以新安全格局保障新发展格局], as the Fifteenth Five-Year Plan faces a harsher external environment: trade barriers, “decoupling and chain-breaking” [脱钩断链], and competition over energy and critical minerals expose the fragility of global supply chains, while AI, big data, quantum information and biotechnology are reshaping production systems and the global division of labour. Chinese overseas investment must be paired with risk controls, “avoiding dangerous places, chaotic regions and hazardous sectors” [危地不往、乱地不去、危业不投]. — Party Secretary and Chairman, National Development and Reform Commission (人民日报, 20 April)
Long Guoqiang (隆国强): “High-quality opening up” and orderly “going global” [“走出去”] are strategies for protecting China’s export strengths amidst slowing global growth and rising market barriers by letting the world “share China’s market opportunities” [“分享中国市场机遇”] and securing overseas critical minerals, energy supplies and transport corridors. China should increase imports, widen service-sector access, and guide firms expanding overseas to support host-country industrialisation. Yet expansion must be disciplined: “dangerous places, risky zones and hazardous industries” should be avoided [“危地不往、险地不去、危业不投”], and while mature technologies can aid developing countries, “one must guard against advanced industrial technology strengths leaking overseas” [“要防范优势产业先进技术外泄”]. — Deputy Director, Development Research Centre of the State Council (中央社会主义学院学报, 2026 Issue 2)
8. Artificial Intelligence
Zhao Minghao (赵明昊): China is building a more detailed governance system for economic and technological security, addressing “chokepoint” risks in core technologies while strengthening AI security across algorithms, data, infrastructure and applications. The Manus case shows that, amid US all-in AI competition and a China-targeted “technology alliance”, commercial interests in sensitive AI sectors must be subordinated to national-security review where personnel flows, technology transfers, data movement and foreign-capital links create strategic risk. — Deputy Director, Centre for American Studies, Fudan University (澎湃, 29 April)
Cai Fang (蔡昉): AI is reshaping market relations by displacing labour more quickly and visibly than new employment can emerge, making universal basic income a more credible policy response than universal shareholding in AI assets because it is simpler and more universal. Existing labour law and social-security frameworks in China are increasingly inadequate as algorithmic management sharpens capital’s capacity to monitor, discipline and replace labour, especially in platform and gig work. The strategic task is therefore to share AI-driven productivity gains through public finance, basic services and “investment in people”, preventing technological progress from reinforcing ageing, weak demand and employment insecurity. — Chief Expert, National High-End Think Tank(s), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (知识分子, 14 April)
Cao Heping (曹和平): A system of personal digital asset accounts [数字资产账户] should allow individuals whose labour is displaced by AI to receive income from the data and digital assets they generate through daily life and large-model use. Large models are not ordinary sales monopolies, but public-good-like “production-process monopolies”: firms should be compensated for initial innovation and production inputs, with support capped at around 2.7 times input and returns regulated near 15%, while downstream gains are shared socially. The key is to recognise users as digital producers, convert confirmed personal data into balance-sheeted “high-energy assets” [高能资产], and bring these assets into monetary circulation through state-managed digital currency issuance. — Professor, School of Economics, Peking University (观察者网, 7 April)
A Chinese-Style Kill Line? (26 April)
This rare social-governance essay by Yang Haiyan uses China’s viral debate over America’s “kill line” to warn that China may face its own form of institutionalised downward mobility. Unlike the US case, China has long relied on hukou controls, rural land rights and poverty-relief systems to prevent large-scale urban destitution, but urbanisation, slower growth and labour-market precarity are weakening those buffers. The piece identifies three groups at risk: hidden poor among second-generation urban residents, landless farmers and new-generation migrant workers. Rather than proposing wholly new remedies, it presents existing governance experiments—Fengqiao-style mediation, sealing minor offence records and credit rehabilitation—as efforts to keep temporary hardship from becoming permanent exclusion, though these reforms risk clashing with public demands for harsh punishment and consistent rule enforcement.
Liquidating an “Empire”: China’s Strategy to Capitalise on US Hegemonic Strain (21 April)
This provocative essay by Wu Xinbo argues that US hegemony has become structurally overextended, forcing Washington to “sell off” non-essential imperial assets to preserve its military, technology and dollar core. Rather than merely observing US decline, China should “harvest” these assets cheaply and precisely, using debt purchases, investment and industrial cooperation as bargaining chips for access to resources, technology, IP and rule-making influence. The piece’s logic is opportunistic but cautious: China should avoid systemic conflict, target moments of US weakness such as credit crises or electoral pressure, dilute political risk through third-party capital and “technology for resources” deals, and guard against asset, patent and rule traps while retaining leverage in rare earths, finance and military pressure.
Strait of Hormuz Blockade: How China Should Respond (15 April)
This legally minded essay by Ye Yan warns against celebrating Iran’s proposed Hormuz transit fees as a breakthrough for RMB settlement. Rather than a strategic gain, paying “protection money” through CIPS would expose China to US secondary sanctions and legitimise a dangerous precedent: turning international straits into politically screened toll gates. The piece argues that Washington benefits from a low-cost “offshore attrition” strategy that burdens Asian manufacturing states while leaving the US relatively insulated. China’s answer should be legal resistance, not tactical accommodation: defend free transit passage, ring-fence CIPS, activate overland energy buffers and reserves, and build an “Asian Consumer Order Alliance” with other energy-importing states.
The “Greater-than-Expected” Impact of the Iran War on China’s Economy (13 April)
This technocratic memo by Peng Shaozong treats the US–Iran war chiefly as an imported inflation and supply-chain security shock for China. Rather than seeing the crisis as a strategic opening, it warns that disruption to Hormuz, Iranian energy and chemical exports, LNG, fertilisers, petrochemicals, shipping and insurance could transmit rapidly into Chinese manufacturing, agriculture and high-end industry. Its core prescription is defensive: China should use the certainty of domestic supply and price stability to offset external geopolitical uncertainty, through tiered oil-reserve releases, import diversification, anti-speculation controls, targeted subsidies, hedging tools, African and overland alternatives, and longer-term reserve-building and energy substitution.
Trump’s Tiger-Riding Predicament | Digest: March 2026 (6 April)
This digest surveys Chinese commentary dominated by the Iran war, often framed as Trump’s “tiger-riding predicament”: easier to begin than to end. It highlights debates over whether the conflict is a quagmire, a strategic opening for China, or a danger through oil shocks and global disruption. Coverage also spans China’s economic model, rural pensions, export resistance, consumption, Taiwan, US-China relations and AI’s social effects. Across these themes, a central question emerges: can China exploit a more turbulent world without misreading American weakness, worsening external backlash, or neglecting the domestic reforms needed to sustain growth?
When Non-Interference Is No Longer Enough: A Qualified Case for Chinese “Interventionism 2.0” (5 April)
This interview with Zheng Yongnian uses the Iran-Hormuz crisis to argue that China’s longstanding non-interference doctrine is no longer adequate for a world of expanding Chinese overseas interests and geopolitical “weaponisation”. Zheng defends non-alignment as essential to preventing bloc confrontation and world wars, but says traditional non-interference no longer fits China’s expanding overseas interests. His proposed “Interventionism 2.0” remains carefully bounded: not US-style regime change or colour revolution, but a more active posture when host states violate Chinese interests, third countries threaten them, or external forces affect China domestically. The piece is cautious and still multilateralist, yet notable because it gives a doctrinal label to a more assertive Chinese role in protecting firms, citizens and strategic interests abroad.
N.B. Sinification features a broad spectrum of voices, ranging from conservative hawks and state propagandists to more moderate and liberal thinkers. Readers are encouraged to bear this diversity in mind when engaging with the content.
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