Good morning, today’s thread is for subscribers only. I will be in and out this morning. These are the three questions I am most interested in but please chip in with whatever you want to talk about:
How is the Hong Kong National Security Law going to play out, in Hong Kong, in the mainland (very popular I will bet), and internationally?
Is the absence of a GDP target in the Premier’s work report to the NPC a positive sign for reform, or just an indication that the economic recovery is still so fragile, and the uncertainty so great, that if they wanted to put in a target it would have had to be shockingly low? The Wall Street Journal has uploaded the report, in English and Chinese, here.
The excellent Keith Zhai of Reuters noted in a Twitter thread this morning that:
3. The change in rhetoric is an important milestone in the evolution of the Mainland's approach to Taiwan. Although I dont anticipate meaningful tangible results immediately, it will be cited by analysts 10 years from now as an important shift.
Most interesting is the fact that this change is rhetoric comes at the same time as the National Security Law and historically bad relations with the US. So, I see two broad themes as possible explanations: 1. Indicative of Beijing growing confidence on international stage and/or perception of increasing American weakness; OR, 2. A domestic political move to sure up Party legitimacy given ongoing uncertainty (which links back to Bill's question #2).
As with everything, I guess they dont have to be mutually exclusive.
1. Central scenario, nothing Material. too much capital and financial interests stuck there. The path of least resistsnce for non-PRC parties is status quo. Espeically now that everyone s got enough on their plates. Although Trump's whitehosue is a wildcard, so anything s possible, but unlikely.
2. Regardless of Motivation, it s a rational decision. Probably positive for all concerned?
3. Only mad politicians would start a war there. And i dont think they are mad. Those who believe a priori that they are have to rationalise decades of facts against that theory.
On Taiwan and Hong Kong, any Chinese leader, who is seen as weak and complacent on these issues, will not last. As these are basically unsolvable problems, Chinese leaders are happy to ignore them, as long as no-one rocks the boat.
We have seen that things were running quite well and relaxed, before the status quo was challenged.
We can see things now running very badly, because the boat is being rocked.
I appreciate the ability as a veteran foreign affairs person to be able to understand the domestic political imperatives of other countries, not just one's own. But the issues were only unsolvable because of fear of estrangement from the West economically (on both HK and Taiwan) and the US military (on Taiwan). Now that Xi clearly does not care if the Western alliance decouples economically from the Chinese sphere (I'm sure he'd love it if they just surrendered economically/technologically and hence militarily and politically but he knows that's unlikely), and that he apparently has the military ability to beat the US and Taiwan in Taiwan, the two things that made it unsolvable have been removed. And as we have seen, HK was "solved" (from the CCP perspective) this week, ha!
So I would disagree with your conclusion that the status quo hasn't changed, and therefore our prior policy was fine. The question is, now that these problems ARE solvable (from the CCP perspective), should Western policy change? In other words, it's the classic means and ends question, should maintaining the independence of Taiwan's thriving, democratic society be an end we care about? If not, of course that's that. But if so, what means, what NEW means given the deterioration in our position, might be necessary, including signaling to Taiwan that we stand by them, and providing more tangible support economically, militarily and diplomatically/politically?
The worst case, basically an economic blockade combined with access-denied to an all-important market, has already happened and China can now act with impunity on what it considers its domestic affairs.
Given this situation, actually, the internal excuse for not invading Taiwan has almost vanished, baring a US military intervention, which is highly unlikely. Still China won't do it. There is reasonable doubt what happens, if Chinese people will be ordered to shoot at Chinese people. Also the end-game is highly doubtful. Different from Tiananmen, the survival of the CCP, a disintegration of the nation are not at stake.
They also can't make friendly overtures to Taiwan, as Taiwan feels emboldened and politically strong, the risk of rejection is high, even though the economy in Taiwan could get an urgently needed boost from better relations.
So, Taiwan is a stalemate at this time.
Enter "kill the chicken": Hong Kong. The leaders know full-well, that what their are doing with Hong Kong now, take over legislation and officially set up what has pre-existed anyway, secret political police and anti-subversion agencies, will unleash a storm of indignation, new flare up of protests. This will divert attention away from Taiwan.
They'll probably not shy away from putting China's Wujing on Hong Kong streets.
In foreign affairs they'll take the position, that Hong Kong is purely a domestic affair, which it actually is. China made already clear, that it will continue to respect the Basic Law, which does not mean, that it won't take full control.
The US have exhausted their arsenal. There is nothing they can do. China will wait out the US elections. No matter who replaces Trump and Pompeo, things can only become better. Even if they are re-elected, nothing can get worse than it is now.
China needs the EU and ASEAN as alternative markets and partners.
ASEAN will keep out of Hong Kong and Taiwan questions.
The EU has been dragging its feet over the China-EU investment agreement, negotiations on which the EU introduced because a free-trade agreement is out of question, in view of China's predatory trade practises.
China would want very friendly relations with the EU now, therefore the EU has some leverage.
The EU does not appreciate the uncalled-for aggression of Chinese ambassadors in the EU and already voiced its concerns about developments in Hong Kong. Even though the EU poses no military threat to anyone, China is listening.
Washington can Rumpelstilz as much as it wants, the minds are numbed, and the world will arrange itself without a super-power, if this kind of government is the best the US can offer to the world.
1. It will play out with heads shaking slowly back and forth and jaws firmly set as each perspective has to bear the implications of the law. Little real dialogue. Many internal decisions among those who will now have to "be prepared" on all sides. There's more than two sides in this one, and that's hard to see sometimes.
2. I totally lack the background for any thoughtful commentary on this question, but I suspect the latter of your suggestions is the more accurate. Reality is so complex as to "why" such omissions are left.
3. People should not "worry" any more than they should have over the past 2-3 decades, but every month there is more and more calculated advantage on the PRC side due to the inexorable growth of PLA Missile Force deployment, development, and training to start the invasion when it happens. I don't think an invasion will happen this year, either, but all our old assumptions have to be tossed in the circular file. I've always felt the PLA will announce at some point to the decision makers that "the situation is now XX% assured of success" and if the politics line up then Xi will simple give the "green light" and it will be "on like Donkey Kong", missiles first (for days) then bombers, while ships load. So, most global citizens will be surprised when they turn on the TVs to see explosions from the warheads raining down, but those watching feeds such as Sinocism will see the actual indicators of "last warnings" politically speaking...which I don't think this omission of "peaceful" is, exactly. (Kudos to Alexander Boyd's contributions in this thread!) Watch for news that people are finding train tickets in/out of Fujian province hard to come by instead... THEN you can start saying "take cover"
1. China is Germany pre world war 1 without Bismarck. China has surrounded itself with enemies. Like Germany then it has to purge all sources of disruption (Australia and the US was filled with Germans who were the wrong religion or team in the 19th century). It can’t care how it looks to the outside world HK has to be silenced no matter the cost.
Internationally I don’t know. In Australia however it has caused revulsion amongst the working class. Women’s hairdressers talk openly that China is Australia’s enemy and those “poor people in HK”. Uni students I know talk about how all their HK friends hate the CCP and are terrified.
Two worker quotes I have heard in the last few days
“I can become American, but I can’t become Chinese”
From an old timer working in a bottle shop “you just can’t trust communists”
The reaction here - Australia has compulsory voting - the workers have turned anti CCP any politician who talks or acts friendly/neutral regarding the CCP will lose at the ballot box (like turn back the boats but 5 times worse).
I have watched the mood darken in a matter of days. Barley farmers slapped with 80% tariffs have simply said “we will just have to find new markets and make less money”. Business leader talking heads have gone dark on the usual “let’s not rock the boat with China”
Like Alexander Downer our ex foreign minister said “the workers have turned”. China has little economic leverage now, farming and mining does employ anyone really it only destroys government tax revenue (see my comment on compulsory evoting above). Tourism/education bigger employers but no worker want the virus to come in and kill their grandmother. So they are dead end. Housing well that has imploded without the Chinese.
The CCP has in the matter of 5 months created a developed country who is now an actual enemy of the CCP. Whose national attitude when bullied is “please try and punch me in the face” the CCP will oblige and the cycle will worsen.
I know a large number of Australians subscribe to Bills excellent email list, but my employment means I send a great deal of time talking to workers and the mood amongst them is much worse than “turn back the boats” era.
I follow a lot of Aussie journalists and commentators on social media (I am American). The degree to which they seem to have soured on China in the last two months is really striking. Clive Hamilton must be nursing the world’s biggest case of “I told you so”. Interesting to hear this shift also has manifested among working class people as well.
Fascinating guys, thanks for sharing. Very interesting to see a whole people "actually" turning away from immediate short-term economic incentives (and those might not be as strong as they once were, particularly obviously during Corona, as Andrew said) and uniting behind a values/united national interest/or perhaps just basic "stop jerking us around already" approach.
Taiwan and Hong Kong are only part of an ever more chaotic situation, as there is no plan, no strategy, nothing. Sentiment and perception drive impulsive US-politics carried out with the attention span of a toddler, mind over matter rules.
The world is stunned by what the US is pulling off here, and if this continues it will alienate more and more countries.
The absence of fact-checking and reason on the US side is particularly appalling.
Take for example: Someone throws into the ring "WTO is bad for USA" and everybody readily agrees. Why? Because the WTO has been good for China. No-one bothers to look at facts like the phenomenal growth of US exports as a direct result of GATT, later WTO. In the past 20 years US soybean exports alone doubled.
All this is headed straight south since 2017, thanks to impulsive policies, as facts don't matter anymore as a base of policy consideration.
Has China abused the WTO? Undoubtedly, yes, by not living up to its accession commitments. Is China manipulating trade? Yes, one can easily prove it based on publicly available Chinese sources, without making too much of an effort. It does not require an MBA to figure that one out.
Is one bad actor a good reason to trash a whole system, that overall has benefitted so many?
These things are not fixed using a sledgehammer. Ideologic tunnel-vision paired with terminal departure from facts also serves no purpose.
Will war or a "regional conflict" like a cabinet war in the South China Sea solve anything? War activity of the US since WWII has gone absolutely nowhere. The US biggest success was achieved without firing a single shot. Isn't it finally time to draw on the experience of all these great learning opportunities?
I would say it is high time to abandon this diplomatic Muppet Show with China, do some growing up and self-reflection. At least have a strategy and formulate an idea, what an endgame is supposed to look like here.
Thanks for the link. Approaching its sunset, this administration tries to rationalise its actions and make it look, as if all was part of a consistent strategy.
The objective of this paper seems to be maintaining a rules based world order, containment, no all-out conflict, not a destruction of China. Steps taken so far and the open hostility towards all institutions who maintain that order contradict this paper.
Also, the current form of containment will consume ever more resources at the expense of the domestic economy, which is unsustainable, IMHO.
The paper shows a wrong perception of issues. For example:
Freedom of navigation in the South China Sea was never at risk. No-one has a greater interest in freedom of navigation than China. It is not and has never been an issue.
The real current issue at hand is simply denial of access to fishing grounds for subsistence fishing, while the industrialised, standardised, state-owned fishing fleet from China systematically depletes fishing grounds (not only in the South China Sea), which is a headache for US-partner-governments, as they can't stand up to Chinese military might and look weak in the eyes of their people (voters).
Just visualise a communist politician in a fishing village, that suffers from China's denial of access to fishing grounds. "I will give you access to the fishing grounds" is a sure winner in a local election. If the politician then walks the talk, thanks to China, the voting trends elsewhere in the land will become very predictable.
Small scale subsistence fishing is no threat to China's industrialised, state-owned fishing fleet and China is sure to gracefully oblige, if asked for access by some China-friendly politician of foreign fishing village.
There has been no initiative from the US-government to address a peaceful, negotiated solution of the South China Sea disputes, other than sending warships and warplanes in order to protect, what has never been at threat.
The US is totally oblivious to the long term approach that is playing out here, on a battle field that is completely off the US radar.
The lofty expectations of rich resources 3000-4000 m beneath the ocean surface, that can't be economically exploited anytime soon, can be part of a long-term negotiated solution. The more pressing issues are those at hand, as they can cause a political trend, that won't serve anybody's interest but China's.
By the way, China's fishing is driven by an ill conceived system of subsidies, that turbo-charges export of processed, canned fish. Forcing China to abandon this policy could reduce the depletion pressure on the world's fishing grounds and reduce conflict in the South China Sea at the same time. This is not a trivial matter, therefore in China the People's Leader is personally in charge of fisheries.
As far as economic pressure is concerned, no nation built on exports can live without access to the US market. However, can the US re-industrialise without access to the Chinese market?
Another example: Steel. No steel manufacturer on this planet can do without buying at least ⅓ of its production consumables in China. Think mill rolling equipment, pumps, abrasives, refractories, filters, and so on. Much of it can be replicated elsewhere, but at a cost, as this is also a matter of availability natural resources such as Mg. Having no access to this means buying more expensive somewhere else, making home-made steel even less competitive than the cheapest steel in the world, China's. That is a never-ending spiral, only one of many in the industrial value chain.
I don't see, that the better-late-than-never strategy paper bases on the knowledge and recognition of the issues and the opposition's constantly morphing long term strategy. This being so, the US is positioned to exhaust itself.
This is a sad situation as the US did very little--other than rhetorical support--last year, essentially letting the leaderless protests end up with tremendous chaos and lawlessness. Hong Kong's fight for democracy and freedom is strategically in line with vital US interests in the Indo-Pacific region, but what seemed strange to me was there were no visible tactical plans or material support from the USG in that movement, despite the fact that the US has a Secretary of State who was previously the CIA director.
My theory was that trade was the topmost item on Trump's list at that time, so he played down Hong Kong to get the trade deal done. But given that the phase-one deal has now been signed and that Trump's priorities re China have shifted in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, it remains to be seen what the Trump administration will do in the new waves of protests and political turmoil in Hong Kong in the foreseeable future, and whether this time the USG can make a difference in tilting the movement in America's favor.
The forced de-listing, if implemented, of the $2T of value on the US capital markets will be a lifeline for HK. The companies will give up little in terms of capital access or liquidity. Another short-sighted move by this administration
When it comes to frauds like $LK, I think this is the right move to protect US investors. A simple Bayesian take on the issue would suggest paying extra attention to Chinese companies, but the de-listing should still be implemented on a case-by-case basis, with decisions made using the weight of evidence.
On the National Security Law, the demonstration this Sunday will reflect if there is a determined prolonged resistance to Beijing interference or residents are resigned that fighting Beijing is a futile effort. Rule of thumb for me is if 2 million plus show up to protest then it's going to be protracted resistance for sometime. If 50,000 - 100,000 is the final number, then it becomes dormant until COVID-19 is contained. Given that the hope that Beijing would bow to the will of the people did not happen and further Beijing was not shamed into submission by international opinion, the protestors are not left with much.
As plans to build a port that would compete with and eventually sideline HK as a financial hub in five years, has not been lost on many in HK. This plan is actually Beijing's response to the pro-democracy movement. It's easier than pictures of PLA and riot police subduing HK demonstrators for years to come. It's appears Beijing's answer is to damn democracy with commercial infrastructure.
To your second question, my thought is Beijing playing it cautious rather than being. Xi and the Politburo stressing the continual development and growth of the internal market is the preferred choice. I tend to think we misread China in believing that it is sitting on tenterhooks wondering what western opinion thinks about every move it makes. China does what suits China.
As to Taiwan. China's policy deals in decades maybe centuries. As much as the US likes to dare China over it, Trump and Pompeo trying to set up a pretext for armed conflict are both clumsy and awkward, you just know that if they try it they will screw it up. When America squeaks these days. does anyone really listen? Sorry Bill, couldn't resist,
I think Pompeo should worry about whether he has forces that are healthy to do anything. COVID is cutting into the military, especially the navy, which has some major morale problems. If the State department wants to start exercising foreign policy with military might, he has another coming. Certainly conducting gunboat diplomacy 8,000 miles from American shores.
In terms of replacing Hong Kong as a port, they are already doing that. As of 2018 Hong Kong was the 7th-busiest container port in the world, with falling volume; Guangzhou was 5th and Shenzhen 3rd, both with rising volume. Hong Kong’s value as a “grey channel” conduit is also fading, at least in the meat sector, due to a combination of stricter Mainland Customs enforcement and many more direct trade protocol agreements with exporting countries.
To me, the first two questions have answers that are intertwined. Regarding Hong Kong, the point that you make about "China does what suits China" is absolutely correct, but the twist is that the separate status of the City has allowed China access to Western financing. Whether the Chinese build a different port in the region in order to bypass Hong Kong skirts the larger financial issues. Perhaps the Chinese are more internally focused, and thus willing to forgo what Hong Kong has given China in the past, but in dropping the GDP target, I think even they can't fabricate their way out of poor economic performance from the Covid-19 shutdowns. Also, most governments around the world seem to be hesitant in making their next policies for emerging from two months or so of shutdowns, and the Chinese are no exception.
Chairman Rabbit portrays Beijing's actions as driven by popular sentiment: "必须采取某种硬干预措施，这也是给广大国民的一个交代.", "2019年香港运动以来，中央必须有所姿态，必须采取行动，否则无法与国民交代", 等等.
As you quoted, "既然关系不能更坏“ they push through this law to satisfy nationalistic public with no further cost in global politics as US is in their view, impossible to please (中国政府如果不做什么“丧权辱国”的事情的话是不可能取悦美国的) ...
maybe in 2008,2012, or 2016 relations wouldn't be able to get worse, but in 2020? Don't know if Beijing (or Chairman Rabbit) has made the right analysis.
From Geopolitical Futures this morning: "The thing is, Beijing has been trying to move away from GDP targets for years anyway. They tend to create all sorts of skewed incentives for officials at the local and provincial levels to either lean on unproductive investment and misallocated capital to meet their marks or to cook the books altogether, leaving the central government blind to the emerging economic risks on the ground. Notably, Li also announced that Beijing would run a budget deficit of at least 3.6 percent of GDP and cut corporate taxes and fees by another 2.5 trillion yuan ($350 billion) in order to stimulate the economy. At the same time, though, he warned governments at all levels to tighten their belts. In other words, despite the unprecedented collapse of growth in China, Beijing still lives in crippling fear of the consequences of a reckless, 2008-style effort to save it."
As for Taiwan, leaving out ‘peaceful’ is part of a bigger shift. Austin Wang also pointed out it did not mention the 1992 Consensus, just as the Taiwanese Mainland Affairs Council Minister said in the Legislative Yuan that history has already turned the page on that. So I suppose we are moving towards a new vocabulary for the cross-Strait relation.
The movement on the Hong Kong question cannot be seen separately from that: Beijing may have given up on using it as a One Country, Two Systems showcase. It wants to pacify Hong Kong, for sure, but now both DPP and KMT have rejected OCTS for Taiwan, it may finally see that the Taiwanese will never accept it anyway. More worryingly is that the changes to the HK policy as well as the general trend of Chinese behaviour show Beijing cares less and less about international repercussions.
China is constrained on Taiwan by the fact that peaceful annexation would be easier, the risk and damage of any kind of effort failing, and international repercussions. On the first, Beijing may now judge it will have to move on Taiwan anyway or lose it forever. (I think it is already ‘lost’, but empirical reality is separate from perception.) As for the second point, its success in dealing with Covid-19 vis-à-vis the stark picture its propaganda paints of the US and ‘the West’ may have given many in the party-state system a confidence boost, so Beijing may now believe more strongly in its capacity to bring complicated endeavours to a good end. Thirdly, it seems to be caring less and less about its image. Its relation with the US is already burning anyway while more and more officials genuinely believe in China’s aggressive nationalism.
To maintain sobriety, it is important to shut down useless alarmist talk of imminent invasion. What we should look out for with Taiwan is China employing Russian tactics. Not too long ago, fishing boats took turns ramming a Taiwanese coast guard vessel of Kinmen. Kyodo News has reported the PLA might do an exercise in August practicing the capture of the Taiwan-controlled Pratas/Dongsha Islands. I expect more menacing behaviour towards Taiwan, trying to slowly win terrain salami-slice style.
1. LegCo 'election' will be fun. Internationally really means US; the admin will just use stock phrases by Pompeo, no real credibility under Trump. Curious how a Biden admin would do/say.
2. Guess we will have to see in 10 months whether it returns or not. But on the ground the talk is still 'industrial upgrade' which in most cases doesn't mean re-orientation towards consumption.
3. On Taiwan, hawks are on the ascendency, had to give ground at least in rhetoric. As in 2., military spending can come into play as part of counter-cyclical fiscal policy but anything more than a build-up is unlikely as costs of waging a real war remain prohibitively high (imagine the reactions on the markets when the banking system is still v fragile).
Hey Bill, is there any reason why you don't include any Taiwanese media in your daily?
I realize that most of it is CCP mouthpiece garbage, but not all of it is CCP mouthpiece garbage. The likes of Commonwealth, Liberty Times, and even (I'm gritting my teeth now) the Taiwan Apple Daily present a very different voice on the whole Taiwan thing than Reuters, Bloomberg, and SCMP could ever do. Not to mention the Central News Agency, which is obviously the Taiwanese government's propaganda department but somebody's got to do it, and they express the Taiwan viewpoint more accurately than Global Times, Xinwen, China Daily and etc. which couldn't give a rat's about Taiwan's viewpoint. Just a thought.
Taiwan s viewüpint is reflected in international press though. What s lacking is what precisely Sinocism does, presenting 'ccp garbage' (as u put it).
I dare say 'ccp garbage' has been more accurate about China than 'free and fair' international media over the years, decades. That that even needs to be said and argued about shows just how bizarre the way the world learns about China is...and then everyone acts surprised and indignant when they cant get China right.
Watch what they say and do, not what you hear from people who know what u want to hear say what they say and do. Simple.
Based on Beijing's national security legislation for HK, the small chance to sell 1C2S to Taiwan has gone from hard to impossible. At the end of the day the evidence says 1C2S now means 1C1S but possibly with a decade or so delay. Based on that, tough to see a scenario where Taiwan signs up for "Peaceful" joining with China. If there is a joining with Taiwan it isn't going to be peaceful, shotgun wedding would be the least warlike option. The change in wording reflects that acknowledgement?
Interested in any thoughts about the UK Government. Is the Sino-British agreement worth the paper it is written on? Does the UK realistically have any levers to pull on to push back on this?
The UK no longer has much say in the agreement they signed years ago, living up to its treaty of so many more years ago. UK has absolutely every obligation to stand up for the Hong Kong people but has failed to do so despite many opportunities. It does not have the military power, nor the financial power, nor the moral fibre to do what is right as HK faces another challenge to their dwindling freedom at the hands of the autocracy under which they find themselves controlled. I pray that the protests that shall come don’t cost the lives of the young, brilliant students who bravely face the foe in the streets. For those of us who love HK, this news is a potential disaster and should be debated in the United Nations. The USA can say what it may, but it too has lots its international leadership position as a result of its current Government and its lack of leadership.
There is realistically not that much that we can do to make the Chinese change their minds.
However, it is looking increasingly likely that UK government support for the “golden“ era in UK China relations is coming to a close. Witness to that is a leak from Downing Street saying that all Huawei infrastructure will be removed from British phone networks by 2023. If Trump is defeated (Please God…) this year as predicted by Oxford Economic’s who have a fairly good forecasting record, it should be likely that a US that is engaging more forcibly with the world will have a lot more willing allies than previously. It looks as if the new Cold War has begun.
Hong Kong was always a “borrowed place on borrowed time“ as the saying goes. Some of you may remember that at the time of the handover everyone thought that Hong Kong was finished. Will it be now? I wonder if there will be a free Internet in Hong Kong when the Law is brought into force.
Problem is with Britain is that we have far less international clout than we did even twenty years ago. The most we can do is make a few statements but the economic costs of active intervention would outweigh the impact we would actually have.
This is certainly the short-term reality. But medium-term there will be more fierce opposition lined up. The Brexiteering brigade should have learnt its operational mistakes 2016~now.
I have the same question as Jonah. "The Brexiteering brigade should have learnt its operational mistakes 2016~now" -- I don't understand what that means.
Sorry for being cryptic. I meant that the anti-China movement will be better run than the Brexit project. I thought the Chinese Research Group is already more balanced than ERG. And there will be less Sinophilia than there has been Europhilia.
I’ll say I won’t expect a wave of protests as intense as last year’s. So many things have changed since then. Police have gained much experience on crowd management. Ban on public gatherings remains effective. Protestors are caught off guard by the short notice of National Security Law. Plus, legislative by way of promulgation won’t create many political opportunities for the opposition.
Most are focusing on Xi Jinping taking advantage of an opportunity while the world is distracted, but they give short shrift to the possibility that he is weak and threatened, a Mao style dictator without Mao's credibility. Xi's China is engaged in genocide, massive repression, extensive economic chicanery, and the destruction of the institutions that have helped the PRC to succeed in the wider world, namely Hong Kong. And what does Xi have to show for all this? The impending cutoff of trade and contact with the outside world. No, Xi is not a strong man, but a frightened one going for broke.
Alexander: Mainlanders haven't felt enough of the effect yet, other than the pervasive environment of fear that surrounds all genocidal totalitarians. It really shows how very little U.S. and likemindeds have done to impose costs on the PRC. Now that the truth of Xi's program is being exposed, that should change quickly.
In the global forum, this is true. But domestically, doesn't this play really well? Question all last summer from mainlanders was, "Why is central gov allowing HK to "monkey around" like this?"
I'm not sure this analogy works very well (I appreciate you probably didn't intend to stretch it as far as I'm about to).
France and Britain had treaty obligations to Poland; the US does not vis a vis Taiwan. France and Britain declared war on Germany knowing it would not affect the invasion; I can only assume America would not intervene to defend Taiwan if they determine it is indefensible.
Annexing Austria was a material gain for Nazi Germany. I am not sure what vocabulary historians will use to describe what is about to happen to Hong Kong, but the city will be diminished in every way. Beijing seems prepared to pay this cost in exchange for ideological gain.
Trite and flimsy analogy/parallel has been the hallmark of Western analysis on Chicom/PRC. Hence the manifest failures over decades. There s little sign that it s changing. Latest, see fukuyama s wheeling out the tired Soviet model again. When in doubt, stick to what we know. It s a mental fetal position. it appeals to a childlike desire for security...hey if it s all parallel then we know the outcome...we win. Yey (with a weak shake of the fist)!
I also went through Macau’s Article 23 NSL, which has been law for awhile. My biggest question/concern is whether it’ll be retroactive. Are they really going to ‘grandfather in’ the 7k people arrested last year, half of which will never go to court because the cases are weak
You are probably quite right, that the CCP is on also the revenge path and quite possibly there may be retrospective application of the law. Since HK seems to be downgraded to "special economic zone", it is also quite clear that certain agencies will not be reporting to the local government. However, they won't do HK people the favour of big drama.
And then, what? Bomb Causeway Bay? HK is sovereign territory of China. That is the reality. Nothing will stop China from exercising its sovereignty over HK. Looking that the NPC documents, the new status of HK seems to be "special economic zone." A substantial downgrade.
在中國，槍桿子裡面出政權。這句話老共很清楚。 可惜，所謂中國通的外國人還不懂。
3. The change in rhetoric is an important milestone in the evolution of the Mainland's approach to Taiwan. Although I dont anticipate meaningful tangible results immediately, it will be cited by analysts 10 years from now as an important shift.
Most interesting is the fact that this change is rhetoric comes at the same time as the National Security Law and historically bad relations with the US. So, I see two broad themes as possible explanations: 1. Indicative of Beijing growing confidence on international stage and/or perception of increasing American weakness; OR, 2. A domestic political move to sure up Party legitimacy given ongoing uncertainty (which links back to Bill's question #2).
As with everything, I guess they dont have to be mutually exclusive.
1. Central scenario, nothing Material. too much capital and financial interests stuck there. The path of least resistsnce for non-PRC parties is status quo. Espeically now that everyone s got enough on their plates. Although Trump's whitehosue is a wildcard, so anything s possible, but unlikely.
2. Regardless of Motivation, it s a rational decision. Probably positive for all concerned?
3. Only mad politicians would start a war there. And i dont think they are mad. Those who believe a priori that they are have to rationalise decades of facts against that theory.
On Taiwan and Hong Kong, any Chinese leader, who is seen as weak and complacent on these issues, will not last. As these are basically unsolvable problems, Chinese leaders are happy to ignore them, as long as no-one rocks the boat.
We have seen that things were running quite well and relaxed, before the status quo was challenged.
We can see things now running very badly, because the boat is being rocked.
I appreciate the ability as a veteran foreign affairs person to be able to understand the domestic political imperatives of other countries, not just one's own. But the issues were only unsolvable because of fear of estrangement from the West economically (on both HK and Taiwan) and the US military (on Taiwan). Now that Xi clearly does not care if the Western alliance decouples economically from the Chinese sphere (I'm sure he'd love it if they just surrendered economically/technologically and hence militarily and politically but he knows that's unlikely), and that he apparently has the military ability to beat the US and Taiwan in Taiwan, the two things that made it unsolvable have been removed. And as we have seen, HK was "solved" (from the CCP perspective) this week, ha!
So I would disagree with your conclusion that the status quo hasn't changed, and therefore our prior policy was fine. The question is, now that these problems ARE solvable (from the CCP perspective), should Western policy change? In other words, it's the classic means and ends question, should maintaining the independence of Taiwan's thriving, democratic society be an end we care about? If not, of course that's that. But if so, what means, what NEW means given the deterioration in our position, might be necessary, including signaling to Taiwan that we stand by them, and providing more tangible support economically, militarily and diplomatically/politically?
Well, it was US policy that rocked the boat.
The worst case, basically an economic blockade combined with access-denied to an all-important market, has already happened and China can now act with impunity on what it considers its domestic affairs.
Given this situation, actually, the internal excuse for not invading Taiwan has almost vanished, baring a US military intervention, which is highly unlikely. Still China won't do it. There is reasonable doubt what happens, if Chinese people will be ordered to shoot at Chinese people. Also the end-game is highly doubtful. Different from Tiananmen, the survival of the CCP, a disintegration of the nation are not at stake.
They also can't make friendly overtures to Taiwan, as Taiwan feels emboldened and politically strong, the risk of rejection is high, even though the economy in Taiwan could get an urgently needed boost from better relations.
So, Taiwan is a stalemate at this time.
Enter "kill the chicken": Hong Kong. The leaders know full-well, that what their are doing with Hong Kong now, take over legislation and officially set up what has pre-existed anyway, secret political police and anti-subversion agencies, will unleash a storm of indignation, new flare up of protests. This will divert attention away from Taiwan.
They'll probably not shy away from putting China's Wujing on Hong Kong streets.
In foreign affairs they'll take the position, that Hong Kong is purely a domestic affair, which it actually is. China made already clear, that it will continue to respect the Basic Law, which does not mean, that it won't take full control.
The US have exhausted their arsenal. There is nothing they can do. China will wait out the US elections. No matter who replaces Trump and Pompeo, things can only become better. Even if they are re-elected, nothing can get worse than it is now.
China needs the EU and ASEAN as alternative markets and partners.
ASEAN will keep out of Hong Kong and Taiwan questions.
The EU has been dragging its feet over the China-EU investment agreement, negotiations on which the EU introduced because a free-trade agreement is out of question, in view of China's predatory trade practises.
China would want very friendly relations with the EU now, therefore the EU has some leverage.
The EU does not appreciate the uncalled-for aggression of Chinese ambassadors in the EU and already voiced its concerns about developments in Hong Kong. Even though the EU poses no military threat to anyone, China is listening.
Washington can Rumpelstilz as much as it wants, the minds are numbed, and the world will arrange itself without a super-power, if this kind of government is the best the US can offer to the world.
1. It will play out with heads shaking slowly back and forth and jaws firmly set as each perspective has to bear the implications of the law. Little real dialogue. Many internal decisions among those who will now have to "be prepared" on all sides. There's more than two sides in this one, and that's hard to see sometimes.
2. I totally lack the background for any thoughtful commentary on this question, but I suspect the latter of your suggestions is the more accurate. Reality is so complex as to "why" such omissions are left.
3. People should not "worry" any more than they should have over the past 2-3 decades, but every month there is more and more calculated advantage on the PRC side due to the inexorable growth of PLA Missile Force deployment, development, and training to start the invasion when it happens. I don't think an invasion will happen this year, either, but all our old assumptions have to be tossed in the circular file. I've always felt the PLA will announce at some point to the decision makers that "the situation is now XX% assured of success" and if the politics line up then Xi will simple give the "green light" and it will be "on like Donkey Kong", missiles first (for days) then bombers, while ships load. So, most global citizens will be surprised when they turn on the TVs to see explosions from the warheads raining down, but those watching feeds such as Sinocism will see the actual indicators of "last warnings" politically speaking...which I don't think this omission of "peaceful" is, exactly. (Kudos to Alexander Boyd's contributions in this thread!) Watch for news that people are finding train tickets in/out of Fujian province hard to come by instead... THEN you can start saying "take cover"
Thanks for the shoutout!
1. China is Germany pre world war 1 without Bismarck. China has surrounded itself with enemies. Like Germany then it has to purge all sources of disruption (Australia and the US was filled with Germans who were the wrong religion or team in the 19th century). It can’t care how it looks to the outside world HK has to be silenced no matter the cost.
Internationally I don’t know. In Australia however it has caused revulsion amongst the working class. Women’s hairdressers talk openly that China is Australia’s enemy and those “poor people in HK”. Uni students I know talk about how all their HK friends hate the CCP and are terrified.
Two worker quotes I have heard in the last few days
“I can become American, but I can’t become Chinese”
From an old timer working in a bottle shop “you just can’t trust communists”
The reaction here - Australia has compulsory voting - the workers have turned anti CCP any politician who talks or acts friendly/neutral regarding the CCP will lose at the ballot box (like turn back the boats but 5 times worse).
I have watched the mood darken in a matter of days. Barley farmers slapped with 80% tariffs have simply said “we will just have to find new markets and make less money”. Business leader talking heads have gone dark on the usual “let’s not rock the boat with China”
Like Alexander Downer our ex foreign minister said “the workers have turned”. China has little economic leverage now, farming and mining does employ anyone really it only destroys government tax revenue (see my comment on compulsory evoting above). Tourism/education bigger employers but no worker want the virus to come in and kill their grandmother. So they are dead end. Housing well that has imploded without the Chinese.
The CCP has in the matter of 5 months created a developed country who is now an actual enemy of the CCP. Whose national attitude when bullied is “please try and punch me in the face” the CCP will oblige and the cycle will worsen.
I know a large number of Australians subscribe to Bills excellent email list, but my employment means I send a great deal of time talking to workers and the mood amongst them is much worse than “turn back the boats” era.
I follow a lot of Aussie journalists and commentators on social media (I am American). The degree to which they seem to have soured on China in the last two months is really striking. Clive Hamilton must be nursing the world’s biggest case of “I told you so”. Interesting to hear this shift also has manifested among working class people as well.
Fascinating guys, thanks for sharing. Very interesting to see a whole people "actually" turning away from immediate short-term economic incentives (and those might not be as strong as they once were, particularly obviously during Corona, as Andrew said) and uniting behind a values/united national interest/or perhaps just basic "stop jerking us around already" approach.
Taiwan and Hong Kong are only part of an ever more chaotic situation, as there is no plan, no strategy, nothing. Sentiment and perception drive impulsive US-politics carried out with the attention span of a toddler, mind over matter rules.
The world is stunned by what the US is pulling off here, and if this continues it will alienate more and more countries.
The absence of fact-checking and reason on the US side is particularly appalling.
Take for example: Someone throws into the ring "WTO is bad for USA" and everybody readily agrees. Why? Because the WTO has been good for China. No-one bothers to look at facts like the phenomenal growth of US exports as a direct result of GATT, later WTO. In the past 20 years US soybean exports alone doubled.
All this is headed straight south since 2017, thanks to impulsive policies, as facts don't matter anymore as a base of policy consideration.
Has China abused the WTO? Undoubtedly, yes, by not living up to its accession commitments. Is China manipulating trade? Yes, one can easily prove it based on publicly available Chinese sources, without making too much of an effort. It does not require an MBA to figure that one out.
Is one bad actor a good reason to trash a whole system, that overall has benefitted so many?
These things are not fixed using a sledgehammer. Ideologic tunnel-vision paired with terminal departure from facts also serves no purpose.
Will war or a "regional conflict" like a cabinet war in the South China Sea solve anything? War activity of the US since WWII has gone absolutely nowhere. The US biggest success was achieved without firing a single shot. Isn't it finally time to draw on the experience of all these great learning opportunities?
I would say it is high time to abandon this diplomatic Muppet Show with China, do some growing up and self-reflection. At least have a strategy and formulate an idea, what an endgame is supposed to look like here.
Once a leader like Xi goes genocidal, the range of options available to stop them tends to get pretty narrow.
Re: “no strategy,” White House just published this: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report-5.20.20.pdf
You really want to watch this one, Dobbs and Navarro having a fallout over this paper: https://www.mediaite.com/tv/youre-peddling-pablum-and-bs-lou-dobbs-erupts-on-wh-adviser-navarro-over-report-on-u-s-approach-to-china/
Thanks for the link. Approaching its sunset, this administration tries to rationalise its actions and make it look, as if all was part of a consistent strategy.
The objective of this paper seems to be maintaining a rules based world order, containment, no all-out conflict, not a destruction of China. Steps taken so far and the open hostility towards all institutions who maintain that order contradict this paper.
Also, the current form of containment will consume ever more resources at the expense of the domestic economy, which is unsustainable, IMHO.
The paper shows a wrong perception of issues. For example:
Freedom of navigation in the South China Sea was never at risk. No-one has a greater interest in freedom of navigation than China. It is not and has never been an issue.
The real current issue at hand is simply denial of access to fishing grounds for subsistence fishing, while the industrialised, standardised, state-owned fishing fleet from China systematically depletes fishing grounds (not only in the South China Sea), which is a headache for US-partner-governments, as they can't stand up to Chinese military might and look weak in the eyes of their people (voters).
Just visualise a communist politician in a fishing village, that suffers from China's denial of access to fishing grounds. "I will give you access to the fishing grounds" is a sure winner in a local election. If the politician then walks the talk, thanks to China, the voting trends elsewhere in the land will become very predictable.
Small scale subsistence fishing is no threat to China's industrialised, state-owned fishing fleet and China is sure to gracefully oblige, if asked for access by some China-friendly politician of foreign fishing village.
There has been no initiative from the US-government to address a peaceful, negotiated solution of the South China Sea disputes, other than sending warships and warplanes in order to protect, what has never been at threat.
The US is totally oblivious to the long term approach that is playing out here, on a battle field that is completely off the US radar.
The lofty expectations of rich resources 3000-4000 m beneath the ocean surface, that can't be economically exploited anytime soon, can be part of a long-term negotiated solution. The more pressing issues are those at hand, as they can cause a political trend, that won't serve anybody's interest but China's.
By the way, China's fishing is driven by an ill conceived system of subsidies, that turbo-charges export of processed, canned fish. Forcing China to abandon this policy could reduce the depletion pressure on the world's fishing grounds and reduce conflict in the South China Sea at the same time. This is not a trivial matter, therefore in China the People's Leader is personally in charge of fisheries.
As far as economic pressure is concerned, no nation built on exports can live without access to the US market. However, can the US re-industrialise without access to the Chinese market?
Another example: Steel. No steel manufacturer on this planet can do without buying at least ⅓ of its production consumables in China. Think mill rolling equipment, pumps, abrasives, refractories, filters, and so on. Much of it can be replicated elsewhere, but at a cost, as this is also a matter of availability natural resources such as Mg. Having no access to this means buying more expensive somewhere else, making home-made steel even less competitive than the cheapest steel in the world, China's. That is a never-ending spiral, only one of many in the industrial value chain.
I don't see, that the better-late-than-never strategy paper bases on the knowledge and recognition of the issues and the opposition's constantly morphing long term strategy. This being so, the US is positioned to exhaust itself.
Re: The Hong Kong National Security Law.
This is a sad situation as the US did very little--other than rhetorical support--last year, essentially letting the leaderless protests end up with tremendous chaos and lawlessness. Hong Kong's fight for democracy and freedom is strategically in line with vital US interests in the Indo-Pacific region, but what seemed strange to me was there were no visible tactical plans or material support from the USG in that movement, despite the fact that the US has a Secretary of State who was previously the CIA director.
My theory was that trade was the topmost item on Trump's list at that time, so he played down Hong Kong to get the trade deal done. But given that the phase-one deal has now been signed and that Trump's priorities re China have shifted in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, it remains to be seen what the Trump administration will do in the new waves of protests and political turmoil in Hong Kong in the foreseeable future, and whether this time the USG can make a difference in tilting the movement in America's favor.
The forced de-listing, if implemented, of the $2T of value on the US capital markets will be a lifeline for HK. The companies will give up little in terms of capital access or liquidity. Another short-sighted move by this administration
When it comes to frauds like $LK, I think this is the right move to protect US investors. A simple Bayesian take on the issue would suggest paying extra attention to Chinese companies, but the de-listing should still be implemented on a case-by-case basis, with decisions made using the weight of evidence.
They may not have to force it, looks like Baidu is already moving on it. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-baidu-delisting-excusive/exclusive-baidu-considers-leaving-the-nasdaq-to-boost-its-valuation-sources-idUSKBN22X1HA?il=0
So HK listing requirements are also going to be rewritten? Is that part of the plan?
On the National Security Law, the demonstration this Sunday will reflect if there is a determined prolonged resistance to Beijing interference or residents are resigned that fighting Beijing is a futile effort. Rule of thumb for me is if 2 million plus show up to protest then it's going to be protracted resistance for sometime. If 50,000 - 100,000 is the final number, then it becomes dormant until COVID-19 is contained. Given that the hope that Beijing would bow to the will of the people did not happen and further Beijing was not shamed into submission by international opinion, the protestors are not left with much.
As plans to build a port that would compete with and eventually sideline HK as a financial hub in five years, has not been lost on many in HK. This plan is actually Beijing's response to the pro-democracy movement. It's easier than pictures of PLA and riot police subduing HK demonstrators for years to come. It's appears Beijing's answer is to damn democracy with commercial infrastructure.
To your second question, my thought is Beijing playing it cautious rather than being. Xi and the Politburo stressing the continual development and growth of the internal market is the preferred choice. I tend to think we misread China in believing that it is sitting on tenterhooks wondering what western opinion thinks about every move it makes. China does what suits China.
As to Taiwan. China's policy deals in decades maybe centuries. As much as the US likes to dare China over it, Trump and Pompeo trying to set up a pretext for armed conflict are both clumsy and awkward, you just know that if they try it they will screw it up. When America squeaks these days. does anyone really listen? Sorry Bill, couldn't resist,
I think Pompeo should worry about whether he has forces that are healthy to do anything. COVID is cutting into the military, especially the navy, which has some major morale problems. If the State department wants to start exercising foreign policy with military might, he has another coming. Certainly conducting gunboat diplomacy 8,000 miles from American shores.
In terms of replacing Hong Kong as a port, they are already doing that. As of 2018 Hong Kong was the 7th-busiest container port in the world, with falling volume; Guangzhou was 5th and Shenzhen 3rd, both with rising volume. Hong Kong’s value as a “grey channel” conduit is also fading, at least in the meat sector, due to a combination of stricter Mainland Customs enforcement and many more direct trade protocol agreements with exporting countries.
I think they will try to maintain Hong Kong’s value as a financial center, at least for a time. Speaking of finance, it looks like Baidu wants to delist from Nasdaq, will that become a trend among Chinese companies? https://www.reuters.com/article/us-baidu-delisting-excusive/exclusive-baidu-considers-leaving-the-nasdaq-to-boost-its-valuation-sources-idUSKBN22X1HA?il=0
To me, the first two questions have answers that are intertwined. Regarding Hong Kong, the point that you make about "China does what suits China" is absolutely correct, but the twist is that the separate status of the City has allowed China access to Western financing. Whether the Chinese build a different port in the region in order to bypass Hong Kong skirts the larger financial issues. Perhaps the Chinese are more internally focused, and thus willing to forgo what Hong Kong has given China in the past, but in dropping the GDP target, I think even they can't fabricate their way out of poor economic performance from the Covid-19 shutdowns. Also, most governments around the world seem to be hesitant in making their next policies for emerging from two months or so of shutdowns, and the Chinese are no exception.
How is HK National Security Law playing out on the mainland?
Look no further than this viral WeChat essay by the Uber-popular Zhanhao account https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/AvINMDWATbjz6qi9u3BjFg
"看到这个消息，是不是非常酸爽？！晚上可以开瓶好酒，畅饮一把了!"
Thoughts on Article 4 which will allow central government to send own agents into Hong Kong to enforce the law?
"换句话说，就是香港做不好的，中央政府派出机构替他们做。只有这样，才能治那些不听中央指挥的坏人，占豪看到这一条是非常欣慰的。“
With that being said, the only room for public comment on HK from the mainland is triumphant crowing like this
It makes me sad how effective propaganda is.
and here is Chairman Rabbit 兔主席 国安法在香港：立法即无退路，关键在于执法 https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/ZBR3w0t6PXjaSeCvazOwlA
笔者对中美关系的看法是十分悲观的，短期内看不出好转的可能。寻求中美关系出现某个蜜月并就势解决香港问题的期望是脱离现实的，因此，既然关系不能更坏，现在确实可能是加强香港治权的好时机
Chairman Rabbit portrays Beijing's actions as driven by popular sentiment: "必须采取某种硬干预措施，这也是给广大国民的一个交代.", "2019年香港运动以来，中央必须有所姿态，必须采取行动，否则无法与国民交代", 等等.
As you quoted, "既然关系不能更坏“ they push through this law to satisfy nationalistic public with no further cost in global politics as US is in their view, impossible to please (中国政府如果不做什么“丧权辱国”的事情的话是不可能取悦美国的) ...
maybe in 2008,2012, or 2016 relations wouldn't be able to get worse, but in 2020? Don't know if Beijing (or Chairman Rabbit) has made the right analysis.
2. If they had been at all optimistic of their control of the virus, I think they would have issued a positive forecast of GDP. EIU in March put the forecast at +1%, with the assumption that “ After quarantines are lifted and people return to work, new outbreaks emerge in coastal regions, caused by international arrivals and returning migrant workers. Parts of these regions are quarantined. The rate of infection slows during the summer. Another wave of infection hits in winter 2020.” This implies a U-shaped recovery, particularly with slumping demand for Chinese exports. I take the absence of the forecast to mean they are not confident that the virus will be no worse and that there would be a greater area quarantined. Source: http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:y7iK6xumS0gJ:country.eiu.com/article.aspx%3Farticleid%3D1479229331%26Country%3DChina%26topic%3DEconomy%26subtopic%3DForecast%26subsubtopic%3DEconomic%2Bgrowth+&cd=15&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=safari
From Geopolitical Futures this morning: "The thing is, Beijing has been trying to move away from GDP targets for years anyway. They tend to create all sorts of skewed incentives for officials at the local and provincial levels to either lean on unproductive investment and misallocated capital to meet their marks or to cook the books altogether, leaving the central government blind to the emerging economic risks on the ground. Notably, Li also announced that Beijing would run a budget deficit of at least 3.6 percent of GDP and cut corporate taxes and fees by another 2.5 trillion yuan ($350 billion) in order to stimulate the economy. At the same time, though, he warned governments at all levels to tighten their belts. In other words, despite the unprecedented collapse of growth in China, Beijing still lives in crippling fear of the consequences of a reckless, 2008-style effort to save it."
As for Taiwan, leaving out ‘peaceful’ is part of a bigger shift. Austin Wang also pointed out it did not mention the 1992 Consensus, just as the Taiwanese Mainland Affairs Council Minister said in the Legislative Yuan that history has already turned the page on that. So I suppose we are moving towards a new vocabulary for the cross-Strait relation.
The movement on the Hong Kong question cannot be seen separately from that: Beijing may have given up on using it as a One Country, Two Systems showcase. It wants to pacify Hong Kong, for sure, but now both DPP and KMT have rejected OCTS for Taiwan, it may finally see that the Taiwanese will never accept it anyway. More worryingly is that the changes to the HK policy as well as the general trend of Chinese behaviour show Beijing cares less and less about international repercussions.
China is constrained on Taiwan by the fact that peaceful annexation would be easier, the risk and damage of any kind of effort failing, and international repercussions. On the first, Beijing may now judge it will have to move on Taiwan anyway or lose it forever. (I think it is already ‘lost’, but empirical reality is separate from perception.) As for the second point, its success in dealing with Covid-19 vis-à-vis the stark picture its propaganda paints of the US and ‘the West’ may have given many in the party-state system a confidence boost, so Beijing may now believe more strongly in its capacity to bring complicated endeavours to a good end. Thirdly, it seems to be caring less and less about its image. Its relation with the US is already burning anyway while more and more officials genuinely believe in China’s aggressive nationalism.
To maintain sobriety, it is important to shut down useless alarmist talk of imminent invasion. What we should look out for with Taiwan is China employing Russian tactics. Not too long ago, fishing boats took turns ramming a Taiwanese coast guard vessel of Kinmen. Kyodo News has reported the PLA might do an exercise in August practicing the capture of the Taiwan-controlled Pratas/Dongsha Islands. I expect more menacing behaviour towards Taiwan, trying to slowly win terrain salami-slice style.
1. LegCo 'election' will be fun. Internationally really means US; the admin will just use stock phrases by Pompeo, no real credibility under Trump. Curious how a Biden admin would do/say.
2. Guess we will have to see in 10 months whether it returns or not. But on the ground the talk is still 'industrial upgrade' which in most cases doesn't mean re-orientation towards consumption.
3. On Taiwan, hawks are on the ascendency, had to give ground at least in rhetoric. As in 2., military spending can come into play as part of counter-cyclical fiscal policy but anything more than a build-up is unlikely as costs of waging a real war remain prohibitively high (imagine the reactions on the markets when the banking system is still v fragile).
Hey Bill, is there any reason why you don't include any Taiwanese media in your daily?
I realize that most of it is CCP mouthpiece garbage, but not all of it is CCP mouthpiece garbage. The likes of Commonwealth, Liberty Times, and even (I'm gritting my teeth now) the Taiwan Apple Daily present a very different voice on the whole Taiwan thing than Reuters, Bloomberg, and SCMP could ever do. Not to mention the Central News Agency, which is obviously the Taiwanese government's propaganda department but somebody's got to do it, and they express the Taiwan viewpoint more accurately than Global Times, Xinwen, China Daily and etc. which couldn't give a rat's about Taiwan's viewpoint. Just a thought.
Taiwan s viewüpint is reflected in international press though. What s lacking is what precisely Sinocism does, presenting 'ccp garbage' (as u put it).
I dare say 'ccp garbage' has been more accurate about China than 'free and fair' international media over the years, decades. That that even needs to be said and argued about shows just how bizarre the way the world learns about China is...and then everyone acts surprised and indignant when they cant get China right.
Watch what they say and do, not what you hear from people who know what u want to hear say what they say and do. Simple.
Based on Beijing's national security legislation for HK, the small chance to sell 1C2S to Taiwan has gone from hard to impossible. At the end of the day the evidence says 1C2S now means 1C1S but possibly with a decade or so delay. Based on that, tough to see a scenario where Taiwan signs up for "Peaceful" joining with China. If there is a joining with Taiwan it isn't going to be peaceful, shotgun wedding would be the least warlike option. The change in wording reflects that acknowledgement?
On the Taiwan question...
I went back and looked at each 政府工作报告 given by Li Keqiang since he took office.
2020- 促进统一
2019- 推进祖国和平统一进程
2018- 推进祖国和平统一进程
2017- 坚定不移推动祖国和平统一进程
2016- no mention of 统一，"携手构建两岸命运共同体"
2015- 为实现祖国和平统一贡献力量
2014- 实现祖国和平统一大业贡献力量
2013- 在同心实现中华民族伟大复兴进程中完成祖国统一大业
2012- 为完成祖国统一大业
(In Wen Jiabao's last report he used 促进祖国和平统一的大政方针和各项政策)
So it seems that peaceful reunification was only used in 5 out of 9 reports.
Not sure what to make of it, but helpful to have the context for thread discussions
Probably reflects the mood of the moment, which now happens to be mandatory triumphalism.
Interested in any thoughts about the UK Government. Is the Sino-British agreement worth the paper it is written on? Does the UK realistically have any levers to pull on to push back on this?
The UK no longer has much say in the agreement they signed years ago, living up to its treaty of so many more years ago. UK has absolutely every obligation to stand up for the Hong Kong people but has failed to do so despite many opportunities. It does not have the military power, nor the financial power, nor the moral fibre to do what is right as HK faces another challenge to their dwindling freedom at the hands of the autocracy under which they find themselves controlled. I pray that the protests that shall come don’t cost the lives of the young, brilliant students who bravely face the foe in the streets. For those of us who love HK, this news is a potential disaster and should be debated in the United Nations. The USA can say what it may, but it too has lots its international leadership position as a result of its current Government and its lack of leadership.
There is realistically not that much that we can do to make the Chinese change their minds.
However, it is looking increasingly likely that UK government support for the “golden“ era in UK China relations is coming to a close. Witness to that is a leak from Downing Street saying that all Huawei infrastructure will be removed from British phone networks by 2023. If Trump is defeated (Please God…) this year as predicted by Oxford Economic’s who have a fairly good forecasting record, it should be likely that a US that is engaging more forcibly with the world will have a lot more willing allies than previously. It looks as if the new Cold War has begun.
Hong Kong was always a “borrowed place on borrowed time“ as the saying goes. Some of you may remember that at the time of the handover everyone thought that Hong Kong was finished. Will it be now? I wonder if there will be a free Internet in Hong Kong when the Law is brought into force.
Problem is with Britain is that we have far less international clout than we did even twenty years ago. The most we can do is make a few statements but the economic costs of active intervention would outweigh the impact we would actually have.
Indeed. £20bn trade deficit, during a pandemic, and in lead-up to Brexit would suggest they'll be big talk, little action
This is certainly the short-term reality. But medium-term there will be more fierce opposition lined up. The Brexiteering brigade should have learnt its operational mistakes 2016~now.
I have the same question as Jonah. "The Brexiteering brigade should have learnt its operational mistakes 2016~now" -- I don't understand what that means.
To be clear, I don't understand what that means in the context of the HK discussion.
Sorry for being cryptic. I meant that the anti-China movement will be better run than the Brexit project. I thought the Chinese Research Group is already more balanced than ERG. And there will be less Sinophilia than there has been Europhilia.
In what sense？
See my reply to Mike.
thanks
If China invaded Tawain in a week with military force, would that surprise you? I ask that tongue in cheek, but curious on what you all think.
*LAM SAYS DOESN'T EXPECT PROTESTS TO END AMID SECURITY LAW
Indeed, almost seems a counter-narrative
I’ll say I won’t expect a wave of protests as intense as last year’s. So many things have changed since then. Police have gained much experience on crowd management. Ban on public gatherings remains effective. Protestors are caught off guard by the short notice of National Security Law. Plus, legislative by way of promulgation won’t create many political opportunities for the opposition.
Every person who goes to the protest next Wednesday will be prepared to get arrested and/or fired from their job, or worse.
Thank you
My fear is that now people are too scared to protest and the whole resistance stops in its tracks (locally).
https://twitter.com/joshuawongcf/status/1263816869250621442?s=20
Do people think protests will ensue this weekend?
If so, will it be only HK hardliners (Josh Wong - the 1k) or the larger citizenry (the 1m)?
Most are focusing on Xi Jinping taking advantage of an opportunity while the world is distracted, but they give short shrift to the possibility that he is weak and threatened, a Mao style dictator without Mao's credibility. Xi's China is engaged in genocide, massive repression, extensive economic chicanery, and the destruction of the institutions that have helped the PRC to succeed in the wider world, namely Hong Kong. And what does Xi have to show for all this? The impending cutoff of trade and contact with the outside world. No, Xi is not a strong man, but a frightened one going for broke.
Alexander: Mainlanders haven't felt enough of the effect yet, other than the pervasive environment of fear that surrounds all genocidal totalitarians. It really shows how very little U.S. and likemindeds have done to impose costs on the PRC. Now that the truth of Xi's program is being exposed, that should change quickly.
In the global forum, this is true. But domestically, doesn't this play really well? Question all last summer from mainlanders was, "Why is central gov allowing HK to "monkey around" like this?"
HK is the Anschluss. Taiwan is Poland.
I'm not sure this analogy works very well (I appreciate you probably didn't intend to stretch it as far as I'm about to).
France and Britain had treaty obligations to Poland; the US does not vis a vis Taiwan. France and Britain declared war on Germany knowing it would not affect the invasion; I can only assume America would not intervene to defend Taiwan if they determine it is indefensible.
Annexing Austria was a material gain for Nazi Germany. I am not sure what vocabulary historians will use to describe what is about to happen to Hong Kong, but the city will be diminished in every way. Beijing seems prepared to pay this cost in exchange for ideological gain.
Trite and flimsy analogy/parallel has been the hallmark of Western analysis on Chicom/PRC. Hence the manifest failures over decades. There s little sign that it s changing. Latest, see fukuyama s wheeling out the tired Soviet model again. When in doubt, stick to what we know. It s a mental fetal position. it appeals to a childlike desire for security...hey if it s all parallel then we know the outcome...we win. Yey (with a weak shake of the fist)!
And here’s the 30k view of how they’re going to pull this off https://twitter.com/comparativist/status/1263700493836009472?s=21
I also went through Macau’s Article 23 NSL, which has been law for awhile. My biggest question/concern is whether it’ll be retroactive. Are they really going to ‘grandfather in’ the 7k people arrested last year, half of which will never go to court because the cases are weak
https://twitter.com/comparativist/status/1263775967832469504?s=21
You are probably quite right, that the CCP is on also the revenge path and quite possibly there may be retrospective application of the law. Since HK seems to be downgraded to "special economic zone", it is also quite clear that certain agencies will not be reporting to the local government. However, they won't do HK people the favour of big drama.
I’ve already written my worst case scenario version. Beijing’s new guy in HK appears to embrace the idea of “攬炒” laam chau.
https://twitter.com/comparativist/status/1263804945217642497?s=21
so grim
And then, what? Bomb Causeway Bay? HK is sovereign territory of China. That is the reality. Nothing will stop China from exercising its sovereignty over HK. Looking that the NPC documents, the new status of HK seems to be "special economic zone." A substantial downgrade.