On today’s Andrew and Bill begin with President Trump’s executive order authorizing a proposal for a TikTok divestiture from ByteDance. Topics include: Why the proposed deal would be a win for ByteDance, China and the Trump administration, security concerns that haven’t necessarily been addressed, and signals that opposition to the deal across D.C. is likely to be muted. Then: A report that the PRC will seek a shift on U.S. Taiwan policy in the course of trade talks, Secretary Bessent floats potential counter-measures for the U.S., and soybean farmers continue to twist in the wind. At the end: Thoughts on the PRC’s new K Visa program to attract foreign tech talent, dates for the fourth plenum, a very interesting rumor about Xi and a revival of the Central Advisory Commission, reactions to a Jensen Huang podcast appearance last week, and BIS closes a big export control loophole.
we need to promote the idea of being a drongo. a drongo, apart from being Australian slang, is a bird which protects its territory with vigour despite its small size. see my article in the ft 'In the hawk-dove ornithology of China policy, consider the drongo'.
Regarding K visas and barriers: I’m reminded about what I hear about Chinese tech firms in Singapore. Even there, employees are forced to operate in Mandarin more and more. The culture is very Chinese. Firms like ByteDance and SEA have managers or programmers operating from China who don’t always know English. This makes it a difficult environment for some anglophone Singaporeans.
However, as some parts of the below article argues, for some Singaporean and Malaysian of Chinese heritage who are less westernised feel more at home in a more ‘PRC’ environment. For those who didn’t manage to get the western education valorised in Singapore, Chinese firms feel culturally more supportive than sometimes alienating western MNCs like Meta and Google. These people would be good candidate for China’s new K visas.
Great episode guys, thanks. If I could just add to what you said on the Taiwan segment, there are two important dimensions of this issue to understand. The first is that “Taiwan independence” is itself a red herring. What Beijing is really opposed to is Taiwan - call it by its official name, the Republic of China - acting independently. It is not about a future constitutional revision that the people of Taiwan might somehow pull off. The narrative Beijing wants to enlist US help in shaping is that being “opposed to Taiwan independence” means being opposed to Taiwan’s de facto independent status. Once the US starts saying it is opposed to Taiwan independence, the logical next step is for Beijing to insist on the right to assert itself against independent actions conducted by the people of Taiwan, and it will surely want to decide what constitutes an act of independence. The second important dimension to this story is that US policy on Taiwan should under no circumstances be discussed as part of a US-China trade deal. It should be possible for the US to trade something politically for a shift on Taiwan policy, but not commercially. To suggest that Trump should “ask for something bigger than soybeans” in exchange for a shift on Taiwan is to lend credence to the argument that countries can somehow buy or sell their sovereignty. Now, if Trump wanted to trade “opposing Taiwan independence” for Beijing “renouncing the use of force” in efforts to unify with Taiwan, that would have credence.
Thoughtful comment. But after watching the 9+year debacle in the Philippines over the Scarborough shoals, I think the US and China define “force” very differently.
https://www.ft.com/content/5b393842-a726-4be4-9e1d-32c2c94f9b68
on jensen Huang and the label 'China hawk'
we need to promote the idea of being a drongo. a drongo, apart from being Australian slang, is a bird which protects its territory with vigour despite its small size. see my article in the ft 'In the hawk-dove ornithology of China policy, consider the drongo'.
Regarding K visas and barriers: I’m reminded about what I hear about Chinese tech firms in Singapore. Even there, employees are forced to operate in Mandarin more and more. The culture is very Chinese. Firms like ByteDance and SEA have managers or programmers operating from China who don’t always know English. This makes it a difficult environment for some anglophone Singaporeans.
However, as some parts of the below article argues, for some Singaporean and Malaysian of Chinese heritage who are less westernised feel more at home in a more ‘PRC’ environment. For those who didn’t manage to get the western education valorised in Singapore, Chinese firms feel culturally more supportive than sometimes alienating western MNCs like Meta and Google. These people would be good candidate for China’s new K visas.
https://www.academia.sg/academic-views/3-challenges/
Great episode guys, thanks. If I could just add to what you said on the Taiwan segment, there are two important dimensions of this issue to understand. The first is that “Taiwan independence” is itself a red herring. What Beijing is really opposed to is Taiwan - call it by its official name, the Republic of China - acting independently. It is not about a future constitutional revision that the people of Taiwan might somehow pull off. The narrative Beijing wants to enlist US help in shaping is that being “opposed to Taiwan independence” means being opposed to Taiwan’s de facto independent status. Once the US starts saying it is opposed to Taiwan independence, the logical next step is for Beijing to insist on the right to assert itself against independent actions conducted by the people of Taiwan, and it will surely want to decide what constitutes an act of independence. The second important dimension to this story is that US policy on Taiwan should under no circumstances be discussed as part of a US-China trade deal. It should be possible for the US to trade something politically for a shift on Taiwan policy, but not commercially. To suggest that Trump should “ask for something bigger than soybeans” in exchange for a shift on Taiwan is to lend credence to the argument that countries can somehow buy or sell their sovereignty. Now, if Trump wanted to trade “opposing Taiwan independence” for Beijing “renouncing the use of force” in efforts to unify with Taiwan, that would have credence.
Thoughtful comment. But after watching the 9+year debacle in the Philippines over the Scarborough shoals, I think the US and China define “force” very differently.