For today’s open thread I have a six questions to seed a discussion but please weigh in with anything you want. I will be in and out throughout the day. Thanks
1. The Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) is, according to the Sydney Morning Herald, “conducting a sweeping investigation into allegations Chinese government agents have infiltrated the office of a NSW Labor politician to influence Australian politics”. How much worse might PRC-Australian relations get?
2. The EU-China summit does not appear to have gone as Xi hoped, and according to Politico “U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Thursday unexpectedly declared that the U.S. had accepted a proposal to create a new U.S.-EU dialogue on China that was put forward last week by the bloc's foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell”. How concerned should Xi be?
3. Will it matter in CCP elite politics when Jiang Zemin dies? If so, how? Or has Xi been mostly successful at rooting out Jiang supporters and influence in the Party and the PLA? Which other elders besides Jiang may still have meaningful influence on the CCP and the PLA?
4. Earlier this week US-National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien gave a very tough speech on the PRC and the CCP, in what he said was the first in a series of similar speeches US officials will be giving. I can not find the full transcript; it appears the speech was heavily influenced by John Garnaut and his views that are encapsulated in this talk Garnaut gave in 2017 - Engineers of the Soul: Ideology in Xi Jinping's China by John Garnaut.
“We had hoped that through our sincere trade negotiations China’s overall behavior would change. It became very clear to the American people with the Wuhan virus outbreak and China’s global response, that China is not going to change its behavior,” national security adviser Robert C. O’Brien told me in an interview. “The Chinese have weaponized covid, they are trying to take advantage of this crisis to displace the United States as the leading global power.”
On Wednesday, O’Brien gave a speech in Phoenix that was among the toughest anti-CCP speeches a senior U.S. official has given. O’Brien attacked the CCP’s character as well as its actions, in stark language that harks back to Cold War times.
“America, under President Trump’s leadership, has finally awoken to the threat the Chinese Communist Party’s actions pose to our way of life,” O’Brien said in his speech.
Here is the video of the speech:
Is this just political positioning for the 2020 election, or are we seeing the national security and domestic political streams merging in a way that means we are likely to see much more meaningful hardline policies from the Trump administration towards China over the next several months?
5. If Joe Biden wins the US election in November, how might he change some of the Trump Administration policies towards China?
6. What will Hong Kong look like the day after the National Security Law goes into effect, which could be as soon as next Thursday?
I think it's a much more appropriate question to ask: What would happen if something happens to 67 year old Xi, even if it would be some minor malaise that will keep him in bed for an extended amount of time, something very likely at that age.
To whom the power will go "on paper," and in reality? How much "reorganisation" can be done while Xi will be lying indisposed?
Would Li be able to seize reign without having guobao, CMC, organisational department on his side?
On Sino-Australian relations - lets remember the large overseas Chinese diaspora in Australia. How will the PRC look to ensure they do not feel alienated? Will they offer a HK - UK style attempt to bring Chinese nationals back? Or will they effectively excommunicate them if relations continue to deteriorate?
Moreover, it is possible that China may not actually care too much about its relations with Australia. As it has a large stranglehold on the world through the BRI, compounded by its overseas influence campaigns etc, having worse ties with any big nations may not matter because its already got what it needs and its rise to becoming a global super power by 2049 is well on track.
Even if it begins to repair relations through less overt or at least more covert subversion of its trading partners, the geo-political knock on effects from COVID 19 toward China's handling of the outbreak could do worse for PRC relations with any country, far more than any subversive activities could.
q6 As for how HK would turn out post-NSL, it's quite likely 2 things. First a few "bad apples" might be taken down as the showcase of its capabilities. These few will be handpicked very carefully (e.g. maybe some with real threat to HK society) as to not trigger a total revolt of HK. Second there can be large-scale national propaganda and education campaign. Post-NSL much older generations would just escape HK for good, so focus might be on "correcting" younger gens with "soft" power - they have less memory of pre-97 HK, some not happy about the struggle after entering society due to various reasons (e.g. sky high housing cost), and also generally more willing to accept new things. Imagine give them the power to rule HK and challenge the incumbent (more knowledgable people might comment on this).
On Australia-China, something is very weird in China’s foreign policy at the moment. I can’t remember a time since 1978 when China has allowed its relations to deteriorate with all countries. In the past if it was at loggerheads with one, it would cultivate the others. It’s a rule of thumb of the way the party plays its own internal politics. Now who is it on terms of trust with? Japan? South Korea? The US? The EU? ASEAN? Canada? India? Sweden? It has burnt up goodwill with all important and unimportant powers. Russia, Cambodia, Venezuela, North Korea, Pakistan, hardly seem a winning combination for furthering China’s economic or regional goals. Mr Nicholas may blame Australia, but if so, we’re in good company. China contra mundum? I doubt it’s in a position yet to stand alone and still further its ambitions.
I keep wondering if there’s something more fundamental awry within the party. The more emollient elements, the smooth barbarian-handlers from the youth league, the reformers, are all put to flight. To defeat the hardliners around Bo Xilai, Xi has had to be as tough as them. In a Marxist party which doesn’t acknowledge any legal limits on power, liberalising and rule of law seem doomed. The hardliners will always be as ruthless as necessary to get their way. Without any nuance in its conduct of international Affairs, China is likely to come a cropper. We should remember, China should remember, on the Thucydides trap that the ascendant power lost, defeated by a coalition of the rest.
Totally agree Peter - this is starting to have a similar flavor to Chinese foreign policy dysfunction during the cultural revolution when everyone had to prove their patriotism by attacking foreign criticism. Obviously it was much more intense in the late 60's with all but one ambassador being recalled... It's a completely different geopolitical environment, but I wonder if certain political currents that are setting the PRC up for a similar type of domestic purge. My guess is that high-level cadre are ok with a slow-burn purge as long as they don't get swept up in it, but (related to Q3) I think most party members are starting to realize that they are more vulnerable than anytime since the cultural revolution.
Even Pakistan is questionable as PM Imran Khan looks at the highway system built with Chinese loans, and wonders how they are going to be paid back, and what other problems will develop.
Jiang Zemin is apparently the only feasible figurehead should Xi fail. If he dies it will probably mean more difficulty for the intra-party opposition to organise. Think Zhu Rongji is still the leader of reformists and there’s no lack of League people.
As for PLA influencers, probably very few as we now see Wu Shengli being the latest to be culled.
1) It is a fascinating case study, and another example of Australia as the canary in the coal mine for Western powers faced with Xi's ultimatum of surrender of political sovereignty as the price for continued short-term profits with China (and medium-term tech theft and reduction to raw material supplier).
2) Not that concerned as long as Trump's president. More than "concerned" if Biden wins.
3) Great question and very interested to hear China insiders' take on this.
4) Impossible to say given Trump's erraticism. Excusing evil because of "the end of history", i.e. "engagement", is dead though.
5) Multilateralism/repairing Western alliances based on common values will be Biden's top foreign policy priority and the CCP fears that the most.
6) Like Mainland China, no? You'd love to see a years-long, heroic struggle by the overwhelming majority of the people there who don't accept the basic CCP principle of "I'm holding a gun to your head so why don't you just accept how great and benevolent what I'm offering you is", but it's unfair to expect that kind of sacrifice and instead I assume the secret police will make example of a few Democratic legislators, and maybe a few older/college students, by disappearing and torturing them into forced confessions, and everyone else will get the message and fall in line.
The Garnaut piece is excellent, but I think that Confucian soul engineering has been simply replaced by Xi soul engineering, and is just a continuum of Chinese totalitarianism. That the latest soul engineering has Stalinist roots makes it simply more virulent but in line with Chinese history.
#5 is an excellent question and begets a second question. Why hasn’t Biden come out with a clear policy stance on China?
Especially when doing so would probably net him votes (provided it was hardline). He could, for example, propose increasing the US industrial base at the expense of Chinese exports, which might help him in some swing states (PA specifically).
Either way, it’s been frustratingly difficult to find some good analysis how Biden would approach the relationship.
If I were to make an uneducated guess: trade war OUT (China happy) TPP IN (China sad), EU cooperation IN (China sad), Human Rights and HK IN (China livid)
Is there much margin for Biden in talking about China right now? It seems like he'd rather spend his time at the moment slamming POTUS over his vulnerabilities on the Floyd protests and the COVID response, which seems prudent. I expect that we'll hear more about China as we approach the election and the debates. I tend to agree with Bill that Biden can't simply remove tariffs while getting nothing in return, especially when those tariffs are now supported by large swathes of the US business community. As for TPP, I think it is still DOA with both progressive and conservative voters, so I'm also not going to hold my breath there.
Little to no daylight between Biden's and Trump's teams on their diagnosis about China. Ely Ratner was writing about China's ideological, illiberal challenge to US order back in 2006 (before it was cool).
Ratner is solid, but here's the problem. When he walks into the room and deals with China will we hear the words Climate Change or Labor rights and everything else gets the boot.
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And before everyone yells about Climate Change, maybe consider Podesta's first Trip on Climate Change and he rate of growth of China's coal power...
Much dimmer view on Biden team as they are unresponsive to all in HKG democracy movement as well as Uyhgurs. "Not taking meetings with foreigners"
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Ryan Hass comments on Taiwan on 20th were just awful. Openly saying they are giving Beijing veto again on Taiwan. Both DPP and KMT folks calling to confirm he really said it. He did.
I'm not super plugged into beltway chatter, but it seems to me that Biden's prospective Presidency will involve a defacto power-sharing arrangement a la Bush/Cheney. Especially given the issues surrounding Hunter Biden and some of Biden's past policy vis a vis China being controversial, it seems possible that the VP may be the face of his admin's China efforts similar to how Pence has been trotted out at different points. Therefore might the views of his VP also give insight into where the China efforts might go?
Whitmer, Abrams, Duckworth, Demings, and most of the also rans don't seem to have much to say about China up to this point, aside from condemning "China virus" statements and such.
Personally I think a Warren pick would send the strongest signal that countering China will be a priority for the Biden admin, but obviously that is just one factor in the choice for VP.
I agree. Warren is one of the few Democrats who outlined a foreign policy vis-à-vis China in their presidential campaign, and she seems to have a deep understanding of the trade-offs between short-term corporate profits vs. long-term prosperity in a civil society. When the Ukrainegate came out and the impeachment inquiry was announced, I thought she would have a decent chance of becoming the nominee. I am still clueless about why things have turned out the way they are right now in the Democratic Party.
Taiwan News piece by Huang Tzu-ti on 6/20 at 10;36 "What Trump re-election could mean for Taiwan". Sorry, having trouble linking.
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"...Joe Biden wins, he could seek to resume direct communications with Beijing, which reduces the chances of a mis-calculation on cross straits issues"... -also in area's of co-operation Hass discussed cancer research and energy. Nothing, nada,,, on arms sales.
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Sullivan comments at the FP Insider event were unsettling, but it's obvious the Biden team see's Taiwan in lesser light than Trump.
But there is everything in his tweet from 5/22 to demonstrate he wants HKG out of the way. His suggestion. Suspend HK's Special Economic Status, which effectively removes HK as a major issue for US. And he even says it in that "it will not escalate the dispute". Keep it confined.
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Other than the most radical demonstrators in HKG, no one wants the Special Economic Status cancelled. Those in US who want it cancelled have one goal. By cancelling it they reduce the issue as one of importance in US-China relations. Bury HKG and move along. Whether it's Asia Society, Chamber of Commerce, or CFR, Hong Kong is a troublesome issue that the pro-engagement community would like to get past.
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As for Taiwan, which is what he addresses here. I'd say our access to DPP decision makers is pretty solid. Haass is seen as pro-Beijing
Although my "access to DPP decision-makers" is non-existent, I don't see how cancelling HK's special economic status is either a partisan issue in the US or a signal of soft-on-China policy. It's an act of retaliation. A second Trump administration would be more likely to bargain it away than would a Biden administration.
The original point you made, however, was Taiwan. Lacking any special access, I tend to agree with the last paragraph of Christian's comment above that, apart from showing greater transparency (rhetoric vs. reality), a Biden Administration would de-escalate rhetoric and the trade war without fundamental change vis a vis Taiwan (support) and HK (strong disapproval). (And without personal pleas to Xi for help winning the next American election.)
Q1 PRC - Australian relations are on the highway to hell. China’s “barbarian management playbook” is perfectly unsuited to managing relations with Australia.
PRC diplomatic verbal bullying only provokes further righteous indignation amongst the public in Australia. This is powerful — everyone has to vote here. So any politician who makes a Pro PRC comment will/has been punished at the ballot box.
Australia for want of a better phase have feared the “yellow peril” since 1901. China when it threatens and acts on economic sanctions has reignited this deeply held fear. This will not end well for China. I think China has a short time to turn this around. I don’t envision they will. China will become Japan 1941 to Australia.
PRC influence operations in Australia are being constantly being exposed and politicians are losing their jobs (today was another one) and billionaires are being pilloried for voicing any favourable PRC comments.
This is toxic. China has created an actual adversary in Australia. Any voice of reason here has and will be tarred with the “pro communist China”.
The consequences - China will just assume a country of 20 million is unimportant. Australia will dog Chinese ambitions in the South Pacific. Australia will become the glue in the Japan-India-US-Australia anti China axis allowing these powerful countries who have their own problems with each other have one party they can always talk to. I think relations are that bad if the PRC gets kinetic with Taiwan Australia would support Taiwan.
Does it though? this casual observer sees a dangerous possibility that the pushback to the PRC will easily escalate to a point where it breaks the fundamental myths and ideologies the 5 eyes type countries build themselves upon, heck, is it even just a possibility in the days where if the Washington memorial gets burned down tomorrow it probably wouldn't be a huge shocker?
The actual domestic unrest in the US has all but subsided. I wouldn't make the mistake of reading too much into the actions of a few dozen anarchists toppling statues late at night due to local governments holding back police out of fear of bad national PR. In fact, I worry about the CCP doing exactly that and assuming that the US is near some kind of breaking point, when that couldn't be further from the truth. The last thing they should want to do right now is to make themselves a target for domestic American ire & produce any kind of "rally round the flag" effect, especially when COVID will already have dire effects on the American public's perception of China.
The key is the “fear” element of Thucydides. China is creating “fear” while being the second strongest. As a 7 year old niece explained to me that means you are the “first loser”. The fear is binding the 5 eyes together. China’s has the two movies problem. They think they are watching starship troopers, which is a great hero action go military sci fi romp. When actually it is an anti war, anti police state movie.
China’s verbal bullying, closed markets, asset purchases etc was only “allowed” as they were second. Now they might being going for first place. And we can all become American but we can’t become Chinese.
Hi Bill, My view of Sino-Australian relations is way worse than Mr. Neuweller assesses. Have watched the steady drumbeat of the China-haters in the Australian media increase as each day passes over the last six months, I believe the "decoupling" lobby will win out.
I believe Scott Morrison and his government believe that they can attack China and that if China shuts off trade with Australia they have other countries in the region who will take-up the slack. I think they believe India, Indonesia and Vietnam will absorb China's trade. It's a tragic mistake in my view.
What I'm seeing in watching what China will do is to reduce trade and investment in Australia to where only Chinese-owned enterprises —dairies and cotton to name two —in Australia will be the only commerce between the two countries by 2025. I read the smug comments by Australian politicians and the commentariat that "China needs us more than we need China." My view is if you think this the go fo it.
Recently, not only barley and processed meat have been shutdown, that this is not temporary as the government speculates and it will blow over in time, not that both have not been cut off totally but the big one is coal and the order has gone out from Beijing to no longer import Australian coal by 2021 and that since natural gas is being directly piped into China from Siberia that LNG sales from Australia is no longer of interest. While iron ore is the largest export and while Brazil is in the throes of the Coronavirus, the exports from there will pick up by 2022. China likes Brazil, being part of BRICS and in spite of Bosenaro.
The way I see China operates from countries that are hostile to it and this includes the US no matter what the trade agreements signed say, they will still buy commodities and goods they agreed to but the amount becomes less to where over time it reduces to so little that it just dies on the vine.
I watch the US soybean and grain purchases to China that it was supposed to be USD 30 bn but only three billion have been purchased. While China have been "assurances" to the USTR that they increase it is unlikely to make the agreed quota not this year and probably not the next. Coronavirus excuses notwithstanding.
As I am pretty long in the tooth these days, all I see is foolishness and manufactured disagreements and that we are cutting our nose off to spite our face. Australia is so intent on doing this that its passed the point where diplomacy now makes little difference. So it goes I'm my view.
You make some really great points, and by the looks of things you are very knowledgeable on the matter (fat more knowledgeable than myself. I must admit, I am an honours student still trying to figure things out)
I completely agree that Australia will look to further diversify their export markets to countries like India, Vietnam etc in the event that Australia and China truly ‘decouple’. I also think this will not be achievable, especially for smaller nations like Vietnam.
However, I am not convinced that Australia will actually pursue a full decoupling strategy. I just don’t see how Australia comes away from that without harming its economy and status as a bellwether in the region.
Again, your point on Brazil is very interesting. There may be a point in time when China pivots more toward Brazil for its resources and sees less value in Australia. If this were to happen, I believe it will not be Australia’s doing.
OP's phrasing of 'China-haters' to represent the rising tide of values-driven opposition to China's tactless attempts at 'diplomacy' with Australia, salami slicing in the SCS/ECS, and abhorrent campaigns of control in HK/XJ is telling.
Simply put, acquiescing into a diplomatic relationship akin to walking on a tightrope, where the stability of Australian exports is threatened every time an MP is forthcoming about any of the issues I mentioned above would be a bafflingly bad idea. Act like a vassal state, get treated like a vassal state.
China has a myriad of endemic problems, on top of bracing itself for a multilateral Indo-Pacific middle-power resistance against China with the support of the US.
Worst-case scenario? There is only so much self-inflicted economic harm re: changing where they get their commodities from that they'll be willing to take in the short-medium term. Australia will hurt, but there will be time to adjust.
That said, I agree with you Julian that, as a matter of strategy, there is 0 chance that 'decoupling' is pursued.
Final thought: What will a post-Xi China look like? If BRI fails, 2025 Made in/for China isn't achieved, if over-leveraged SOEs collapse and lead to mass unemployment, what then? Will Australia have a more flexible/amenable China to deal with?
The 18th CCP Politburo (2012-2017) with reference to Table 1 still shows around 6 members likely tied to Jiang Zemin. Looking at Table 2 depicting the 19th Politburo (2017-2022), all the previous names were either purged or retired. The only remaining member of the Politburo with likely allegiance to Jiang Zemin is Guo Shengkun.
It seems Xi is getting more and more control of the top political circles and the PLA. However, his way of gaining control also causes new splitting or disagreement among Chinese people, which is dangerous for the nation.
As for the question whether it matters when Jiang dies, my opinion is it doesn't matter much as the party leaders since Deng have learnt not using harsh purge of political opponents to ensure the stability of the country. The way China behaves nowadays seems from a well-designed path from Deng to Jiang to Hu and Xi. Politically they all fundamentally agree with each other.
Ad 2. EU is like a glacier. You can't see it moving and it's seems passive and immobilize, but it's constantly on the move, you can't stop it and over the time it will entirely change the landscape. PRC misinterprets current crisis as business as usual (blah, blah, human rights, blah, blah, reciprocity, blah, blah...), but mental change in EU towards PRC (and also partially towards US) is happening now. Relations with PRC will go south - just like a glacier. With US? All depends on US elections. I don't think majority of EU can stand another 4 years of DT.
HK: well, the probable outcome in the not so long term is that we will have domestic terrorism for real in HK, and it'll basically be Northern Ireland for awhile. immigration out of HK have always been high anyway, with several major waves, so we'll have a lot of the current residents leaving one direction or another and taken over by a new generation which might shape things pretty differently.
And this current generation will grow old and there will always be a next generation, one of the most fundamental problem almost everyone has is to assume they're young forever and current trend is infinite
Hi Everyone, here is a short comment from me on Bill's nb.2. I recently asked the EC to share more details on von der Leyen's words targeting China for cyberattacks against hospitals (and others), and spreading disinformation.
Hi Bill, I’m going to take a stab at the first question. I am an Australian and the Australian public’s sentiment toward China is currently the worst I have ever seen. This has been shown with the survey conducted by the Lowy Institute earlier this week.
I don’t see PRC-Australia relations deteriorating to that of US-PRC relations. Australia is largely dependent on China in terms of mining exports, tourism and education. However I think Australia is rightfully pushing the line with China to see how far they can take it, asserting to to China that Australia is It’s own established nation with its own interests in the region. Australia is a country that advocates multilateralism and cooperation, and obviously wants to cooperate with China. Yet, Australia also will pursue and follow through with certain things that are for the nations best interests.
Australia is the canary in the coal mine. I think the CCP would dearly love to wrench the Five Eyes apart, and they are starting with Australia. I feel that if Biden gets elected he will act to reestablish America's alliances the Trump has trashed. Which makes question 2 interesting.
* China’s cyber attacks have been directed at Australia’s military secrets under the cover of broader commercial and government attacks. They will escalate these. Australia calling these out makes no difference to China. The CCP has no shame.
* Deliberate attempts will be made to isolate Australia from its neighbours. Good relations will be offered to NZ to provide a contrast. The usual bribes will be offered to pacific islands as part of OBOR.
* I hope all of my Australian friends are safe in China. Be vigilant. After the sudden decision to execute a convicted Australian drug dealer, more examples will be made.
* How will this end? Australia will need to raise its military preparedness.
* I would not want to be an Australian business with significant China exposure right now. Wine, coal, iron ore, seafood, universities, tourism. All will need to find new customers quickly.
Do you have much choice? If China is willing to throw its weight around at this stage over issues which are so clear-cut and feature such broad global support, surely as they become more powerful they'll only be more eager to do so even more forcefully on increasingly trivial issues.
> Which other elders besides Jiang may still have meaningful influence on the CCP and the PLA?
The one that brought Xi into power, of course! The "Korean," Zhang Dejiang
I think it's a much more appropriate question to ask: What would happen if something happens to 67 year old Xi, even if it would be some minor malaise that will keep him in bed for an extended amount of time, something very likely at that age.
To whom the power will go "on paper," and in reality? How much "reorganisation" can be done while Xi will be lying indisposed?
Would Li be able to seize reign without having guobao, CMC, organisational department on his side?
On Sino-Australian relations - lets remember the large overseas Chinese diaspora in Australia. How will the PRC look to ensure they do not feel alienated? Will they offer a HK - UK style attempt to bring Chinese nationals back? Or will they effectively excommunicate them if relations continue to deteriorate?
Moreover, it is possible that China may not actually care too much about its relations with Australia. As it has a large stranglehold on the world through the BRI, compounded by its overseas influence campaigns etc, having worse ties with any big nations may not matter because its already got what it needs and its rise to becoming a global super power by 2049 is well on track.
Even if it begins to repair relations through less overt or at least more covert subversion of its trading partners, the geo-political knock on effects from COVID 19 toward China's handling of the outbreak could do worse for PRC relations with any country, far more than any subversive activities could.
Re: q.1 BJ sanctioning Australia for misbehaving? Sooo mean. Wherever did they learn such bully tricks?
q6 As for how HK would turn out post-NSL, it's quite likely 2 things. First a few "bad apples" might be taken down as the showcase of its capabilities. These few will be handpicked very carefully (e.g. maybe some with real threat to HK society) as to not trigger a total revolt of HK. Second there can be large-scale national propaganda and education campaign. Post-NSL much older generations would just escape HK for good, so focus might be on "correcting" younger gens with "soft" power - they have less memory of pre-97 HK, some not happy about the struggle after entering society due to various reasons (e.g. sky high housing cost), and also generally more willing to accept new things. Imagine give them the power to rule HK and challenge the incumbent (more knowledgable people might comment on this).
On Australia-China, something is very weird in China’s foreign policy at the moment. I can’t remember a time since 1978 when China has allowed its relations to deteriorate with all countries. In the past if it was at loggerheads with one, it would cultivate the others. It’s a rule of thumb of the way the party plays its own internal politics. Now who is it on terms of trust with? Japan? South Korea? The US? The EU? ASEAN? Canada? India? Sweden? It has burnt up goodwill with all important and unimportant powers. Russia, Cambodia, Venezuela, North Korea, Pakistan, hardly seem a winning combination for furthering China’s economic or regional goals. Mr Nicholas may blame Australia, but if so, we’re in good company. China contra mundum? I doubt it’s in a position yet to stand alone and still further its ambitions.
I keep wondering if there’s something more fundamental awry within the party. The more emollient elements, the smooth barbarian-handlers from the youth league, the reformers, are all put to flight. To defeat the hardliners around Bo Xilai, Xi has had to be as tough as them. In a Marxist party which doesn’t acknowledge any legal limits on power, liberalising and rule of law seem doomed. The hardliners will always be as ruthless as necessary to get their way. Without any nuance in its conduct of international Affairs, China is likely to come a cropper. We should remember, China should remember, on the Thucydides trap that the ascendant power lost, defeated by a coalition of the rest.
Totally agree Peter - this is starting to have a similar flavor to Chinese foreign policy dysfunction during the cultural revolution when everyone had to prove their patriotism by attacking foreign criticism. Obviously it was much more intense in the late 60's with all but one ambassador being recalled... It's a completely different geopolitical environment, but I wonder if certain political currents that are setting the PRC up for a similar type of domestic purge. My guess is that high-level cadre are ok with a slow-burn purge as long as they don't get swept up in it, but (related to Q3) I think most party members are starting to realize that they are more vulnerable than anytime since the cultural revolution.
Even Pakistan is questionable as PM Imran Khan looks at the highway system built with Chinese loans, and wonders how they are going to be paid back, and what other problems will develop.
Robert O'Brien's speech.. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/chinese-communist-partys-ideology-global-ambitions/
Jiang Zemin is apparently the only feasible figurehead should Xi fail. If he dies it will probably mean more difficulty for the intra-party opposition to organise. Think Zhu Rongji is still the leader of reformists and there’s no lack of League people.
As for PLA influencers, probably very few as we now see Wu Shengli being the latest to be culled.
1) It is a fascinating case study, and another example of Australia as the canary in the coal mine for Western powers faced with Xi's ultimatum of surrender of political sovereignty as the price for continued short-term profits with China (and medium-term tech theft and reduction to raw material supplier).
2) Not that concerned as long as Trump's president. More than "concerned" if Biden wins.
3) Great question and very interested to hear China insiders' take on this.
4) Impossible to say given Trump's erraticism. Excusing evil because of "the end of history", i.e. "engagement", is dead though.
5) Multilateralism/repairing Western alliances based on common values will be Biden's top foreign policy priority and the CCP fears that the most.
6) Like Mainland China, no? You'd love to see a years-long, heroic struggle by the overwhelming majority of the people there who don't accept the basic CCP principle of "I'm holding a gun to your head so why don't you just accept how great and benevolent what I'm offering you is", but it's unfair to expect that kind of sacrifice and instead I assume the secret police will make example of a few Democratic legislators, and maybe a few older/college students, by disappearing and torturing them into forced confessions, and everyone else will get the message and fall in line.
The Garnaut piece is excellent, but I think that Confucian soul engineering has been simply replaced by Xi soul engineering, and is just a continuum of Chinese totalitarianism. That the latest soul engineering has Stalinist roots makes it simply more virulent but in line with Chinese history.
#5 is an excellent question and begets a second question. Why hasn’t Biden come out with a clear policy stance on China?
Especially when doing so would probably net him votes (provided it was hardline). He could, for example, propose increasing the US industrial base at the expense of Chinese exports, which might help him in some swing states (PA specifically).
Either way, it’s been frustratingly difficult to find some good analysis how Biden would approach the relationship.
If I were to make an uneducated guess: trade war OUT (China happy) TPP IN (China sad), EU cooperation IN (China sad), Human Rights and HK IN (China livid)
Is there much margin for Biden in talking about China right now? It seems like he'd rather spend his time at the moment slamming POTUS over his vulnerabilities on the Floyd protests and the COVID response, which seems prudent. I expect that we'll hear more about China as we approach the election and the debates. I tend to agree with Bill that Biden can't simply remove tariffs while getting nothing in return, especially when those tariffs are now supported by large swathes of the US business community. As for TPP, I think it is still DOA with both progressive and conservative voters, so I'm also not going to hold my breath there.
Little to no daylight between Biden's and Trump's teams on their diagnosis about China. Ely Ratner was writing about China's ideological, illiberal challenge to US order back in 2006 (before it was cool).
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/2/chinas-illiberal-challenge/
Biggest difference would be multilateralism, but will take vigilance from Biden team to make sure that actually sharpens, not defangs, US pressure.
Ratner is solid, but here's the problem. When he walks into the room and deals with China will we hear the words Climate Change or Labor rights and everything else gets the boot.
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And before everyone yells about Climate Change, maybe consider Podesta's first Trip on Climate Change and he rate of growth of China's coal power...
Much dimmer view on Biden team as they are unresponsive to all in HKG democracy movement as well as Uyhgurs. "Not taking meetings with foreigners"
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Ryan Hass comments on Taiwan on 20th were just awful. Openly saying they are giving Beijing veto again on Taiwan. Both DPP and KMT folks calling to confirm he really said it. He did.
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I'm not super plugged into beltway chatter, but it seems to me that Biden's prospective Presidency will involve a defacto power-sharing arrangement a la Bush/Cheney. Especially given the issues surrounding Hunter Biden and some of Biden's past policy vis a vis China being controversial, it seems possible that the VP may be the face of his admin's China efforts similar to how Pence has been trotted out at different points. Therefore might the views of his VP also give insight into where the China efforts might go?
Warren looks good: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/08/elizabeth-warren-could-be-even-tougher-than-trump-on-china-says-analyst.html
Harris not promising: https://uscnpm.org/2019/10/23/china-policy-profiles-senator-kamala-harris/
Tammy Baldwin has been involved in some China legislation: https://www.baldwin.senate.gov/press-releases/baldwin-protecting-rail-and-bus-manufacturing-from-china-threat
Whitmer, Abrams, Duckworth, Demings, and most of the also rans don't seem to have much to say about China up to this point, aside from condemning "China virus" statements and such.
Personally I think a Warren pick would send the strongest signal that countering China will be a priority for the Biden admin, but obviously that is just one factor in the choice for VP.
Correct on Warren... She is very solid on all things China,,,
I agree. Warren is one of the few Democrats who outlined a foreign policy vis-à-vis China in their presidential campaign, and she seems to have a deep understanding of the trade-offs between short-term corporate profits vs. long-term prosperity in a civil society. When the Ukrainegate came out and the impeachment inquiry was announced, I thought she would have a decent chance of becoming the nominee. I am still clueless about why things have turned out the way they are right now in the Democratic Party.
what were the 6.20 comments?
Taiwan News piece by Huang Tzu-ti on 6/20 at 10;36 "What Trump re-election could mean for Taiwan". Sorry, having trouble linking.
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"...Joe Biden wins, he could seek to resume direct communications with Beijing, which reduces the chances of a mis-calculation on cross straits issues"... -also in area's of co-operation Hass discussed cancer research and energy. Nothing, nada,,, on arms sales.
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Sullivan comments at the FP Insider event were unsettling, but it's obvious the Biden team see's Taiwan in lesser light than Trump.
There is nothing in this Hass column of 6/15 in the Taipai Times that suggests this interpretation.
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2020/06/15/2003738226
But there is everything in his tweet from 5/22 to demonstrate he wants HKG out of the way. His suggestion. Suspend HK's Special Economic Status, which effectively removes HK as a major issue for US. And he even says it in that "it will not escalate the dispute". Keep it confined.
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Other than the most radical demonstrators in HKG, no one wants the Special Economic Status cancelled. Those in US who want it cancelled have one goal. By cancelling it they reduce the issue as one of importance in US-China relations. Bury HKG and move along. Whether it's Asia Society, Chamber of Commerce, or CFR, Hong Kong is a troublesome issue that the pro-engagement community would like to get past.
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As for Taiwan, which is what he addresses here. I'd say our access to DPP decision makers is pretty solid. Haass is seen as pro-Beijing
Although my "access to DPP decision-makers" is non-existent, I don't see how cancelling HK's special economic status is either a partisan issue in the US or a signal of soft-on-China policy. It's an act of retaliation. A second Trump administration would be more likely to bargain it away than would a Biden administration.
The original point you made, however, was Taiwan. Lacking any special access, I tend to agree with the last paragraph of Christian's comment above that, apart from showing greater transparency (rhetoric vs. reality), a Biden Administration would de-escalate rhetoric and the trade war without fundamental change vis a vis Taiwan (support) and HK (strong disapproval). (And without personal pleas to Xi for help winning the next American election.)
Or is it that we are in the Thucydides Trap and regardless of the US president the “fear” China creates leads to the same destination?
Bill
Q1 PRC - Australian relations are on the highway to hell. China’s “barbarian management playbook” is perfectly unsuited to managing relations with Australia.
PRC diplomatic verbal bullying only provokes further righteous indignation amongst the public in Australia. This is powerful — everyone has to vote here. So any politician who makes a Pro PRC comment will/has been punished at the ballot box.
Australia for want of a better phase have feared the “yellow peril” since 1901. China when it threatens and acts on economic sanctions has reignited this deeply held fear. This will not end well for China. I think China has a short time to turn this around. I don’t envision they will. China will become Japan 1941 to Australia.
PRC influence operations in Australia are being constantly being exposed and politicians are losing their jobs (today was another one) and billionaires are being pilloried for voicing any favourable PRC comments.
This is toxic. China has created an actual adversary in Australia. Any voice of reason here has and will be tarred with the “pro communist China”.
The consequences - China will just assume a country of 20 million is unimportant. Australia will dog Chinese ambitions in the South Pacific. Australia will become the glue in the Japan-India-US-Australia anti China axis allowing these powerful countries who have their own problems with each other have one party they can always talk to. I think relations are that bad if the PRC gets kinetic with Taiwan Australia would support Taiwan.
Does it though? this casual observer sees a dangerous possibility that the pushback to the PRC will easily escalate to a point where it breaks the fundamental myths and ideologies the 5 eyes type countries build themselves upon, heck, is it even just a possibility in the days where if the Washington memorial gets burned down tomorrow it probably wouldn't be a huge shocker?
The actual domestic unrest in the US has all but subsided. I wouldn't make the mistake of reading too much into the actions of a few dozen anarchists toppling statues late at night due to local governments holding back police out of fear of bad national PR. In fact, I worry about the CCP doing exactly that and assuming that the US is near some kind of breaking point, when that couldn't be further from the truth. The last thing they should want to do right now is to make themselves a target for domestic American ire & produce any kind of "rally round the flag" effect, especially when COVID will already have dire effects on the American public's perception of China.
The key is the “fear” element of Thucydides. China is creating “fear” while being the second strongest. As a 7 year old niece explained to me that means you are the “first loser”. The fear is binding the 5 eyes together. China’s has the two movies problem. They think they are watching starship troopers, which is a great hero action go military sci fi romp. When actually it is an anti war, anti police state movie.
China’s verbal bullying, closed markets, asset purchases etc was only “allowed” as they were second. Now they might being going for first place. And we can all become American but we can’t become Chinese.
Hi Bill, My view of Sino-Australian relations is way worse than Mr. Neuweller assesses. Have watched the steady drumbeat of the China-haters in the Australian media increase as each day passes over the last six months, I believe the "decoupling" lobby will win out.
I believe Scott Morrison and his government believe that they can attack China and that if China shuts off trade with Australia they have other countries in the region who will take-up the slack. I think they believe India, Indonesia and Vietnam will absorb China's trade. It's a tragic mistake in my view.
What I'm seeing in watching what China will do is to reduce trade and investment in Australia to where only Chinese-owned enterprises —dairies and cotton to name two —in Australia will be the only commerce between the two countries by 2025. I read the smug comments by Australian politicians and the commentariat that "China needs us more than we need China." My view is if you think this the go fo it.
Recently, not only barley and processed meat have been shutdown, that this is not temporary as the government speculates and it will blow over in time, not that both have not been cut off totally but the big one is coal and the order has gone out from Beijing to no longer import Australian coal by 2021 and that since natural gas is being directly piped into China from Siberia that LNG sales from Australia is no longer of interest. While iron ore is the largest export and while Brazil is in the throes of the Coronavirus, the exports from there will pick up by 2022. China likes Brazil, being part of BRICS and in spite of Bosenaro.
The way I see China operates from countries that are hostile to it and this includes the US no matter what the trade agreements signed say, they will still buy commodities and goods they agreed to but the amount becomes less to where over time it reduces to so little that it just dies on the vine.
I watch the US soybean and grain purchases to China that it was supposed to be USD 30 bn but only three billion have been purchased. While China have been "assurances" to the USTR that they increase it is unlikely to make the agreed quota not this year and probably not the next. Coronavirus excuses notwithstanding.
As I am pretty long in the tooth these days, all I see is foolishness and manufactured disagreements and that we are cutting our nose off to spite our face. Australia is so intent on doing this that its passed the point where diplomacy now makes little difference. So it goes I'm my view.
Hi David,
You make some really great points, and by the looks of things you are very knowledgeable on the matter (fat more knowledgeable than myself. I must admit, I am an honours student still trying to figure things out)
I completely agree that Australia will look to further diversify their export markets to countries like India, Vietnam etc in the event that Australia and China truly ‘decouple’. I also think this will not be achievable, especially for smaller nations like Vietnam.
However, I am not convinced that Australia will actually pursue a full decoupling strategy. I just don’t see how Australia comes away from that without harming its economy and status as a bellwether in the region.
Again, your point on Brazil is very interesting. There may be a point in time when China pivots more toward Brazil for its resources and sees less value in Australia. If this were to happen, I believe it will not be Australia’s doing.
I'm late to the party, but ~
OP's phrasing of 'China-haters' to represent the rising tide of values-driven opposition to China's tactless attempts at 'diplomacy' with Australia, salami slicing in the SCS/ECS, and abhorrent campaigns of control in HK/XJ is telling.
Simply put, acquiescing into a diplomatic relationship akin to walking on a tightrope, where the stability of Australian exports is threatened every time an MP is forthcoming about any of the issues I mentioned above would be a bafflingly bad idea. Act like a vassal state, get treated like a vassal state.
China has a myriad of endemic problems, on top of bracing itself for a multilateral Indo-Pacific middle-power resistance against China with the support of the US.
Worst-case scenario? There is only so much self-inflicted economic harm re: changing where they get their commodities from that they'll be willing to take in the short-medium term. Australia will hurt, but there will be time to adjust.
That said, I agree with you Julian that, as a matter of strategy, there is 0 chance that 'decoupling' is pursued.
Final thought: What will a post-Xi China look like? If BRI fails, 2025 Made in/for China isn't achieved, if over-leveraged SOEs collapse and lead to mass unemployment, what then? Will Australia have a more flexible/amenable China to deal with?
With 3, I think it's best that I defer to Neil Thomas' recent analysis here: https://macropolo.org/analysis/the-ties-that-bind-xi-people-politburo/
The 18th CCP Politburo (2012-2017) with reference to Table 1 still shows around 6 members likely tied to Jiang Zemin. Looking at Table 2 depicting the 19th Politburo (2017-2022), all the previous names were either purged or retired. The only remaining member of the Politburo with likely allegiance to Jiang Zemin is Guo Shengkun.
It seems Xi is getting more and more control of the top political circles and the PLA. However, his way of gaining control also causes new splitting or disagreement among Chinese people, which is dangerous for the nation.
As for the question whether it matters when Jiang dies, my opinion is it doesn't matter much as the party leaders since Deng have learnt not using harsh purge of political opponents to ensure the stability of the country. The way China behaves nowadays seems from a well-designed path from Deng to Jiang to Hu and Xi. Politically they all fundamentally agree with each other.
Ad 2. EU is like a glacier. You can't see it moving and it's seems passive and immobilize, but it's constantly on the move, you can't stop it and over the time it will entirely change the landscape. PRC misinterprets current crisis as business as usual (blah, blah, human rights, blah, blah, reciprocity, blah, blah...), but mental change in EU towards PRC (and also partially towards US) is happening now. Relations with PRC will go south - just like a glacier. With US? All depends on US elections. I don't think majority of EU can stand another 4 years of DT.
HK: well, the probable outcome in the not so long term is that we will have domestic terrorism for real in HK, and it'll basically be Northern Ireland for awhile. immigration out of HK have always been high anyway, with several major waves, so we'll have a lot of the current residents leaving one direction or another and taken over by a new generation which might shape things pretty differently.
The new generation is far more hardline in resistance to old generation. something even folks in their 40's learned since 2019
And this current generation will grow old and there will always be a next generation, one of the most fundamental problem almost everyone has is to assume they're young forever and current trend is infinite
Hi Everyone, here is a short comment from me on Bill's nb.2. I recently asked the EC to share more details on von der Leyen's words targeting China for cyberattacks against hospitals (and others), and spreading disinformation.
Here is their answer:
1: (Cyberattacks)
We will not divulge information on security incidents. We would, however, refer you to the Declaration of the High Representative on behalf of the EU, issued on 30 April, on malicious cyber activities exploiting the coronavirus pandemic ( https://www.consilium.europa.eu/hu/press/press-releases/2020/04/30/declaration-by-the-high-representative-josep-borrell-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-malicious-cyber-activities-exploiting-the-coronavirus-pandemic/). - link in Hungarian...
2: (Disinformation)
https://euvsdisinfo.eu/eeas-special-report-update-short-assessment-of-narratives-and-disinformation-around-the-covid19-pandemic-updated-23-april-18-may/
Hope it helps, it did not help me tough... Wondering why Xinhua and Global Times articles are considered as disinformation campaigns against the EU.
Happy to read your comments.
Best,
Viktor
I think u r trying to do proper analysis. But most people just want to do politics...
Hi Bill, I’m going to take a stab at the first question. I am an Australian and the Australian public’s sentiment toward China is currently the worst I have ever seen. This has been shown with the survey conducted by the Lowy Institute earlier this week.
I don’t see PRC-Australia relations deteriorating to that of US-PRC relations. Australia is largely dependent on China in terms of mining exports, tourism and education. However I think Australia is rightfully pushing the line with China to see how far they can take it, asserting to to China that Australia is It’s own established nation with its own interests in the region. Australia is a country that advocates multilateralism and cooperation, and obviously wants to cooperate with China. Yet, Australia also will pursue and follow through with certain things that are for the nations best interests.
Australia is the canary in the coal mine. I think the CCP would dearly love to wrench the Five Eyes apart, and they are starting with Australia. I feel that if Biden gets elected he will act to reestablish America's alliances the Trump has trashed. Which makes question 2 interesting.
* China’s cyber attacks have been directed at Australia’s military secrets under the cover of broader commercial and government attacks. They will escalate these. Australia calling these out makes no difference to China. The CCP has no shame.
* Deliberate attempts will be made to isolate Australia from its neighbours. Good relations will be offered to NZ to provide a contrast. The usual bribes will be offered to pacific islands as part of OBOR.
* I hope all of my Australian friends are safe in China. Be vigilant. After the sudden decision to execute a convicted Australian drug dealer, more examples will be made.
* How will this end? Australia will need to raise its military preparedness.
* I would not want to be an Australian business with significant China exposure right now. Wine, coal, iron ore, seafood, universities, tourism. All will need to find new customers quickly.
I have a bad feeling it’s back to the 1980’s Australian economy for us.
Do you have much choice? If China is willing to throw its weight around at this stage over issues which are so clear-cut and feature such broad global support, surely as they become more powerful they'll only be more eager to do so even more forcefully on increasingly trivial issues.
You sell commodities. China needs what Oz has.