Three questions that I am interested in, but feel free to weigh in with anything:
What are some of the concrete measures the leadership will enact to guarantee the “6 ensures” - ensure employment 保居民就业; ensure basic livelihood 保基本民生; ensure market entities 保市场主体; ensure food and energy security 保粮食能源安全; ensure stability of the supply chain 保产业链供应链稳定; ensure functioning of grassroots institutions 保基层运转 (确保基层政府保基本民生、保工资、保运转)?;
How can the US Presidential candidates talk about the PRC and criticize each other’s PRC policies without inflaming racism?;
The rumors are flying on the Chinese Internet about Kim Jung Un, down to details like the North Korean doctor inserting the stent screwed up because his hands were shaking so badly, and that the PRC medical team arrived “8 minutes too late”. So far there is no confirmation Kim is dead or incapacitated, and there have been crazy rumors about the Kims many times over the years. But in the event that this time they are mostly correct, what would his demise mean for the PRC?
A school in Shenzhen just had an outbreak. We (educators) are all holding out breath (some literally) that there won't be another outbreak in other schools. Domestic divisions are furiously trying to make up lost ground to prep their students for the gaokao. Now that we are back at school, the Matthew effect in widespread online education is clearer. Wealthier, more disciplined students absolutely have made more progress than their less affluent, less attentive classmates. I don't have data on that yet, but maybe after the next college app cycle I will. Be well everyone!
Related to #3, I spent a lot of time in NE China (Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Jilin) and I think some special attention needs to be paid to that region given the confluence of events that is occuring there.
1) Harbin lockdown: Capitol city locked down in addition to several border cities due to COVID 19 returnees from Russia. Word on the ground that I am hearing is that this area is now hosting a second wave outbreak.
2) NK instability: Dongbei region is always preoccupied with NK events. Refugee crisis, nuke tests, and I think there is a COVID 19 concern here as well as no one has ever made a good determination as to the extent of the NK infections. Hell, KJU could have died from COVID for all we know.
3) Economic crisis: Dongbei has been an economic basket case for years now, and propping up failing SOEs to preserve jobs in this region was already a drain on the central government's balance sheet. This is the region where cracks were already showing, what possible hope is there for any improvement under current circumstances and will this be where the "ensures" are tested first?
Regarding succession, KJU's rise to power was held together with duct tape, and it is hardly consolidated. I can't see any smooth transition at this point. China really has a lot of balls in the air and I'm not sure that they are going to get a good outcome out of this situation even if they might have been able to exercise influence during normal times.
My hot take: NE China/Korean peninsula is extremely volatile right now, approaching Fall 2017 levels.
We should probably worry far more about the other extreme of #2, what if Trump takes the racism to extreme and wins, and all the inevitable shit that might come after, what if in 2021 there literally is a lynching mob of Chinese and Asian Americans roaming around
Hello Bill, Thanks for this thread. I would like to raise a couple of Qs to you and our friends here. 1. What is the employment scene in the mainland like, right now? I saw some videos of some factory owners setting their factories on fire due to the dried up orders and lack of working capital. 2. Any informed guesses on how much steel and Aluminium China would produce this FY? We in India are looking at a contradiction of at least 10% in steel production (15% if the shutdown gets extended). Thank you.
On #2, I'd like to think it's not THAT complicated--make clear that who you are talking about is "the Chinese government" as most American obviously don't know what the CCP is, that the Chinese government is entirely separate from "Chinese people" and most specifically Chinese-Americans, and then criticize the Chinese government in the strongest possible terms for its threat to American and allied national security, and to freedom and decency-loving people everywhere, and for all the many horrible actions it's taking of which we all can name myriad (and which political people need to frame very clearly and relatable, specifically stop using "rules-based international order" and be much more specific). And say in no uncertain terms that unlike the Chinese government, America is based on values/principles, not ethnicity, anyone can be an American, and that Chinese-Americans are loyal Americans (while being clear-eyed about the fact that many recent Mainland immigrants are to an extent brainwashed by CCP propaganda and we need to keep a close eye on those doing media influence operations or outright intelligence work especially in high-tech areas and academia, but not going overboard because since they're here, they have an interest in not being outright anti-American--especially since we're so strong in comparison to a place like Australia--their kids will end up being Americanized and it's fine. Still need to do something about WeChat though).
Hi Bill, on #1, I'm sure you're familiar with the work of Michael Pettis, I've always been curious why he is not more widely cited among China hands in general as opposed to just a certain section of macroeconomic people. When judging between experts when they disagree, I think in general what we (people trying to be informed citizens) do is look at what each side says, then look at each's counterarguments, and when you find one side has detailed and reasonable seeming explanations as to why their opponents' arguments are incorrect, and their opponents either regurgitate their original ones or else get mad, you can be pretty sure the first person is correct. Certainly that's been my impression from Pettis. Given that (lengthy, sorry) framing, it would seem that given Xi's core interest is ensuring the absolute political dominance of himself and the 100 or 300 or however many (you would know better than almost any Westerner) families who control China, and that political dominance ultimately flows from ensuring their absolute economic privilege (so they all stay rich and hence loyal) and intoxicating ability to live entirely above the law, any dramatic rebalancing measure is off the table. In other words, any economic policy will fundamentally not solve their problem (far too much unproductive investment as opposed to consumption) because it will not transfer money from the rich and politically powerful government sector to the completely powerless private sector/households, but rather will dance around the problem with "supply side" reforms or lower interest rates or whatever. Do you agree with this general fundamental framing (which I believe is Pettis's)?
2) In general, it’s important to focus on the actions and characteristics of the PRC government, political system, and political leaders which shock the conscience, are harmful to U.S. interests, and interests of PRC citizens themselves, rather than resort to the lazy shorthand “China this, China that.” The PRC’s coronavirus response is a good case study, but (especially given how sick everyone must be of hearing coronavirus news), must be universalized: on the one hand, it provides a nice parallel with how incompetent the current administration’s response has been; on the other, it undermines the narrative that the CCP are hyper-efficient bureaucrats who are running laps around the U.S. paper tiger. Moreover, the point that should really be emphasized is how the CCP’s neurotic impulse for controlling information is actively harmful to U.S. interests and ordinary Chinese people—and that should be part of a broader narrative, of which multiple examples abound, rather than, again, resorting to lazy and childish slogans like “China virus” or “CCP virus.” One problem is, Biden can’t remember that level of detail, nor can he articulate that level of nuance—and his China policy is an incoherent mess. If Biden wanted to avoid charges of xenophobia, he’d be criticizing Trump’s travel and immigration bans, not calling them leaky sieves.
If I were advising the Trump campaign, frankly, I would really lean into the “Communist” part of CCP, and use that to smear the U.S. left writ large. On top of that, Trump could easily characterize Biden’s China policy as incoherent and weak—who voted for MFN status? What was the Obama admin doing while China was building islands in the SCS? What was Obama doing in cyber or intellectual property theft—more ineffectual negotiations? I personally think some of those charges would be a little harsh on Obama-Biden, but its hard for me to see how Biden can win on a China debate.
WRT the question about the importance of not opening up to charges of racist incitement, I post a link to news reporting about an incident that should serve as a cautionary tale, but also as a "how to" primer on the way to respond when someone goes off the rails:
Kathleen Harris, Conservatives blast MP who asked whether top pandemic doctor 'works for China' as Scheer steers clear:Party leader refuses to comment on Derek Sloan's words, says it's up to him to explain them, CBC News, Posted: Apr 23, 2020 2:24 PM ET | Last Updated: 34 minutes ago
In a nutshell, most political actors in Ottawa were swift in their condemnation of the comments from the Conservative Party backbencher, who had accused Theresa Tam, Canada's top unelected public health official, of working for China and the WHO.
I meant to write "not opening oneself up to charges of racist incitement". I probably should have been clear, as well, that the 'onself' in question would be politicians and other public figures.
Does anyone know what Mitt Romney was talking about in yesterday’s WashPost oped where he wrote “A Chinese conglomerate acquired a dominant Indonesian stainless steel company…suddenly, Indonesia has agreed to shut off nickel exports to any of China’s foreign competitors”. Following that story over the years, my understanding is just the opposite: China pioneered nickel pig-iron (NPI) as a new technology to use low-grade Indonesia local ore, Indonesia then forced investment into local value-added processing by banning those ore exports (with several years advance notice), a private Chinese company called Tsingshan invested heavily in a new plant in Indonesia, and then China (along with the US and EU) actually put anti-dumping duties on Tsingshan’s Indonesia new low-cost stainless exports. Meanwhile, Chinese NPI producers are now struggling without Indonesia nickel ore exports.
Indonesia tries to be more than just a resource slave. It wants more added value of raw materials to occur inside Indonesia. That has been valid policy for many years and did not come out of the blue. It does not only apply to nickel and copper.
Chinese stainless steel manufacturer Tsingshan Holdings began a production of stainless steel slabs in Indonesia, exactly in line with what the Indonesian government wants to achieve. These slabs would be exported to Tsingshan's rolling mills in China and rolled to plates, coils and sheets.
Tsingshan's main competitor is state-owned stainless steel behemoth Taiyuan Iron & Steel Co "TISCO", who applied to the PRC government to investigate dumping of foreign stainless steel in China. Naturally PRC government has complied and now China has - among others - also antidumping in place against one of their own, producing abroad.
The "going out" (investing in production abroad) policy of the central government for the Chinese steel industry is still in place, but of course Chinese steel mill look at the a.m. with bewilderment.
I can just point you in a direction. The Indonesian government banned the export of metal concentrates some years ago, with the goal of building up Indonesian industry. The rest, it would appear, follows from your thinking.
3. The reason the Korean peninsula has been relatively stable for so long is that the rough status quo of a divided Korea has always been the preferred choice for all the major actors. For Beijing: keeps the Koreans divided and provides a buffer state between it and the ROK/US military. For Washington: a rationale (and a reliable space that pays for most of the presence!) to keep a large number of troops and military equipment in East Asia. For Pyongyang: a guarantee of regime survival. For Seoul: no need to figure out how to integrate a malnourished, economically backward, and ideologically contaminated North into the South's vibrant economy and society. Everybody wins (with the exception of the poor souls in North Korea prison camps or who are at risk of starvation every year...).
KJU's death will only cause a change if the succeeding faction cannot seize sufficient power to maintain control over the North. Without a stable North, the balance of interests between the actors starts to fall apart and the potential for conflict becomes very real as suddenly everybody's interests are at stake all at once. In that event I would expect to see both Beijing (more openly) and Seoul (less openly) work to shore up the North's stability be it with direct financial and resource aid but even possibly with some forms of military/security assistance.
I agree with most of what you have written, although the US has other places for troops/equipment in the Far East, like Okinawa. The bigger danger is inside North Korea, where there is no "Kim" to be the next dictator, so the risk of a fight for power spilling out of the country would be extreme.
When I think about a fight for power spilling out of North Korea, mostly I think of refugees trying to get out of the way of a factional fight, and the Chinese having to intervene, not anything associated with South Korea or anybody in the West or Japan.
In those days, everyone knew there was a strong hand behind the regime. With no Kim male older than 10, and female family figures in line, I don't believe that in misogynist North Korea, other leading figures will accept a female leader.
There are few places in the Indo Pacific where the US military can forward base in large numbers and train and exercise for conventional warfare as well as South Korea. Okinawa is relatively small and already quite full with a military presence that is not nearly as welcomed by the locals as on the peninsula.
I agree, but if the South Koreans were willing to try to absorb the North, and I believe they balked at that in the 1990s, then if I were president of the US, it would be one of the trade-offs that I would be willing to make with the Chinese--de-militarize the Korean peninsula in exchange for something in the South China Sea.
China hasn't had a good grip on all things North Korea since XJP came to power. Even after XJP finally decided to recognise KJU's existence, China's access may still be as limited as everybody else's. If there is a problem with KJU, gravely ill, dead or otherwise decapacitated, China may want to use the opportunity to re-gain access and a degree of control in DPRK. For this it would be important not to bet on the wrong horse, if there should be a horse race going on right now. As far as I read, China's MFA has neither confirmed nor denied knowledge of the matter, while everybody else uses terms like "believe", "think", "hope".
Racism is an evil you have to take a clear line on consistently. If you've done that, you can approach a sensitive issue from a position of moral clarity. The CCP would love nothing more than for criticism of it to be taken as racism. I would point out there is a similar issue with Israel and antisemitism. In both cases, the racism is real and it is incumbent upon all decent people to reject it. It is possible that some will take political criticism as a cue for their own racism, causing leftist scolds and nationalist trolls to howl in indignation. You can't help that, and frankly the problem belongs to them, not to the person making honest commentary.
I was actually surprised to learn that Pres. Trump's "China virus" tirade was provoked by PRC lying and not the other way around. It's a bad way to put it precisely because it inflames the racists, but an honest person *might* have said that in response to the PRC. However, because Trump has not established a clear line on racism, it's very difficult for him to show he wasn't deliberately stoking it.
"CCP virus," on the other hand, seems fine. The only thing is I can't tell whether it refers to a pathogen or to a corrupting political organization.
Depends what you mean by "origin." Bats have a ton of viruses, but a massive and growing pile of evidence shows the CCP cover-up (and possibly initial negligence and ongoing malicious intent) encouraged the spread of this one. I have no problem with "SARS-CoV-2," except that WHO seems to have given the PRC special deference throughout the process.
I prefer Laurie Garrett's interpretation – damning of responses in both US and China, but steering clear of what are, in my view, unsubstantiated claims about China intentionally spreading the virus. Unless you subscribe to such conspiracy theories (I use that term not because they couldn't be true, but because there is no good proof that they are), I'd stick with SARS-CoV-2 as you've used above: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/15/coronavirus-xi-jinping-chinas-incompetence-endangered-the-world/
I have studied Kim’s health for some time, and given his positive family history of sudden cardiac death and stroke, as well as his smoking, his hypothetical risks are high. These can be studied using AstroCharm, a risk calculator developed by NASA and my UTSW colleague Dr Amit Khera. It allows for hypothetical predictions of a fatal/non-fatal cardiac or stroke event in the next 10 yrs. The hypothetical numbers for Kim are high, greater than 30%. It’s possible that Kim had unstable angina, requiring a cardiac cath, and a subsequent stent(s). This is a safe procedure and recovery is expected. If he doesn’t quit smoking, any putative stents are likely to re-occlude within 4-6 months. In addition, Kim likely suffers from morbid obesity (BMI > 40) but this too can be managed with medications, diet, exercise, and/or bariatric day surgery procedures.
Re #1: continued messaging for domestic support / acceptance(?) dominates for now. More fundamental than ambitious. However - near sea activity has at minimum continued - the potential for a critical misstep has risen with this continued distraction - what are the chances?
Does not question 3 to some extent depend on whether there is a faction in the Kim family and the party that is "pro-China"? I assume there is, but I don't know (I also assume that there are other factions).
IF there was something to happen, I suspect the Chinese government would have some involvement with succession. These are the three I hear are under consideration:
His sister and close confidant, Kim Yo Jong
His aunt General Kim Kyong-hui (73) who is sister of the founding leader of NK
the person who posted this weibo, of two candles and then a follow on comment that it basically saying neither the US or China wants this, and Russia is probably the biggest beneficiary, without saying that "this" is, is apparently the niece of former foreign minister Li Zhaoxing. The rumors really are flying
A school in Shenzhen just had an outbreak. We (educators) are all holding out breath (some literally) that there won't be another outbreak in other schools. Domestic divisions are furiously trying to make up lost ground to prep their students for the gaokao. Now that we are back at school, the Matthew effect in widespread online education is clearer. Wealthier, more disciplined students absolutely have made more progress than their less affluent, less attentive classmates. I don't have data on that yet, but maybe after the next college app cycle I will. Be well everyone!
Related to #3, I spent a lot of time in NE China (Heilongjiang, Liaoning, Jilin) and I think some special attention needs to be paid to that region given the confluence of events that is occuring there.
1) Harbin lockdown: Capitol city locked down in addition to several border cities due to COVID 19 returnees from Russia. Word on the ground that I am hearing is that this area is now hosting a second wave outbreak.
2) NK instability: Dongbei region is always preoccupied with NK events. Refugee crisis, nuke tests, and I think there is a COVID 19 concern here as well as no one has ever made a good determination as to the extent of the NK infections. Hell, KJU could have died from COVID for all we know.
3) Economic crisis: Dongbei has been an economic basket case for years now, and propping up failing SOEs to preserve jobs in this region was already a drain on the central government's balance sheet. This is the region where cracks were already showing, what possible hope is there for any improvement under current circumstances and will this be where the "ensures" are tested first?
Regarding succession, KJU's rise to power was held together with duct tape, and it is hardly consolidated. I can't see any smooth transition at this point. China really has a lot of balls in the air and I'm not sure that they are going to get a good outcome out of this situation even if they might have been able to exercise influence during normal times.
My hot take: NE China/Korean peninsula is extremely volatile right now, approaching Fall 2017 levels.
> But in the event that this time they are mostly correct, what would his demise mean for the PRC?
I want to talk about similar topic. Xi is not a young man either. His father also had a rather early decline, despite living till 89.
I think it's certain that Xi has at least some kind of "Plan B" in case he become bedridden, or feel his days being numbered.
The closest person to the state I have says that in recent years Xi has transferred a lion share of his day to day duties to his personal secretaries.
Is there any chance for political continuity in China if something happens to Xi?
We should probably worry far more about the other extreme of #2, what if Trump takes the racism to extreme and wins, and all the inevitable shit that might come after, what if in 2021 there literally is a lynching mob of Chinese and Asian Americans roaming around
The only racism I've seen against Asians is the "elite" universities denying more qualified Asians admission in preference to a racist quota system.
Hello Bill, Thanks for this thread. I would like to raise a couple of Qs to you and our friends here. 1. What is the employment scene in the mainland like, right now? I saw some videos of some factory owners setting their factories on fire due to the dried up orders and lack of working capital. 2. Any informed guesses on how much steel and Aluminium China would produce this FY? We in India are looking at a contradiction of at least 10% in steel production (15% if the shutdown gets extended). Thank you.
Sorry.. contraction not contradiction 😬
On #2, I'd like to think it's not THAT complicated--make clear that who you are talking about is "the Chinese government" as most American obviously don't know what the CCP is, that the Chinese government is entirely separate from "Chinese people" and most specifically Chinese-Americans, and then criticize the Chinese government in the strongest possible terms for its threat to American and allied national security, and to freedom and decency-loving people everywhere, and for all the many horrible actions it's taking of which we all can name myriad (and which political people need to frame very clearly and relatable, specifically stop using "rules-based international order" and be much more specific). And say in no uncertain terms that unlike the Chinese government, America is based on values/principles, not ethnicity, anyone can be an American, and that Chinese-Americans are loyal Americans (while being clear-eyed about the fact that many recent Mainland immigrants are to an extent brainwashed by CCP propaganda and we need to keep a close eye on those doing media influence operations or outright intelligence work especially in high-tech areas and academia, but not going overboard because since they're here, they have an interest in not being outright anti-American--especially since we're so strong in comparison to a place like Australia--their kids will end up being Americanized and it's fine. Still need to do something about WeChat though).
Hi Bill, on #1, I'm sure you're familiar with the work of Michael Pettis, I've always been curious why he is not more widely cited among China hands in general as opposed to just a certain section of macroeconomic people. When judging between experts when they disagree, I think in general what we (people trying to be informed citizens) do is look at what each side says, then look at each's counterarguments, and when you find one side has detailed and reasonable seeming explanations as to why their opponents' arguments are incorrect, and their opponents either regurgitate their original ones or else get mad, you can be pretty sure the first person is correct. Certainly that's been my impression from Pettis. Given that (lengthy, sorry) framing, it would seem that given Xi's core interest is ensuring the absolute political dominance of himself and the 100 or 300 or however many (you would know better than almost any Westerner) families who control China, and that political dominance ultimately flows from ensuring their absolute economic privilege (so they all stay rich and hence loyal) and intoxicating ability to live entirely above the law, any dramatic rebalancing measure is off the table. In other words, any economic policy will fundamentally not solve their problem (far too much unproductive investment as opposed to consumption) because it will not transfer money from the rich and politically powerful government sector to the completely powerless private sector/households, but rather will dance around the problem with "supply side" reforms or lower interest rates or whatever. Do you agree with this general fundamental framing (which I believe is Pettis's)?
2) In general, it’s important to focus on the actions and characteristics of the PRC government, political system, and political leaders which shock the conscience, are harmful to U.S. interests, and interests of PRC citizens themselves, rather than resort to the lazy shorthand “China this, China that.” The PRC’s coronavirus response is a good case study, but (especially given how sick everyone must be of hearing coronavirus news), must be universalized: on the one hand, it provides a nice parallel with how incompetent the current administration’s response has been; on the other, it undermines the narrative that the CCP are hyper-efficient bureaucrats who are running laps around the U.S. paper tiger. Moreover, the point that should really be emphasized is how the CCP’s neurotic impulse for controlling information is actively harmful to U.S. interests and ordinary Chinese people—and that should be part of a broader narrative, of which multiple examples abound, rather than, again, resorting to lazy and childish slogans like “China virus” or “CCP virus.” One problem is, Biden can’t remember that level of detail, nor can he articulate that level of nuance—and his China policy is an incoherent mess. If Biden wanted to avoid charges of xenophobia, he’d be criticizing Trump’s travel and immigration bans, not calling them leaky sieves.
If I were advising the Trump campaign, frankly, I would really lean into the “Communist” part of CCP, and use that to smear the U.S. left writ large. On top of that, Trump could easily characterize Biden’s China policy as incoherent and weak—who voted for MFN status? What was the Obama admin doing while China was building islands in the SCS? What was Obama doing in cyber or intellectual property theft—more ineffectual negotiations? I personally think some of those charges would be a little harsh on Obama-Biden, but its hard for me to see how Biden can win on a China debate.
WRT the question about the importance of not opening up to charges of racist incitement, I post a link to news reporting about an incident that should serve as a cautionary tale, but also as a "how to" primer on the way to respond when someone goes off the rails:
https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/sloan-tam-china-coronavirus-pandemic-1.5542497.
Kathleen Harris, Conservatives blast MP who asked whether top pandemic doctor 'works for China' as Scheer steers clear:Party leader refuses to comment on Derek Sloan's words, says it's up to him to explain them, CBC News, Posted: Apr 23, 2020 2:24 PM ET | Last Updated: 34 minutes ago
In a nutshell, most political actors in Ottawa were swift in their condemnation of the comments from the Conservative Party backbencher, who had accused Theresa Tam, Canada's top unelected public health official, of working for China and the WHO.
I meant to write "not opening oneself up to charges of racist incitement". I probably should have been clear, as well, that the 'onself' in question would be politicians and other public figures.
Does anyone know what Mitt Romney was talking about in yesterday’s WashPost oped where he wrote “A Chinese conglomerate acquired a dominant Indonesian stainless steel company…suddenly, Indonesia has agreed to shut off nickel exports to any of China’s foreign competitors”. Following that story over the years, my understanding is just the opposite: China pioneered nickel pig-iron (NPI) as a new technology to use low-grade Indonesia local ore, Indonesia then forced investment into local value-added processing by banning those ore exports (with several years advance notice), a private Chinese company called Tsingshan invested heavily in a new plant in Indonesia, and then China (along with the US and EU) actually put anti-dumping duties on Tsingshan’s Indonesia new low-cost stainless exports. Meanwhile, Chinese NPI producers are now struggling without Indonesia nickel ore exports.
Indonesia tries to be more than just a resource slave. It wants more added value of raw materials to occur inside Indonesia. That has been valid policy for many years and did not come out of the blue. It does not only apply to nickel and copper.
Chinese stainless steel manufacturer Tsingshan Holdings began a production of stainless steel slabs in Indonesia, exactly in line with what the Indonesian government wants to achieve. These slabs would be exported to Tsingshan's rolling mills in China and rolled to plates, coils and sheets.
Tsingshan's main competitor is state-owned stainless steel behemoth Taiyuan Iron & Steel Co "TISCO", who applied to the PRC government to investigate dumping of foreign stainless steel in China. Naturally PRC government has complied and now China has - among others - also antidumping in place against one of their own, producing abroad.
The "going out" (investing in production abroad) policy of the central government for the Chinese steel industry is still in place, but of course Chinese steel mill look at the a.m. with bewilderment.
I can just point you in a direction. The Indonesian government banned the export of metal concentrates some years ago, with the goal of building up Indonesian industry. The rest, it would appear, follows from your thinking.
3. The reason the Korean peninsula has been relatively stable for so long is that the rough status quo of a divided Korea has always been the preferred choice for all the major actors. For Beijing: keeps the Koreans divided and provides a buffer state between it and the ROK/US military. For Washington: a rationale (and a reliable space that pays for most of the presence!) to keep a large number of troops and military equipment in East Asia. For Pyongyang: a guarantee of regime survival. For Seoul: no need to figure out how to integrate a malnourished, economically backward, and ideologically contaminated North into the South's vibrant economy and society. Everybody wins (with the exception of the poor souls in North Korea prison camps or who are at risk of starvation every year...).
KJU's death will only cause a change if the succeeding faction cannot seize sufficient power to maintain control over the North. Without a stable North, the balance of interests between the actors starts to fall apart and the potential for conflict becomes very real as suddenly everybody's interests are at stake all at once. In that event I would expect to see both Beijing (more openly) and Seoul (less openly) work to shore up the North's stability be it with direct financial and resource aid but even possibly with some forms of military/security assistance.
I agree with most of what you have written, although the US has other places for troops/equipment in the Far East, like Okinawa. The bigger danger is inside North Korea, where there is no "Kim" to be the next dictator, so the risk of a fight for power spilling out of the country would be extreme.
> the risk of a fight for power spilling out of the country would be extreme.
It would not be extreme. It can't be.
NK military will not dare to poke South in its sane mind.
When I think about a fight for power spilling out of North Korea, mostly I think of refugees trying to get out of the way of a factional fight, and the Chinese having to intervene, not anything associated with South Korea or anybody in the West or Japan.
Well, that didn't happen in the last 30 years, even under his father, when soldiers themselves were dying of hunger.
In those days, everyone knew there was a strong hand behind the regime. With no Kim male older than 10, and female family figures in line, I don't believe that in misogynist North Korea, other leading figures will accept a female leader.
There are the sister and underage daughter. But would agree about the danger of power vacuum.
There are few places in the Indo Pacific where the US military can forward base in large numbers and train and exercise for conventional warfare as well as South Korea. Okinawa is relatively small and already quite full with a military presence that is not nearly as welcomed by the locals as on the peninsula.
I agree, but if the South Koreans were willing to try to absorb the North, and I believe they balked at that in the 1990s, then if I were president of the US, it would be one of the trade-offs that I would be willing to make with the Chinese--de-militarize the Korean peninsula in exchange for something in the South China Sea.
China hasn't had a good grip on all things North Korea since XJP came to power. Even after XJP finally decided to recognise KJU's existence, China's access may still be as limited as everybody else's. If there is a problem with KJU, gravely ill, dead or otherwise decapacitated, China may want to use the opportunity to re-gain access and a degree of control in DPRK. For this it would be important not to bet on the wrong horse, if there should be a horse race going on right now. As far as I read, China's MFA has neither confirmed nor denied knowledge of the matter, while everybody else uses terms like "believe", "think", "hope".
Racism is an evil you have to take a clear line on consistently. If you've done that, you can approach a sensitive issue from a position of moral clarity. The CCP would love nothing more than for criticism of it to be taken as racism. I would point out there is a similar issue with Israel and antisemitism. In both cases, the racism is real and it is incumbent upon all decent people to reject it. It is possible that some will take political criticism as a cue for their own racism, causing leftist scolds and nationalist trolls to howl in indignation. You can't help that, and frankly the problem belongs to them, not to the person making honest commentary.
I was actually surprised to learn that Pres. Trump's "China virus" tirade was provoked by PRC lying and not the other way around. It's a bad way to put it precisely because it inflames the racists, but an honest person *might* have said that in response to the PRC. However, because Trump has not established a clear line on racism, it's very difficult for him to show he wasn't deliberately stoking it.
"CCP virus," on the other hand, seems fine. The only thing is I can't tell whether it refers to a pathogen or to a corrupting political organization.
Virus already has a name. I don't see any need to further muddy the geopolitical waters in this way. It also has an origin which has vanishingly little to do with the CCP (which is not to dismiss questions of CCP culpability): https://monthlyreview.org/press/who-should-we-blame-for-coronavirus-rob-wallace-has-some-answers/
Depends what you mean by "origin." Bats have a ton of viruses, but a massive and growing pile of evidence shows the CCP cover-up (and possibly initial negligence and ongoing malicious intent) encouraged the spread of this one. I have no problem with "SARS-CoV-2," except that WHO seems to have given the PRC special deference throughout the process.
https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/did-xi-jinping-deliberately-sicken-the-world/
I prefer Laurie Garrett's interpretation – damning of responses in both US and China, but steering clear of what are, in my view, unsubstantiated claims about China intentionally spreading the virus. Unless you subscribe to such conspiracy theories (I use that term not because they couldn't be true, but because there is no good proof that they are), I'd stick with SARS-CoV-2 as you've used above: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/15/coronavirus-xi-jinping-chinas-incompetence-endangered-the-world/
I have studied Kim’s health for some time, and given his positive family history of sudden cardiac death and stroke, as well as his smoking, his hypothetical risks are high. These can be studied using AstroCharm, a risk calculator developed by NASA and my UTSW colleague Dr Amit Khera. It allows for hypothetical predictions of a fatal/non-fatal cardiac or stroke event in the next 10 yrs. The hypothetical numbers for Kim are high, greater than 30%. It’s possible that Kim had unstable angina, requiring a cardiac cath, and a subsequent stent(s). This is a safe procedure and recovery is expected. If he doesn’t quit smoking, any putative stents are likely to re-occlude within 4-6 months. In addition, Kim likely suffers from morbid obesity (BMI > 40) but this too can be managed with medications, diet, exercise, and/or bariatric day surgery procedures.
Re #1: continued messaging for domestic support / acceptance(?) dominates for now. More fundamental than ambitious. However - near sea activity has at minimum continued - the potential for a critical misstep has risen with this continued distraction - what are the chances?
2. How about criticizing the Communist Party and not the people themselves?
Does not question 3 to some extent depend on whether there is a faction in the Kim family and the party that is "pro-China"? I assume there is, but I don't know (I also assume that there are other factions).
Jake Parkerjust now
IF there was something to happen, I suspect the Chinese government would have some involvement with succession. These are the three I hear are under consideration:
His sister and close confidant, Kim Yo Jong
His aunt General Kim Kyong-hui (73) who is sister of the founding leader of NK
His 10-yr old son
re #3, this is some of what is fueling the rumors:
https://twitter.com/ZichenWanghere/status/1253655783297998848/photo/1
the person who posted this weibo, of two candles and then a follow on comment that it basically saying neither the US or China wants this, and Russia is probably the biggest beneficiary, without saying that "this" is, is apparently the niece of former foreign minister Li Zhaoxing. The rumors really are flying
Another man to watch: Zhang Dejiang . The man has always been rather secretive, despite attending all party conclaves. He resurfaced a week ago.
He is one of the few people in CPC with personal links to NK beyond the "royal family"