Recent news out of HK: The HK public library announced that books by Joshua Wong and others, with references to“HK independence”, “Demosisto” and related topics are to be “re-eximined” (復檢）and will no longer be available for loan or reserve. Sorry for the rough translation.
What do people think the end game is between China and US over the next 10-20 years?
My opinion is that the US wants to contain and constrain an authoritarian China to the best of its ability over the next 10-20 years (decoupling, sanctions, alliance systems, etc) and hope the same result occurs that happened to the USSR (e.g. Cold War with a 21st century twist)
On the Chinese side, I am sure they are trying to stall for time to develop their economy and power, through a balancing act between holding strong against what it sees as hostile forces while keeping enough space to develop economically.
Neither side wants a hot war, each side is trying to shape the environment so that time favors their side.
I personally think that the balance of advantages favors the US in this regard, but the chance of a collapse of the PRC is unlikely. If things start to go poorly for PRC, I think they will accept poverty in favor of keeping a unified country under their control and we will see a poorer, less economically integrated China that is self-reliant ala N. Korea with its own (inferior) versions of everything, but far from the cutting edge and far from the ability to project power outwards (even to Taiwan).
To add a bit more on the Chinese side, their hope is to stall for time while preventing fragmentation and Taiwanese independence to grow into the largest economy with cutting edge technology for parity or even superiority to the US in economic and technological terms. Once they achieve that, they can reach all of their goals (Taiwan unification, security, etc) without having to fire a shot. (Peaceful rise as they sincerely believe)
There are some overlooked aspects of the Meng Wanzhou case that deserve further consideration: Iran, sanctions, gender of detainee. If you think sanctions on Iran are a good idea and Washington should enforce them as it sees fit, then you are likely to approve of Canada’s arrest and detention as necessary support for the broader US middle east policies. If you disagree and think sanctions on Iran (or generally) are illegal and unjust and approve China’s efforts to help the Iranians, then you might well regard Ms Meng as a hostage and the rulings of the courts of Canada and the US as political antics worthy of contempt. Lastly, to the Chinese, abuse of a woman is tantamount to barbarism (see Yuan drama for e.g). The land (jiang shan) is female, fecund and therefore sacred. Taking a woman hostage has a very different resonance, culturally speaking, from taking a man hostage. Check with your Chinese friends.
yes. theres another thread above talking about CCP might give time and let protestors and dissidents leave HK for good, and capture the rest who don't. then whoever stays are surely willing to follow CCP, making HK just another city in China. the only question remained is if western countries "dare" to seize the moment and punish CCP by using this as an excuse.
Hey Bill, how do you see the likelihood of the US or other countries taking similar action to India in banning Chinese apps? Seems like a rather large cudgel to wield, and politically justifiable/deniable by pointing to national security.
A couple of thoughts have been rattling around in my head. Just finished David Frum's "Trumpocalypse" which combined with the security law for Hong Kong makes this July 4th rather gloomy.
I am moving to a view that Xi has been drinking his own Kool Aid of the "China Dream" and a resurgent China. Put in the context of playing up nationalism as a vehicle to support the CCP, the willingness to go "wolf warrior" and contravene the Joint Declaration seems to say that Xi thinks he can sell the confrontation with the West domestically and does not really have to worry about what the West will do.
I suspect that he is right on this, but his willingness to do this would seem to be creating a broad consensus in the West that China is "rogue". If the result of Xi's actions are to slow Chinese economic growth (as I suspect they will) then Xi has not really shored up support for the CCP, but has simply kicked the can of CCP comeuppance down the road.
The challenge for Biden, believing that he is the likely next US president, is to rebuild US relations with Europe and Asia to craft a response that checks the abuses of China while keeping the relationship open for the post-Xi era.
As for Hong Kong, it is gone, sadly, and the best we can do is provide refuge for the many who are at risk.
Many people in the Chinese diaspora--some pretty liberal, to my knowledge--are still questioning the effectiveness of a Biden administration in dealing with China.
Their concerns include whether Biden would ditch the policy guidelines (e.g., the US strategic approach to the PRC) from the current administration and whether his political appointees would defy the current trend of "decoupling," seeking more conciliation and accommodation with China instead.
There appears to be a consensus among many overseas Chinese that the Democratic Party is weak vis-à-vis China when reality calls for more assertiveness--this is especially true given the "other guy" is a non-empathic, non-reciprocal, Machiavellian actor, unlike what one would expect in domestic politics in a well-functioning liberal society.
The kind of "liberal international order" under the Obama administration does not seem to have impressed them mainly because--according to their narratives--they have cried wolf for many years and been ignored until recently the whole world wakes up to see China's true color and proves them right.
As a result, a negative image has been cast on "Biden the candidate," who also happens to be "Biden the Obama VP."
What Biden will do is an open question and to me a significant one.
However, it was only towards the end of the Obama Presidency that the consensus on both sides of the US aisle re-evaluated China policy stepping back from waiting China to democratize to seeing China and the CCP as rather less interested in "convergence" than had been envisioned in the Hong Kong handover (1C2S) or China's accession to the WTO.
The timing seems not to be coincidental. Xi came to power in 2012 and where he was going took a while to reveal itself.
The relationship is in a very different place now from 2016 and not just because of Trump. The situation in Australia should be an object lesson for US policy. Where one goes from here depends on one's version of realpolitik. The harsher one's view of CCP authoritarian government, the harsher the US policy should be. Where Biden stands is an unknown. I would like to see who is advising him and who the grapevine says will be sitting in the State Department chairs for East Asia.
Biden if he wins will only be a figurehead - Obama will be pulling the strings but lets see what emerges from the democrat's convention - they have a history of overplaying their hand. Other figures will be saying that they should be the candidate - and if Biden does win what about Elizabeth Warren being Treasury Sec?!!
When Huawei claims US countermeasures are based on a "misunderstanding of Chinese law" - does the security law not say Huawei and PRC-citizen employees must actively assist PRC Intel services? Is there something I missed?
I’d like to hear from Sinocism subscribers who has been following the recent news like EU FDI Screening, Australian foreign investment approval measures, Sino-Indian conflicts... Do you see George Kennan’s Containment in all these developments?
These all seem to me to be actions organically taken by the relevant countries in view of their own interested rather than spurred on by the US in any kind of orchestrated containment strategy. The wolf has taken off the sheep's clothing and other nations are reacting accordingly.
Could a new US President "reset" relations with the PRC? If so, what would that look like, and how might they go about undoing some of the Trump policies towards China?
Most of the Mainland Chinese I know think USA officials are corrupt and easy to buy - all the China lobbyists in DC that are ex-government officials, Biden's son, etc. Are they wrong? Money talks in DC.
I concur that the priority for a new President is to repair relations with out allies first, then deal with China. We have left Canada hanging in the case of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor and need to be clear in out support.
Repairing relations with allies should take priority. There s actually not much of substance to reset re China. The list is short and those are probably the only ones worth keeping. The rhetorical reset is easy. The smile with a big stick approach is always better than the opposite...which seems to characterise this administration's approach.
Second one today: appreciate the comments saying trump like this 2. like i didn't know that..my point is it does not matter who is the US president, this is how Xi & his CCP roll...the idea that there could be a "reset" w a different US president is tragically a new variant of the "china fantasy"
Before a "reset" with China can happen, I think that a new US president (clearly Joe Biden, if he were to win) would have to devote no small sum of energy to re-engaging US allies, including Canada.
President Trump has done enormous damage to US standing in the capitals of allied states (which is not to say that allied states have not, in the past, taken the United States for granted). To "reset" with China before doing at least some of this other work would only signal that the United States was intent on a continued policy of unilateralism.
Under Joe Biden it would likely be depicted as something other than that, but it would be unilateralism all the same.
It’s been a few weeks since the Xinfadi outbreak. Authorities did 32k tests of imported products and got no positive results. But 4 more European meat plants were suspended this week over Covid-19 concerns. Why?
Are we certain that China might not be suppressing knowledge of the odd case here and there? They've clearly got the epidemic well in hand, of courses aided by the fact that it only mutated to become more contagious after escaping China (though they'd have suppressed it effectively anyways), but it strains credulity that the largest country in the world is reporting only a couple dozen new cases, if that, on a daily basis.
1,000 workers from this Germany meat company tested positive, which is also the biggest pork exporter to China from Germany. A lot of the workers there apparently are seasonal workers from Eastern Europe, and don’t necessarily live close to the factor all the time
It's because workers at those plants tested positive for coronavirus. Tönnies, the biggest German pork exporter to China, had a particularly big problem.
Do you think the provision for Hong Kong Police recruitment outside the HKSAR of art. 16 last § National Security Law will lead to riot police being replaced by mainland forces?
My bad. I should have read the original post more carefully. The point I sought to make was that new recruits in the HKPF receive much of their training in China from mainland police.
Hey friends. I’ve been trying to register for HSK 1 this summer, but I seem to be getting blocked out of everything I register for. Many Confucius Institutes in the US seem to be closing down or are no longer administering tests. Does anyone here know if this is by design by PRC, or is there a reliable Confucius Insitute in the US that is still administering? Thank you.
Article 1.22 as it relates to physical markets and copyright / trademark infringement in China:
1. The Parties shall take sustained and effective action against copyright and trademark infringement at physical markets.
2. Measures China shall take include significantly increasing the number of enforcement actions beginning within four months after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, and publishing online quarterly updates of enforcement actions at physical markets.
So my questions are:
1. Have they published any of these actions online yet? I haven’t been able to find anything.
2. Did you’ve ever been to Huaqiangbei in Shenzhen, you know the place is alive and teaming with trademark/copyright violations. Do you really think this provision will have an impact?
I am interested about recent moves by the Taiwanese government in securing a commitment from Somaliland to establish bilateral representation, and in committing to set up an office in Guam. The U.S. plays an important role in the latter, and I suspect also the former. Would these developments impact US-China or cross-strait relations, and how would the Chinese government respond to these events (if this is necessary)?
I can't help thinking that the 'trade' deal will be scrapped very soon. It's clear that China is making little effort to honour it, even allowing for Covid.
Moreover the additional issues of HK and Xinjiang are accelerating the, already horrendous, deterioration in Sino-US relations. Congress has the bit between its teeth and it is hard to see how much longer Trump can resist the momentum.
Based on the Administration's statements and actions, it seems like the deal will stay in place through at least November. For example:
- When US Trade Rep Lighthizer testified before Congress last month, he repeatedly defended China's efforts to comply while noting COVID and falling oil prices have created unexpected hurdles. He even specifically criticized the methodology used by PIIE in their tracker.
- After Peter Navarro said the Phase One deal was over during a TV interview, he almost immediately walked back the statement through multiple media outlets. President Trump also quickly tweeted out that the deal was still "fully intact." The speed of the response and the message discipline in the response signal to me how much they want the deal to remain.
- Whenever he speaks about his first-term accomplishments, President Trump is quick to mention the Phase One deal. It is one of his few accomplishments that has bipartisan appeal (as opposed to his other accomplishments, such as tax reform and immigration), and it would seem to be foolish to take off the table before November.
The President wants to appear "tough" on China throughout the rest of the campaign and will no doubt take more actions against the country between now and November. But he has several other actions he can take that won't rattle the markets and won't take away a key talking point.
Leaving aside the lens of US domestic politics through which Prof. Walt sought to examine the issue, he referred to the importance of understanding what [the Communist Party leadership] considers to be issues on which no compromise is possible ("China's red lines").
What are those red lines?
I think we can all agree that the Party's security approach in Hong Kong is a red line. As is its determination to maintain itself as the sole arbiter of what's right and what's not in China.
Is Taiwan still a red line?
What about the border with India--how would that fit in?
Finally, is the Meng Wanzhou case (and the position China has staked out in this context) a red line?
The overall media probably over plays the“expansionary” military risk of China. While in the last few years they certainly made some claims like South China Sea, but if one look at China history since 220BC (when “modern China” was formed), there was seldom, if any expansionary military effort in the forms of Tsarist Russia, Imperial Japan, or Conquistador Spain. Instead, China mostly got its ass kicked by invading forces and had to cede territory, starting in 1689 with Russia in Siberia, Opium war with UK on HK, Taiwan/Okinawa/Senkaku Islands to Japan (some may not have been administered by Qing dynasty and were sphere of influence or vassal states like Korea) and so on. Even the expansion of China in its history wasN’t result of conquest, but rather China being conquered and ruled by Northern Nomads, who subsequently adopted “Chinese” cultures and became “Chinese” and thus its territory expanded to include the form nomad land, e.g. Mongos and Manchus (12th century and 15th by two different Manchu tribes). Even the popular Disney story Mulan wasn’t even about Han Chinese government, it was a solider in the nomad Gov. of Sarpi (Xianbei, an early Mongo tribe) fighting against another nomad tribe.
I think you may be wrong on two counts here. First, by the time China conquered today's Xinjiang and Tibet, the Ching dynasty was as sinified as it would ever become. But if you go back in time a bit, the Tang was the first to conquer and rule the Kansu corridor. Those were clearly major conquests by a Chinese empire. Second, I don't know why these historical examples may or may not be relevant now. Japan had not been expansionist until is suddenly was. I think the PRC makes it very clear that they take the nine-dotted-line very seriously. Why should we not take them seriously?
Thanks for the reply, I certainly could be wrong as the future is impossible to predict, and even history is not exactly science， contradictory evidences exist depending on which side the historical written source come. Having said that, let’s discuss on the several points you raised, which I believe your conclusion is inaccurate or at least incomplete without full context. Happy to get into more detailed historical reference in a different capacity.
1. Kansu Corridor (I think you meant Gansu Corridor). First, Tang Dynasty is not the first “Chinese” empire to administer it. Han Dynasty took control the Corridor and Tarim Basin in 121BC after war with the Huns (or Xiongnu, some scholar say these were ancestors of Attila the Hun). Four administrative territories were established by Han Dynasty, and lasted more or less until AD63-89. Historically, the Corridor is somewhat of an ethnic melting pot on the border of “Chinese civilization” and northern nomads. Starting in Qin Dynasty, the areas was occupied by various small Kingdoms before being conquered by the Huns/Xiongnu, then more or less exchanged hands between “Chinese” empires and nomad tribes. Huns/Xiongnu was one such tribe, but also included Sarpi/xianbei, Tibetan,Turkic, Mongols, most are probably Mongoloids but Caucasian mummies have been discovered in the area. The Tang Dynasty conquest you referred to, I believe it’s just another similar battle between Turkic tribes (who subjugated smaller tribes) and Tang (whose Founding Family were not Han Chinese but Sarpi/Han Chinese mix). And this was not an one way deal, the same Turkic Tribe (or Kingdom) started invading what’s consider “traditional Chinese” territory as early as AD615 and was at the Gate of ChangAn, Tang’s Capital, in AD626. So it may be too much a stretch to pin the aggression on Tang along rather than at least both sides here.
2. Tibet. It was not first conquered by Qing Dynasty, Mongo/Yuan dynasty took control of it (invaded ~AD1240). Even prior to Qing taking control in 1720, Tibet rulers were consulting with Qing court on major decisions until the death of 5th Dalai Lama were concealed from Qing in 1682 and Dzungars Mongo tribes took over Tibet in 1717. Dzungars was also the dominant ethnic group in Xinjiang until Qing eradicated them via genocide in 1757-1758, and some scholars argue Uighurs did not become prominent in Xinjiang until Zungars were wiped out in the genocide (but that’s another topic). Was Qing Dynasty “as sinified as it would ever become” as your referenced? Two data points, in the Treating with Russia regarding Manchuria/Siberia in 1689, also by Emperor Kangxi who conquered Tibet, the official document had Manchu, Russian and Latin but not Chinese. Two, Han Chinese were not allowed in Manchuria, Qing’s ancestral land, until after 1861. So this questions is too subjective and there is no right answer, but I think it’s hard to argue they are as signified as it would ever become in 1720, not even 50 years after Manchu conquered China
3. Japan. The notion “Japan had not been expansionist until is suddenly was” you mentioned could not be further from the historical facts. Japan invaded Korea in 1592, 4 years after Toyotomi Hideyoshi first united Japan and again in 1597, it almost took the entire Korea until Ming Dynasty’s intervention. This is before the Shogun period! In subsequent years, Japan had various small scale military actions against Chinese coast and Korea, culminated into the First Sino-Japan war, which again started with Japan’s invasion of Korea. At China’s defeat in this war, Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed to cede various Chinese territories including Taiwan. Senkaku Island was also taken control by Japan after this. This is all before WWII, with Japan’s invasion of China, Malaya, and rest of Asia. Yes Japan is not expanding today after US dropped two Nukes and armies of American soldiers based there, but many who studied WW2 and battles of pacific islands, and the treatment of WW2 POWs at the hands of Japanese may have a different view.
Notwithstanding all of the above, there is no right or wrong answer in terms of how serious one should take “China’s threat or aggression”, it’s up to individual citizens and countries. But if we look at historical context and make an objective comparison with Japan’s occupation of Korea/China/Malaya, Rome’s expansion into Greece/Carthage/Hispania/Gaul/Britannia, Spanish Conquistador, US/UK Slave trading, and all the genocides came after those, I find it hard to compare factual Chinese military expansionary actions measuring up anywhere close to these examples. So the questions is, why should people become so concerned of a culture/country whom neither in historical or modern times, made such expansionary advances, especially compared with the above peers who have? Obviously being a different culture and communism government have a lot to do with it, but informed people should look deeper than that. Happy to change my mind upon new evidence.
Nothing personal, but I hate the idea of red lines ... what do they even mean? We see time and time again that labeling something as a "red line" is rather frivolous - the reaction to crossing a redline will always depend on the circumstances and capabilities of the interested parties at that moment, so labeling something a red line means nothing.
For example, is Taiwan a sensitive and key issue to China? Of course, it is arguably an issue as close to the core of Chinese stability as Internet censorship. Is Taiwan a key issue for the USA? I will argue it absolutely is - the US cannot allow Taiwan to be taken over by China for strategic reasons in addition to ideological ones. So what happens when two "red lines" overlap?
In the minds of most, a "red line" is defined by the type of an action that results when it is crossed. Are angry words a reaction anyone fears? Probably not. So which Chinese reactions are the ones to be feared? I would argue that China has precious few cards to play against the US for any Taiwan actions short of a full scale invasion. Given the risks involved of a full scale invasion to the PRC, there is probably a lot of room for the US to make on Taiwan that will fall short of the threshold for the PRC to initial real action outside of angry words and trade restrictions (given that taking military action/invasion could possibly result in military defeat and loss of control over its population).
I expect that we will see that theory tested out over the next several years, with high profile visits, arm sales, etc between the US and China
Agree with the idea of “red lines” can be frivolous, but that’s probably what those in power think, rightly or wrongly. To China, Taiwan is probably a lot more sensitive than Internet censorship or even US strategics. From China’s perspective, Taiwan to them is probably like Alaska to the US, not saying that’s right or accurate but that’s the way they think. Would the US view Russia taking over Alaska (or get Alaska to declare independence and become a Russia ally, similar to Texas back in the days) the same significance as Russia taking over some territory from Ukraine?
You are right that the next few years will reveal a lot of things, one can only hope all the actors will remain calm and not make any irrational decisions.
Yes, I agree that Taiwan is a hugely critical issue for China. I just think it is for America as well, maybe not to the same extent, but enough for America to be able to deter China with its capabilities (military and non-military)
The red lines should at least include the following based on CCP’s rhetoric and actions in the last several decades in my view. 1. Potential territorial dispute/sovereignty or perception of Gov. being soft on them, whether it’s Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan or Senkaku Islands, etc. Historically these are perceived as weak Gov. (late Qing dynasty who signed away them to UK, Japan and Russia) and shares the legitimacy of Gov. 2. Foreign support to those who advocate for independence/secession of these territories, especially using certain jurisdiction as a “headquarter” for independence/anti CCP movement, like HK had been by many organizations, in China’s views. 3. Taiwan historically is a redline in action, though they had been willing to Stick with status quo and kick the can down the road as long as US/TW aren’t saying too much about it. Xi is the first one that publicly spoke about the need to resolve Taiwan issues in this generation, so this is a tricky one but definitely a red line. So it’s not really surprising that China has been non-compromising on these issues above. The Gov. probably feels that ruling support come from the mass low income population (Not Urban elites) and nationalistic sentiment (formed by history, education system, and propaganda), and perception of being soft in territory sovereignty would result in loss of support. One of the current China administration’s first economic policies was to increase low-end labor wages, increase their social welfare, instill massive public healthcare programs, increase retirement pensions, etc. all at the cost to businesses/urban elites and benefit to low end labors.
HK is really a sacrificial lamb on the altar for 2022. Xi had genuine ambitions to make Taiwan his "crown jewel" for 2022, but obviously a realisation eventually came that he cannot. He was told that he can have HK instead.
Xi's China is totalitarian, genocidal, and has just committed its Anschluss. It's on the people who say this is anything less than a mortal threat to the world to provide evidence.
For the record, I believe the Meng case is undoubtedly a "red line". Why do I suggest as much? In part, it is such because of China's hubristic perception of how others should now defer to it, as it believes it was unjustly forced to defer to the United States and other countries in the past.
The more powerful version of China that now confronts us will not permit "pipsqueeks" like they perceive Canada to be to arrest prominent members of the "red elite", whatever the crime said persons may have committed.
Which bodes ill for Canada and Canadians (and the two Michaels in particular).
The Canadian perspective is complicated by the view among many in my country that the United States deliberately sought to use Canada as a pawn in a much bigger geopolitical game.
I disagree with that view, as it overlooks the role of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which issued an arrest warrant for Meng Wanzhou in late August, 2018.
Notwithstanding President Trump's initial attempt to make her extradition a bargaining chip, I do not personally believe that he had the legal right to interfere with that judicial process.
I'd be curious to hear what others think of that understanding. Perhaps I'm ill-informed?
As a Canadian, I'm sure you harken back to the detention of the Garratts as retaliation for the extradition of Su Bin. It looks like deja vu all over again.
The unfortunate arrest of the two Michaels is just another example of the west underestimating the resolve of the CCP. They are determined to weaken/break any western alliances against them. This is why it is crucial that the US, Canada and the other three eyes remain united. Hopefully the next US president will be able to turn things around.
I agree with your take on Meng Wanzhou. It was a wake-up call for me personally when Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor were arrested. I immediately registered with Canadians Abroad, and haven't felt safe in this country since.
Even if we did get unnecessarily sucked into a geopolitical game, I still think it's perfectly understandable that Canada would stand with their neighbor and biggest trade partner on something that really should not have been a very big deal in the first place.
Yet here we are. Meng is out on bail and enjoying the good life while she waits for a transparent legal system to do its thing. The Michaels have been in jail for 18 months facing an inevitable guilty verdict in the opaque Chinese courts. Trudeau has done little more than express disappointment with the situation. He's hardly banging the drum for America and he's not doing much to appease domestic China hawks either. Surely Party diplomats must understand this is about as nice as he could play it? But it seems it's not good enough for Canada to just play nice - the Party will not be happy with anything less than full compliance.
It is now painfully clear that Xi does not respect Canada at all. If we do not defer to the Party, we will be punished. I suspect this is how the Party sees all countries that don't have the economic clout to really hurt them. Until Canada can find allies who are willing to stand together against the Party, we will probably continue to face this kind of bullying and overreaction whenever we do something they don't like.
你寫的我都同意. I might point out how effective the arrest of the two Michaels has been in moving public opinion in Canada against the US. This is Realpolitik and has to be met with equal or greater resolve and skill. Trudeau has to lift his game as does the next US president. The Chinese play the long game and we must learn to play as well. Trudeau is a nice guy but 老共吃硬不吃軟。
Thank you for providing the link to the Glasbeak article.
I was not convinced. The following passages were particularly troubling to me:
* QUOTE
All that effort to put Wanzhou Meng’s fraud into legal context and not a scintilla of regard for the political, social and economic context of the case!
Everyone, literally everyone, knew what had led the US to charge Huawei and its CFO. It was to obtain bargaining chips in its fight with China. It was to persuade its citizens that it was right for the government to deny them access to cheaper goods and a better 5G system because China would abuse its growing economic influence and enhance its spying potential. It was to make China more pliable when the US demanded better trade terms and more protection for its intellectual property, etc. There was no attempt to hide any of this.
Did the Canadian government understand this? Of course. Did it feel it had to allow the US to use Canada’s supposedly neutral legal machinery to further its political project? Of course. Could the Canadian government have said “no” and simply turned a blind eye when Wanzhou Meng landed in Vancouver? Of course.
Was Associate Justice Holmes, at the very least, in a position to guess all of this? Of course.
* QUOTE
I think he makes far too many assumptions in this section of his paper. I would also argue that this reflects his general animus about the extent to which money and power influence the judicial system (no question--like all institutions in Canada, the court system is influenced by larger social features).
Perhaps the most questionable passage was the following: "Everyone, literally everyone, knew what had led the US to charge Huawei and its CFO. It was to obtain bargaining chips in its fight with China."
Really? Is that true? Or could it not have been a matter of inputs (investigative leads pointing at Meng's alleged acts of fraud) leading to outputs (the issuance of the warrant for her extradition).
I don't doubt that members of President Trump's entourage, as well as others in US government circles, viewed this in political terms. I don't believe, however, that it was as clear cut as he claims.
Seems pretty clear and simple to me. But people prefer to extrapolate these into absurd world domination and control of humanity type theories. I find this grand melodramatic approach puzzling.
It s not as if it has helped in anyway in the past in competing or fighting against chicom/PRC. Indeed it s not as if it has helped evening scores in 2020 one iota. What s most consistent with 70 or 100 years of existence of the prc or chicom? it s obssessional about staying in control but in rational and calculating ways, is risk averse but very adventurous opportunisticly, and it has a self correcting mechanism somehow (the most puzzling and unexpected aspect).
Most relevant to now, it hardly ever over-reaches internationally (unlike the US or the Soviets). IMHO it is still not overreaching despite what people claim. Every 'assult' is calibrated and jsut below threshold.
P.s. To focus on the low end majority is both strategically and morally correct. Something the developed world badly needs to emulate before it s too late.
There is momentum in the Indo-Pacific right now towards exactly that. If things continue how they are, I anticipate China will have a middle power multilateral monster on its hands.
Is the momentum you are talking about heading in the direction of an Indo-Pacific NATO, do you think? I was hoping that the CPTPP would provide an economic bloc that would allow smaller countries to better stand up to China's economic pressure, but with the Meng situation the Party have chosen different tactics to intimidate so perhaps a different kind of alliance is needed.
Ugh, I don't think I'd hazard a guess at what form it may take. Though interested actors like Japan, India, Australia, Indonesia all have converging interests. When you crudely put the numbers together and ignore the potential problems, it's tenable. In my view, and probably not shockingly, the more China pushes its borders in 'self-defense', the more galvanised the Indo-Pacific middle powers will become. Aus with its LRASMs, India with the LAC conflict, pushback from within the LDP in Japan, and then Indonesia is Australia's puzzle to solve.
With the support of the US, EU, the UK, Vietnam, South Korea etc etc It is a plausible and more optimistic direction for the Indo-Pacific.
XJP was a consensus candidate, elected together with a consensus to-do-list, not an election freak-accident like leaders of certain other countries.
XJP's selection is the result of a process, that started after the Lehman crisis. Of course he himself was part of it.
He managed to do away with consensus. Unclear is, if that was pre-agreed.
XJP and all his predecessors are hardcore, flaming communists, even if our perception of the one or the other may have been different. Economic development is a pillar of the ideology and therefore by itself it is no deviation from the path.
Until he dies or there is a different system. Xi is 67 now. Jiang Zemin is 93, deng was almost 93 when he died. Xi's genius of writing Xi Thought into the constitution is that effectively Xi is the Party and the Party is Xi, so it is much harder to remove him while he is alive but keep the Party in power
If his objectives are achieved he may well want to pass the reigns onto a younger man. People forget that Xi is a reformer - as Lee Kuan Yew said to Graham Allison. Before he can/could reform he has had to clean up the Party.
I've read that chapter on China in Lee Kuan Yew's *One Man's View of the World*, including his take on 一尊. Pretty consistent with the views that the CCP Elders had about him before 十八大.
I would argue that the "clean up" effort should be understood as a political consoliidation effort. Few would likely believe that Xi's efforts have actually brought about a meaningful decline in corrupt behaviour among Party members.
I think you should consider the way China politics tick. If you look closely, whatever the political move, it is always at least dual purpose and can be interpreted one way or another, depending on how the wind blows.
That may be born of the necessity to satisfy multiple stakeholders in a consensus-driven environment.
Anti-corruption came about in the early days of XJP's reign and therefore must have been a consensus decision. It serves multiple purposes and was actually designed this way.
Overwhelming majority of mainland Chinese I m in touch with would beg to differ. Based on what evidence do you make your claim? Sorry. My pet hate=china watchers hand waving in a vaccum of projection and wishful thinking.
Actually based on what most people in China say for the last 3 years, the corruption has been reduced significantly, so much as that many bureaucrats refuse to do any work to avoid any possibility of accountability so nothing gets done. People were saying that “shanghai officials” were corrupt, but at least getting things done. Whether the reason is to reduce corruption or power consolidation is up to anyone’s guess
Having been on the ground for the first 6 years of XJP reign I can confirm, there were a lot of changes.
A less arbitrarily acting bureaucracy being the most visible to the 老百姓. You couldn't get "off the hook" against payment of a "fee" anymore. Licensing according to the terms, not depending on a "fee", which actually frustrated some citizens.
On a political level, being corrupt meant you would be safe, as those important for you did the same thing. Not being perceived as corrupt meant posing a risk to all others.
Perhaps that was, why XJP served only very, very briefly in the snake-pit Shanghai.
Political moves in China always serve dual-purposes or more. Killing two birds with one stone is a necessity. It is therefore futile to argue if e.g. anti-corruption had one purpose or another, as it may have had both or more, beyond what we are considering.
Think for example the impact on some powerful private enterprise, whose success depended on corruption and whose owners played politics. Disabling them may also have been a target.
Or simply strengthening the army. What, if Taiwan had bribed PLA officers to foul up an attack on Taiwan? Of course Taiwan was utterly unaware of corruption in the PLA and would have never done that....or would it?
Agreed. It is comforting for most people to believe that chicom is this irrational corrupt hopping mad power crazed clown of an organization. Hence the tendency to weave narratives that ignore what s fairly basic common sense. Hence the shambolic record of anticipating chicom development and moves.
Corruptions always occur and plenty still goes on at all levels, but I would not count the examples like PLA’s procurement head (caught with 200M RMB cash at home along with Gold), another general on the military chief committee, something like 100 minister level as pedestrians. There are a lot of stuff WSJ doesn’t know or doesn’t publish
he may end up running things through proxies as he gets older, but we should assume that barring a sudden shift the odds of Xi effectively running things into the 2040s is quite high
Well, Putin just locked himself in place for another 16 years. No reason Xi can't effectively do the same thing even if he is slightly more subtle about it
If an increasingly concentrated decision-making system makes a state more fragile (see Taleb/Tverton) and the problem of succession remains the biggest source of instability in authoritarian states (see Svolik and elsewhere), I wouldn't take any long positions in China's political stock.
One of the most desired objective of CCP is to ensure stability in China with any means, as a way to ensure its own ruling not to be challenged. In terms of dissident within the party, Xi seems to be very good at squashing them if there's still any. Its relationship with outside world could be bad, but I'd say the party's grasp of China will last long (think N.K.).
My sense is about 7 years. As I am told when he came into office his close advisors told him that if you want to accomplish all of what you want to do it will take longer than 10 years
They have been issuing dire threats against the UK, although they don't say what. It looks as if any retaliation would be asymmetric as not that many Brits want to move to China. Let's hope they don't start taking British hostages in HK....
It looks as if their prospects of selling Huawei 5G equipment and more nuclear power stations here are dead.
I have lived in HK several times over 40 years and I can tell you that HK people, in general, prefer to stay in Hk for all the normal reasons (food, family, etc.) but they all want one foot out the door in case. They will take citizenship if they can get it but only from countries where they can avoid global taxes. Once they get it they will move back to HK and have little to no allegiance to their new country. I have seen this time and time again. Mostly about the money!
Good point but I’ll bet their kids won’t want to move back. It takes a generation for the allegiance to weaken. I don’t know too many Chinese in LA dying to move back. Also, you are referring to the old HK, not the new. The influx of mainland Chinese into HK has had a negative impact on 生活水準。
You are seeing plenty of second generation Chinese back in China and HK because of the ut language ability and career prospects. Same for Vietnam with second generation Vietnamese. Still all about the money!
I've been thinking about this one a lot, myself...
For “troublemakers” like Joshua Wong, Martin Lee, Anson Chan, and Jimmy Lai, my assumption is that the Party would gladly fly them first-class to London just to be rid of them (although that's not to say that the aforementioned four would actually choose to leave).
But what of the many other Hong Kongers who might seek an exit strategy? A part of me would be surprised if Beijing was too incredibly rigid about making everyone stay. I say this for two primary reasons:
1) Think of the further international outcry it would bring, especially if those prevented from exiting met some of the criteria for refugee legal status as defined by the 1951 UN Convention.
2) Moreover, why would a party that’s obsessed with stability want to keep around any potential “agents of instability?” Wouldn't this just create a potential "pressure cooker?"
Thus, notwithstanding the strong public statements thus far, I wouldn’t be surprised if the CCP did ultimately let some people go—perhaps “replacing” them with Mainlanders in the process—and to then try to play down the numbers, and maybe even the “value,” of those leaving.
If necessary, CCP propaganda organs may try to slander - in subtle terms or otherwise - those leaving as Western pawns, traitors, etc. I'm sure the Global Times would be well up to that challenge.
Re: International outcry - I think Beijing directives in HK from the outset of the extradition bill render this kind of analysis as unreliable now. While Beijing is currently beleaguered with more hostility than before from international actors, they're also simply just acting with more belligerence.
I tend to agree with your point on stability though. Letting at least the well-resourced slip through the cracks of Beijing's now-visible hand while it makes a fist. The pessimist in me thinks there could be some selectivity based on... factors in this. We know Beijing is totally fine with a loyal Chinese diaspora.
While the pressure cooker analogy makes perfect sense, I think they'd be more willing to try out their new tricks developed in XJ before they'd willingly let an inordinate number of people flee. I think that's a much larger perceivable threat to China-wide stability than the initial succumbing to pressure to withdraw the bill.
Re: the big four, I think to have them 'abandon' Hong Kong might be in the interests of Beijing even more than making an example of them. But I could be convinced either way tbh. Really have no strong feelings about that.
Re: Bringing more mainlanders + propaganda organs, need not say more. Han migration and propaganda will do what han migration and propaganda does in the zhong guo.
Ugh, I should probably clarify, I don't anticipate gulags or a police state near the level of XJ, I just meant they are more capable of controlling large numbers of people with technology etc.
I would like to share your assumption that they would let Wong plus the "Hong Kong Gang of Four" leave, as they used to do with prominent dissidents in the mainland. But I think they are much more likely to make examples of them now
My assumption is that the likes of Martin Lee and Anson Chan wouldn’t necessarily be eager to leave at this late stage even if given the chance, which could, indeed, further motivate the Party to make examples of them (after all, it was just two months ago that authorities suddenly arrested 82-year-old Martin Lee and confiscated his mobile phone... More like that to come?).
However, as for Wong and the younger generation, I wouldn’t be surprised if they were allowed to go at some point. And if so, I further wouldn't be surprised if the CCP then turned to some of its usual tactics to try to prevent them from speaking out too loudly in the West—i.e. threatening family members and friends still in HK.
This has certainly proven to be a "useful" tactic in the CCP's efforts to silence Uighur activists in the West and elsewhere in recent years…
An open question from Spain: Do you expect a tougher position from the European Left against China in the coming months/years? I have always been surprised why Bolsonaro and other populist right leaders attract so much criticism from the left but they barely talk about Xinjiang, PCCh corruption or Hong Kong.
I feel that German greens are taking the lead on this, but I am not sure if it will become a trend.
Spain specifically is not in a good position to comment on those given it's own domestic independence movements. In general, mainstream European left is far more aware of what goes on around the world than say the European right or the American left or right. Given the amount of problems everywhere, everyone has different priorities.
Recent news out of HK: The HK public library announced that books by Joshua Wong and others, with references to“HK independence”, “Demosisto” and related topics are to be “re-eximined” (復檢）and will no longer be available for loan or reserve. Sorry for the rough translation.
What will be China’s GDP growth in 2020 and 2021 ?
What do people think the end game is between China and US over the next 10-20 years?
My opinion is that the US wants to contain and constrain an authoritarian China to the best of its ability over the next 10-20 years (decoupling, sanctions, alliance systems, etc) and hope the same result occurs that happened to the USSR (e.g. Cold War with a 21st century twist)
On the Chinese side, I am sure they are trying to stall for time to develop their economy and power, through a balancing act between holding strong against what it sees as hostile forces while keeping enough space to develop economically.
Neither side wants a hot war, each side is trying to shape the environment so that time favors their side.
I personally think that the balance of advantages favors the US in this regard, but the chance of a collapse of the PRC is unlikely. If things start to go poorly for PRC, I think they will accept poverty in favor of keeping a unified country under their control and we will see a poorer, less economically integrated China that is self-reliant ala N. Korea with its own (inferior) versions of everything, but far from the cutting edge and far from the ability to project power outwards (even to Taiwan).
To add a bit more on the Chinese side, their hope is to stall for time while preventing fragmentation and Taiwanese independence to grow into the largest economy with cutting edge technology for parity or even superiority to the US in economic and technological terms. Once they achieve that, they can reach all of their goals (Taiwan unification, security, etc) without having to fire a shot. (Peaceful rise as they sincerely believe)
There are some overlooked aspects of the Meng Wanzhou case that deserve further consideration: Iran, sanctions, gender of detainee. If you think sanctions on Iran are a good idea and Washington should enforce them as it sees fit, then you are likely to approve of Canada’s arrest and detention as necessary support for the broader US middle east policies. If you disagree and think sanctions on Iran (or generally) are illegal and unjust and approve China’s efforts to help the Iranians, then you might well regard Ms Meng as a hostage and the rulings of the courts of Canada and the US as political antics worthy of contempt. Lastly, to the Chinese, abuse of a woman is tantamount to barbarism (see Yuan drama for e.g). The land (jiang shan) is female, fecund and therefore sacred. Taking a woman hostage has a very different resonance, culturally speaking, from taking a man hostage. Check with your Chinese friends.
Do you think Hong Kong as we knew it is gone forever?
Yes.
yes. theres another thread above talking about CCP might give time and let protestors and dissidents leave HK for good, and capture the rest who don't. then whoever stays are surely willing to follow CCP, making HK just another city in China. the only question remained is if western countries "dare" to seize the moment and punish CCP by using this as an excuse.
Probably becomes like Singapore but less responsive government. LKY would never allow a few famI lies to own the country.
Hey Bill, how do you see the likelihood of the US or other countries taking similar action to India in banning Chinese apps? Seems like a rather large cudgel to wield, and politically justifiable/deniable by pointing to national security.
A couple of thoughts have been rattling around in my head. Just finished David Frum's "Trumpocalypse" which combined with the security law for Hong Kong makes this July 4th rather gloomy.
I am moving to a view that Xi has been drinking his own Kool Aid of the "China Dream" and a resurgent China. Put in the context of playing up nationalism as a vehicle to support the CCP, the willingness to go "wolf warrior" and contravene the Joint Declaration seems to say that Xi thinks he can sell the confrontation with the West domestically and does not really have to worry about what the West will do.
I suspect that he is right on this, but his willingness to do this would seem to be creating a broad consensus in the West that China is "rogue". If the result of Xi's actions are to slow Chinese economic growth (as I suspect they will) then Xi has not really shored up support for the CCP, but has simply kicked the can of CCP comeuppance down the road.
The challenge for Biden, believing that he is the likely next US president, is to rebuild US relations with Europe and Asia to craft a response that checks the abuses of China while keeping the relationship open for the post-Xi era.
As for Hong Kong, it is gone, sadly, and the best we can do is provide refuge for the many who are at risk.
> I am moving to a view that Xi has been drinking his own Kool Aid of the "China Dream" and a resurgent China.
Best to say, he and his cabinet both drink it. Xi, I heard from a number of sources, is very easily swayed by his "smart kid" advisers.
Xi's first circles hasn't changed for like 18 years, since his year in Hangzhou, where Zhang Dejiang picked him up. They are a very close knit team.
Many people in the Chinese diaspora--some pretty liberal, to my knowledge--are still questioning the effectiveness of a Biden administration in dealing with China.
Their concerns include whether Biden would ditch the policy guidelines (e.g., the US strategic approach to the PRC) from the current administration and whether his political appointees would defy the current trend of "decoupling," seeking more conciliation and accommodation with China instead.
There appears to be a consensus among many overseas Chinese that the Democratic Party is weak vis-à-vis China when reality calls for more assertiveness--this is especially true given the "other guy" is a non-empathic, non-reciprocal, Machiavellian actor, unlike what one would expect in domestic politics in a well-functioning liberal society.
The kind of "liberal international order" under the Obama administration does not seem to have impressed them mainly because--according to their narratives--they have cried wolf for many years and been ignored until recently the whole world wakes up to see China's true color and proves them right.
As a result, a negative image has been cast on "Biden the candidate," who also happens to be "Biden the Obama VP."
What Biden will do is an open question and to me a significant one.
However, it was only towards the end of the Obama Presidency that the consensus on both sides of the US aisle re-evaluated China policy stepping back from waiting China to democratize to seeing China and the CCP as rather less interested in "convergence" than had been envisioned in the Hong Kong handover (1C2S) or China's accession to the WTO.
The timing seems not to be coincidental. Xi came to power in 2012 and where he was going took a while to reveal itself.
The relationship is in a very different place now from 2016 and not just because of Trump. The situation in Australia should be an object lesson for US policy. Where one goes from here depends on one's version of realpolitik. The harsher one's view of CCP authoritarian government, the harsher the US policy should be. Where Biden stands is an unknown. I would like to see who is advising him and who the grapevine says will be sitting in the State Department chairs for East Asia.
Yes, but will HK be that different than Singapore is now? No freedom of speech or right of assembly and very low key but effective security forces.
Biden if he wins will only be a figurehead - Obama will be pulling the strings but lets see what emerges from the democrat's convention - they have a history of overplaying their hand. Other figures will be saying that they should be the candidate - and if Biden does win what about Elizabeth Warren being Treasury Sec?!!
Interesting could you elaborate on why you think it's Obama pulling strings?
Simon is making him seem to work at Fox. But Biden will do well to delegate properly. Really not seeing he's an egomania at Trump's level.
When Huawei claims US countermeasures are based on a "misunderstanding of Chinese law" - does the security law not say Huawei and PRC-citizen employees must actively assist PRC Intel services? Is there something I missed?
I’d like to hear from Sinocism subscribers who has been following the recent news like EU FDI Screening, Australian foreign investment approval measures, Sino-Indian conflicts... Do you see George Kennan’s Containment in all these developments?
These all seem to me to be actions organically taken by the relevant countries in view of their own interested rather than spurred on by the US in any kind of orchestrated containment strategy. The wolf has taken off the sheep's clothing and other nations are reacting accordingly.
Could a new US President "reset" relations with the PRC? If so, what would that look like, and how might they go about undoing some of the Trump policies towards China?
Most of the Mainland Chinese I know think USA officials are corrupt and easy to buy - all the China lobbyists in DC that are ex-government officials, Biden's son, etc. Are they wrong? Money talks in DC.
I concur that the priority for a new President is to repair relations with out allies first, then deal with China. We have left Canada hanging in the case of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor and need to be clear in out support.
Repairing relations with allies should take priority. There s actually not much of substance to reset re China. The list is short and those are probably the only ones worth keeping. The rhetorical reset is easy. The smile with a big stick approach is always better than the opposite...which seems to characterise this administration's approach.
Started a similar conversation on Twitter. I expect we will get much better ideas from you all.
My first tweet on this on Thursday: Xi and the CCP don't seem to be interested in having a sensible and nuanced discussion with the US or its allies.
https://twitter.com/niubi/status/1278720387346509824
Second one today: appreciate the comments saying trump like this 2. like i didn't know that..my point is it does not matter who is the US president, this is how Xi & his CCP roll...the idea that there could be a "reset" w a different US president is tragically a new variant of the "china fantasy"
https://twitter.com/niubi/status/1279046227162693633
"Happy Independence Day" ("Happy belated Canada Day")... it's all so damned depressing.
you too, and yes
It would not be easy, I think.
Before a "reset" with China can happen, I think that a new US president (clearly Joe Biden, if he were to win) would have to devote no small sum of energy to re-engaging US allies, including Canada.
President Trump has done enormous damage to US standing in the capitals of allied states (which is not to say that allied states have not, in the past, taken the United States for granted). To "reset" with China before doing at least some of this other work would only signal that the United States was intent on a continued policy of unilateralism.
Under Joe Biden it would likely be depicted as something other than that, but it would be unilateralism all the same.
It’s been a few weeks since the Xinfadi outbreak. Authorities did 32k tests of imported products and got no positive results. But 4 more European meat plants were suspended this week over Covid-19 concerns. Why?
Are we certain that China might not be suppressing knowledge of the odd case here and there? They've clearly got the epidemic well in hand, of courses aided by the fact that it only mutated to become more contagious after escaping China (though they'd have suppressed it effectively anyways), but it strains credulity that the largest country in the world is reporting only a couple dozen new cases, if that, on a daily basis.
1,000 workers from this Germany meat company tested positive, which is also the biggest pork exporter to China from Germany. A lot of the workers there apparently are seasonal workers from Eastern Europe, and don’t necessarily live close to the factor all the time
It's because workers at those plants tested positive for coronavirus. Tönnies, the biggest German pork exporter to China, had a particularly big problem.
Do you think the provision for Hong Kong Police recruitment outside the HKSAR of art. 16 last § National Security Law will lead to riot police being replaced by mainland forces?
It's been happening, by stealth, since 1997.
Any evidence? R u saying that hk police is substantially staffed by mainlanders? Explosive news if true and surely not hard to prove/leak?
My bad. I should have read the original post more carefully. The point I sought to make was that new recruits in the HKPF receive much of their training in China from mainland police.
Mea culpa.
我舉雙手贊成。
Hey friends. I’ve been trying to register for HSK 1 this summer, but I seem to be getting blocked out of everything I register for. Many Confucius Institutes in the US seem to be closing down or are no longer administering tests. Does anyone here know if this is by design by PRC, or is there a reliable Confucius Insitute in the US that is still administering? Thank you.
I have a rather specific question related to the US-China trade agreement (https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement/Economic_And_Trade_Agreement_Between_The_United_States_And_China_Text.pdf) that one of you might be able to help with.
Article 1.22 as it relates to physical markets and copyright / trademark infringement in China:
1. The Parties shall take sustained and effective action against copyright and trademark infringement at physical markets.
2. Measures China shall take include significantly increasing the number of enforcement actions beginning within four months after the date of entry into force of this Agreement, and publishing online quarterly updates of enforcement actions at physical markets.
So my questions are:
1. Have they published any of these actions online yet? I haven’t been able to find anything.
2. Did you’ve ever been to Huaqiangbei in Shenzhen, you know the place is alive and teaming with trademark/copyright violations. Do you really think this provision will have an impact?
Does anyone have a sense of whether the number of foreign residents in China has risen or dropped in recent years?
My ‘sense’ is that the mix of nationalities has changed over the past 5 years (more folks from the OBOR nations).
In terms of overall numbers, almost certainly down, on account of stricter visa policies and the closed borders.
It’s an easy guess on the trend as well - down.
I am interested about recent moves by the Taiwanese government in securing a commitment from Somaliland to establish bilateral representation, and in committing to set up an office in Guam. The U.S. plays an important role in the latter, and I suspect also the former. Would these developments impact US-China or cross-strait relations, and how would the Chinese government respond to these events (if this is necessary)?
I can't help thinking that the 'trade' deal will be scrapped very soon. It's clear that China is making little effort to honour it, even allowing for Covid.
https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/us-china-phase-one-tracker-chinas-purchases-us-goods
Moreover the additional issues of HK and Xinjiang are accelerating the, already horrendous, deterioration in Sino-US relations. Congress has the bit between its teeth and it is hard to see how much longer Trump can resist the momentum.
arguments against?
Based on the Administration's statements and actions, it seems like the deal will stay in place through at least November. For example:
- When US Trade Rep Lighthizer testified before Congress last month, he repeatedly defended China's efforts to comply while noting COVID and falling oil prices have created unexpected hurdles. He even specifically criticized the methodology used by PIIE in their tracker.
- After Peter Navarro said the Phase One deal was over during a TV interview, he almost immediately walked back the statement through multiple media outlets. President Trump also quickly tweeted out that the deal was still "fully intact." The speed of the response and the message discipline in the response signal to me how much they want the deal to remain.
- Whenever he speaks about his first-term accomplishments, President Trump is quick to mention the Phase One deal. It is one of his few accomplishments that has bipartisan appeal (as opposed to his other accomplishments, such as tax reform and immigration), and it would seem to be foolish to take off the table before November.
The President wants to appear "tough" on China throughout the rest of the campaign and will no doubt take more actions against the country between now and November. But he has several other actions he can take that won't rattle the markets and won't take away a key talking point.
I think much will depend on the outcome of the elctions this fall (I know, too obvious, but true nonetheless).
The trade deal was just a delaying tactic by the CCP and a sound bite for Trump, so who cares anyway?
I would like to hear from Sinocism subscribers who have read Stephen Walt's latest article in Foreign Policy:
Stephen M. Walt, Everyone Misunderstands the Reason for the U.S.-China Cold War
The left says it’s U.S. arrogance. The right says it’s Chinese malevolence. Both are wrong, 30 June 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/30/china-united-states-new-cold-war-foreign-policy/
Leaving aside the lens of US domestic politics through which Prof. Walt sought to examine the issue, he referred to the importance of understanding what [the Communist Party leadership] considers to be issues on which no compromise is possible ("China's red lines").
What are those red lines?
I think we can all agree that the Party's security approach in Hong Kong is a red line. As is its determination to maintain itself as the sole arbiter of what's right and what's not in China.
Is Taiwan still a red line?
What about the border with India--how would that fit in?
Finally, is the Meng Wanzhou case (and the position China has staked out in this context) a red line?
The overall media probably over plays the“expansionary” military risk of China. While in the last few years they certainly made some claims like South China Sea, but if one look at China history since 220BC (when “modern China” was formed), there was seldom, if any expansionary military effort in the forms of Tsarist Russia, Imperial Japan, or Conquistador Spain. Instead, China mostly got its ass kicked by invading forces and had to cede territory, starting in 1689 with Russia in Siberia, Opium war with UK on HK, Taiwan/Okinawa/Senkaku Islands to Japan (some may not have been administered by Qing dynasty and were sphere of influence or vassal states like Korea) and so on. Even the expansion of China in its history wasN’t result of conquest, but rather China being conquered and ruled by Northern Nomads, who subsequently adopted “Chinese” cultures and became “Chinese” and thus its territory expanded to include the form nomad land, e.g. Mongos and Manchus (12th century and 15th by two different Manchu tribes). Even the popular Disney story Mulan wasn’t even about Han Chinese government, it was a solider in the nomad Gov. of Sarpi (Xianbei, an early Mongo tribe) fighting against another nomad tribe.
I think you may be wrong on two counts here. First, by the time China conquered today's Xinjiang and Tibet, the Ching dynasty was as sinified as it would ever become. But if you go back in time a bit, the Tang was the first to conquer and rule the Kansu corridor. Those were clearly major conquests by a Chinese empire. Second, I don't know why these historical examples may or may not be relevant now. Japan had not been expansionist until is suddenly was. I think the PRC makes it very clear that they take the nine-dotted-line very seriously. Why should we not take them seriously?
Thanks for the reply, I certainly could be wrong as the future is impossible to predict, and even history is not exactly science， contradictory evidences exist depending on which side the historical written source come. Having said that, let’s discuss on the several points you raised, which I believe your conclusion is inaccurate or at least incomplete without full context. Happy to get into more detailed historical reference in a different capacity.
1. Kansu Corridor (I think you meant Gansu Corridor). First, Tang Dynasty is not the first “Chinese” empire to administer it. Han Dynasty took control the Corridor and Tarim Basin in 121BC after war with the Huns (or Xiongnu, some scholar say these were ancestors of Attila the Hun). Four administrative territories were established by Han Dynasty, and lasted more or less until AD63-89. Historically, the Corridor is somewhat of an ethnic melting pot on the border of “Chinese civilization” and northern nomads. Starting in Qin Dynasty, the areas was occupied by various small Kingdoms before being conquered by the Huns/Xiongnu, then more or less exchanged hands between “Chinese” empires and nomad tribes. Huns/Xiongnu was one such tribe, but also included Sarpi/xianbei, Tibetan,Turkic, Mongols, most are probably Mongoloids but Caucasian mummies have been discovered in the area. The Tang Dynasty conquest you referred to, I believe it’s just another similar battle between Turkic tribes (who subjugated smaller tribes) and Tang (whose Founding Family were not Han Chinese but Sarpi/Han Chinese mix). And this was not an one way deal, the same Turkic Tribe (or Kingdom) started invading what’s consider “traditional Chinese” territory as early as AD615 and was at the Gate of ChangAn, Tang’s Capital, in AD626. So it may be too much a stretch to pin the aggression on Tang along rather than at least both sides here.
2. Tibet. It was not first conquered by Qing Dynasty, Mongo/Yuan dynasty took control of it (invaded ~AD1240). Even prior to Qing taking control in 1720, Tibet rulers were consulting with Qing court on major decisions until the death of 5th Dalai Lama were concealed from Qing in 1682 and Dzungars Mongo tribes took over Tibet in 1717. Dzungars was also the dominant ethnic group in Xinjiang until Qing eradicated them via genocide in 1757-1758, and some scholars argue Uighurs did not become prominent in Xinjiang until Zungars were wiped out in the genocide (but that’s another topic). Was Qing Dynasty “as sinified as it would ever become” as your referenced? Two data points, in the Treating with Russia regarding Manchuria/Siberia in 1689, also by Emperor Kangxi who conquered Tibet, the official document had Manchu, Russian and Latin but not Chinese. Two, Han Chinese were not allowed in Manchuria, Qing’s ancestral land, until after 1861. So this questions is too subjective and there is no right answer, but I think it’s hard to argue they are as signified as it would ever become in 1720, not even 50 years after Manchu conquered China
3. Japan. The notion “Japan had not been expansionist until is suddenly was” you mentioned could not be further from the historical facts. Japan invaded Korea in 1592, 4 years after Toyotomi Hideyoshi first united Japan and again in 1597, it almost took the entire Korea until Ming Dynasty’s intervention. This is before the Shogun period! In subsequent years, Japan had various small scale military actions against Chinese coast and Korea, culminated into the First Sino-Japan war, which again started with Japan’s invasion of Korea. At China’s defeat in this war, Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed to cede various Chinese territories including Taiwan. Senkaku Island was also taken control by Japan after this. This is all before WWII, with Japan’s invasion of China, Malaya, and rest of Asia. Yes Japan is not expanding today after US dropped two Nukes and armies of American soldiers based there, but many who studied WW2 and battles of pacific islands, and the treatment of WW2 POWs at the hands of Japanese may have a different view.
Notwithstanding all of the above, there is no right or wrong answer in terms of how serious one should take “China’s threat or aggression”, it’s up to individual citizens and countries. But if we look at historical context and make an objective comparison with Japan’s occupation of Korea/China/Malaya, Rome’s expansion into Greece/Carthage/Hispania/Gaul/Britannia, Spanish Conquistador, US/UK Slave trading, and all the genocides came after those, I find it hard to compare factual Chinese military expansionary actions measuring up anywhere close to these examples. So the questions is, why should people become so concerned of a culture/country whom neither in historical or modern times, made such expansionary advances, especially compared with the above peers who have? Obviously being a different culture and communism government have a lot to do with it, but informed people should look deeper than that. Happy to change my mind upon new evidence.
Nothing personal, but I hate the idea of red lines ... what do they even mean? We see time and time again that labeling something as a "red line" is rather frivolous - the reaction to crossing a redline will always depend on the circumstances and capabilities of the interested parties at that moment, so labeling something a red line means nothing.
For example, is Taiwan a sensitive and key issue to China? Of course, it is arguably an issue as close to the core of Chinese stability as Internet censorship. Is Taiwan a key issue for the USA? I will argue it absolutely is - the US cannot allow Taiwan to be taken over by China for strategic reasons in addition to ideological ones. So what happens when two "red lines" overlap?
In the minds of most, a "red line" is defined by the type of an action that results when it is crossed. Are angry words a reaction anyone fears? Probably not. So which Chinese reactions are the ones to be feared? I would argue that China has precious few cards to play against the US for any Taiwan actions short of a full scale invasion. Given the risks involved of a full scale invasion to the PRC, there is probably a lot of room for the US to make on Taiwan that will fall short of the threshold for the PRC to initial real action outside of angry words and trade restrictions (given that taking military action/invasion could possibly result in military defeat and loss of control over its population).
I expect that we will see that theory tested out over the next several years, with high profile visits, arm sales, etc between the US and China
Agree with the idea of “red lines” can be frivolous, but that’s probably what those in power think, rightly or wrongly. To China, Taiwan is probably a lot more sensitive than Internet censorship or even US strategics. From China’s perspective, Taiwan to them is probably like Alaska to the US, not saying that’s right or accurate but that’s the way they think. Would the US view Russia taking over Alaska (or get Alaska to declare independence and become a Russia ally, similar to Texas back in the days) the same significance as Russia taking over some territory from Ukraine?
You are right that the next few years will reveal a lot of things, one can only hope all the actors will remain calm and not make any irrational decisions.
Yes, I agree that Taiwan is a hugely critical issue for China. I just think it is for America as well, maybe not to the same extent, but enough for America to be able to deter China with its capabilities (military and non-military)
The red lines should at least include the following based on CCP’s rhetoric and actions in the last several decades in my view. 1. Potential territorial dispute/sovereignty or perception of Gov. being soft on them, whether it’s Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, Taiwan or Senkaku Islands, etc. Historically these are perceived as weak Gov. (late Qing dynasty who signed away them to UK, Japan and Russia) and shares the legitimacy of Gov. 2. Foreign support to those who advocate for independence/secession of these territories, especially using certain jurisdiction as a “headquarter” for independence/anti CCP movement, like HK had been by many organizations, in China’s views. 3. Taiwan historically is a redline in action, though they had been willing to Stick with status quo and kick the can down the road as long as US/TW aren’t saying too much about it. Xi is the first one that publicly spoke about the need to resolve Taiwan issues in this generation, so this is a tricky one but definitely a red line. So it’s not really surprising that China has been non-compromising on these issues above. The Gov. probably feels that ruling support come from the mass low income population (Not Urban elites) and nationalistic sentiment (formed by history, education system, and propaganda), and perception of being soft in territory sovereignty would result in loss of support. One of the current China administration’s first economic policies was to increase low-end labor wages, increase their social welfare, instill massive public healthcare programs, increase retirement pensions, etc. all at the cost to businesses/urban elites and benefit to low end labors.
No,
HK is really a sacrificial lamb on the altar for 2022. Xi had genuine ambitions to make Taiwan his "crown jewel" for 2022, but obviously a realisation eventually came that he cannot. He was told that he can have HK instead.
Xi's China is totalitarian, genocidal, and has just committed its Anschluss. It's on the people who say this is anything less than a mortal threat to the world to provide evidence.
For the record, I believe the Meng case is undoubtedly a "red line". Why do I suggest as much? In part, it is such because of China's hubristic perception of how others should now defer to it, as it believes it was unjustly forced to defer to the United States and other countries in the past.
The more powerful version of China that now confronts us will not permit "pipsqueeks" like they perceive Canada to be to arrest prominent members of the "red elite", whatever the crime said persons may have committed.
Which bodes ill for Canada and Canadians (and the two Michaels in particular).
The Canadian perspective is complicated by the view among many in my country that the United States deliberately sought to use Canada as a pawn in a much bigger geopolitical game.
I disagree with that view, as it overlooks the role of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, which issued an arrest warrant for Meng Wanzhou in late August, 2018.
Notwithstanding President Trump's initial attempt to make her extradition a bargaining chip, I do not personally believe that he had the legal right to interfere with that judicial process.
I'd be curious to hear what others think of that understanding. Perhaps I'm ill-informed?
As a Canadian, I'm sure you harken back to the detention of the Garratts as retaliation for the extradition of Su Bin. It looks like deja vu all over again.
The unfortunate arrest of the two Michaels is just another example of the west underestimating the resolve of the CCP. They are determined to weaken/break any western alliances against them. This is why it is crucial that the US, Canada and the other three eyes remain united. Hopefully the next US president will be able to turn things around.
I agree with your take on Meng Wanzhou. It was a wake-up call for me personally when Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor were arrested. I immediately registered with Canadians Abroad, and haven't felt safe in this country since.
To give some context to other readers, I find this article to be a good read: https://socialistproject.ca/2020/06/meng-huawei-and-canadian-law-soap-rinse-and-dry-laundered/
Even if we did get unnecessarily sucked into a geopolitical game, I still think it's perfectly understandable that Canada would stand with their neighbor and biggest trade partner on something that really should not have been a very big deal in the first place.
Yet here we are. Meng is out on bail and enjoying the good life while she waits for a transparent legal system to do its thing. The Michaels have been in jail for 18 months facing an inevitable guilty verdict in the opaque Chinese courts. Trudeau has done little more than express disappointment with the situation. He's hardly banging the drum for America and he's not doing much to appease domestic China hawks either. Surely Party diplomats must understand this is about as nice as he could play it? But it seems it's not good enough for Canada to just play nice - the Party will not be happy with anything less than full compliance.
It is now painfully clear that Xi does not respect Canada at all. If we do not defer to the Party, we will be punished. I suspect this is how the Party sees all countries that don't have the economic clout to really hurt them. Until Canada can find allies who are willing to stand together against the Party, we will probably continue to face this kind of bullying and overreaction whenever we do something they don't like.
你寫的我都同意. I might point out how effective the arrest of the two Michaels has been in moving public opinion in Canada against the US. This is Realpolitik and has to be met with equal or greater resolve and skill. Trudeau has to lift his game as does the next US president. The Chinese play the long game and we must learn to play as well. Trudeau is a nice guy but 老共吃硬不吃軟。
Thank you for providing the link to the Glasbeak article.
I was not convinced. The following passages were particularly troubling to me:
* QUOTE
All that effort to put Wanzhou Meng’s fraud into legal context and not a scintilla of regard for the political, social and economic context of the case!
Everyone, literally everyone, knew what had led the US to charge Huawei and its CFO. It was to obtain bargaining chips in its fight with China. It was to persuade its citizens that it was right for the government to deny them access to cheaper goods and a better 5G system because China would abuse its growing economic influence and enhance its spying potential. It was to make China more pliable when the US demanded better trade terms and more protection for its intellectual property, etc. There was no attempt to hide any of this.
Did the Canadian government understand this? Of course. Did it feel it had to allow the US to use Canada’s supposedly neutral legal machinery to further its political project? Of course. Could the Canadian government have said “no” and simply turned a blind eye when Wanzhou Meng landed in Vancouver? Of course.
Was Associate Justice Holmes, at the very least, in a position to guess all of this? Of course.
* QUOTE
I think he makes far too many assumptions in this section of his paper. I would also argue that this reflects his general animus about the extent to which money and power influence the judicial system (no question--like all institutions in Canada, the court system is influenced by larger social features).
Perhaps the most questionable passage was the following: "Everyone, literally everyone, knew what had led the US to charge Huawei and its CFO. It was to obtain bargaining chips in its fight with China."
Really? Is that true? Or could it not have been a matter of inputs (investigative leads pointing at Meng's alleged acts of fraud) leading to outputs (the issuance of the warrant for her extradition).
I don't doubt that members of President Trump's entourage, as well as others in US government circles, viewed this in political terms. I don't believe, however, that it was as clear cut as he claims.
Unfortunately Trump himself lent credence to this claim when he said he might intervene. Can’t blame Canadians for feeling used.
Oh come on, I just responded to your deleted message :(
Sorry. I did post a rephrased version.
Seems pretty clear and simple to me. But people prefer to extrapolate these into absurd world domination and control of humanity type theories. I find this grand melodramatic approach puzzling.
It s not as if it has helped in anyway in the past in competing or fighting against chicom/PRC. Indeed it s not as if it has helped evening scores in 2020 one iota. What s most consistent with 70 or 100 years of existence of the prc or chicom? it s obssessional about staying in control but in rational and calculating ways, is risk averse but very adventurous opportunisticly, and it has a self correcting mechanism somehow (the most puzzling and unexpected aspect).
Most relevant to now, it hardly ever over-reaches internationally (unlike the US or the Soviets). IMHO it is still not overreaching despite what people claim. Every 'assult' is calibrated and jsut below threshold.
P.s. To focus on the low end majority is both strategically and morally correct. Something the developed world badly needs to emulate before it s too late.
There is momentum in the Indo-Pacific right now towards exactly that. If things continue how they are, I anticipate China will have a middle power multilateral monster on its hands.
Is the momentum you are talking about heading in the direction of an Indo-Pacific NATO, do you think? I was hoping that the CPTPP would provide an economic bloc that would allow smaller countries to better stand up to China's economic pressure, but with the Meng situation the Party have chosen different tactics to intimidate so perhaps a different kind of alliance is needed.
Ugh, I don't think I'd hazard a guess at what form it may take. Though interested actors like Japan, India, Australia, Indonesia all have converging interests. When you crudely put the numbers together and ignore the potential problems, it's tenable. In my view, and probably not shockingly, the more China pushes its borders in 'self-defense', the more galvanised the Indo-Pacific middle powers will become. Aus with its LRASMs, India with the LAC conflict, pushback from within the LDP in Japan, and then Indonesia is Australia's puzzle to solve.
With the support of the US, EU, the UK, Vietnam, South Korea etc etc It is a plausible and more optimistic direction for the Indo-Pacific.
Edit: Typo
And a longer term question, how much longer do you think we will have to live with Xi Jinping? What is his realistic term?
XJP was a consensus candidate, elected together with a consensus to-do-list, not an election freak-accident like leaders of certain other countries.
XJP's selection is the result of a process, that started after the Lehman crisis. Of course he himself was part of it.
He managed to do away with consensus. Unclear is, if that was pre-agreed.
XJP and all his predecessors are hardcore, flaming communists, even if our perception of the one or the other may have been different. Economic development is a pillar of the ideology and therefore by itself it is no deviation from the path.
Change at the top may not bring reprieve.
Until he dies or there is a different system. Xi is 67 now. Jiang Zemin is 93, deng was almost 93 when he died. Xi's genius of writing Xi Thought into the constitution is that effectively Xi is the Party and the Party is Xi, so it is much harder to remove him while he is alive but keep the Party in power
If his objectives are achieved he may well want to pass the reigns onto a younger man. People forget that Xi is a reformer - as Lee Kuan Yew said to Graham Allison. Before he can/could reform he has had to clean up the Party.
I've read that chapter on China in Lee Kuan Yew's *One Man's View of the World*, including his take on 一尊. Pretty consistent with the views that the CCP Elders had about him before 十八大.
Yet we all witnessed what happened after that.
I would argue that the "clean up" effort should be understood as a political consoliidation effort. Few would likely believe that Xi's efforts have actually brought about a meaningful decline in corrupt behaviour among Party members.
I think you should consider the way China politics tick. If you look closely, whatever the political move, it is always at least dual purpose and can be interpreted one way or another, depending on how the wind blows.
That may be born of the necessity to satisfy multiple stakeholders in a consensus-driven environment.
Anti-corruption came about in the early days of XJP's reign and therefore must have been a consensus decision. It serves multiple purposes and was actually designed this way.
Overwhelming majority of mainland Chinese I m in touch with would beg to differ. Based on what evidence do you make your claim? Sorry. My pet hate=china watchers hand waving in a vaccum of projection and wishful thinking.
你說的對。我寫的太廣泛了一點ㄦ。應該說中國官員本性貪污了。因為不知道有多少黨員是當官的。當然有的是上班族，我有的是教書等等。
對不起，寫錯了， 應該是 ‘恨’
哇！跟你意見不同的人你就很。你是外國人，老中絕不會跟你說實話，尤其是嗎自己人的話。沒面子。你了解老中沒有你想象的那麼多。
Actually based on what most people in China say for the last 3 years, the corruption has been reduced significantly, so much as that many bureaucrats refuse to do any work to avoid any possibility of accountability so nothing gets done. People were saying that “shanghai officials” were corrupt, but at least getting things done. Whether the reason is to reduce corruption or power consolidation is up to anyone’s guess
Having been on the ground for the first 6 years of XJP reign I can confirm, there were a lot of changes.
A less arbitrarily acting bureaucracy being the most visible to the 老百姓. You couldn't get "off the hook" against payment of a "fee" anymore. Licensing according to the terms, not depending on a "fee", which actually frustrated some citizens.
On a political level, being corrupt meant you would be safe, as those important for you did the same thing. Not being perceived as corrupt meant posing a risk to all others.
Perhaps that was, why XJP served only very, very briefly in the snake-pit Shanghai.
Political moves in China always serve dual-purposes or more. Killing two birds with one stone is a necessity. It is therefore futile to argue if e.g. anti-corruption had one purpose or another, as it may have had both or more, beyond what we are considering.
Think for example the impact on some powerful private enterprise, whose success depended on corruption and whose owners played politics. Disabling them may also have been a target.
Or simply strengthening the army. What, if Taiwan had bribed PLA officers to foul up an attack on Taiwan? Of course Taiwan was utterly unaware of corruption in the PLA and would have never done that....or would it?
Agreed. It is comforting for most people to believe that chicom is this irrational corrupt hopping mad power crazed clown of an organization. Hence the tendency to weave narratives that ignore what s fairly basic common sense. Hence the shambolic record of anticipating chicom development and moves.
Spot on analysis
I would agree that most of the corruption exists at the local level which makes it harder to detect. China is, after all, a big country 天高皇帝遠。
While some pedestrian corruption may have been reduced to reduce the ire of the laobaixing, what still occurs is privileged, dual-tier corruption. Take for example, Xi Jinping's cousin: https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-presidents-cousin-draws-scrutiny-of-australian-authorities-11564500031
Corruptions always occur and plenty still goes on at all levels, but I would not count the examples like PLA’s procurement head (caught with 200M RMB cash at home along with Gold), another general on the military chief committee, something like 100 minister level as pedestrians. There are a lot of stuff WSJ doesn’t know or doesn’t publish
中國共產黨員本性貪污。從古至今做官是為了發財。老習也很清楚。小貪污沒關係，大貪污要打。
he may end up running things through proxies as he gets older, but we should assume that barring a sudden shift the odds of Xi effectively running things into the 2040s is quite high
I think what is worth talking is the outcome if Xi will have, well, an accident, or a health issues which will render him bedridden.
Would the rather weak, and few Xi's lieutenants be able to hold his flagpole?
It's a lot of time till 2022. Just like Xi's coming to power, things can change quickly.
The official order of succession means Xi's power going to straight to Li, and state council.
From my first contact, a CYL ranked member, now living overseas, Xi was always "one broken leg away from a palace coup" in his first term.
Well, Putin just locked himself in place for another 16 years. No reason Xi can't effectively do the same thing even if he is slightly more subtle about it
Putin made a deal with Jelzin and that way he became president: No attacks on Jelzin, his family and his cronies.
Putin has no-one left to cut a deal with. He therefore must continue until he dies in office.
exactly
If an increasingly concentrated decision-making system makes a state more fragile (see Taleb/Tverton) and the problem of succession remains the biggest source of instability in authoritarian states (see Svolik and elsewhere), I wouldn't take any long positions in China's political stock.
One of the most desired objective of CCP is to ensure stability in China with any means, as a way to ensure its own ruling not to be challenged. In terms of dissident within the party, Xi seems to be very good at squashing them if there's still any. Its relationship with outside world could be bad, but I'd say the party's grasp of China will last long (think N.K.).
My sense is about 7 years. As I am told when he came into office his close advisors told him that if you want to accomplish all of what you want to do it will take longer than 10 years
How do you think China will respond to the offer of visas/future citizenship to HK BNO passport holders by UK/Aus/US?
They have been issuing dire threats against the UK, although they don't say what. It looks as if any retaliation would be asymmetric as not that many Brits want to move to China. Let's hope they don't start taking British hostages in HK....
It looks as if their prospects of selling Huawei 5G equipment and more nuclear power stations here are dead.
英國🇬🇧政府聰明。老共進退兩難。它拒絕港人走的話也沒面子，允許的話也沒面子。
I have lived in HK several times over 40 years and I can tell you that HK people, in general, prefer to stay in Hk for all the normal reasons (food, family, etc.) but they all want one foot out the door in case. They will take citizenship if they can get it but only from countries where they can avoid global taxes. Once they get it they will move back to HK and have little to no allegiance to their new country. I have seen this time and time again. Mostly about the money!
The thing is, the Chinese don't recognise dual citizenship. Moreover, having a foreign passport doesn't provide any protection in their eyes.
The Swedish bookseller....
Good point but I’ll bet their kids won’t want to move back. It takes a generation for the allegiance to weaken. I don’t know too many Chinese in LA dying to move back. Also, you are referring to the old HK, not the new. The influx of mainland Chinese into HK has had a negative impact on 生活水準。
You are seeing plenty of second generation Chinese back in China and HK because of the ut language ability and career prospects. Same for Vietnam with second generation Vietnamese. Still all about the money!
Only a small fraction of those leaving. 這是 老中的弱點，也是西方要專心的地方。
I've been thinking about this one a lot, myself...
For “troublemakers” like Joshua Wong, Martin Lee, Anson Chan, and Jimmy Lai, my assumption is that the Party would gladly fly them first-class to London just to be rid of them (although that's not to say that the aforementioned four would actually choose to leave).
But what of the many other Hong Kongers who might seek an exit strategy? A part of me would be surprised if Beijing was too incredibly rigid about making everyone stay. I say this for two primary reasons:
1) Think of the further international outcry it would bring, especially if those prevented from exiting met some of the criteria for refugee legal status as defined by the 1951 UN Convention.
2) Moreover, why would a party that’s obsessed with stability want to keep around any potential “agents of instability?” Wouldn't this just create a potential "pressure cooker?"
Thus, notwithstanding the strong public statements thus far, I wouldn’t be surprised if the CCP did ultimately let some people go—perhaps “replacing” them with Mainlanders in the process—and to then try to play down the numbers, and maybe even the “value,” of those leaving.
If necessary, CCP propaganda organs may try to slander - in subtle terms or otherwise - those leaving as Western pawns, traitors, etc. I'm sure the Global Times would be well up to that challenge.
What do others think?
Re: International outcry - I think Beijing directives in HK from the outset of the extradition bill render this kind of analysis as unreliable now. While Beijing is currently beleaguered with more hostility than before from international actors, they're also simply just acting with more belligerence.
I tend to agree with your point on stability though. Letting at least the well-resourced slip through the cracks of Beijing's now-visible hand while it makes a fist. The pessimist in me thinks there could be some selectivity based on... factors in this. We know Beijing is totally fine with a loyal Chinese diaspora.
While the pressure cooker analogy makes perfect sense, I think they'd be more willing to try out their new tricks developed in XJ before they'd willingly let an inordinate number of people flee. I think that's a much larger perceivable threat to China-wide stability than the initial succumbing to pressure to withdraw the bill.
Re: the big four, I think to have them 'abandon' Hong Kong might be in the interests of Beijing even more than making an example of them. But I could be convinced either way tbh. Really have no strong feelings about that.
Re: Bringing more mainlanders + propaganda organs, need not say more. Han migration and propaganda will do what han migration and propaganda does in the zhong guo.
Ugh, I should probably clarify, I don't anticipate gulags or a police state near the level of XJ, I just meant they are more capable of controlling large numbers of people with technology etc.
Jimmy Lai is already under a travel ban, isn't he? He's not allowed to leave. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3088728/apple-daily-founder-jimmy-lai-has-travel-ban-upheld-and
I would like to share your assumption that they would let Wong plus the "Hong Kong Gang of Four" leave, as they used to do with prominent dissidents in the mainland. But I think they are much more likely to make examples of them now
That’s an interesting take.
My assumption is that the likes of Martin Lee and Anson Chan wouldn’t necessarily be eager to leave at this late stage even if given the chance, which could, indeed, further motivate the Party to make examples of them (after all, it was just two months ago that authorities suddenly arrested 82-year-old Martin Lee and confiscated his mobile phone... More like that to come?).
However, as for Wong and the younger generation, I wouldn’t be surprised if they were allowed to go at some point. And if so, I further wouldn't be surprised if the CCP then turned to some of its usual tactics to try to prevent them from speaking out too loudly in the West—i.e. threatening family members and friends still in HK.
This has certainly proven to be a "useful" tactic in the CCP's efforts to silence Uighur activists in the West and elsewhere in recent years…
Excellent analysis.
An open question from Spain: Do you expect a tougher position from the European Left against China in the coming months/years? I have always been surprised why Bolsonaro and other populist right leaders attract so much criticism from the left but they barely talk about Xinjiang, PCCh corruption or Hong Kong.
I feel that German greens are taking the lead on this, but I am not sure if it will become a trend.
Spain specifically is not in a good position to comment on those given it's own domestic independence movements. In general, mainstream European left is far more aware of what goes on around the world than say the European right or the American left or right. Given the amount of problems everywhere, everyone has different priorities.