China’s Political Discourse October 2023: BRI Forum, Li Keqiang, Feminism with a Socialist Character
Edited by Chu Yang and David L. Bandurski
This monthly report is prepared for Sinocism by the excellent China Media Project. You can read it in your web browser here if you prefer.
Introduction
From the beginning of 2023, even as China emerged from the drastic lockdown policies that had brought the country to a standstill for nearly three years, it was clear that the Belt and Road Initiative, the signature infrastructure project Xi Jinping launched in 2013 to connect Asia with Africa and Europe via land and maritime networks, would be one of the year’s most important propaganda themes. Underscoring China’s full-court-press approach to propaganda, the year kicked off with a complex array of diplomatic, education, and media events, from special discussion forums arranged by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) through local embassies and consulates across the world to special themed conferences at universities across the country, to large-scale BRI media events and related features, and — illustrating the tight weave between state media, state education, and state diplomacy in China — joint events such as Belt and Road-themed film festivals and international video contests hosted by the MFA, the Ministry of Education and the China Media Group.
In October, as China’s leadership continued to push for diplomatic advances, the Belt and Road propaganda push reached its 2023 apogee with the hosting of the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing, the fourth major international event of the year following the China-Central Asia Summit, the FISU World University Games, and the Asian Games. Related coverage exerted upward pressure on a host of related terms in China’s political discourse, underscoring the notion of BRI as a historic global development program that would advance the “great rejuvenation” at home — through “high-quality development” (高质量发展) under “Chinese-style modernization” (中国式现代化) — while having a “paradigm effect” (范式效应) for the world and promoting a “community of shared destiny” (人类命运共同体).
In China, where ten-year anniversaries have a special political significance in providing the scaffolding for soaring propaganda, a parade of self-congratulation over the BRI was inevitable in October. While Xi Jinping first mentioned the notion of the Belt and Road (一带一路) in September 2013, during a state visit to Kazakhstan, it was in October 2013 that he first broadened the concept before a meeting of ASEAN, outlining plans for a “21st-century maritime silk road.” The introduction of the concept, which came with a host of new international development projects as well as the wholesale repackaging of existing ones, was an important milestone in what has come to be known as China’s strategy of "Major Country Diplomacy" (大国外交) — the pursuit of a greater leadership role for global affairs.
Flagging Attendance?
But as the BRI entered its second decade, comments on the project outside the official propaganda, both internationally and domestically, were notably mixed. Extensive commentary on the anniversary Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation was not possible inside China, where the focus in the mainstream media and online was on triumphalism. However, one revealing meme that made the rounds on social media was a compilation of official images from past international forums that suggested dwindling interest from global leaders. On top, the image from 2017 showed attendance by well over 100 leaders, lined up for the photograph in five closely-packed rows. Two years later, on the eve of the global pandemic, the group was already noticeably diminished, with only 46 leaders present.
In this year’s photograph, even as the backdrop of the official leaders’ photograph at the international forum was more grandiose than in the past, just 38 leaders posed with General Secretary Xi Jinping. They were arranged in three rows set at least a full stride apart, as though every desperate effort had been made to amplify their impression.
Even with already diminished attendance of the 2019 forum, official media could emphasize the presence of Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, whose country had signed an MOU with China in March of that year, marking the first (and last) participation by a G7 economy, as well as leaders from Greece, Austria, Portugal, and the Czech Republic. Since that time, the mood has turned dramatically in Europe, and skepticism toward China has accelerated since Russia invaded Ukraine, as Beijing has rendered economic and diplomatic support to Moscow. As the 2023 forum opened, the departure from the Belt and Road of Italy, now under the government of Prime Minister Georgia Meloni, was imminent. Back in July, the Meloni government signaled plans to exit the BRI — prompting a wave of warnings from China’s MFA and state media about Belt and Road cooperation as “the right choice” — and Italy’s defense minister, Guido Crosetto, called his country’s 2019 decision to join the BRI “atrocious.”
The only EU leader to attend the BRI international forum this year was Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, who has recently been at loggerheads with the rest of Europe over his antagonizing move to prevent further funding for Ukraine. If any EU or other Western leaders were inclined to attend the October event, they were most certainly deterred by the invitation extended to Vladimir Putin, which underlined China’s continued commitment to a close relationship with Russia.
Even though Russia has yet to officially sign up for the initiative, Putin was given the full red-carpet treatment as he attended the international forum. On the night of the welcome banquet for attending foreign heads of state, Xi and Putin strolled side-by-side through the golden doors as the group of attendees were led into the venue. This arrangement, not at all an accident, was a visual reminder of how closely Xi Jinping has tied his fortunes with the Russian leader through their comprehensive strategic partnership.
The chorus of analysis saying that China has lost Eastern Europe has persisted for many months. And since the international forum in October, others have written that China has lost Europe and that perhaps the time has come, after 10 underwhelming years of BRI, to acknowledge openly that it is an “empty slogan” and a “game of narratives.” Setting aside the question of narratives for a moment, there are plenty of signs that Xi Jinping’s signature program faces significant problems. In a study released in April this year, the independent National Bureau for Economic Research reported that as of 2022, 60 percent of China’s overseas lending portfolio supports debtors in distress, up from just 5 percent in 2010 — three years before the BRI was launched.
However, the appeal of BRI among countries in the Global South — and particularly in Africa — continues, and a more measured assessment published in September found that “the BRI has delivered significant benefits to host countries, but has also accentuated real risks for China and host countries alike.” The study found that the BRI, compared to World Bank lending, has tended to address infrastructure bottlenecks and enabled energy access, which has meant that Chinese finance is "more associated with economic growth" among recipients. Debt distress, however, continues to be a serious issue, and in the case of several countries reviewed by the study, China accounted for a significant share of external debt.
Doubling Down on Propaganda
One conspicuous trend at this year’s international forum was the absence of developed economies, the exit of Italy leaving European countries virtually out of the picture. But despite dwindling participation, the forum was the centerpiece of coverage by state media in October. BRI was intensely covered across the state media in the weeks ahead of and after the event, and related content was often featured in the People's Daily. The phrase “Belt and Road” was mentioned in 420 unique articles in October, ranking the phrase at the top of the CMP scale.
BRI-related content appeared on the front page of the People’s Daily for 11 days of the month, and the forum — closely linked to Xi Jinping and his legacy — dominated the front page for four consecutive days starting on October 18.
In addition to news reports on the forum, the People's Daily also planned a series of special features under the title "Building the Belt and Road Together" (共建”一带一路”), which included feature stories, special reports, interviews, and commentaries covering different BRI participating countries. In addition to collecting international responses to the initiative, the People's Daily published seven commentary pieces by various authors, as well as a series of 12 commentaries attributed to He Yin (和音), a pen name used by the international news team. The headlines were as follows:
October 9, 2023, "Jointly Paving a Wider and Farther Path to Happiness for the Benefit of the World" (共同把造福世界的幸福之路铺得更宽更远)
October 10, 2023, "Making Incremental Efforts to Promote Global Connectivity Together" (共同为促进全球互联互通做增量)
October 11, 2023, "Achieving Higher Quality of Joint Consultation, Common Construction and Sharing" (实现更高质量的共商、共建、共享)
October 12, 2023, "Drawing up a Blueprint for Promoting the Realization of Common Development and Prosperity for All Countries" (为推动实现各国共同发展繁荣擘画蓝图)
October 13, 2023, "Upholding the True Colors of Openness, Green and Integrity" (坚守开放本色、绿色底色、廉洁亮色)
October 14, 2023, "Toward a Bright Future of Peace, Development, Cooperation and Win-Win Together" (共同迈向和平、发展、合作、共赢的光明未来)
October 20, 2023, " Building the ‘Belt and Road’ Together is the Right Path for the World" (共建“一带一路”走的是人间正道)
October 23, 2023, "Realizing the Modernization of a World of Peaceful Development, Mutually Beneficial Cooperation and Common Prosperity" (实现和平发展、互利合作、共同繁荣的世界现代化)
October 24, 2023, "Firmly Taking Actions to Build the ‘Belt and Road’ in High Quality" (坚定做高质量共建“一带一路”的行动派)
October 27, 2023, " Establishing a Long-Term Project that Will Benefit all People in the Future" (建立利在千秋、福泽万民的长久之功)
October 28, 2023, " Leading China's Strong Voice in Global Artificial Intelligence Governance" (引领全球人工智能治理的中国强音)
October 30, 2023, " A Bright Path of Good-Neighborly Friendship and Win-Win Cooperation" (一条睦邻友好、合作共赢的光明大道)
In the week following the BRI International Forum, as the chorus of praise for China’s growing global role and economic vibrancy continued (amid persistent coverage outside China of its economic woes), the news came of the death of former Premier Li Keqiang (李克强). As we wrote in our analysis at the China Media Project, Premier Li was sidelined in death as he had been for many years within China’s political discourse. For days, official Party-state media remained conspicuously terse in its treatment of the passing of Li, who had widely been seen as a pragmatic force in economic policy-making.
While it remained in keeping with the Party’s generally terse tradition on official deaths, Li Keqiang’s paint-by-number treatment in the official media (including a brief initial announcement on October 27, and an official obituary the next day) closely mirrored his sidelining by the leadership under Xi Jinping. This was likely a reflection of plans at the top to ensure that Li’s death would pass swiftly, with due respect and properly stage-managed solemnity, to ensure that all possible political inferences were swiftly buried — particularly as they might relate to and intersect with questions of economic governance and, for many Chinese, real economic pain.
Outside of coverage — or its conspicuous absence — in the state media, there was a flurry of activity online and offline to commemorate the life of Premier Li. Likely wary of parallels to the commemoration of former leader Hu Yaobang (胡耀邦), which sparked widespread pro-democracy protests across the country in 1989, the leadership moved to restrict these tributes. Nevertheless, the lines of people converging on Li’s former home in Anhui to lay flowers and personal messages snaked for nearly a mile through the neighborhood.
In some cases, the messages left for Li, and shared across social media, reflected popular dissatisfaction with Xi Jinping’s apparent apathy toward people's livelihoods, and quiet anger over the retrograde nature of political governance under his leadership. In lamenting Li’s marginalization within Chinese politics, many were projecting their sense of powerlessness in the face of a deteriorating environment. For an eyewitness account of commemorations for Premier Li, readers can refer to “Flowers in Hefei,” our full translation of a report from Initium Media.
The public outpouring of grief over the death of Li Keqiang offered a hint of public disappointment over the direction of Chinese politics under Xi Jinping in recent years, and the retrogressive policy shifts have worsened the situation for different social groups. In the Focus Topic for October 2023, we take a closer look at worker’s rights and women’s rights and how these have fared in the discursive space under Xi Jinping.
Focus Topic: Workers and Women as Risk Factors
As a Marxist–Leninist party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was born out of the workers' movement, and theoretically, at least, the CCP is led by the working class. Part of its legitimacy derives still from this source. Meanwhile, another source of self-proclaimed superiority and legitimacy arises from the Party’s narrative of women's liberation. In her book The Transformation of Chinese Socialism, Lin Chun, a professor at LSE, writes that “[women’s] liberation had been highlighted in the communist agenda from the outset and, in that sense, the Chinese revolution was simultaneously a women's revolution, and Chinese socialism a women's cause."
Both worker’s rights and women's rights have always placed high on the party’s agenda, at least in theory. After the founding of the PRC in 1949, specialized bodies were established for the political mobilization of these two groups. The All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) is the organ that leads the workers’ movement, while the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF) is the official leader of the country’s women’s movement. The national congresses of the two organizations meet every five years to select the executive and standing committees of each Party-linked organization and determine the goals for the respective movements. In October 2023, congresses were held for both the ACFTU and the ACWF.
The 18th National Congress of the ACFTU congress opened on October 9 in Beijing. Following established practice, the congress was featured on the front page of the People’s Daily. Looking more closely at the respective front pages from 2018 and 2023, however, the change in political messaging was clear. Five years ago, front-page coverage of the ACFTU congress featured an image of Xi shaking hands with a delegate, as though emphasizing a pact of mutual interest. On this year’s front page, by contrast, Xi was featured right at the center of the shot, standing stiffly at attention — an affirmation of his authority and centrality.
Secretary of the CCP Secretariat Cai Qi (蔡奇) addressed the general assembly under the title “Striving to Write a Magnificent Chapter of Our Country's Working Class to Devote Itself to the Construction of a Strong Nation and National Rejuvenation” (奋力书写我国工人阶级投身强国建设民族复兴的壮丽篇章). The speech constantly emphasized “striving,” or “struggle,” emphasizing the role of workers in achieving broader national goals, including the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” “Labor creates happiness and struggle forges greatness,” Cai told the representatives gathered in the Great Hall of the People.
The core message emphasized by Cai had nothing to do with the rights and interests of workers, who have continued to face such problems as unpaid wages and workplace safety but centered on the absolute leadership of the Party, and the role of workers as “the most solid and reliable class foundation of our Party.” Cai also stressed the need for obedience to the authority of the central leadership, saying: “On the new journey, the working class should unswervingly listen to and follow the Party."
As is typical practice, coverage of the congress was featured on the front page of the People’s Daily the following day, focusing on the meeting between Xi Jinping and the newly-elected executive committee of the ACFTU. Comparing related headlines over the past decade, we can see a marked shift in focus further away from even lip service to issues of core interest to China’s workers. In 2013, the emphasis on the front page was on workers as a force to "unite" in the cause of the labor movement. Five years later, in 2018, the major concern was to "safeguard the rights and interests of workers,” as there seemed to be a push from the top for reform of the trade union system. This year, however, front-page coverage emphasized “adhering to the Party's complete leadership.” Workers were a force that required “organization” and leadership by the CCP — not for the labor movement, mind you, but in the interest of national rejuvenation.
The focus on political security and the leadership of the CCP is almost certainly a reflection of related concerns in the leadership given China’s slowing economy, worsening job market, and intensifying labor dispute environment.
Safeguards for the Party
Given China’s identity as a socialist country, labor disputes, though always a somewhat sensitive matter in terms of the broader goals of stability maintenance, have been seen as legitimate challenges — speaking relatively here — to the regime. But a shift toward greater intolerance for such actions seems to have been underway since at least August 2018, just months ahead of the last ACFTU congress, when a labor dispute at Shenzhen’s Jasic International prompted the arrest of more than 50 workers, and led to official accusations of foreign interference.
Following the rejection of a related petition to the official ACFTU over poor working conditions, illegal mandatory overtime work, and excessive fines, workers at Jasic attempted to form an autonomous labor union. As these attempts were rebuffed, the workers organized weeks of protests that gained international attention and received aid from hundreds of Chinese university activists. On August 24, 2018, the official Xinhua News Agency published a report claiming the incident had been instigated by foreign NGOs. It is possible that the visibility of the Jasic protests in 2018, and the involvement of university students and other activists identifying as leftists, prompted the emphasis at the 2018 ACFTU congress on "safeguarding the rights and interests of workers."
Since 2018, the discourse around labor organization and unionization has shifted notably from safeguarding workers’ rights and interests as a foundation of CCP legitimacy to safeguarding the Party’s interests as a precondition of union work.
The same patterns and changes can be seen in the case of women’s rights and interests in China. On October 23, the 13th National Women's Congress was held in Beijing. The gathering was addressed by Vice Premier Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥), whose speech bore the lengthy title “Composing a Splendid Chapter of ‘Half the Sky’ in the New Era for the Construction of a Strong Country and National Rejuvenation” (为强国建设民族复兴伟业谱写新时代“半边天”的绚丽华章). While Ding made passing reference to Mao’s famous saying — often associated with the idea of women’s empowerment under the CCP — that “women hold up half the sky,” three points in the speech bear noting. These are encompassed by three phrases, namely: "demonstrating the unique role of women in leading new cultural trends”; "building a new form of online work" and "resolutely safeguarding political security in the field of women."
These points were further elaborated during the meeting between Xi and the newly elected executive committee. As with the ACFTU case, in the days following the National Congress, the meeting was featured on the front page of the People’s Daily. Looking back over the past decade, this issue has taken up increasingly more space, mirroring the prioritization of women's issues on the agenda.
Looking back on the People’s Daily headlines, the emphasis in 2013 was on gender equality, while in 2018 the focus was on career advancement. This year, the emphasis was on "contributing women's strengths to Chinese-style modernization" (为中国式现代化建设贡献巾帼力量). At first glance, this year’s theme might seem consistent with advancing women’s rights and interests. However, we need to understand better what the CCP means here by the vague expression “women’s strengths.”
What exactly does this mean?
In his speech, and the People’s Daily front-page headline, the term used for “women’s strength,” jinguo liliang (巾帼力量), uses an archaic form of “woman.” Correspondingly, the view of women’s strengths, and the role of women, could be characterized as archaic. After going through a list of demands of women, including that they implement Xi Jinping's ideas on culture,” and “take the lead in practicing socialist core values,” Ding said that, “Women should keep their family and nation in mind, and establish correct views on marriage, childbearing, and the family.”
As the People’s Daily reported the content of the meeting between Xi Jinping and the newly-elected executive committee of the ACWF, the meaning of “women’s strength” became even clearer, directly associated with, and limited to, marriage and childbirth. “It is necessary to actively cultivate a new type of marriage and parenting culture, strengthen guidance for young people's views on marriage, childbearing, and the family, promote the improvement and implementation of policies to support childbearing, improve the quality of demographic development, and actively cope with the aging of the population,” Xi said.
Over the past decade, Xi Jinping has consistently emphasized women's unique role in the family during such meetings with the ACWF. However, this year's emphasis on marriage, childbearing, and the family — all in the interests of improving “demographic development” — was new and should be understood as a retrograde movement for women's liberation. This narrow definition of “women’s strength” as equivalent to childbearing is a clear step away from the revolutionary ideal of women’s liberation, and a step back toward China’s Confucian past — with clear nationalist overtones.
October Surprises: When Marx Meets Confucius
On October 9, a new TV series, “When Marx Meets Confucius” (当马克思遇见孔夫子) began airing in the evening prime time on Hunan TV. The series attempted to reveal the connection that exists between Marxism and Confucianism through dialogues between the two historical figures.
This official TV series was produced in response to the leadership’s discourse notion of the “Two Adaptations” (两个结合), which include 1) adapting the basic tenets of Marxism to China’s concrete realities, and 2) adapting Marxism to China’s “excellent traditional culture.” The concept of the “Two Adaptations,” introduced by Xi Jinping, was covered in greater detail in our July report.
To visualize this "adaptation" of Marxism, one scene in the program featured a portrait painted by a young Chinese woman of Marx dressed like Confucius in traditional garb. In response to receiving the portrait, the fictional Marx responded: "I have been in China for more than 100 years, and in fact, I have been Chinese for a long time."
However, this concept was not well received by audiences. On Weibo, under the topic #When Marx Meets Confucius#, Almost all of the comments were angrily critical or sarcastic, and there were few positive sentiments. One repeated comment was "too abstract," an Internet slang term used to indicate absurdity or astonishment.
This scene in the Hunan TV program was likely inspired by Guo Jicheng (郭继承), a professor at the China University of Political Science and Law, who once said that Marx had been “a true Chinese lurking in the West." Professor Guo also appeared as a guest in this television series — another reason why the program was. On Bilibili, a Chinese video-sharing platform usually considered to have nationalistic tendencies, Guo deleted all his videos following a concerted comment attack from young audiences for his condescending remarks.
“When Marx Meets Confucius” managed to anger Chinese people across the political spectrum. Self-avowed patriots and Maoists saw the program as revisionist. some asserting that the only time Marx and Confucius had met was in August 1966 in Qufu — this being a reference to the destruction visited on the Temple of Confucius in the city in southwestern Shandong province by Mao-inspired Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution.
On Zhihu, the Chinese version of Quora, some users posted a question, “What are your comments on the Hunan TV program ‘When Marx Meets Confucius’?” Among the many responses was a quote from an alleged conversation between Mao Zedong and his nephew Mao Yuanxin in 1973. The quote was circulated widely on social media to comment on the television program, with a clear subtext about the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party — though no one seemed able to confirm its authenticity:
“We Communists started by criticizing Confucius, but we must not follow their path, criticizing and then respecting. If we take Confucius' ideas out to the people to consolidate our position, thus falling into the cycle of history, it will not work. If the Communist Party reaches a point where it is unable to rule or is in a difficult situation, and it has to bring back Confucius, it means that you are almost finished.”
While “When Marx Meets Confucius” was discussed enthusiastically across social media, these conversations were generally either hidden or removed as they gathered steam. The question posed on Zhihu was eventually censored.
The Hot and the Cold: About the Scale
According to the discourse scale developed by CMP in 2016, based on a historical analysis of keywords appearing in the China Communist Party’s flagship People’s Daily newspaper, we define a six-tier system of discourse intensity based on the total number of appearances of a given discourse term on a per article basis for the full year in the paper. The scale is as follows:
In 2021, CMP adjusted its classification method for CCP discourse, determining the intensity (热度) of Party terminologies according to the absolute number of articles including those terms in the People's Daily newspaper. Previously, CMP used a proportional method, which looked at the number of articles including a particular catchphrase (提法) as a ratio of total articles in the newspaper over a given period. Our monthly classification standard, based on the six-level scale created in 2016, is as follows:
The key terms appearing at the top of the CMP scale remained largely unchanged in October compared to the previous month. As the case in September, “high-quality development” (高质量发展), “Belt and Road” (一带一路), and “Chinese path to modernization” (中国式现代化) appeared in Tier 1. But they were joined by “community of common destiny for mankind” (人类命运共同体), which is central to the notion of “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” (习近平外交思想), the phrase encompassing Chinese foreign policy in the so-called “New Era.” The “community of common destiny” phrase was boosted mainly due to the wave of coverage of the Belt and Road Summit held in October. The phrase “20th CCP National Congress” (二十大), which marks the start of Xi Jinping’s unprecedented third term, dropped one level to Tier 2. Other political catchphrases that were closely associated with Xi, such as “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” (习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想), Xi’s lengthy banner phrase (旗帜语) meant to define his political legacy, remained in Tier 2.
“One China policy” (一个中国) rebounded to Tier 2 in October, having dropped down to Tier 3 for three consecutive months. During the Belt and Road Summit, as many foreign leaders visited Beijing, cross-straits relations were a major topic addressed — not as a matter of substantive discussion, of course, but as a matter of signaling, as China made sure to use bilateral exchanges to amplify its position on Taiwan. The term “China's Plan” (中国方案) also made Tier 2 in October, rising one level, a reflection of China’s ambitions to portray itself as contributing to new visions of international governance, playing a responsible global role and contributing “Chinese wisdom” (中国智慧).
Another term that was boosted for the same occasion was “anti-corruption” (反腐败), rising from Tier 4 to Tier 3 with twice the mentions of the previous month. While some of the mentions were related to domestic affairs, including one that appeared in Li Keqiang’s obituary, the term appeared mainly as an area of bilateral cooperation this month.
Several key terms associated with different aspects of risk increased notably in use in October. These included “financial risks” (金融风险), “political security” (政治安全), and “stabilizing expectations” (稳预期), all of which moved up one level to Tier 4. On the economic front, one indicator of greater attention to the downside was “downward pressure” (下行压力), the term used within the CCP discourse to describe the move from a growth trend to a declining economic trend in terms of such measures as GDP and CPI. The phrase has eased up marginally in use for several consecutive months, though always remaining at the bottom of our scale. In October, however, it rocketed up to Tier 4 from ice cold. What does this mean?
The increase in the use of “downward pressure” seems to have appeared in the context of improving economic performance in the third quarter, with the People’s Daily noting the overcoming of challenges. On October 18, the National Bureau of Statistics released the economic data for the first three quarters of 2023, with growth exceeding forecasts. On the front page of the October 25 edition, the People’s Daily ran a commentary called “China's Economy Has Great Resilience and Potential” (中国经济具有巨大韧性和潜力), which read: “China's economy has withstood the downward pressure brought about by external risks and challenges and the intertwining and overlapping of multiple domestic factors, and growth has stabilized and rebounded.”
Despite the mildly positive indicators on economic performance, “new development stage” (新发展阶段), one of Xi Jinping’s key catchphrases for economic policy, underperformed in October. It had half the number of mentions as in September, moving it down one level to Tier 5. The phrase, which is more about political salesmanship than substantive economic policies or measures, has long been used to suggest that Xi Jinping has a uniquely strategic grasp of domestic and international affairs that informs his work plotting China’s course forward (and further “victories” for the Party). Perhaps, it was still too early to turn up the volume on the victory talk.
As we noted in our report on September 2023, the People’s Daily that month emphasized so-called “Party building” (党的建设) and internal party discipline, which pointed to increased efforts on political political education and anti-corruption. In October, however, these phrases gave way to other priorities. “Comprehensive law-based governance” (全面依法治国) fell into the ice-cold Tier 6 from Tier 3, where it was joined by the “Four Malfeasances” (四风), a collective term for formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism, and extravagance — used to bring problems of conduct among officials into focus. “Comprehensive strict governance of the Party” (全面从严治党) also moved one level down to Tier 4.
As was the case in September, the various permutations of Xi Jinping’s banner phrase for specific policy areas continued to underperform in October. Xi’s catchphrase for environmental policy and sustainable development, “Xi Jinping Thought on Ecological Civilization” (习近平生态文明思想), remained the single strongest performer, remaining in Tier 3 despite having just half as many mentions as in September. “Xi Jinping Thought on Rule of Law” (习近平法治思想) was largely unchanged in Tier 4. “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” (习近平外交思想), which has consistently been the weakest performer, rose to Tier 5 with slightly more mentions on the back of Belt and Road-related coverage. Not surprisingly, given continued economic challenges, “Xi Jinping Economic Thought” (习近平经济思想) again languished down at the bottom in Tier 6, with just three mentions for the month.
The “Two Establishes” (两个确立), since late 2021 a crucial phrase signaling the legitimacy of Xi Jinping’s rule, remained in Tier 3, as did the “Two Safeguards” (两个维护), which is similar in meaning. The first phrase refers to 1) the establishment of Xi as the “core” of the CCP leadership, and 2) the establishment of Xi’s ideas (his banner phrase, in other words) as the leading thought of the Party. The second phrase refers to the need to protect 1) Xi’s “core” status and 2) the authority and centralized leadership of the Party.
The following table shows the key terms we reviewed for the month of October 2023 and how they rated on our scale:
The Centrality Index
In terms of the relative visibility of leaders in the CCP Central Committee in the People’s Daily, October continued the trend that started in September, with a slightly more diversified array of names in the headlines. Of the 23 members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), 10 were arrayed across Tiers 2-4, making for a relatively strong month for central leaders who were not Xi Jinping. The only other month during which this trend was noted was March, corresponding with the Two Sessions.
While Xi Jinping continued to have a commanding lead on the front page of the People’s Daily, considerable space was dedicated to other central leaders. While Xi was busy hosting the Belt and Road Forum and receiving foreign leaders at home, other central leaders were more involved in state visits and other diplomatic engagements. Xi Jinping was mentioned in 702 articles in the People’s Daily in October 2023, a slight downturn from September. This placed the general secretary at the top of the CMP scale in Tier 1, where he has held strong for well over two years. He was far and away the most mentioned leader in the CCP’s Central Committee.
Generally, over the past two years, Tier 2 has remained vacant, a visual expression of the massive gap dividing Xi Jinping from the remaining members of the PSC. In October, however, three PSC members made solid presences in Tier 2. These included Wang Yi (王毅), China’s top diplomat as director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs; Premier Li Qiang (李强); and Cai Qi (蔡奇), secretary of the CCP Secretariat.
Wang Yi led the pack with 82 mentions, outperforming Premier Li Qiang as the most mentioned central leader in October. His performance has remained strong since the beginning of this year, and it reached a peak this month, which reflects the central importance for the CCP leadership of getting diplomatic relations back on track in the post-pandemic era (and following the still mysterious sidelining over the summer of Foreign Minister Qin Gang). Among the events on Wang Yi’s October calendar, he accompanied Xi to meet 30 leaders and delegations from different countries and international organizations and attended two diplomatic events associated with the Belt and Road Forum. Wang himself met 20 leaders and delegations, addressed nine with speeches that were reported in the People’s Daily, and attended four diplomatic events. Towards the end of the month, Wang went on a state visit to the United States and met with President Joe Biden.
Cai Qi also made a solid presence in Tier 2 with 67 mentions. Cai’s exceptional performance was largely due to the heavy coverage of the Belt and Road Forum. He was mentioned in several reports alongside Xi Jinping, as he accompanied the general secretary to many diplomatic engagements. Outside of this, Cai's work this month was mainly related to ideological work, and related coverage appeared twice on the front page. At the start of the month, Cai addressed the National Propaganda Ideological and Cultural Work Conference, where there was an emphasis on “resolutely and effectively preventing and defuse ideological risks,” with propaganda and public opinion officials urged to “dare to show their swords” (敢于亮剑), and “dare to struggle” (敢于斗争). Towards the end of the month, Cai went on an inspection trip to Ningshan County, Shaanxi to supervise the implementation of the “themed education” (主题教育) initiatives, which refers to special training programs designed to deepen loyalty to the CCP and its traditions and principles.
Premier Li Qiang (李强) came in third place within Tier 2 with 66 mentions for October, still a solid presence. Apart from the Belt and Road Forum, Li had a busy run of engagements in domestic affairs as well as diplomacy. At the beginning of the month, Li went on an inspection trip in Zhejiang, during which he inspected Hikvision, the notorious tech company that aids government surveillance, and emphasized the importance of developing China’s digital economy. This coverage made the front page of the October 10 edition.
Another of Li Qiang’s mentions owed to the release of a report into a fire at Beijing's Changfeng Hospital in April. An entire page of the October 26 edition was devoted to the handling of the fire and also included a commentary by Zhong Yin (仲音), a homophone for “important voice” (重要声音) that marks it as reflecting the prevailing leadership view. Coverage of the report in the People’s Daily was short on specifics, noting only that the fire had been “a major production safety liability accident caused by the illegal and irregular implementation of renovation works in the hospital where the incident occurred.” The report was used largely as a platform to promote Xi Jinping’s language on “production safety” (“安全生产).
On the diplomatic front, Premier Li received one mention for attending the 22nd Session of the Council of Heads of Government of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, which also made the front page of the October 27 edition of the People’s Daily.
Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee Zhao Leji (赵乐际) and Vice-Premier Ding Xuexiang (丁薛祥) both made Tier 3 with 31 and 20 mentions respectively in October 2023. Besides addressing the 13th National Women's Congress, Ding was made to the front page of the October 16 edition for going on an inspection trip to Shenzhen. The remaining leaders in the Central Committee were arrayed across Tiers 4, 5, and 6 for the month. Wang Huning (王沪宁), chairman of the Political Consultative Conference, received 12 mentions, his role in United Front work landing him on the front page twice. These reports included Wang’s address to celebrations for the 110th anniversary of the founding of the Western Returned Scholars Association — in which he emphasized adherence to the “comprehensive leadership of the Party” (党的全面领导) — and the 70th anniversary of the founding of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, where he spoke about “uniting people in the private economy more closely around the Party” (把广大民营经济人士更加紧密地团结在党的周围).
Foreign Leaders
Foreign leaders in October 2023 were arrayed across Tiers 3-6. The overall distribution of mentions was relatively even during the month. Due to the heavy coverage of the Belt and Road Forum, the leaders from 22 countries attending received an average of 8-9 mentions each. Several leaders received 10 or more mentions.
Indonesian President Joko Widodo, popularly known in his country as “Jokowi,” was the only leader to make Tier 3 in October, placing him in a league of his own. Jikowi’s wave of mentions owed to the completion on the eve of the Belt and Road international forum of the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway (HSR). This project has been hailed as one of the BRI’s flagship projects, and so the wide-ranging media coverage and acclaim came as no surprise. Jokowi and the high-speed rail were mentioned together in six articles. These included a tribute called, "‘Golden Sign’ of China-Indonesia Cooperation in Building the ‘Belt and Road’” (中印尼共建“一带一路”合作的“金字招牌”), as well as a front-page story in the October 16 edition that hailed BRI as a “road to happiness” (幸福路) for the world.
Railway and bridge construction seemed to be major themes during the BRI forum underscoring Chinese claims of global success in coverage. During his bilateral meeting with Jikowi, Xi Jinping applauded the railway line becoming operational. In another report on October 11, Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić was quoted as saying that the Hungary-Serbia Railway “has become part of the modernization of Serbia, thanks to the idea of cooperation proposed by the Chinese side.” Pakistani Prime Minister Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar was quoted in a report on the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project as saying that the BRI “allows China and co-constructing countries to realize common development and prosperity.” In an article on October 19 called “Deepening Connectivity and Realizing Common Development” (深化互联互通 实现共同发展), Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith was quoted as praising the benefits of the Lao-China Railway, another flagship project that went into operation in 2021.
In Tier 4, Russian President Vladimir Putin led the pack with 13 mentions in total for October. in addition to the Belt and Road Forum, he was mentioned in coverage of a separate meeting between Premier Li Qiang and his Russian counterpart, Mikhail Mishustin, in Bishkek, as well as in reporting on talks between Zhang Youxia (张又侠), the vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu on in-depth military cooperation. The People’s Daily readout of that meeting said that, “China is ready to work with the Russian Federation to actively address various security threats and challenges and to join hands in maintaining global strategic balance and stability.”
Joining Putin in Tier 4 was Srettha Thavisin, the newly-elected prime minister of Thailand. Coverage of Thavisin corresponded with his first official visit to Beijing, to attend the Belt and Road Forum. The People's Daily also ran an interview with Thavisin that emphasized the benefits of economic cooperation under the framework of the Belt and Road. As typical of the “interview” format in the official CCP media, the article was a mixture of direct quotes and paraphrases, enabling framing according to the main themes to be emphasized — in this case, the benefits of BRI for participating countries, the vastness and appeal of the Chinese market, and the strength of the bilateral relationship.
All other world leaders appearing in October in the People’s Daily, including US President Joe Biden, were mentioned three or fewer times. Biden’s mentions were mainly associated with Wang Yi’s state visit to the United States, in preparation for the much-anticipated meeting between Biden and Xi (a subject in our upcoming November discourse report).
In keeping with its generally understated treatment of the war in Ukraine, the CCP’s flagship newspaper once again left out any mention of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.