China’s Political Discourse September 2023: Struggling With Negotiation in the US-China Relationship
By Chu Yang and David L. Bandurski of the China Media Project
This monthly report is prepared for Sinocism by the excellent China Media Project. You can read it in your web browser here if you prefer.
Focus Topic: Reinforcing the Law of Xi Jinping, the Party and the State
September Surprises: "Damaging the Spirit and Hurting the Feelings of Chinese People"
Introduction
Released in November, on the heels of the Biden-Xi meeting in San Francisco, this study of discourse in the month of September 2023 offers an interesting contrast in tone in China’s state media regarding the US-China relationship. In the lead-up to the bilateral meeting, seen by many as a crucial opportunity to improve ties, Chinese state media noticeably moderated their criticism of the United States. The emphasis in the Chinese Communist Party’s official People’s Daily newspaper the day before Xi’s arrival in California was on bringing US-China relations back to a point of calm and mutual benefit, avoiding what Xinhua News Agency called “negative agendas” (消极议程) — meaning issues like Tibet, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and human rights. In its main coverage on page three on the Wednesday of Xi’s departure from Beijing, the operative word in the People’s Daily was “stable” (稳定). The word was mentioned 11 times in total, the most important related phrase, repeated three times, being “[getting] back on track for healthy and stable development” (重回健康稳定发展轨道).
Rewind to September and the more recent change in tone is obvious. Foreign policy was strongly emphasized as a priority in the Party-state media in September, just as in the first eight months of 2023, and by the second half of the month there were hints of more active efforts to seek a stable relationship with the US. Examples included the announcement, appearing in the People’s Daily on September 22, of the establishment of two working groups on economic issues, one on the economy and the other on finance. The working groups hinted at a potential return to the state of relations before the Trump presidency in 2017, when the US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue provided a regular mechanism for exchanges on a wide range of global strategic and economic issues.
During the first half of September, however, the tone of criticism and recrimination in the People’s Daily was familiar and unmistakable. China’s state media slammed US hegemony, and what it portrayed as a broader US-led conspiracy of containment directed against China. In the first of two commentaries by "Zhong Sheng" (钟声), an official pen name used by the International Department at the People’s Daily, the tone on September 12 was angry and defiant on the issue of technology. "In recent years, the US government has introduced restrictive measures against China one after another to suppress it in science and technology, always under the guise of safeguarding national security,” it said, adding further down: “China firmly opposes the use of containment and suppression in the name of competition.”
In another invective two days later, “Zhong Sheng” was back to criticize the “so-called ‘competition’” (所谓”竞争”) of the United States, which it said was in fact “an all-round siege and a bottomless [act of] containment and suppression.” This commentary was called, “Defining the Entire Sino-US Relationship in Terms of Competition Is a Serious Mistake” (以竞争定义全部中美关系是严重误判).
As the state-run China Central Television (CCTV) reported on the formation of the working groups with the US, it traced this development back to understandings reached between Biden and Xi Jinping in Bali in late 2022, and to the subsequent “connections” (沟通) made by senior US officials, including the four-day visit to China in July by US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen, and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo’s trip at the close of August. But even as CCTV praised the move as “creating an opportunity for mutual progress,” it could not resist also referring to the working groups in more combative language as “creating a platform through which the Chinese side can continue to negotiate and struggle.”
The notion of “struggle,” or douzheng (斗争), has strong political and historical overtones in China, referencing the purges and persecution of the Mao Zedong era, and to this day makes many Chinese uncomfortable [See CMP’s 2013 pieces, “Parsing the ‘Public Opinion Struggle,” and “The Word ‘Struggle’ Freaks People Out”]. The persistent use of the word “struggle” in this and other contexts is a sign of how the rhetoric of the CCP has taken a more hardline turn since 2013 — so that even matters that should be distant from ideology, including trade and finance, have become tied up with political positions and claims.
The tonal shift that much international coverage of the Biden-Xi meeting has noted in November could persist to some extent in the months to come, with increased attempts in the official discourse to build on the foundation of constructive friendship perhaps firmed up in California. But as Chinese dissident and political commentator Chen Pokong (陈破空) noted in an interview with Radio France International over the summer, the CCP has long pursued a “two-handed strategy” (两手策略), combining “one soft hand” with “one hard fist” (一手软). Chen suggested that the strategy moving forward might be characterized as “simultaneously struggling and negotiating.” While the hard fist may be pulled back for a time following the Biden-Xi meeting, it is bound to return as the two sides continue to grapple with deeper and more intractable concerns — including sanctions and export controls, the war in Ukraine (and China’s alignment with Russia), and of course Taiwan. As Biden said coming out of the November meetings, "We have real differences with Beijing."
As China endeavored to find a balance in its outward language in September between the discourse of confrontation and the discourse of partnership and negotiation, there were some interesting signs of the challenges facing Xi Jinping in terms of discipline within the Party ranks. In the Focus Topic for September 2023, we look at how the CCP leadership continues to address the internal discipline problems that became publicly evident over the summer in the unexplained disappearance of former Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang (秦刚) — and which were underscored again in September in the case of Minister of Defense Li Shangfu (李尚服).
Focus Topic: Reinforcing the Law of Xi Jinping, the Party and the State
Back on August 3, only a week after Qin Gang was formally removed as China’s minister of foreign affairs without explanation, the front page of the People’s Daily announced the release of an Opinion from the CCP Central Committee and the State Council on the creation of a “list system” (清单制度) for Party leaders and cadres at all levels across the country. The basic idea was that this “list system” would set out the basic CCP rules and domestic laws that all officials “should be familiar with and understand” (应知应会). The People’s Daily article made clear that all regions and departments across the country would need to ensure that the system was properly implemented.
What was this “Opinion” actually about? Why now? And why, when such rules and laws were already in place, would a special high-level document from the Party be needed to further impress them on the minds of officials?
In fact, the “list system” had been included as a priority for national governance in the Plan for Building China Under the Rule of Law (2020-2025), released in January 2021, and in the political report to the 20th National Congress one year ago the role of “leading cadres” as model examples (示范带头作用) was mentioned as a priority. Nevertheless, the specific timing of the release of the August opinion in the People’s Daily is possibly related to more immediate questions of intra-party discipline raised in dramatic fashion by the Qin Gang case. As it happened, the announcement of the “list system” in the People’s Daily also came just weeks before another prominent disappearance again drew the attention of international media and foreign governments.
In mid-August General Li Shangfu (李尚服), China’s minister of defense, regarded as a close protégé of Xi Jinping, made a high-profile visit to Russia. On August 29, he delivered the keynote at a China-Africa forum in Beijing. But as September rolled around, Li was absent from public events. By the second week of September, there were whispers of trouble, and by September 15 the general’s lengthy absence was international news, with Reuters reporting that he had been placed under investigation. The BBC quoted Neil Thomas, an expert at the Asia Society Policy Institute, as saying that the high-level disappearances of Qin and Li, with rumors swirling of possible corruption, “are not a good look for Xi because he approved the selection of the current leadership.” Other outlets read the absences as a “sign of growing turbulence” within the CCP leadership.
The People’s Daily announcement on August 3 of the Opinion on the “list system” could be read as the Party’s cryptic acknowledgment that there was indeed turbulence, and that firm reminders to leading cadres were in order. It is likely that the announcement signaled a high-level effort to reassert discipline within the CCP, in light of cases like Qin’s and following the promises made in the 2021 Plan for Building China Under the Rule of Law and related language in Xi’s 2022 political report.
As to what discipline entailed, the Opinion was clear that the top priority was ensuring loyalty to Xi Jinping. While it did speak of the need for cadres to “restrain [their] words and deeds” through the application of the Party Charter and Party discipline regulations (用党章党规党纪约束自己的一言一行), the primary emphasis was on “Xi Jinping Thought on Rule of Law” (习近平法治思想) — a permutation of Xi’s so-called “banner term,” or qizhiyu (旗帜语).
In the hierarchy of discipline defined by the Opinion, “Xi Jinping Thought on Rule of Law” reigned supreme, followed by CCP regulations, and finally by China’s Constitution and the Criminal Law, and other laws and regulations. This hierarchy in the application of various limitations on the conduct of leading cadres is shown in the diagram below.
The release of this “list system” from the CCP Central Committee and the State Council can be understood as a reassertion of discipline from the top of the leadership, and it is likely that the more recent emphasis on the “list system” reflects concern within the top leadership over problems in terms of discipline and perhaps also obedience. On the question of obedience, it is important for the leadership to re-emphasize Xi Jinping’s core status by embedding his governing ideology within the fabric of Party discipline and the rule of law.
By late September, as the disappearance of General Li Shangfu became the subject of fierce speculation internationally, and as Reuters reported that he was under investigation for corrupt procurement, the People’s Daily ran a series of columns remarking on the new “list system,” praising it as an “innovative” approach to governance. The timing of these commentaries seemed to reinforce the sense that the Party was applying the “list system” to grapple with serious internal discipline concerns. On September 20, the newspaper ran a commentary called, “Making the ‘Key Few’ Exemplary in Complying with Party Rules and State Laws” (让关键少数成为遵守党规国法的模范) on the front page. The commentary spoke of the introduction of the “list system” as an “innovative” approach to discipline, and of “Xi Jinping Thought on Rule of Law” as “the fundamental guideline and guide to action for promoting the rule of law in a comprehensive manner in the New Era.”
On September 22, an entire page of the People's Daily was dedicated to the discussion of the role of discipline among leading cadres as essential to the rule of law. The page included three separate commentaries, all under the label “People’s Observer” (人民观察). They were: “Driving Leading Cadres to Take the Lead in Enforcing the Rule of Law by Institutional Force” (以制度力量推动领导干部带头厉行法治), “Strengthening the Institutional Foundation for Conscientious Implementation of Party Regulations” (夯实自觉执行党内法规的制度根基), and “Continuous Improvement of the Level of Competence in the Performance of Duties in Accordance with the Law” (不断提高依法履职的能力水平).
As a general rule, the CCP does not deal openly with its own disarray. But in various ways, disarray can leave its traces in the discourse. The release of the “list system” Opinion in August and related signaling in the People’s Daily in September are perhaps the closest we will come to an open reckoning on the internal turbulence surrounding the cases of Qin Gang and Li Shangfu. We can also note that our survey of CCP discourse for September showed a clear boost for terms related to “party building” (党的建设) and party discipline, both having to do with CCP efforts at self-improvement.
September Surprises: "Damaging the Spirit and Hurting the Feelings of Chinese People"
On September 1, the National People's Congress released for public consultation the draft revisions of the Public Security Administration Punishments Law. This was the first major revision of the law since it came into force 17 years ago.
Among the revisions, two clauses included in Article 34 defined newly punishable acts, including "wearing clothing or bearing symbols in public places that are detrimental to the spirit of the Chinese people and hurt the feelings of the Chinese people, or forcing others to do so”; and also “producing, transmitting, promoting, or disseminating items or speech that is detrimental to the spirit of the Chinese people, and that hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.” These were strongly criticized by netizens in China, including academics and legal experts, who argued that the vague formulation of the clauses would lead to arbitrary and selective enforcement.
For many Chinese commenting online on the draft revisions, the new stipulations recalled a case last year in Suzhou in which a female cosplayer wore a traditional Japanese yukata on the streets and was taken away by police on the grounds that she was “picking quarrels and provoking trouble” [Learn more on this frequently cited crime in the CMP Dictionary]. If the revisions were passed, many said, this would give the police even more justification to intervene in coercive ways in matters such as personal choice of fashion and dress.
In a post to Weibo, Tsinghua University law professor Lao Dongyan (劳东燕) wrote that she found the draft revisions unbelievable. “The concept of ‘damaging the spirit and hurting the feelings of the Chinese people’ is vague in its connotations,” she said, “and if it is applied as a legal criterion for punishment, it will inevitably face the problem of excessively vague standards of punishment.”
She added that the consequences for the credibility of the police and therefore the effectiveness of law enforcement more broadly would be significant. “Such obscurity will lead to selective enforcement of administrative power, which is prone to abuse of power, and will thus open up new space for corruption to flourish, and may intensify conflicts between the police and the public.”
In a pre-drafted response to certain portions of the draft revision, state media managed not to respond at all to criticisms about the language concerning “hurting the feelings of the Chinese people.” And on September 11, an official response came from the NPC Standing Committee that addressed issues raised by the public with stiff diplomatic rhetoric. "The public's submission of comments on the draft law through normal channels is a concrete manifestation of the public's interest in and orderly participation in national legislative work, which is of great significance and which we sincerely welcome,” the statement read.
By the time the consultation formally closed on September 30, more than 120,000 comments had been submitted online.
The Hot and the Cold
About the Scale:
According to the discourse scale developed by CMP in 2016, based on a historical analysis of keywords appearing in the China Communist Party’s flagship People’s Daily newspaper, we define a six-tier system of discourse intensity based on the total number of appearances of a given discourse term on a per article basis for the full year in the paper. The scale is as follows:
In 2021, CMP adjusted its classification method for CCP discourse, determining the intensity (热度) of Party terminologies according to the absolute number of articles including those terms in the People's Daily newspaper. Previously, CMP used a proportional method, which looked at the number of articles including a particular catchphrase (提法) as a ratio of total articles in the newspaper over a given period. Our monthly classification standard, based on the six-level scale created in 2016, is as follows:
The key terms appearing at the top of the CMP scale remained largely unchanged in September compared to the previous month. The phrase “20th CCP National Congress” (二十大), which marks the start of Xi Jinping’s unprecedented third term, bounced back to Tier 1, rejoining “high-quality development” (高质量发展), “Chinese path to modernization” (中国式现代化), and “Belt and Road” (一带一路). Other political catchphrases that were closely associated with Xi, such as “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想), Xi’s lengthy banner phrase (旗帜语) meant to define his political legacy, remained in Tier 2.
One notable phrase in Tier 2 for September was "major changes not seen in a century" (百年未有之大变局). After a weak performance in August, the phrase advanced significantly in September, moving up two levels to Tier 2. The phrase, which first emerged in the months ahead of the 19th CCP National Congress in 2017, has routinely been used to allude to the decline of the West and the rising power of China, paired with the notion that “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is at a critical period.” The phrase is generally seen in the context of international relations. In September, however, it was associated also with domestic economic development. On the front page of the September 18 edition of the People’s Daily, an article from Xinhua News Agency called “Observations on the Grand Cycle of China's Economy” (中国经济大循环观察) used the phrase to contextualize and, at least in part, explain the challenges facing China’s economy at home. "Currently, major changes not seen in a century are accelerating,” the piece said, “with the international political and economic situation complex and severe, the landscape of the global economic cycle undergoing deep restructuring, and the domestic economy still facing many difficulties."
Echoing this new context, the phrase “dual circulation of the domestic and the international” (国内国际双循环) was also boosted significantly, moving from Tier 4 to Tier 3 with four times the number of mentions logged in August. This phrase was coined in May 2020, when the Chinese government unveiled a strategy to reorient China’s economy by prioritizing domestic consumption in the face of international trade and investment faced a major downturn due to pandemic-related restrictions. The clear rise in the use of these and related phrases seems to suggest an interest in September in signaling strong resolve within the CCP on economic policymaking. But the phrases should also be viewed as an attempt within the official discourse to grapple with the negative consequences of “decoupling” (脱钩) — which the WTO reported in September was “nascent but real” — and to address possible countermeasures.
Other phrases related to the more practical aspects of economic policymaking eased up only marginally for the month. For example, “seeking improvement in stability” (稳中求进), which signals an attitude of cautious development in the midst of uncertainty (See our CMP Dictionary), and “deepening reform and opening” (深化改革开放) both dropped on level to Tier 4. Meanwhile, “downward pressure” (下行压力), a phrase used to describe the move from a growth trend to a declining economic trend in terms of such measures as GDP and CPI, dropped to the bottom of the CMP scale. The only word that outperformed was ”stabilizing expectations” (稳预期), which moved up into Tier 4 from Tier 5. “Stabilizing expectations” is generally found in the context of references to the need for what could be called cautious optimism, and has also in the past been part of the formula called the “Six Stabilities” (六稳).
In other discourse moves on the economic front, “new development stage” (新发展阶段), one of Xi Jinping’s key catchphrases for economic policy, was boosted significantly in September, with four times the number of mentions from August — moving it up two levels to Tier 4. The phrase, which is more about political salesmanship than substantive economic policies or measures, has long been deployed to suggest that Xi Jinping has a strong strategic grasp of domestic and international affairs that informs his forward planning as the head of the Party. “Since the 18th National Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping has highly prioritized maintaining strategic resolve,” said a related official commentary in May 2021 penned by the theory and propaganda department of the People’s Daily.
Another phrase worth noting, and related to the discussion in the Focus Topic of this report (above), was “comprehensive law-based governance” (全面依法治国). The phrase rocketed to Tier 3 from Tier 5, with nearly five times the number of mentions from August. This strong performance was largely due to the greater emphasis during the month on so-called “party building” (党的建设) or party discipline — which refers broadly to various activities and initiatives within the CCP aimed at self-improvement, including political education and anti-corruption.
On the front page of the September 20 edition, a piece titled “Let the ‘Critical Minority’ Become Models of Adherence to Party Rules and State Laws” again mentioned the “list system” for leading cadres announced as a governance innovation in early August and ran through a number of measures taken over the past decade to ensure a stronger sense of self-governance within the CCP as the foundation of stronger national governance. “Governing the nation means first governing the Party” (治国必先治党), the article said. Further, the governance of the Party relied, it said, on a strong sense and knowledge of law-based governance among the “critical minority” (关键少数).
In relation to this focus on governance and the “list system,” the performance of a number of terms related to party-building improved in September 2023. The terms “self-revolution”(自我革命) and “Four Consciousnesses” (四个意识) both rose from Tier 2 to Tier 3. “Self-revolution,” the idea that the Party must continue to evolve its processes internally in order to maintain vitality, was included in the declaration on history emerging from the Sixth Plenum of the 19th CCP Central Committee in November 2021.
As was the case in August, the various permutations of Xi Jinping’s banner phrase for specific policy areas continued to underperform in September. Xi’s catchphrase for environmental policy and sustainable development, “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization” (习近平生态文明思想), remained the single strongest performer, only half as many mentions as last month, but still solidly in Tier 3. “Xi Jinping Thought on Rule of Law” (习近平法治思想) was largely unchanged in Tier 4. After being boosted notably for two months, “Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military” (习近平强军思想), the general secretary’s signature national security phrase, moved down one level to Tier 5 with slightly fewer mentions. Not surprisingly, “Xi Jinping Economic Thought” (习近平经济思想), likely to be de-emphasized in light of ongoing economic challenges, again languished down at the bottom in Tier 6, with just three mentions in total. The phrase was joined by “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” (习近平外交思想), which also had just three mentions.
Readers may note that since September, a new permutation of Xi Jinping’s banner phrase has entered the field. This is “Xi Jinping Thought on Culture” (习近平文化思想), which was first raised by Xi during the first week of October. We will deal with this newly emerging phrase in the next report.
The “Two Establishes” (两个确立), since late 2021 a crucial phrase signaling the legitimacy of Xi Jinping’s rule, was just two mentions away from rising to Tier 2 from Tier 3 in September. Meanwhile, the “Two Safeguards” (两个维护), which is similar in meaning, moved one level up to Tier 2, but only just. The first phrase refers to 1) the establishment of Xi as the “core” of the CCP leadership, and 2) the establishment of Xi’s ideas (his banner phrase, in other words) as the leading thought of the Party. The second phrase refers to the need to protect 1) Xi’s “core” status and 2) the authority and centralized leadership of the Party.
The following table shows the key terms we reviewed for the month of September 2023 and how they rated on our scale:
The Centrality Index
One of the highlights of the official discourse in September 2023 was a stronger-than-usual overall performance for a number of China’s top leaders, representing a slight but notable moderation of the overwhelming visual dominance of Xi Jinping.
Among the 23 members of the CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), more than half were arrayed across Tiers 2-4, making September the strongest month so far in 2023 for central leaders other than Xi, apart from the Two Sessions in March (which is typically a strong month for those who aren’t the general secretary, including China’s premier). While Xi Jinping undoubtedly dominated the front page of the People’s Daily in September, considerable space was also devoted to other central leaders. One possible explanation for this was the fact that other central leaders were more involved in diplomatic engagements and traveling on state visits, which all tend to receive strong official media coverage, as Xi was kept busy attending to various domestic events and receiving leaders who visited China to take part in the Asian Games.
It should be noted that greater visibility for the rest of the PSC in September did not in any way diminish Xi Jinping’s overall presence in terms of article frequency. The CCP’s general secretary was mentioned in 760 articles in the People’s Daily in September 2023, making for his strongest month since March. This placed him at the top of the CMP scale in Tier 1, where he has held strong for well over two years. Xi Jinping was far and away the most mentioned leader in the CCP’s Central Committee.
However, the stronger performance of PSC leaders did mean a break in September to the general status quo of PSC vacancies in Tier 2. Generally, over the past two years, Tier 2 has remained empty, a visual expression of the massive gap separating Xi Jinping from the remaining members of the PSC. In September, Premier Li Qiang (李强) made a solid presence in Tier 2, the first time he has done so since March this year when he formally assumed the premiership. Li Qiang received 79 mentions in all, making him the most mentioned leader apart from Xi this year. On top of that, coverage of his various engagements was included on the front page on nine separate days.
Li’s exceptional performance resulted from a busy run of engagements in domestic affairs as well as diplomacy. These included mainly a state visit to Indonesia, where he attended the 26th China-ASEAN (10+1) leaders' meeting in Jakarta, and to India, where he attended the G20 Summit. Both trips received heavy coverage. The former made it to the front page of the People’s Daily three times, and the latter twice. As Li addressed the 10+1 sessions, he placed special emphasis on maintaining the common market and deepening cooperation in the industrial supply chain. Notably, in the areas of education and cultural exchange, he revealed China's plan to build a network of ten "China-ASEAN Institutes of Modern Craftsmanship" (中国-东盟现代工匠学院) in ASEAN countries, as well as to launch what it called the "10,000 Training Seminar Plan" (万人研修研讨计划). The latter, according to Li’s announcement and related state media coverage, aims to train talent across ASEAN member countries in areas such as governance, anti-corruption, and green development.
Wang Yi (王毅), China’s top diplomat as director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, continued his strong performance in the People’s Daily in September. Just as in August, he fell only slightly short of Tier 2, with 41 mentions in total for the month. September marked the eighth consecutive month of Wang’s strong performance, which could be seen to reflect the central importance for the CCP leadership of getting diplomatic relations back on track in the post-pandemic era. Among the events on his September calendar, Wang accompanied Xi Jinping to meet 14 leaders and delegations from different countries and international organizations, attended six domestic and diplomatic events, and met with 12 leaders and delegations personally.
Wang’s personal meetings included that with US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, as the two countries sought to stabilize relations and prepare the way for the November meeting between Biden and Xi in San Francisco.
Also in September, Wang went on a state visit to Russia, where he attended the 18th round of China-Russia strategic security consultation and met with Russian President Vladimir Putin. In addition to signaling the deepening of political trust and strategic collaboration, the two parties agreed to strengthen cooperation in law enforcement and security, counter-proliferation, and global governance of emerging science and technology.
Joining Wang in Tier 3 were Zhao Leji (赵乐际), Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee; Cai Qi (蔡奇), Secretary of the CCP Secretariat; and vice-premiers Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥) and He Lifeng (何立峰). These leaders had 39, 32, 31, and 17 mentions in the People’s Daily respectively in September.
These and other central CCP leaders seem to have been more involved in diplomatic engagements in September, perhaps a reflection of efforts to get Chinese diplomacy back on track. For his part, Zhao Leji met with leaders from 11 countries and international organizations, in addition to attending the Asian Games. Ding Xuexiang, too, had a busy diplomatic and economic schedule in September. He delivered a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the 8th Belt and Road Summit in Hong Kong, met with US business leaders, chaired the 10th China-EU High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue, and acted as the Chinese coordinator for the newly established China-US working group in economic issues.
Foreign Leaders
Mentions of foreign leaders in the People’s Daily in September 2023 were led by a group of states in the Global South, whose leaders were arrayed across tiers 4 and 5, while leaders such as US President Joe Biden and Russian President Vladimir Putin languished at the bottom in Tier 6.
At the top of the list in September was Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet, son of former Prime Minister Hun Sen. Making his first state visit to China since taking office in August, Hun Manet had 15 mentions in the People’s Daily related to his time in Beijing from September 14-16. While in the capital, he met with Xi Jinping, Li Qiang and Zhao Leji. This year marks the 65th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Cambodia, and it has also been designated by both sides as the "Year of Sino-Cambodian Friendship," both themes that featured strongly in related coverage. During the visit, the sides signed a joint communiqué meant to strengthen comprehensive strategic cooperation.
Joining Hun Manet in Tier 4 were Indonesian President Joko Widodo, Nepalese Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda), Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, and East Timorese Xanana Gusmão.
Joko Widodo of Indonesia was mentioned largely as a result of the ASEAN summit in Jakarta, and was quoted in a “Zhong Sheng” (钟声) foreign affairs commentary that was critical of the actions of the United States. Called "No Market for the US to Use the South China Sea to Engage in Provocative Diplomacy" (美方借南海问题搞挑拨外交不会有市场), the commentary stated that “ASEAN must not serve as a proxy for any country or become enmeshed in great power rivalries.”
The US-China rivalry was in the background also as Maduro of Venezuela made his state visit to China. A joint statement of strategic partnership released on September 14 said that "China firmly supports the Venezuelan people in their just struggle to defend national sovereignty and oppose external sanctions, and opposes the imposition of unlawful coercive unilateral sanctions and so-called ‘long-armed jurisdiction' by some countries against Venezuela under any pretext." While this passage did not mention the country explicitly, there is no question that its finger is pointed at the US.
Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel, and Vietnamese President Nguyen Phu Trong all made Tier 5 in September with 7, 6, and 6 mentions respectively. Anwar was mentioned in the context of the ASEAN summit, and an exclusive interview with the leader also appeared in the September 23 edition of the People’s Daily, focused mainly on expanding economic and trade cooperation between China and Malaysia.
Díaz-Canel of Cuba was mentioned mainly due to the “Group of 77 + China” summit held in Havana on September 16-17. Related coverage in the People’s Daily centered on China’s leadership among countries in the Global South, including a series of three commentaries under the official byline “He Yin” (和音) as follows:
“Building a Community of Common Destiny in the Global South” (共筑全球南方命运共同体)
“Moving the Wheel of Human Development Towards a Brighter Future” (推动人类发展的巨轮驶向更加光明的未来)
“Injecting More Stability into Global Peace and Development” (为全球和平与发展注入更多稳定性)
All other world leaders appearing in September in the People’s Daily were mentioned three or fewer times, including Russian President Vladimir Putin, who met with Wang Yi and Zhang Guoqing, and North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un, who spoke to Xi Jinping by phone and received the Chinese delegation led by Vice Premier Liu Guozhong on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the DPRK's National Day. US President Joe Biden was mentioned just twice in September, both in purely negative contexts. The first was a report on the official response given by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning to the US president’s report to Congress, in which he identified China as a "major source country" for drugs. In that response, Mao retorted that the US was a “major drug-demanding country.” The second mention of Biden was in an article discussing US foreign policy interventions and Central and South America from the 19th century onward. It quoted former Bolivian president Evo Morales as saying that “[the] United States is the greatest enemy of life, democracy, freedom and sovereignty."
In keeping with its generally understated treatment of the Russian invasion of Ukraine — which it still calls a “special military operation” after Putin’s rhetorical preference, or otherwise a “crisis” — the CCP’s flagship newspaper once again left out any mention of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in September.
 | A guest post by
|
 | A guest post by
|
Further to the "rule of law" in China, still another Chinese dissident-journalist allegedly killed by the CCP security apparatus. According to RSF, "China ranks 179th out of 180 in the 2023 RSF World Press Freedom Index and is the world's largest captor of journalists and press freedom defenders with at least 123 detained." And still we drool and grovel for the China "market." To borrow from a folk song of years gone by, "When will we ever learn?"
https://rsf.org/en/beaten-death-state-security-rsf-shocked-gruesome-murder-independent-journalist-china
"In fact, the “list system” had been included as a priority for national governance in the Plan for Building China Under the Rule of Law (2020-2025), released in January 2021, and in the political report to the 20th National Congress one year ago the role of “leading cadres” as model examples (示范带头作用) was mentioned as a priority."
I wonder how the CCP can speak of the rule of law without blushing. The party and XJP are increasingly parodies of themselves. If they weren't so capable of breaking things, lots of things, and around the world, it would be comic.