China Media Project Discourse Tracker August 2024
CMP Discourse Tracker / August 2024
A month-to-month reading of the Chinese Communist Party's flagship People's Daily newspaper and key discourse trends – with crucial context, from China Media Project’s
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As we prepare to hit “publish” on this latest edition of the CMP Discourse Tracker, covering August 2024, the top story promoted on the front-page of the People’s Daily, just to the right of the masthead, is a read-out from the 17th collective study session of the Politburo. The study session, which addressed the question of building China as a “cultural power” (文化强国), was naturally led by Xi Jinping. But how is the session significant? How should we begin to “read” it? And why, as China watchers, should we devote even a moment of precious time to such a tower of official babble?
Building on what we said in the last two reports, the “framing words,” or tifa (提法), within elaborate constructions like this one are the building blocks of discourse reading. It is not sufficient to treat the read-out like a piece of text to be “translated,” even machine translated, and summarized — as though its content was simply being dumped out of a box. This text, in fact, is made up of boxes. Reading means unpacking. Each specialized term has a history in the CCP context, sometimes also of change and co-optation, and many derive their meaning from the boxes to be found within them. The distinct packets of consensus concepts within the text are your key to drawing out greater meaning and specificity.
Let’s turn, for example, to a portion of the read-out that addresses most directly the issue of what the CCP terms variously “international communication” (国际传播) or “external propaganda” (对外宣传). Both of these pertain to China’s strategies, both covert and overt, for advancing the influence of the Party-state, a priority that also falls under the umbrella of “cultural soft power” (国家文化软实力). If you are researching “influence” issues, what the European Union, seeking a consensus definition, now terms foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), these framing words drawn from within the textual context itself will unlock far more than selective frames that may have currency within our own international research contexts — terms like “information warfare,” or “united front.” The keys to the black box are hanging on the door, as it were.
So, a bit of text from the read-out:
Xi Jinping emphasized that [we must] continuously enhance the country's cultural soft power and the influence of Chinese culture. [We must] promote the pattern reconstruction of international communication, engage in innovative online external propaganda, and build multi-channel and three-dimensional patterns of external communication.
Here I’ve chosen two keys hanging on the door. These are: “pattern reconstruction of international communication” (国际传播格局重构), and “innovative online external propaganda” (创新开展网络外宣). We want to better understand what China is planning concretely, right? So these keys can help.
Search “pattern reconstruction of international communication” and “external propaganda” together and you quickly turn up references to Xi Jinping’s address to the Third Plenum back in July, where he spoke of “building a more effective international communication system” (构建更有效力的国际传播体系). Another key, this system is the goal of “reconstruction.” So what is it?
Search “building a more effective international communication system” in double quotes and you quickly find other coverage through August elaborating the significance (“spirit”) of Xi’s Third Plenum speech. Here is the top-most one on my search results, a piece about effectively “telling China’s story” globally. Beyond just more boxes, we have important and revealing specifics in the text. It notes, in particular, that "in recent years, international communication centers have been set up across the country, becoming a new force in China's international communication.”
And there you have a key piece of the puzzle.
Here at CMP, in fact, we were the first to report on these “international communication centers” (国家传播中心), or ICCs, which utilize the resources of provincial and city-level media groups, in close collaboration with propaganda offices, to join the national struggle to “tell China’s story.” On the CMP site, you can find more than 10 in-depth stories since the middle of 2023 on this trend, one of the most important developments in external propaganda studies in years. We’ve even developed an interactive map for provincial-level ICCS.
The method of reading past the official discourse we outlined above, which we apply in our daily research at CMP, is the reason we were ahead of the curve on ICCs. And we hope it is useful for more researchers as they endeavor to “read” the official discourse.
On to our August analysis.
David L. Bandurski /CMP Director
Chu Yang / Editor, Discourse Tracker
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TOPPING THE AGENDA
Topic 1
Ecological Protection and the Green Economy
Given that the month of August came on the heels of the Chinese Communist Party’s long-awaited Third Plenum, held July 15-18, we would normally anticipate a focus on the plenum and the study of its “spirit” on successive August front pages of the official People’s Daily. This was doubly the case given that a Politburo meeting on July 30, following on the plenum, dealt with economic policy. However, for reasons that are not entirely clear, this is not the pattern we saw. Instead, in a departure from the pattern, coverage focused more heavily on regional development, with a particular emphasis on both ecological protection and green transformation.
Since the dawn of the reform period, the Third Plenum has had a special role in signaling readjustments and shifts in direction. And yet, throughout the second half of July, pundits trying to squeeze meaning from the four-day session were left underwhelmed, noting that the communiqué emerging from the meeting "contains no major policy initiatives to address the country’s near-term growth challenges."
The focus in August on “green” policies seems an odd act of looking the other way when it comes to the serious problems lately facing China’s economy. But the focus on green is also a part of the leadership’s efforts to promote “high-quality development” (高质量发展), which Xi Jinping identified at the December 2017 Central Economic Work Conference as “development that can properly satisfy the growing needs of the people for a better life; development that embodies the new development concept; development for which innovation becomes the main force, coordination becomes the inherent dynamic, green becomes the general form, openness becomes the necessary path, and sharing becomes the ultimate goal.” Plainly, as CCP discourse is wont to do, this definition packs in a great deal — doing less to clarify the concept than stack it together with others.
But “green” is clearly a key component of “high-quality development,” and it became a major topic in state media in August 2024, particularly around the phrase “green transition” (绿色转型). This is a concept arising from the international climate change discourse that China’s CCP leadership has now folded into the its Xi-associated governance concepts, including the notion of “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization” (习近平生态文明思想), the concept under the general secretary’s banner phrase (see below) that is meant to cover climate and the environment.
The global foundation of the “green transition” were laid out in the Paris Agreement, the international, legally binding agreement on climate change adopted by the Paris Climate Change Conference (COP21) in December 2015. Generally speaking, it deals with new sustainable economic models, economies that are circular and regenerative, avoidance of overconsumption of natural resources, and so on. The concept also became part of the European Green Deal launched by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in December 2019.
The foundations of what is now termed “green transition” under Xi Jinping began with his introduction in 2013 of the verbose phrase “green waters and green mountains are gold mountains and silver mountains” (绿水青山就是金山银山), which in state media coverage was dated back to August 2005 when Xi made an inspection tour of Anji County in Zhejiang as top leader of the province. This history, in fact, is entirely apocryphal, a fact that we have documented in our entry for the phrase in our “CMP Dictionary.” While the phrase was introduced as a Xi Jinping innovation in 2013, it was slow to gain traction within CCP discourse. That changed in 2019 and 2020, when it was strongly touted in propaganda as a major innovation of environmental and economic policy.
Xi Jinping’s use of “green transition” (绿色转型) can be traced back to 2016, the year after COP21. Its use continued in 2017, but only in limited contexts. The phrase rose substantially in use only in November 2020, as Xi Jinping addressed a side event on safeguarding the climate at the G20 Riyadh Summit. State media coverage at the time focused on Xi’s remarks about the need to “promote a comprehensive green transition of social and economic development” (促进经济社会发展全面绿色转型). Xi’s not-so-original “green waters and green mountains” phrase can now frequently be found in close proximity to the term “green transition,” and both are generally subordinated, once again, to the banner phrase permutation “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization”
Returning to coverage in August 2024, the phrase “green transition” appeared on the front page of the August 12 edition of the People’s Daily as it featured the State Council's opinions on accelerating the comprehensive green transformation of economic and social development. This was in an expanded “newspaper eye” (报眼), which refers to the space immediately to the right of the masthead on the front page.
The document listed a 33-point set of guidelines that signal the first systematic deployment of green targets by China’s top leadership. The State Council plan emphasized key areas such as optimizing land use, industrial restructuring, energy transition, transportation reform, urban and rural development, resource conservation, and promoting green consumption. It also set ambitious goals for transitioning to a greener, low-carbon economy by 2030 and 2035, including: raising the proportion of non-fossil energy in China's energy consumption mix to approximately 25 percent; growing the country's energy conservation and environmental protection industry to a scale of around 15 trillion yuan (2 trillion USD) by 2030; and making new energy vehicles the bulk of new vehicle sales by 2035.
These goals immediately became the focus of state media coverage and international communication, emphasizing China’s role as a responsible global partner on climate change and sustainable development. In English-language coverage, the Global Times, a spin-off of the People’s Daily, called the document a “groundbreaking green transition plan.”
Beyond its role as a responsible power — a common theme in external propaganda — how did China characterize its “green transition”? The State Council document focused on two strategic considerations: long-term security and economic growth. The green energy transition at this moment, it said, would firstly ensure a “secure transition”:
[We need to] properly prevent and resolve internal and external risks and challenges faced by the green transition; effectively ensure food and energy security; [and protect] industrial supply-chain security.
Meanwhile, on the economic front, China's slowing economy — and here came the link with the goals outlined in the Third Plenum communique — necessitated new drivers for growth. Economic transformation and “high-quality development,” as mentioned above, have been consistent themes in the People's Daily since last year, reflecting its policy priorities around the adjustment of the country’s economic system.
Closely tied to Xi Jinping's policy agenda, the emphasis on sustainable development has been one of the key areas of focus during his leadership. In 2017, Xi incorporated the concept of "ecological civilization" into the party charter through the longer phrase “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization” (习近平生态文明思想), which is related to Xi’s banner phrase to seal his political legacy. It is interesting to note, in fact, that this phrase was the earliest indication of the incorporating of the word “civilization,” or wenming (文明), in CCP terms related closely to regime legitimacy. Previous uses of “civilization” in the CCP discourse have largely occurred within the context of “civilized” behavior, centering on the idea of improving the aspect of urban spaces (“civilized cities”) and urging citizens against spitting and other uncouth acts. Since 2021, the notion of “civilization” has become core to Xi Jinping’s construction of legitimacy, and the idea that China has, through a unique process of “Chinese-style modernization” (中国式现代化) created a “new form of human civilization” (人类文明新形态).
China’s hosting of the UN Biodiversity Conference in Kunming from October 11-24, 2021, was a prominent platform for China to promote its vision of "ecological civilization" on the international stage. In the absence of U.S.participation in the Convention on Biological Diversity, biodiversity talks became an area where Beijing could easily set the agenda. The Kunming Declaration "Towards an Ecological Civilization: Building a Shared Future for All Life on Earth," supported by over 100 environment ministers, signified China's intention to leave Xi’s mark on global biodiversity and climate discussions. It should also be noted that the Kunming event came just weeks ahead of the Sixth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee, held in November 2021, which brought the unveiling of the broader discourse of “civilization” that would be foregrounded at the 20th National Congress of the CCP the next year — applied liberally across policy areas — and culminate in Xi’s announcement in March 2023 of the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI).
One plausible theory, then, is that the area of China’s green discourse was the original testing ground of the broader leadership discourse around “civilization.” A case can certainly be made that this context is politically less contentious, and hence a good candidate for such a pre-launch. Unlike political and ideological topics that generate internal tensions or controversies, the concept of ecological civilization is a relatively uncontroversial and easily marketable policy area — aligning with global trends and international expectations even as it plays to domestic audiences, both inside and outside the CCP. This makes it a valuable positive political asset for Xi Jinping and the Chinese leadership. Both factors, including the utility of the concepts associated with the phrase in building China’s positive image internationally, might explain why “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization” — Xi’s catchphrase for environmental policy and sustainable development— consistently outperformed other banner phrases, maintaining a Tier 3 status over the past two months.
Protecting the Environment, Protecting the People
At home, the concept of “ecological civilization” has been an excellent vehicle for reinforcing Xi Jinping's image as a people's leader (人民領袖) and building his political capital. This was clearly demonstrated by a series of articles published on the front page of the People’s Daily in August 2024 under the theme "The General Secretary's Affection for the People" (总书记的人民情怀). The August 8 edition published a piece with the headline, "Leaving An Ecological Space of Verdant Mountains and Clear Water to Future Generations" (为子孙后代留下山清水秀的生态空间), which directly linked Xi's leadership with long-term environmental stewardship. This portrayed Xi as a forward-thinking leader who cares not just about immediate gains, political and economic, but about the welfare of future generations. It appeals to traditional Chinese values of responsibility towards posterity while addressing contemporary environmental concerns.
On the front page of the August 11, 2024, edition of the People’s Daily, Xi Jinping’s concept of “ecological civilization” was also more closely linked to one of his flagship development projects, the Xiong’an New Area, conceived by Xi as a development hub for the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei economic triangle. The edition featured a story on Hebei province, the location of the state-level new area, as a model for comprehensive green transformation. According to the article, the Xiong’an New Area exemplifies the implementation of the “ecological civilization” concept, linking Xi's personal, legacy-related development vision with tangible progress in ecological development. By showcasing this project, state media reinforced the idea that Xi's leadership is directly responsible for positive environmental changes.
There was a strong regional aspect to the promotion of green development and Xi Jinping’s legacy in August, all closely related to the promotion of high-quality development. A prime example of this was another series of columns in the People’s Daily called "High-Quality Development Research Tour" (高质量发展调研行), running in August for its third consecutive month, which featured four successive articles related to ecological protection and the green economy. Among these, three articles focused on Fujian province — which Xi had recently urged to play a pioneering role in the country’s modernization drive — while one centered on Erhai Lake in Yunnan province. For a more detailed analysis of how different provinces have been positioned in China's green development strategy, please refer to our expanded discussion in the next section.
Topic 2
Ethnic Unity
In recent months, ethnic unity has emerged as a prominent theme in China's domestic policy discourse, with a particular focus on forging a unified national identity. This renewed emphasis can be seen in greater front-page emphasis on related articles in the People’s Daily. Visited by Xi Jinping to both Qinghai and Ningxi, where ethnic issues were forefronted, became front-page official coverage. Two significant articles about Tibet were also featured — one on August 27th titled "Unite and Work Together to Build a New Socialist Modernized Tibet" (团结携手，建设社会主义现代化新西藏) and another on August 28 titled "Gathering Tremendous Strength to Build a Beautiful and Happy Tibet" (汇聚建设美丽幸福西藏的磅礴伟力). Both pieces included a lengthy histories of the CCP’s supposed aid for Tibet since the mid-1990s, and the “spirit of support for Tibet” (援藏精神). The stories were woven together with Xi Jinping’s legacy, noting his visit to the region as CCP secretary of Fujian province in June 1998, and later as a member of a National People’s Congress delegation in 2013.
Screenshot of an official Xinhua News Agency video promoting the August 28 article "Gathering Tremendous Strength to Build a Beautiful and Happy Tibet.”
Additionally, the People's Daily launched a special column titled "Forging a Community, One Chinese Family" (铸牢共同体 中华一家亲), which were given prominence on the front pages. Three front-page articles featured ideological unity and ethnic solidarity and the strengthening of revolutionary tradition education in Ningxia, and the ethnic minority-focused tourism in Guilin, Guangxi.
PROVINCES IN PRIME POSITION
The People's Daily often mirrors the focus areas of the central leadership, and provinces that align closely with national strategic objectives — such as those involved in major economic initiatives or showcasing successful implementation of party policies — tend to receive more prominent coverage in the newspaper. Similarly, domestic policies that support such goals as poverty alleviation, technological innovation, or environmental protection are frequently highlighted. Each month, we survey provinces in prime positions in the People’s Daily to determine how they are emphasized in the CCP’s official discourse. This can offer a view of how China is defining its priorities in domestic policies. How did provinces fare in the People’s Daily in August 2024?
High-Quality Development
Technological innovation remained a central priority in China's domestic policy, as evidenced by its continued high prominence in official media coverage throughout August 2024. The front pages of the People's Daily featured several articles highlighting this focus, including coverage of manufacturing upgrades in Changzhou, Jiangsu, and efforts to accelerate the industrialization of scientific and technological achievements in Shaanxi. This persistent emphasis on technological innovation aligned with China's broader goals of pursuing “high-quality development” (高质量发展), a term that emerged at the 19th National Congress of the CCP in 2017 and rapidly accelerated in use in 2021. The article on Changzhou, for example, spoke glowingly of a “Changzhou in which science and technology innovation are on the rise.” The article on Shaanxi spoke of “promoting innovative industrial chains” (推动创新链产业), and like a number of articles on innovation featured local innovators by name — in this case Northwestern Polytechnical University professor Luo Jian (罗剑), who according to his bio did his postgraduate work in Munich 10 years ago.
Beyond technological innovations, China's pursuit of high-quality development also encompassed economic transformation, as highlighted on quite a number of People’s Daily front pages in August. Examples included the upgrading of the electronic industry in Shenzhen, the digital economy in Guizhou — which has become known as China’s big data valley — and the marine economy in Dalian, the capital of northeastern Liaoning province. Among these, the green economy and export-oriented foreign trade stood out as particularly significant. Xiong'an in Hebei, Xi's signature project, was, as discussed previously, held up as a model for the new green transformation policy. The ongoing "High-Quality Development Research Tour" (高质量发展调研行) column, mentioned in our “Topping the Agenda” section above, focused four out of five articles in August on the green economic development in Fujian, with an additional piece on the Erhai Lake in Yunnan. In terms of developing an export-oriented economy, Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei, the Greater Bay Area, Sichuan and Chongqing were all given strategic prominence.
Beyond the substance of these reports on transformation and innovation, which essentially deliver a positive report card while signaling the leadership’s priorities, we can note the way the People’s Daily itself describes the purpose and context of the "High-Quality Development Research Tour" series. Here is the description of the column as it appears on a special page at People’s Daily Online archiving the articles and categorizing them by province, with our emphasis on key official terminologies:
High-quality development is the primary task of building a modern socialist country. The People's Daily has launched the "High-Quality Development Research Tour" column, focusing on implementing the new development concept, building a new development pattern and promoting high-quality development, and conducting in-depth research and interviews at the grassroots level in batches, to profoundly reveal the truth and practical power of Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era in leading high quality development . . .
It goes without saying that establishing the “truth and practical power” of Xi Jinping’s signature political concept — and hence his legitimacy construction — is the central goal of the series, which cannot be read (now we are stating the obvious) as a true survey, or credible on-the-ground reporting. Nevertheless, the series is structured like a tour through the provinces, and the language often reflects this framing — as in the piece on the Greater Bay Area, the megalopolis vision of Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao, which was cast as a “frontline observation” (一线观察).
Another column featured prominently in August was “Anchoring Modernization, Deepening Reforms" (锚定现代化 改革再深化), which interpreted various aspects of the Sixth Plenum communique. Begun during the second half of July, the column continued in August with a regional focus. The column upheld typical cases in various provinces and cities corresponding to specific policy aspects mentioned in the communique. Details are illustrated in the map below.
UPS & DOWNS
Every month, we look at the terms in our discourse list that move substantially up and down the tiers of the CMP scale. August showed largely consistent performance compared to the previous month. However, the few terms that did exhibit substantial changes were predominantly characterized by a scale back in prominence. The words experiencing the most significant weakening could be clustered into three main themes: domestic policy, diplomacy, and reform.
Domestic Policy
Due to the Third Plenum, terms related to governance and domestic development were significantly boosted in July 2024. With the plenum now behind, August saw a notable decline in the prominence of these terms. However, it's crucial to understand that this decline does not represent a setback, but rather a return to normal levels of discourse after the exceptional emphasis in the previous month.
Some governance-related terms experienced a marked decrease for the same reason. "The national governance system and the modernization of governing capacity" (国家治理体系和治理能力现代化) halved in prominence, dropping to Tier 3. Similarly, "comprehensive law-based governance" (全面依法治国) saw an even more dramatic decline, falling to just one-third of the mentions in the previous month and dropping down to Tier 4.
In the realm of domestic development, terms closely associated with Xi Jinping's policies underperformed compared to the previous month. The "new development concept" (新发展理念), which Xi introduced at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee in 2015 and which encompasses the ideas of innovative, coordinated, green, open, and shared development, saw its usage halve, dropping to Tier 3. The "new development stage" (新发展阶段), a term referring to the new phase of fully building a modern socialist country and marching toward the second centenary goal that began in 2021, also decreased by half in mentions, falling to Tier 5 — again, likely a direct result of the post Third Plenum drop. The "new development pattern" (新发展格局), an economic policy that was introduced during the COVID-19, which aimed at reorienting China's economy by prioritizing domestic consumption, dropped to Tier 3. Similarly, "dual circulation of the domestic and the international" (国内国际双循环) saw its mentions halve, falling to Tier 5.
Diplomacy
As previously noted, the focus of coverage this month primarily centered on domestic policy, with terms related to foreign relations and diplomatic engagement showing a noticeable weakening across the board.
The Belt and Road Initiative, Xi’s signature project, experienced a significant drop in prominence. After being boosted to Tier 1 last month due to Xi's visit to Central Asia, the term "Belt and Road" (一带一路) fell back to Tier 2 this month. China's efforts to play a larger role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, as demonstrated by the 2024 Beijing Declaration signed in July, which aimed at unifying Palestinian factions, did not translate into increased prominence for related terms. In fact, phrases like "China's wisdom" (中国智慧) and "China's Plan" (中国方案) saw their usage decrease to just one-third of the previous month's levels, dropping to Tier 4. This decline suggests a potential scaling back of emphasis on China's diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East, at least in terms of public messaging.
The sensitive issue of cross-strait relations also saw a reduction in rhetorical emphasis. The term "One China policy" (一个中国) weakened to half of its prominence from July, also falling to Tier 4. This change is particularly revealing of the responsive nature of China's Taiwan-related rhetoric. The significant decrease in emphasis on such a crucial aspect of China's foreign policy stance can be attributed to the absence of major events or developments regarding Taiwan in August. We will likely see a marked reversal of this trend when we take a closer look at discourse on Taiwan in the People’s Daily and other official media for our report on October 2024, covering the period of Taiwan’s National Day, or Double Ten Day, when China stage large-scale military exercises to protest a speech by Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te.
Even more telling in July was the scaling back of confrontational rhetoric related to international influence. Terms like "external forces" (外部势力) and "decoupling" (脱钩), often used in the context of geopolitical tensions, both halved in prominence, dropping to Tier 5. This moderation in tone likely signaled a temporary softening of aggressive diplomatic language or a strategic recalibration of China's international messaging.
Reform
August marked the 120th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping's birth. There was heavy coverage of related meetings and commemorative activities in the People's Daily. Despite Deng's status in CCP history as a pioneering reformer, keywords associated with reform notably underperformed compared to the previous month. "Reform and opening" (改革开放), which had seen a substantial boost in the previous month due to the Third Plenum, experienced a one-third decline, falling to Tier 2. Even more dramatically, "Deepening reform and opening" (深化改革开放) plummeted to merely one-third of its former prominence, dropping to Tier 4. The trend extends to terms related to specific areas of reform as well. "Economic system reforms" (经济体制改革) fell to just over half its previous level, descending to Tier 3, while "Judicial system reforms" (司法体制) tumbled from Tier 4 to Tier 6.
The reduced emphasis on reform-related terms, even during a month commemorating a historically significant reformer like Deng Xiaoping, suggested our observations in the previous Discourse Tracker for July 2024 were on base — that the emphasis on reform in July had little to do with Deng Xiaoping, but related to state media efforts to construct myths and narratives supporting Xi's legitimacy, portraying him as a reformer.
Xi-deology Slips
The performance of various permutations of Xi Jinping’s powerful banner phrase for specific policy areas in August largely remained unchanged compared to the previous month. The strongest member of the team, “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization” — Xi’s catchphrase for environmental policy and sustainable development — remained in Tier 3 with the same amount of mentions. It was the same with Xi’s catchphrase for culture and ideology, “Xi Jinping Thought on Culture” (习近平文化思想), in Tier 4. “Xi Jinping Thought on Rule of Law” (习近平法治思想) remained in Tier 4 with slightly fewer mentions. “Xi Jinping Thought on a Strong Military” (习近平强军思想), the general secretary’s signature national security phrase, was boosted to Tier 4 with slightly more mentions. “Xi Jinping Thought on Economy” (习近平经济思想) remained in Tier 5 with almost the same amount of mentions from the previous month. Despite of being boosted to Tier 5 with a doubling of mentions, “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” (习近平外交思想) remained the weakest of the group.
None of these permutations, variations of the banner phrase “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想), has moved in a substantial way over the past several years. However, as we approach the midpoint in Xi’s third term, they are worth watching closely for signs of the shortening of the banner phrase — almost certainly a key discourse objective of Xi and his leading acolytes in the CCP. While we routinely talk in English outside China about “Xi Jinping Thought” when referring to Xi’s signature buzzword, this shortening has not actually been achieved in Chinese.
THE CENTRAL LEADERBOARD
It should surprise no one that Xi Jinping was once again the clear front runner among central CCP leaders mentioned in the People’s Daily in August 2024. The general secretary was mentioned in 525 articles. Although there was a significant drop this month compared to last month, this was not a rhetorical setback but a return to normal levels after July’s major meeting. Xi’s 525 mentions placed him at the top of the CMP scale in Tier 1, where he has held strong for well over three years. He was far and away the most mentioned leader in the CCP’s Central Committee.
Apart from Xi, all central leaders have seen a notable pullback in their performance this month. Premier Li Qiang (李强) and China’s top diplomat as director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi (王毅), both made solid presences in Tier 3 with 40 and 29 mentions. Over the past year or so, Wang and Li have been the frontrunners among central leaders excepting Xi, and the two have often alternated positions as the number two most mentioned officials. Which of these two leads generally signals in any given month whether state media have focused on diplomatic or domestic affairs. In August, domestic policy was the actual highlight.
Premier Li Qiang was mentioned in August for his involvement in both diplomatic and domestic affairs. Li met with two foreign leaders in Beijing early in the month, and later visited Russia and Belarus, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko. However, his primary focus remained on domestic affairs. Li traveled to Hunan to console disaster victims and stress the importance of flood prevention and safety measures. He also chaired the State Council's fifth plenary meeting, emphasizing yearly economic and social development goals. A key highlight was Li's participation in the 2024 World Robot Expo, where he addressed China's commitment to advancing robotics technology and industry development, aligning with the country's recent industrial policy priorities.
Wang Yi accompanied Xi during meetings with three foreign leaders, and attended one diplomatic event. Wang met personally or made phone calls to a further eight leaders and delegations in Beijing, including US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. Sullivan’s visit occurred right after the US announced new sanctions against Chinese companies for aiding Russia's war against Ukraine. Sullivan came for "strategic communications" with Wang Yi with the goal of stabilizing the bilateral relationship amid growing tensions. Wang also co-chaired the fifth meeting of the China-Indonesia Governmental Joint Commission on Bilateral Cooperation with Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, vowing to deepen cooperation in various fields. Wang emphasized the shared identity of China and Indonesia as members of the “global south” (全球南方), and as “two major developing great nations” (两大发展中大国). As we mentioned in previous analysis, Xi Jinping has stressed that China will “forever” be a developing nation — underscoring the importance of this notion for the country’s foreign policy, regardless of its economic development state.
Towards the end of the month, Wang visited Myanmar and then traveled to Thailand, where he chaired the 9th Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Foreign Ministers' Meeting to further promote regional cooperation. Prior to his overseas trip, Wang met with the UN Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar in Beijing, signaling China's willingness to involve itself in the situation in Myanmar. During his visit to Myanmar, Wang also held talks with Min Aung Hlaing, the Burmese army general who rules the country. Wang voiced China’s support for implementation of the Five-Point Consensus (5PC), a plan introduced by ASEAN in 2021 to address the political crisis in Myanmar. The Myanmar issue also featured prominently in the informal meeting of foreign ministers from China, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand.
Trailing Wang Yi and Li Qiang in Tier 4 in August 2024 were Cai Qi (蔡奇), secretary of the CCP Secretariat, Zhao Leji (赵乐际), chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, Wang Huning (王沪宁), chairman of the People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), Vice Premier Liu Guozhong (刘国中), and Li Shulei (李书磊), head of the Central Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee.
Cai’s work primarily centered around “Party building” (党的建设) — a term referring to the process of organization and discipline within the CCP — and ideological reinforcement. In August, he attended three meetings related to this work, including one for central and state organs to study and implement the spirit of the Third Plenum of the 20th CCP Central Committee, one on the central-level mechanism for combating “formalism” (形式主义) — a term referring to an emphasis on political performance over action and substance — and another of the Central Leading Group for Party Building Work. These activities underscore the ongoing efforts to streamline party operations and enhance efficiency at various levels of governance. Additionally, Cai participated in the national seminar commemorating the 120th anniversary of Deng Xiaoping's birth, where he delivered a speech.
Wang attended and spoke at the Fourth Tibet Work Conference on Counterpart Support. He addressed the Party's strategy for governing Tibet in the new era, emphasizing the ideological thread of the Chinese national community and focusing on the four major issues of stability, development, ecology and strengthening the borders. He also sent a congratulatory letter to the 2024 Global Conference of Overseas Chinese Promoting China's Peaceful Reunification, encouraging overseas Chinese compatriots to enthusiastically join the movement against Taiwan's independence and for reunification. Liu went on inspection trips to Fujian and Henan, inspecting the implementation of rural construction actions and agricultural disaster recovery efforts. Meanwhile, Li participated in media cooperation forums, including the 2024 "Belt and Road" Media Cooperation Forum in Chengdu and the 6th China-Africa Media Cooperation Forum and China-Africa Think Tank High-Level Dialogue in Beijing, showcasing China's efforts to strengthen international media ties and promote its global initiatives.
The remaining members of the Politburo Standing Committee trailed in Tier 5 or below. Secretary of the CCP Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Li Xi (李希) met with Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Civil Service Hun Many to discuss how to deepen exchanges and co-operation in party discipline. Meanwhile, Vice Premier Zhang Guoqing (张国清) focused on domestic disaster management, visiting Heilongjiang and Liaoning provinces to console disaster-affected residents and inspect flood prevention and disaster relief work.
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Although not members of the Politburo, two central leaders are worthy of note for their exposure in the People’s Daily in August 2024. They are Liu Jianchao (刘建超), the Chinese diplomat and head of the International Department of the CCP, and Wang Xiaohong (王小洪), the country’s minister of public security. Since last year, the two have maintained steady mentions for their engagement in both domestic and diplomatic events. In August, Liu was placed in Tier 4, while Wang remained in Tier 5. Liu met with eight foreign delegations in Beijing and visited three countries. Liu led the delegation to attend the inauguration ceremony of President Paul Kagame of Rwanda.
DIPLOMACY IN FOCUS
Each month we survey world leaders to determine how they are emphasized (or left out) in the CCP’s official discourse, which can offer a view of how China is defining its priorities in foreign relations. How did world leaders fare in the People’s Daily in August 2024?
As previously noted, August's coverage maintained a predominantly domestic focus, with diplomatic engagement noticeably quieter. This inward-looking trend is evident in the limited presence of diplomatic activities on the front pages, with visits abroad by Chinese officials and visits by foreign leaders to China featuring for only five days throughout the month. The reduced emphasis on diplomatic engagement is further reflected in the mentions of foreign leaders, which showed an overall weakening in performance. While in the previous month, mentions of two Central Asian leaders were placed in Tier 3, this month saw mentions of foreign leaders generally falling to Tiers 4-6.
Vietnam’s new leader, Tô Lâm, led the pack with 10 mentions in Tier 4, reflecting a medium level of attention for the month. Tô Lâm was appointed in early August as general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), following the death in July of former general secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. For his first foreign trip after assuming his new role, Tô chose Beijing. The visit was featured on the front page of the August 20th edition of the People’s Daily. In the article, Tô Lâm described China as a “strategic choice and top priority for Vietnam's foreign policy.” While in Beijing, Tô Lâm also met with Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, and Wang Huning. His visit concluded with a joint statement on further strengthening the comprehensive strategic partnership and advancing the building of a “China-Vietnam community of shared destiny” (中越命运共同体), this related to one of the core buzzwords of Xi Jinping era foreign policy (more in our CMP Dictionary). The two sides vowed to strengthen cooperation in the areas of defense and public security, as well as manage the issue of territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka followed in Tier 4 for his 10-day visit to Beijing, his first trip to China since he was elected in late 2022. While in Beijing, he met with Xi Jinping, Li Qiang and Zhao Leji. Judging from the joint statement by the end of this trip, his mission was mainly to deepen economic ties with China, especially in infrastructure, tourism, and trades. As the third visiting South Pacific leader since July, he came right before the upcoming Pacific Islands Forum, which showed how China leveraged such high-level visits to grow its regional influence.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, Brazilian President Lula da Silva, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, South African President Matamela Ramaphosa, Belarusian President Dmitry Lukashenko, French President Emmanuel Macron, Zanzibari President Hussein Mwinyi, and Zambian President Hakainde Hichilema were all placed in Tier 5 in August 2024, pointing to a low level of coverage in the People’s Daily.
Recent months have seen frequent top-level exchanges between China and Russia. In July, Putin met with Xi in Astana during the SCO meetings. Additionally, three Chinese central leaders — Zhang Guoqing, Zhao Leji, and Ding Xuexiang — visited Russia to promote bilateral cooperation across various fields. August saw the continuation of this trend with Premier Li Qiang's visit to Moscow. The primary purpose of his trip was to attend the 29th regular meeting between Chinese and Russian heads of government, which he co-hosted with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. While in Moscow, Li Qiang also met with Putin.
The joint communiqué released after the meeting described the bilateral relationship as being at a historical high. Despite the adverse economic environment and growth pressures, trade between the two countries has reportedly reached historic levels, amounting to 200 billion dollars. The two parties also expanded cooperation in new areas, such as digital governance and media collaboration. Notably, the joint communiqué addressed several global issues, a fair world trade and monetary financial system in a multipolar world, the stability of global and regional industrial and supply chains, and condemning the seizure of foreign assets and property, with language that appeared to speak directly to Russia's circumstances following the Ukraine war.
Lula was mentioned due to the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil. He and Xi exchanged congratulatory messages. Scholz was cited in response to the EU's potential tariff increase on Chinese electric vehicles, appearing in an article opposing this policy decision and in two commentaries summarizing China's diplomatic achievements as a major power. Macron was mentioned in relation to the Olympic Games, France of course being the host country in August. The references to three African leaders were primarily due to the approach of the September China-Africa Forum, with a series of articles reviewing China-Africa relations, such as “Jointly Advancing Modernization and Building a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Destiny” (携手推进现代化，共筑高水平中非命运共同体). Additionally, South Africa’s Ramaphosa was mentioned in connection with Liu Jianchao's visit to his country, while Mwinyi was noted for awarding medals to Chinese medical teams that have aided the country over the past six decades.
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This newsletter is in development, with new sections planned for the future — including a monthly rundown of the top commentaries in the People’s Daily from central and provincial leaders as well as ministries. But we also need your feedback. If you have suggestions on how we can improve the CMP Discourse Tracker, please write directly to David Bandurski at david[at]chinamediaproject.org.